“THE FOUR FEARS OF EUROPE”
“THE FOUR FEARS OF EUROPE”
Definition: Euroscepticism refers to opposition to European integration, especially European Union (EU) policies and practices.
Key Dimensions:
Economic concerns (redistribution, welfare states)
Cultural concerns (immigration, national identity)
Political concerns (sovereignty, EU governance)
"Citizens on the far left and the far right oppose the European Union."
This is the famous horseshoe idea: the notion that the far left and the far right bend toward each other and end up looking surprisingly similar.
The study shows instead that there are two Euroscepticisms distinct, contradictory, and rooted in very different worldviews. Understanding this distinction is crucial if we want to grasp the real dynamics of European politics today, and avoid the oversimplifications.
In recent years, Euroscepticism has evolved from a fringe sentiment into a major political force across Europe. It’s often explained through economics: the divide between the winners and losers of globalization, or the so-called left-behinds. But a recent study (K. Abts and S. Baute; 2022; Social resentment, blame attribution and Euroscepticism: the role of status insecurity, relative deprivation and powerlessness) suggests that something far deeper, and far more emotional, is driving the trend.
At the heart of growing anti-EU sentiment lies a complex feeling the authors call social resentment. It isn’t a single emotion, but a mix of three powerful psychological components:
status insecurity, the fear that one’s social position is fragile;
relative deprivation, the sense that one’s group is falling behind while others unfairly move ahead;
powerlessness, the feeling of having no control over political or economic forces.
According to the study, not all of these elements carry the same weight. The strongest drivers of Euroscepticism are relative deprivation and powerlessness. These feelings fuel what researchers describe as blame politics: a tendency to seek culprits for perceived decline.
Blame can move upward, toward distant elites, or downward, toward immigrants and minorities viewed as “undeserving.”
Within this emotional landscape, the EU becomes an ideal target: a symbol of technocratic elites on one side and open-border policies on the other. Surprisingly, the study finds that personal status insecurity does not directly translate into anti-EU attitudes, challenging the assumption that Euroscepticism is mainly about individual economic anxiety.
The study's central conclusion is that social resentment is a significant driver of Euroscepticism, but its effects are indirect. Resentment is channeled through two primary forms of blame attribution: cultural blame, directed "downwards" at immigrants, and political blame, directed "upwards" at the establishment. The European Union ultimately becomes a superordinate scapegoat onto which these frustrations are projected.
These diagrams represent two Structural Equation Models (SEM). SEM is a statistical approach used to analyse complex relationships between variables, especially when some variables act as mediators between others.
Both diagrams share the same structure:
b) Mediating psychological or attitudinal variables (middle section),
The diagrams therefore show chains of influence rather than simple direct relationships. Nevertheless, social resentment affects Euroscepticism directly, without going through the vulnerability mediators. ( Table 2 )
Finally, the study provides a detailed and nuanced understanding of the psychological and social roots of mass Euroscepticism: its findings confirm that opposition to the EU is not merely a reaction to economic hardship but is driven by deeper feelings of group-based injustice and a profound loss of personal agency.
Euroscepticism is an Expression of Broader Discontent: Anti-EU sentiment is rooted in the impression that one's group is losing its status and hegemony and that life is determined by uncontrollable external forces. It is the feeling of being "left behind" rather than a fear of personal economic decline that matters most.
Blame is the Critical Mechanism: Social resentment does not automatically lead to Euroscepticism. It must first be channeled through a "politics of resentment" that directs blame "downwards" toward immigrants and "upwards" toward the political establishment. The EU becomes the embodiment of this out-of-touch, cosmopolitan elite that is perceived to favor outsiders over the "native" population.
Unraveling Resentment is Key: By disaggregating resentment into distinct components, the study shows that group-based grievances are more potent than individual anxieties in mobilizing political opposition. This highlights the importance of intergroup relations and perceived fairness in shaping attitudes toward supranational projects.
Implications for European Legitimacy: The findings suggest that the democratic legitimacy of the European project is threatened by social frustrations that political actors can mobilize through frames related to cultural identity, political sovereignty, and welfare chauvinism. Addressing Euroscepticism requires understanding and engaging with these underlying feelings of powerlessness and perceived group injustice.
Is Euroscepticism a Democratic Corrective or a Democratic Threat?
Euroscepticism as a Democratic Corrective
In this view, Euroscepticism is healthy because it forces the EU to listen to citizens.
A. It gives voice to people who feel ignored
Many Europeans felt hurt by:
the Eurozone crisis (Greece, Spain, Portugal)
austerity policies (budget cuts)
unemployment
inequality
Euroscepticism expresses their anger and demands change.
B. It pushes the EU to improve
When people criticize the EU, it encourages reforms such as:
more transparency
better democratic participation
more fairness in economic policy
C. It exposes real problems
For example: People feel the EU is too distant
People want national voices to be heard
Some want more social protection
So in this view, Euroscepticism strengthens democracy by forcing the EU to respond to citizens’ concerns.
Euroscepticism as a Democratic Threat
In this view, Euroscepticism is dangerous because it can weaken democracy and break Europe apart.
A. It reduces trust in democratic institutions
Populist Eurosceptic leaders often say:
“The EU is not democratic.”
“Brussels controls us.”
“National elites betray us.”
This creates fear, anger, and political distrust.
B. It increases nationalism and division
Strong Euroscepticism has grown in: Italy , France , Poland , Hungary
These movements often focus on:immigration fears
identity protection
“take back control” messages............... This can divide Europe.
C. It weakens the EU’s ability to act
countries stop trusting the EU, it becomes harder to solve: migration
climate change
war (e.g., Russia-Ukraine)
economic crisis
Brexit is the best example:
It caused division, economic problems, and political instability. So in this view, Euroscepticism threatens Europe’s unity and democratic stability.
A Balanced View: It Can Be Both
Euroscepticism is both a democratic corrective and a democratic threat.
It is a democratic corrective when it highlights real problems and pushes the EU to improve.
It is a democratic threat when it fuels nationalism, division, distrust, and attempts to dismantle the EU.
The EU’s challenge is to listen to criticism while preventing extremism and fragmentation.
What This Means for the Debate on Euroscepticism
Data supports the “democratic corrective” view: since many support the EU but still want reforms, Euroscepticism can be a valid tool to press for improvements But it doesn’t eliminate the “democratic threat” possibility: Eurobarometer doesn’t rule out exit-oriented skepticism in some member states — especially where local problems (economy, migration, national identity) are acute.
The real challenge is differentiating types and intensities of Euroscepticism — not just whether people “support the EU” or not
Comparison of Centre-Right (CR) and Radical Right (RR) Euroscepticism.
Based on manifestos from Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
RR = Hard, systemic critique of the EU.
CR = Soft, reform-oriented, pragmatic criticism.
RR parties dedicate far more manifesto space to Euroscepticism.
68% of all claims are unique to a single party.
Only 4% of claims are shared between CR and RR.
CR and RR clearly speak different "languages" in their critiques.
Specific claims show minimal overlap, but topics show higher overlap.
CR parties address issues politicized by RR (e.g., bureaucracy, borders).
CR avoids radical rhetoric while engaging voters' concerns.
CR competes by adopting topics, not RR arguments.
Brexit emerged after the UK’s 2016 referendum, but as the article shows, it mainly reinforced the longstanding Euroscepticism already rooted in British party politics, especially within the Conservative Party and UKIP.
Previously, known for Euroscepticism, Ireland showed the clearest shift in party rhetoric. Instead of increasing Euroscepticism, Brexit produced a strong pro-EU backlash, driven by fears of economic disruption and the political risks surrounding the Irish border. As a result, several Irish parties reduced their Eurosceptic framing after 2016, strengthening support for EU membership rather than weakening it.
DEBATE QUESTIONS
Q-1 Can Euroscepticism be a healthy part of democratic discourse, or does it undermine the EU's ability to address collective European challenges? "
Q-2 Is the EU itself contributing to Euroscepticism? Is the EU part of the solution or part of the problem?
Q-3 To what extent do Eurosceptic represent the legitimate grievances of citizens, and to what extent parties are they fuelling populism and division within European democracies ?
Q-4 To what extent crises (migration, eurozone, Covid, Ukraine) are contributing to Euroscepticism?
Q-5 How should the EU respond to Euroscepticism—by reforming itself to better meet citizens' concerns, or by doubling down on its current trajectory?