The abrupt withdrawal of U.S. Government (USG) foreign assistance in 2025 has significantly disrupted the landscape of civil society pro-democracy work. This brief offers policy advice on how to strategically address the effects of the USG exit for the countries investigated and identifies factors that could have relevance for democracy actors and supporters beyond. Complementing other research efforts in the field, our analysis is grounded in data from interviews with advocacy and watchdog organizations in Serbia and Ukraine on the impacts of the withdrawal on their capacities to continue with their missions and on longer-term democratic trajectories of the two countries.
Pro-democracy advocates in Serbia and Ukraine have survived the initial blow from the complete withdrawal or disruption of USG funding. This is no small feat considering that stop work orders resulted in the loss of staff, downsizing or widespread discontinuation of watchdogging and advocacy activities. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Serbia and Ukraine have rolled up their sleeves, implemented organizational contingencies, and switched gears in their resource mobilization. Emergency and bridging funds and flexibility of some non-USG donors were instrumental for ensuring immediate survival of NGOs and the relative stability that they now feel. However, NGOs overwhelmingly lacked strategic adaptations and are palpably vulnerable beyond early 2026 due to hunger games fundraising context and inadequate non-USG donor response.
The USG’s abandonment of its earlier democracy assistance policy had even graver ramifications for frontline NGOs’ efforts to push for reforms or hold the government accountable than the funding withdrawal. Without much-needed external democracy backing, both governments have become freer to act with unchecked power with marked democratic backsliding and constricted space for civil society activists and organizations.
What has happened in Serbia and Ukraine also further exposes the chronic vulnerabilities of the democracy assistance system itself. Now faced with significant reductions in funding and pro-democracy policy commitments, this system needs a critical review and reboot to address the new reality and the old deficiencies. To address these challenges, we offer up recommendations to democracy assistance stakeholders arguing that it is I) time to stop to set new bearings II) time to reorder and reinforce the fundamentals and III) time to recalibrate our instruments and approaches.
We should stop to prepare for the next horizon:
Sit back and breathe out. Take the time to clear our minds.
Learn from recent crises. Imagine the worst and plan contingencies.
Keep a clear eye on the mission. Define appropriate means to achieve it.
Be our own best friends. Be mindful that funding and policy coherence are always critical.
In our quest to define new priorities, goals and means to achieve their mission, we should go back to the basics:
Return to constituencies. Rediscover and gauge the needs of underserved communities.
Bolster civic values. Expand civic education across audiences.
Capitalize on organic partnerships. Assess traditional alliances and build new alliances.
Embrace technology. Make the giant leap to be early adopters.
To reclaim leadership or retain control in the vacuum left after the USG, we must reformulate the support model:
Check the math. Recalculate ‘the gap’ to focus on funding what really matters
Walk the talk of agility. Institutionalize the much-praised flexibility and responsiveness.
Trust in local wisdom. Align democracy support policies with home grown objectives.
Lean into our value-add. Appreciate that democracy support is a two-way partnership.
Hence, we argue that we as democracy supporters and advocates should take stock of programming priorities, resources and relationships in this post-USG support reality, mitigate and fix what we can, including what has been broken for years regardless of the USG departure.