DirectActionJinnahWavellNehruJuly

Documents included

• • Resolution 1 of the Council of the All-India Muslim League 29 July 1946 . From Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47, Vol II. Selected by Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, 1957.(excerpts) [Full text in CMP(12C)]

  • Viceroy Wavell's interview with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on 30th July 1946. 'The Transfer of Power 1942-47' Vol VIII The Interim Government 3 July- 1 November 1946, Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, 1979.(excerpts)

  • Statement by Mr M. A. Jinnah on the Congress Resolution of 10 August 1946, 12 August 1946- Gwyer and Appadorai.(excerpts)

  • Jinnah's Statement while releasing his correspondence with the Viceroy, 25 August 1946, 'Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam', Vol IV, Ed. Khursid Yusufi.(excerpts)

Comment

On 29 July, the Muslim League withdrew its acceptance of the Mission Plan and declared Direct Action. The Viceroy told Nehru he was partly responsible and ought to placate Jinnah. [-as if constitutional arrangements are simply a matter of one man being placated on terms set by the British with no regard to their intrinsic merits. It might be worth looking at Middle Eastern history to see if THEIR present troubles stem from unworkable constitutional contraptions left behind by the departing British].

Resolutions of the Council of the All-India Muslim League 29 July 1946 (excerpts) [Full text in CMP(12C)]

Resolution No 1.

On the 6th of June 1946, the Council of the All-India Muslim League accepted the scheme embodied in the statement of the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy dated 16th May...

The scheme of the Cabinet Delegation fell far short of the demand of the Muslim nation for the immediate establishment of an independent and fully sovereign state of Pakistan comprising the six Muslim Provinces, but the Council accepted a Union Centre for ten years strictly confined to three subjects, viz, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, as the scheme laid down certain fundamentals and safeguards and provided for the grouping separately of the six Muslim Provinces in Sections B and C for the purpose of framing their Provincial and group Constitutions unfettered by the Union in any way; and also with a view to end the Hindu-Muslim deadlock peacefully and accelerate the attainment of freedom of the peoples of India.

In arriving at this decision, the Council was also greatly influenced by the statement of the President which he made with the authority of the Viceroy that the Interim Government, which was an integral part of the Mission's scheme, was going to be formed on the basis of a formula, viz, 5 Muslim League, 5 Congress, 1 Sikh and 1 Indian Christian or Anglo-Indian stipulating that the most important portfolios would be distributed equally between the two major parties, the Muslim League and the Congress.

The Council authorized the President to take such decision and action with regard to further details of setting up the Interim Government as he deemed fit and proper. In that very resolution the Council also reserved the right to modify and revise this policy, if the course of events so required.

The British Government committed a breach of faith with the Muslim League in that the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy went back on the original formula of 5:5:2 for setting up of the Interim Government to placate the Congress.

Having gone back on the original formula upon the faith of which the Muslim League Council had come to their decision of the 6th of June, the Viceroy suggested a new basis of 5:5:3 and...(etc)

...

As regards the proposal embodied in the statements of the 16th and 25th of May of the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy, the Muslim League alone of the two major parties has accepted it.

The Congress have not accepted it because their acceptance is conditional and subject to their own interpretation which is contrary to the authoritative statements of the Delegation and the Viceroy issued on the 16th and the 25th of May. The Congress have made it clear that they do not accept any of the terms or the fundamentals of the scheme but that they have agreed only to go into the Constituent Assembly and to nothing else; and that the Constituent Assembly is a sovereign body and can take such decisions as it may think proper in total disregard of the terms and basis on which it was proposed to be set up.

Subsequently it has been made further clear and beyond any doubt in the speeches that were made at the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay on the 6th of July by prominent members of the Congress and in the statement of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the President of the Congress, to a press conference on 10th July in Bombay and then again even after the debate in Parliament in a public speech by him on the 22nd of July...

Once the Constituent Assembly were summoned and met there was no provision or power that could prevent any decision from being taken by the Congress, with its overwhelming majority, which could not be competent for the Assembly to take or which would be ultra vires of it and however repugnant it might be to the letter or the spirit of the scheme.

It would rest entirely with the majority to take such decisions as they may think proper or suit them and the Congress have already secured by sheer numbers an overwhelming Caste-Hindu majority whereby they will be in a position to use the Assembly in the manner in which they have already declared, i.e, that they will wreck the basis form of grouping of the Provinces and extend the scope, powers and subjects of the Union Centre which is confined strictly to three specific subjects as laid down in paragraph 15 and provided for in paragraph 19 of the statement of 16th May.

The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy collectively and individually have stated on more than one occasion that the basic principles were laid down to enable the major parties to join the Constituent Assembly and that the scheme cannot succeed unless it is worked in a spirit of co-operation.

The attitude of the Congress clearly shows that these conditions precedent for the successful working of the constitution-making body do not exist. This fact, taken together with the policy of the British Government of sacrificing the interests of the Muslim nation and some other weaker sections of the peoples of India, particularly the Scheduled Castes, to appease the Congress and the way in which they have been going back on their oral and written solemn pledges and assurances given from time to time to the Muslims, leaves no doubt that in these circumstances the participation of the Muslims in the proposed constitution-making machinery is fraught with danger and the Council, therefore, hereby withdraws its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's proposals.."

(end excerpts)

Comment

The second resolution called for Direct Action by Muslims. [full text in CMP(A3)]

The Viceroy spoke to Nehru on the subject the next day.

91, page 144 (relevant portions)

Note by Field Marshal Viscount Wavell

Wavell papers. Notes of Important Interviews 1943-7 pp 192-3

His Excellency's interview with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on 30th July 1946

1. I began by asking him about his visit to Kashmir...

..

2. I then said that the Resolution of the Muslim League had changed the situation since we last met. I said that it was most unfortunate, but I thought that Nehru must recognise that what the League had done was partly reaction from the rather intemperate statements made by some of the leaders since the A-I.C.C in Bombay; I referred in particular to his own unguarded language in his interview with the Press after the meeting.

I said it would be most unfortunate if we did not succeed in getting the Muslim League to join the Constituent Assembly since obviously it would be impossible to frame a complete constitution without the Muslims. I said that Congress now had a chance of showing real statesmanship and of giving the Muslim League assurances that would bring them into the Constituent Assembly.

Nehru said that he agreed it would be most unfortunate if the Muslim League did not enter the Constituent Assembly but he did not quite see what assurances could be given to them, they certainly could not be given an assurance of Pakistan.

I said that the principal grievance of the League against Congress was that the statements of the Congress leaders made them believe that it was not intended to give the Group system, on the basis of which the Muslim League had agreed to join, a fair chance. I referred specially to the Congress reservations in their acceptance of the Statement of May 16th. Nehru said that the Muslim League had also made reservations.

I pointed out that these were long-term reservations, on a possible Pakistan a number of years ahead; whereas the Congress reservations were short-term ones and affected the immediate issue.

Nehru then began on the legal interpretation of various articles and sentences in the Statement of May 16th, such as have already been well ventilated. I said that I was neither a lawyer nor a politician but a plain man and I knew what the intentions were of the people who drew up this document, and it seemed to me to be pure casuistry to try and force different interpretations out of it.

Nehru merely said that there were points in the document which would have to be interpreted, and the Congress had intended to refer these to the Federal Court, not just to force them through by weight of votes.

3. He then asked what was going to be done about the Constituent Assembly now that the Muslim League had declined to participate. I said that obviously it was impossible to make a constitution of India without the participation of Muslims. We were pledged to go ahead as far as possible with any party that accepted the Statement of May 16th, but that I did not see how, without the Muslims, we could get much further than a constitution for the "A" Group Provinces.

Nehru then said that the intention of the Congress had been to form a Committee of all parties at the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly, to discuss the implications of the Central subjects, not to extend them, in order to give the groups some sort of basis on which to work. He instanced the matter of foreign loans, i.e., would Provinces be entitled to raise their own loans abroad independently, or would there be some general policy based on the credit of India as a whole.

4. Nehru went on to refer to the making of the American constitution. He said that if the British went there would be a vacuum which would have to be filled. We discussed the framing of the American constitution for a little, and he said that his point was that if it was clear that things were going to go ahead the Muslim League would be forced to come in and take part; the fatal thing would be if they were given to believe that they could hold matters up indefinitely by intransigence..."

(end excerpts)

Comment

In response to a 10th August Congress resolution expressing regret at the Muslim League's decision and to a Parliamentary debate referring to the Plan in Britain, Jinnah expressed outrage over, among other things, the resolution passed by the Assam Assembly not to participate in Section C.

Statement by Mr M. A. Jinnah on the Congress Resolution of 10 August 1946, 12 August 1946(excerpts)

"..The debate in Parliament which took place on the 18th of July showed that the British Government approved of the scrapping of the Interim Government by the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy and paid no attention whatever to the new situation that had arisen, not only by pronouncements and clarifications and interpretations given by the Congress leaders which were published throughout the country, but also by the fact that the Assam Assembly, while electing the Assam representatives to the Constituent Assembly, had, under the instructions of the Congress High Command, passed a resolution giving a mandate not only to the Congress members but also to the representatives of the Mussulmans elected by a separate block of Muslim members, to have nothing to do with the C Group from the very start.

This clearly repudiated one of the fundamental terms of the statement of 16th May and this is an instance of how the majority acted although it is highly doubtful whether the Assam Assembly was competent to give such a mandate to the representatives of the Constituent Assembly.."

(end excerpts)

Comment

On the morning of 15 August 1946, a day before the Direct Action Day, Nehru went to meet Jinnah at his home and discussed the possible composition of the Interim Government.

According to V.P. Menon in 'The Transfer of Power', Nehru told the Viceroy later he had

"offered Jinnah five seats in an interim government of fourteen, and made it clear to him that any names proposed by the Muslim League would be accepted by the Congress. Jinnah asked how the minorities would be nominated, and Nehru had replied that, as he had been asked to make the proposals, he would naturally suggest the names of minority representatives for the consideration of the Viceroy. Jinnah complained that under the proposed arrangement it would be open to the Congress to nominate a non-League Muslim. Nehru told him that he did not see how the League could object, if it came out of the Congress quota."