With Marc Willinger.
Abstract. Based on a representative sample of the French population (n = 1,154), we show that there is a positive association between risk tolerance and trust. We rely on, the World Value Survey WVS binary trust measure, and a ‘0 − 10’ scale that we decline in three domains: trust in general, family, and co-workers. We also vary the measure of risk tolerance, by considering an incentivized investment task, and a ‘0 − 10’ stated preference scale that we decline in three domains: risk tolerance in general, in finance, and health. These variations allow us to test 16 different relations, by crossing four dependent trust variables with four different risk tolerance covariates. After adjusting for multiple testing, we found nine combinations with a strong positive link between risk tolerance and trust in the general population, and that stated risk tolerance measures predict stated trust better than elicited risk measures.
With Simon Varaine, Guillaume Cheikbossian, Dimitri Dubois & Antoine Pietri.
Abstract. The ability of groups to assort cooperators together is crucial to their success, especially in situations of conflict. In this registered report, we present an experimental design exploring the effect of endogenous group sorting on cooperation in intergroup conflict. Specifically, we focus on one sorting mechanism: individual costly sacrifice. We exogenously manipulate the opportunity to make such sacrifices (i.e. the possibility to join groups by reducing the return on private investment) in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), with no intergroup conflict, versus an Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), in which ingroup cooperative contributions are detrimental for the outgroup. Here, we present the research rationale and hypotheses, experimental design, procedure, and pre-analysis plan.
Job market paper.
Experimental research often challenges traditional group contest theory, revealing that individuals' decisions are influenced by other-regarding preferences. Building on this insight, this study examines how inequality concerns shape effort distribution within a 2×2 group contest framework. Specifically, it models players' utility as a function of their engagement relative to their teammates. The findings highlight how heterogeneity and other-regarding preferences jointly influence within-group cooperation in conflict scenarios. These theoretical results resonate with experimental evidence, offering new perspectives on the dynamics of cooperative behavior under competition.