In early 2025, a sweeping policy reversal led to the abrupt cessation of USG assistance globally. When USAID stop work orders and other USG agency funding cuts were announced, war-torn Ukraine and Serbia with its mass student protests had contrasting democratic trajectories, but both were heavily reliant on foreign support for democratization, good governance and rule of law. The U.S. particularly has been a key donor and democracy policy influencer in both Serbia and Ukraine for decades. It provided significant foreign aid funding through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State (DOS), the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) (some of these funding managed by implementing partner organizations), as well as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and US Embassies. Washington’s sharp turn to stop all foreign aid disbursements put in turmoil those who relied on USG support to protect rights, push for critical reforms and demand government transparency and accountability.
The US’s overnight axing of its key development agency and overhaul of its democracy policy prompted many to assess the democracy support landscape. Assessments completed to date have typically covered three broad categories of scrutiny. Some have looked at the sheer numbers suddenly withdrawn from geographical or sectoral development coffers and demonstrate devastating immediate policy impacts. A second approach has been rapid-fire assessments, typically through self-appraisal, of the financial standing and institutional capacities of NGOs, providing then consequent organizational and chiefly fundraising recommendations. A third approach has been to focus on the broader geopolitical ramifications, while other authors offered their visions for the future of US and EU democracy assistance.
Our study complements these approaches; it focuses on democratic development repercussions both from development aid provider and recipient perspectives. We are interested in learning from NGOs’ coping responses and adaptations to crises to inform a vision of what the new, post-USG democracy assistance world could look like. While recognizing that civil society is a broad set of actors, we chose to zoom in on the subset of watchdog and advocacy organizations operating in Serbia and Ukraine because they are ‘front-line’ democracy advocates. They are a barometer of the health of the broader sector: highly visible and engaged with donors and governments with access to and knowledge of grassroots actors. We studied these two countries because both share EU membership aspirations while dealing with their own set of challenges to democracy and are at least telling examples to other countries in Europe’s vicinity. Furthermore, the traits they share of heavy dependence on external aid and hence external support for democratic aspirations have global relevance.
Examining both organizational and policy impacts, we conducted twenty-nine in-depth key informant interviews with organizations that are historically champions of their countries’ democratic reform course; thirteen in Serbia and sixteen in Ukraine from June through August 2025. Please see the Annex for more details on methodology and limitations.
We have collated our findings and conclusions along with our recommendations in the subsequent sections. The findings section first examines the levels of exposure and impacts NGOs in both countries experienced. The second part of the findings section describes the policy aftershocks this meant to their work. The policy recommendations section brings together our and interviewees’ recommendations on how to move forward to promote and preserve democratic societies.
Our key assumption is that despite the decision of the current US administration, there is still genuine interest in and support for global democracy assistance. In concluding our brief, we propose research areas that can further inform policy discourses among democracy actors and the broader development community. We hope the discussions among donors, thinkers and policy makers provoked by the current paper results in more agile strategies to support democracies under the emerging new order.
This section presents key findings about the effects of USG funding withdrawal and the reversal of its democracy support policy on missions of advocacy and watchdog NGOs in Serbia and Ukraine and on democratic trajectories of both countries. The first section analyzes operational and programmatic effects of funding cuts to NGOs. The second section analyzes the policy shift impacts on NGOs’ abilities to push for democratic reforms and the larger ramifications for democracy programming in their countries.
Operational and Programming Impacts
Key Takeaways
❖ USG funding cuts had deep and broad effects resulting in the loss of staff, downsizing or widespread discontinuation of watchdogging and advocacy activities.
❖ Few have clear funding plans or options beyond early 2026 due to lack of strategic planning, hunger games fundraising context and inadequate non-USG donor response.
The findings need to be interpreted against the framework of the sample interviewed, which largely consisted of long-standing NGOs with rich track records of domestic democratic achievements and engagement with external funders. The vast majority (72%) of the organizations interviewed were established in the first two decades of the century, although nearly a quarter of them were active already since the 1990s. Generally, organizations in Ukraine are five years younger on average than their counterparts in Serbia, reflecting a more recent expansion of civic activism and watchdogging in the country.
NGOs in both countries managed sizable annual budgets (roughly $1.45mln) on average, however with significant differences. The lowest annual revenue in Serbia was reported at about $180,000 and in Ukraine at $250,000, while the highest annual budget in Ukraine reached $4.5mln and the highest in Serbia exceeded $5.3mln.
On average, 52% of NGOs’ annual budgets in Ukraine came from USG sources (primarily from USAID), a significantly higher exposure compared to 28% in Serbia. The most ‘USG-dependent’ interviewed NGO from Ukraine had 80% of their budget covered by USG funders, while the largest USG share in a single NGO in Serbia was well below 60%.
Regardless of their reliance on USG funding, all NGOs interviewed were significantly impacted by the cuts, including those few groups who had their USG cashflows resume.
Staff Reductions: Most Valuable Asset is the Key Cost-saving Solution
Two thirds of NGOs interviewed were forced to implement staff reductions, ranging from 20% to 30% in Serbia and from 20% to 50% of staff in Ukraine thus challenging their specialized and functional capacities to pursue pro-democracy missions. The severity of staff reductions was stronger for those NGOs where USG funding was over 50% of revenue, where the NGOs had both project and institutional funding. Regardless of the share of USG funding in NGOs’ overall budgets, USG donors were covering a larger proportion of NGOs’ operational costs than other donors.
Those organizations that avoided immediate staff layoffs were not as dependent on USG funding and had funding from non-USG donors (particularly the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)) who allowed budget reallocations or issued additional emergency funds. Other coping mechanisms included temporary salary reductions and transition of staff from social benefits-heavy employment agreements to consultancy contracts. In a few cases, NGO teams demonstrated commitment and worked without pay for weeks at a time.
A common narrative from the interviews suggested that organizational teams were the most important asset of pro-democracy NGOs. At the same time, staff cuts or salary reductions were virtually the only reported cost-saving solution applied by democracy advocates. Where layoffs were unavoidable, personnel that was let go included functional staff, such as communications, analytical and grants management teams. Whether or not such a strategy has left democracy advocates with capacities to pursue their missions and deliver results beyond representational, fundraising and reporting functions remains a question.
NGOs’ Programming Took a Hit, but the Commitment is Still There
None of the NGOs who received USG funding in 2024 closed shop, but their capacity to implement democracy programming has been challenged. The impact on programming has been severe where large direct USAID awards or project-based sub-awards from USAID-funded implementers were cancelled.
Many NGOs expressed strong commitments to implement their core advocacy work, “No matter what,” but the reality was that the overnight disappearance of these types of funding resulted in full discontinuation or significant downsizing of some of the flagship oversight and advocacy activities in both countries. Examples of major, long-standing activities affected include regular monitoring reports of human rights violations or parliamentary deliberations, monitoring of media quality and disinformation, reporting on transparency of party finance and on public procurement, functioning of advisory bodies to support rule of law and judiciary reforms, operation of legal aid networks and others.
Democracy advocates in both countries also reported a “tsunami effect” from the discontinuation or halting of USG-funded regranting programs to grassroots NGOs and local media outlets. The latter were often heavily dependent on USAID funding from localized regranting mechanisms pioneered by the Agency. They are now forced to compete for resources with better-positioned and well-connected national NGOs or risk disappearing.
Some Flexibility but Overall Lackluster Non-USG Donor Response
The reported cases of donor flexibility and funders’ apparent intention to fill the gaps has played an important factor in the NGOs’ short-term abilities to function. While elusive hope for the filling of the post USAID-gap was very much present, interviewees believed that non-USG donors’ current responses were largely insufficient to remedy the losses, particularly noting other bilateral donors’ own cuts in democracy programming due to domestic and security policy issues. Interview data also indicates that non-USG donors responded to the situation reactively, had little coordination, and were ill-prepared for the USG departure vacuum.
Fundraising Frenzy Turning into Hunger Games
The most popular priority response to address operational and programming challenges was to actively fundraise from non-USG donors, resulting in a fundraising frenzy. “We submitted over 20 proposals since January,” noted one of the interviewees. In Serbia, the external donor funding trajectory had been downward for some years already, and almost all NGOs interviewed mentioned the same EU calls for proposals. Ukraine had a more diverse availability of non-USG funds, but the USG exit has made fundraising efforts in both countries extremely competitive. One interviewee noted that, “The pool got much smaller, but there are the same number of fish in it;” others mentioned that the number of applications received by donors nearly quadrupled.
NGOs in both countries confirmed that there were no viable alternatives to fundraising from traditional democracy donors; only a handful had the ability to generate some revenue from business or constituencies. In Serbia, pro-democracy NGOs were unlikely to get much support from the private sector in the current political and economic climate. In Ukraine, domestic donations have been on the rise in the past three years, but more for the effort to resist Russia’s war and humanitarian support than for civic oversight or policy advocacy.
The increased competition for external funding is described as escalating the ‘hunger games’ and splintering the pre-existing sense of solidarity and shared purpose that united the NGO sector. Grass-roots groups who were earlier eligible for localized regranting schemes now compete with their more well-established national-level peers. Domestic NGOs, particularly among think tanks and independent media support groups, must increasingly compete with international intermediary actors who are localizing their operations and applying for the same funds.
Currently Treading Water but not for Long
Pro-democracy advocates in Serbia and Ukraine have survived the initial blow from the complete withdrawal or disruption of USG funding. Now they are under extreme pressure to prioritize survival into 2026 in the circumstances of reduced staff, increased competition, emerging divide among civic advocates and lack of effective alternatives to project-based funding from traditional donors. Emergency and bridging funds and flexibility of some donors were instrumental for ensuring immediate survival of NGOs and the ‘relative stability’ that they feel until the end of 2025, but few have a plan for 2026 or can bridge more than six months of funding shortage.
Strategic Response Sidelined
A key theme coming from the NGOs’ discussion of their experience these past nine months is that organizations’ responses to operational and programming impacts overwhelmingly lacked strategic adaptation. There were rapid coping reactions to secure breathing space in the short to mid-term, but none of the NGOs chose to invest resources in strategic reflection and review because they prioritized emergency fundraising, lacked budgets for strategic planning or were happy with pre-existing strategies.
Some of the NGOs who were receiving institutional funding from USAID on their “journey to self-reliance” were better positioned to reshuffle their organizational budgets because of the strategic autonomy they had under those funding frameworks. At the same time, the NGOs who directly implemented large USAID grants found themselves as “slaves in the golden cage” being totally dependent not just on the funding, but also on the attached strategic frameworks. Regardless, nine months into the post-USAID reality, interviewees prioritized rapid-response reactions to more strategic adaptations. This has jeopardized the ability of democracy advocates in Serbia and Ukraine not only to survive, but to strategically focus on how to best carry out their pro-democracy missions.
Policy Level Impacts
Key Takeaways
❖ The USG’s abandonment of its earlier democracy assistance policy has left frontline NGOs’ efforts to push for reforms or hold the government accountable without much-needed external political backing.
❖ Both governments have become freer to act with unchecked power with marked democratic backsliding and constricted space of operation for the advocacy and watchdog NGOs.
The findings below highlight how the impacts of USG democracy policy change vary between Ukraine and Serbia due to each’s political context and where both felt similar fallout effects.
Serbia: Government Gloves are off Against Democracy Advocates
In Serbia the USG policy stance before January 2025 was already described by advocates as ‘democracy lite’ or ‘soft’ on the government due to competing geopolitical interests and the reality of trying to do government-to-government programming in key reform sectors. Still the US engagement was seen as useful for keeping the government somewhat in check from its threats and attacks on civil society and independent media.
After January 2025, this safeguard changed dramatically with advocates directly linking the words of the US president describing USAID as a criminal organization to the February armed raid of five leading NGOs receiving USAID funds. Several organizations who experienced the raid firsthand – one with 18 weapons pointed at them for up to 28 hours as they went through 8,000 documents – reported that the harassment was less traumatic than the sense of dread for ‘what next’ which pervaded the attacked organizations as well as similar NGOs. Hence in addition to dealing with financial survival, organizations had to deal with physical survival due to a stepped-up sector-wide smear campaign through government-controlled media.
Not only had the US government statements triggered the crackdown, but its subsequent silence also allowed it to continue. Advocates' sense of betrayal is deep; during the harshest times, no one from the US Embassy even called them to see how they were doing. As one recounted, we were left, “chasing our tail,” for most of February due to the funding cuts and then we had this raid and lack of clarity about what would happen.
Others noted that generating a sense of abandonment was the calculated effect, to keep the sector panicked and divided. Some NGO representatives go as far as wondering if the US current policies in Serbia exhibited outright malevolent transactional behavior. In this sense of helplessness, Serbian advocates assume that the ‘Foreign Agents’ legislation that was proposed in the fall of 2024 will be activated at some point. They also assume that there will be further demonization of foreign funding support and curtailing of operational space; several NGOs have already begun planning to set up shop outside of the country.
Ukraine: Deafening USG Silence Emboldened Anti-reform Actors and Undermined Democracy Advocates
In Ukraine, the US had a huge democracy assistance portfolio focusing on keeping the reform process going towards more democratic standards and EU accession (while of course helping to stop Russia’s aggression). Advocates saw US engagement as a working instrument to monitor the government and keep it in check. That USG policy stance didn’t reverse; it just stopped, mostly cold turkey. And with the stopping of pro-democracy policy efforts, democracy advocates are crystal clear in their linking of US policy stoppage to reform reversals across most sectors. As one described, “Reform rollback is a direct result of USG policy change.”
Since January 2025, anti-reform actors in Ukraine have become emboldened since the previous ‘sandwich’ pressure from the USG and civil society in Ukraine was gone. This diminished access and ability to advocate for key reform areas, and it allowed democratic backsliding. As one interviewee noted, “We were one of the biggest watchdogs with the ministry of interior, justice etc. With the cut in funds, we lost this opportunity to monitor, which is not a good ground for evolution of democracy in Ukraine.” The signs of democratic erosion included among others the continued political pressure on independent media outlets, persecution of a prominent anti-corruption activist and adoption of legislation to revoke independence of key anti-corruption institutions that triggered the ‘cardboard revolution’. NGOs from Ukraine were seriously concerned about physical safety of their staff for the first time since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war and were updating internal security protocols in case authorities decided to “visit” their office.
The EU is not (yet) a New Democracy Champion
Democracy advocates in both countries point to the vast void in international actors now demanding international democratic standards. Any assumption that the EU as a policy actor or other Western actors would replace the USG positions has not been borne out.
The EU accession process in both countries is the declarative framework for advocating and engaging on democratic reforms. Yet the EU as a policy actor per se is seen as underperforming in both countries. Advocates point to professional and personal networks that have allowed them to continue to have some level of influence into policy processes; however, the missing external backing is becoming painfully clear.
In Ukraine, the EU is generally viewed as too silent and acquiescent to a government that has been marked in its efforts to weaken checks on its power. The EU stance has recently shifted somewhat with callouts on government efforts to undermine anti-corruption institutions, but the general sense is that the EU is focused more on being a partner to the government than a partner to the reform process and its proponents.
In Serbia, the EU has put significant pressure on NGOs to engage with the government even after the sector’s decision to boycott engagement in February 2025 through the formal national consultative mechanism. Furthermore, NGOs in Serbia are increasingly disappointed with what they see as the transactional stances of the EU and its member states where they demand performative progress from the government of Serbia without any real reform changes.
Democracy is Out. Realpolitik is in.
Advocates point to the difficulties of thinking and maneuvering in a new world order where the previous anchors of democratic standards are expressing and exhibiting anti-democratic values and practices. Advocates see the whole international understanding of what is democratic and acceptable as shifting. As one advocate explained, “Things that were unimaginable in the past are becoming a norm – with the rhetoric – If the US, France can do it, we can do it too.”
The effective legitimization of authoritarian practices and leaders is understood as giving more space to leaders to govern unchecked. In Serbia’s case, this means that the government doesn’t even have to pretend to uphold the rule of law, maintain the separation of powers or play by democratic norms. In Ukraine’s case this means that government voices trying to say that corruption is not a big deal and its efforts to silence critical voices will be met with tepid slaps on the wrist.
Soft power and longer-term idealism are giving way to hard power and short-term realpolitik, thus opening the pro-democracy space to be manipulated and further maligned. This bodes ill for both the democratic and European prospects of Ukraine and Serbia as well as for front-line NGOs trying to push for and maintain democratic standards and trajectories.
The findings document the impacts of USG funding withdrawal on the abilities of watchdog and advocacy organizations to function and carry out their democracy focused efforts in Serbia and Ukraine. Beyond this, they highlight the fragility of the global democracy ecosystem that until now was dominated by USG funding.
This system has created a situation where many leading watchdog and advocacy organizations were supported from their inception allowing them to become full-grown institutions with recognizable brands and achievements to push democracy agendas, yet dependent on external funding where core or institutional support was mostly given by USG sources. In that top-heavy assistance framework intermediary implementers have blurred the added value, and NGOs’ strategies were heavily affected by USG funding priorities. Decades of discussing ways to improve this system have not resulted in any considerable progress.
While the recent EC’s proposal to double funding for civil society in the EU's long-term 2028-2034 budget holds some promise, the wider funding ecosystem is sobering. With the parallel blows of USG funding gone and European as well as overall OECD countries’ significant cuts there is little choice but to revisit fundamental tenets of democracy assistance and its delivery models and to finally recognize and address serious deficiencies in the system.
The findings on policy impact are even more concerning, as they suggest increased vulnerability of the already exposed watchdog and advocacy groups and of their democracy agendas. These large and visible organizations by design play the role of a ‘thorn in the side’ vis-à-vis their governments. Now without the USG political backstop, they are more vulnerable, their space is more confined, and their ability to influence domestic trajectories is more limited. The push-pull support and pressure points that USG previously undertook sometimes in coordination with other EU and bilateral partners (and sometimes not), however imperfectly, are not easy to replace.
Hence, while the findings are clear, the way forward is not. But because the observed consequences of USG funding cuts are rooted in vulnerabilities of the global democracy assistance system, experience of NGOs in Serbia and Ukraine can be relevant beyond the Eastern European region in preparing for the future.
To begin the likely long way forward, we recommend first steps to address the immediate gap and to begin to grapple with the larger democracy support ecosystem and the ‘what next’ question. Our recommendations reflect feedback given by interviewees combined with our own experience and analysis of the situation.
Most of the steps recommended here should not require additional resources. More challenging will be marshalling the will to take the actions with confidence, including making hard choices as both democracy advocates and supporters to better recognize the reality and what it brings beyond the here and now.
We intentionally frame these recommendations as a ‘we all should consider’ to underline a shared responsibility of domestic democracy advocates, donors, development policy makers and implementers, and provoke a debate amongst them as equal partners. Where our advice is directed at a particular set of stakeholders – we make it clear. We also frame these recommendations as three sets of steps: I) time to stop to set new bearings; II) time to reorder and reinforce the fundamentals; and III) time to (begin) recalibrate our instruments and approaches to address decades-long dilemmas in the democracy development sector.
Stop to Prepare for the Next Horizon
Sit back and breathe out: Take the time to clear our minds.
We argue that we should all do the reality check, regroup, pause and reflect, strategize, future cast, scenario plan. Pick any name to your liking for an intentional process of thinking things through and make it a priority among thousands of other seemingly urgent and important tasks. We offer this advice for all actors in this process from those designing and strategizing support to counterparts on the ground. This advice seems obvious, but our experience suggests that it is too often easier said than done. Indeed, our interview respondents overwhelmingly reported that they had no time or funding to have a proper thinking exercise amidst all the turmoil.
Keep a clear eye on the mission: Define appropriate means to achieve it.
The advocates we interviewed were passionate about their missions and often described priorities generically, optimistically and – understandably – in line with activities they have been implementing under existing donor-funded projects. However, this might not be the programming that is most needed or most strategic. Prioritizing quality and addressing local demand over quantitative growth, it would really help reality – and local needs-based decision making – if democracy actors took time to crystallize a few key work areas that are most relevant to the needs of constituencies and societies and the corresponding resource frameworks.
Most NGOs recognized that strategizing about a longer-term future was of critical importance. We argue that now, when the effects of the first shockwaves are seemingly over and when virtually all NGOs have secured some levels of funding to ensure ‘relative stability’ in the short term, early adaptations should give way to mid-and longer-term strategizing. Local democracy advocates should prioritize their existing resources on thinking through the exact things under their mission that they really want to do in current contexts and how much they need to be able to do that. Identifying what human capital is strategically needed to accomplish those priorities is particularly important in light of the recent layoffs of NGOs’ technical and functional staff.
Learn from recent crises: Imagine the worst and plan contingencies.
As one of those interviewed said, “Only now people are understanding that what happened to USAID can happen to non-USG donors as well and are starting to think in the direction of ‘what if?’’ The lessons of this year suggest that it seems timely for us all as democracy advocates and supporters to imagine possible ‘black swans’ and their consequences not just for the survival of organizations but also for the democratic legacy. At the time of the interviews, very few respondents seemed to be imagining scenarios about what would happen to democratic initiatives they supported if they had to discontinue their work. We argue that even basic discussion of a possible set of contingency planning could help minimize the damage if democracy support space is (further) constricted. In parallel, constricting political trends observed in Serbia and Ukraine should stimulate external policy makers to put in place or strengthen contingency plans and rapid response mechanisms to provide comprehensive emergency support to democracy advocates if such need arises.
Be our own best friend: Preserve unwavering funding and policy coherence.
Short-term diplomatic goals should not undermine long-term investment in societies where funding is only part of the relationship: policy stance and diplomatic presence are integral ingredients for ensuring a “return” on that investment. Donors need to ensure that their respective policy advocacy efforts and those of their governments (if bilateral) are coherent, focused on shared objectives and supported by funding priorities. When there is pushback, there needs to be clear and consistent stick-level policy reactions.
Go Back to the Basics
Return to constituencies: Rediscover and gauge the needs of underserved communities.
The scarcity of traditional resources should inevitably lead democratic activism to go back to its roots and rely on its bases. Front-line activists must specify, identify, reach out to and engage their constituencies and communities. Donors cannot be key clients, often because they will not be around but also because they shouldn’t be. Some organizations indicated they are already on this path; others can follow suit by building on the power of engaging with their underserved constituencies.
Bolster civic values: Expand civic education across audiences.
Along with finding their genuine audience, activist groups will also need to readjust their programming to the needs of those individuals. Here activists in both countries echoed the value and need to turbocharge civic education efforts for various groups of people. This dovetails the current renaissance of civic education across the globe in response to political populism, polarization, radicalization, and violence.
Serbia’s students since November 2024 and Ukraine’s “cardboard activists” from the past months are a testament that civic education pays dividends. They are a lesson to both NGOs and their funders that democratic practices are lived experiences that bring to life abstract rights and democratic institutions. Students and activists stepping up for checks and balances of institutions, the rule of law, and transparency and accountability are a reminder to democracy advocates of the long-haul effect of civic education entrenching citizen responsibilities in mindsets and every-day behaviors.
Capitalize on organic partnerships: Assess traditional and build new alliances.
The demonstrations in both countries are also a powerful reminder that partnerships, coalitions, and broad-based engagement are essential for success. In both Serbia and Ukraine, creation of coalitions was viewed as an effective approach to fundraising. Partnerships that are built on naturally developed relationships with joint policy advocacy agendas help achieve collective impact, swiftly build on emerging opportunities and safeguard from unanticipated threats and malign influences.
Democratic actors are found among all social strata and their civic formations, be they academic, faith or community-based, built on professional ties or individual interests. They come from all walks of life, even those serving in government. It is critically important for supporters of such democratic expression of opinions to keep a healthy distance, to preserve their authenticity, preempt criticism of external interference or influence, and to allow genuine home-grown democratic behaviors to flourish. In return, as we learned in some of the interviews, organic partnerships based on trust and credibility can even yield local private sector financial engagement.
Embrace technology: Make the giant leap to be an early adopter.
To ensure tactics can support efforts, we as democracy advocates and supporters should consider more intentionally engaging with new technologies to be fit for purpose and to be proactive in their programming efforts. First the pandemic, then the new threats of hybrid warfare revealed the major gap in digital literacy, digital hygiene, and digital security of activists and their backers. Hence being able to fend off ongoing risks is a clear and present challenge that needs to be addressed more comprehensively by all.
Beyond this, there are very few examples of democracy’s proponents being ahead of the curve to use data proactively by applying large language models, artificial intelligence, and other forms of computerization in democracy programming. In the past decades political science generated the largest set of data and knowledge about democratic and other forms of governance; human rights activists hold vast archives about human rights abuses; election watchdogs, and anti-corruption activists have the most evidence about electoral fraud, and corrupt government practices. Hence democracy advocates and their supporters could be best placed to utilize this data in enhanced ways if they take a technology leap. Finally, stronger reliance on technology could help increase organizations’ efficiency and cope with the loss of at least some of the staff.
Begin to Reformulate the Support Model
Check the math: Recalculate ‘the gap’ to focus on funding what really matters
Many discussions focus on how to approach the post-USG funding gap. We have heard during the interviews and read from peers about the need to almost mechanically replace past USAID funding with funding from alternative sources.
We offer a different challenge. Instead of the potentially misleading formula to calculate ‘the gap’ (i.e., past amount of USAID dollars minus current amount of USAID dollars), we offer a new formula:
Funding_Currently_Available – Funding_Needed_for_what_Really_Matters = Actual Funding Gap
In addition to having a much clearer understanding of what is really needed for democracy work, the application of the new formula requires the recognition that the previous USG funding, in addition to its undoubted legacy, was often vulnerable to chronic challenges owned and shared by the donor, implementers and local NGOs.
Those challenges included volumes (the too much money kills and the golden cage dilemmas); models of delivery design (project vs institutional support); spending incentives (the burn rate approach to spend more in order to get more); and its heavy use to pay for artificially created layers of external services that were neither necessary nor financially reasonable combined with general lack of actual coordination within and outside of the USAID funding ecosystem. The list can go on with the persistence of myths about the sugar daddy funding options through private funding or own income generation for democracy advocacy NGOs.
All these past challenges need to be honestly revisited and considered to understand the real financial scope of the problem for democracy advocates. It may very well be that the actual democracy funding gap turns out to be less scary than the funding gap for democracy organizations and recent programming, which primarily seems to be the lens of the current debate.
Walk the talk of agility: Institutionalize the much-praised flexibility and responsiveness.
As an immediate subsequent step, advocates and donors could work together to figure out how the already signed grant agreements could be reshaped under existing rules and regulations to accommodate the emergent programmatic priorities and corresponding budget implications. It may also be high time for the donor community to adopt rules and regulations to allow project-based funding to be significantly more responsive to locally owned priorities and actual funding needs. In fact, many respondents highlighted the value of some donors’ flexibility allowing them to stay afloat, so there is no reason for not imagining formalizing that flexibility in a more sustainable way.
Trust in local wisdom: Align democracy support policies with homegrown objectives.
Advancement of democracy should be a shared responsibility where its objectives are homegrown and realistic and where donor agendas, whether in the EU reforms framework or other democracy issues, are identified, owned and led by domestic voices. Too often we heard during the interviews that donor-funded priorities and performance indicators were detached from reality on the ground. While the current set of prepackaged support frameworks generally cover the evident needs, these and other more targeted support mechanisms should resonate more with the genuine demands of advocates and how they imagine the trajectory/set of prioritized issues in their countries. For example, there is an obvious need for engagement with governments, but there are limits to this collaboration. Formal consultations strive to show NGO numbers but do not wish to sincerely listen to civil society voices. This should be recognized for what it is, and real engagement and consultation needs to be prioritized.
Lean into the value-add: Appreciate that democracy support is a two-way partnership.
Citing key donor support pathologies, most democracy advocates called on the donors and policy makers to finally address the dilemmas that have kept democracy advocates secondary partners to international middlemen. While it can be argued that regional regranters and technical assistance providers can be indispensable in ensuring localization, flexibility and agility of support, often intermediaries stand between donor governments and local democracy advocates competing both for funding and policy solutions. These groups are crucial in bolstering the democracy movement especially when they are part and parcel of local partnerships. They should be of genuine service to local organizations including by mobilizing potential additional resources; this was something that several did amidst the panic of lost USG funds which was recognized with gratitude by their local partners both in Serbia and in Ukraine.
They should also find additional ways of servicing their local activists as their sole clients by lowering their transaction costs, developing additional demand-driven services designed specifically to the local context and activist customers. Since international intermediaries often serve as main fiduciary trustees for a donor, they should not simply replicate or set even more rigorous requirements towards their sub-recipients but rather be the activists who take on more of the risk on behalf of their local actor partners. These international middlemen serve as chief nodes of the global democratic partnerships; the impressions they leave on partners in the development sphere bear long-term consequences vis-à-vis government and non-governmental partners.
Looking Forward
We recommend these first steps as a beginning of a longer path towards addressing the larger issues raised by the overnight disappearance of US leadership in the global democracy assistance movement.
What can be realistically expected in terms of democratization, rule of law and good governance impacts of advocacy and watchdog NGOs and what external support does it merit? Is it possible to achieve true sustainability of their democracy missions by simply extending the duration of grants or switching to institutional support models, or does it require rethinking of agency, ownership and accountability aspects of donor-grantee relationship? Is maintaining the same civic structures through formal NGOs as relevant today as it was a decade ago, and are there other competitive forms of organized pro-democracy action to be explored?
What is a coherent and coordinated alternative to the push-pull support and pressure points approach that USG previously undertook, sometimes in coordination with other EU and bilateral partners (and sometimes not). What are new ways to create Trans-Atlantic and pro-democracy partnerships and ensure policy coherence in global democracy assistance? How can the EU carrot and stick tools truly deliver on value-based approaches in their next funding and strategic policy cycles?
These and similar questions are likely to shape the discussions about the future of global pro-democracy movement beyond early 2026, and honest answers will likely suggest the need for a more radical (re)order of things. In the meantime, democracy actors should, each in their own way, strategically preposition themselves for the next reality within opportunities and constraints of the existing/remaining democracy assistance ecosystem.