Cabinet Mission Plan May16

NORTH-EASTERN AREA

The Muslim Minorities in the remainder of British India number some 20 million dispersed amongst a total population of 188 million.

These figures show that the setting up of a separate sovereign state of Pakistan on the lines claimed by the Muslim League would not solve the communal minority problem; nor can we see any justification for including within a sovereign Pakistan those districts of Punjab and of Bengal and Assam in which the population is predominantly non-Muslim. Every argument that can be used in favour of Pakistan can equally, in our view, be used in favour of the exclusion of the non-Muslim areas from Pakistan. This point would particularly affect the position of the Sikhs.

7. We, therefore, considered whether a smaller sovereign Pakistan confined to the Muslim-majority areas alone might be a possible basis of compromise. Such a Pakistan is regarded by the Muslim League as quite impractical because it would entail the exclusion from Pakistan of (a) the whole of Ambala and Jullundur divisions in the Punjab;(b) the whole of Assam except the district of Sylhet; and (c) a large part of Western Bengal, including Calcutta, in which city the percentage of the Muslim population is 23.6 per cent. We ourselves are also convinced that any solution which involves a radical partition of Punjab and Bengal, as this would do, would be contrary to the wishes and interests of a very large proportion of the inhabitants of these Provinces. Bengal and the Punjab each has its own common language and a long history and tradition. Moreover, any division of the Punjab would of necessity divide the Sikhs, leaving substantial bodies of Sikhs on both sides of the boundary. We have therefore been forced to the conclusion that neither the larger nor the smaller sovereign state of Pakistan would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem.

8. Apart from the great force of the foregoing arguments there are weighty administrative, economic and military considerations. The whole of the transportation and postal and telegraph systems of India have been established on the basis of a united India. To disintegrate them would gravely injure both parts of India. The case for a united defence is even stronger. The Indian armed forces have been built up as a whole for the defence of India as a whole, and to break them in two would inflict a deadly blow on the long traditions and high degree of efficiency of the Indian Army and would entail the gravest dangers. The Indian Navy and Indian Air Force could become much less effective. The two sections of the suggested Pakistan contain the two most vulnerable frontiers in India and for a successful defence in depth the area of Pakistan would be insufficient.

9. A further consideration of importance is the greater difficulty which the Indian States would find in associating themselves with a divided British India.

10. Finally there is the geographical fact that the two halves of the proposed Pakistan State are separated by some seven hundred miles and the communications between them both in war and peace would be dependent on the goodwill of Hindustan.

11. We are therefore unable to advise the British Government that the power which at present resides in British hands should be handed over to two entirely separate sovereign states.

12. This decision does not, however, blind us to the very real Muslim apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might become submerged in a purely unitary India, in which the Hindus with their greatly superior numbers must be a dominating element.

To meet this the Congress have put forward a scheme under which Provinces would have full autonomy subject only to a minimum of Central subjects, such as Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications.

Under this scheme Provinces, if they wished to take part in economic and administrative planning on a large scale, could cede to the Centre optional subjects in addition to the compulsory ones mentioned above.

13. Such a scheme would, in our view, present considerable constitutional disadvantages and anomalies. It would be very difficult to work a Central Executive and Legislature in which some Ministers who dealt with compulsory subjects were responsible to the whole of India while other Ministers, who dealt with optional subjects, would be responsible only to those Provinces who had elected to act together in respect of such subjects. This difficulty would be accentuated in the Central Legislature, where it would be necessary to exclude certain members from speaking, and voting when subjects with which their Provinces are not concerned are under discussion.

Apart from the difficulty of working such a scheme, we do not consider that it would be fair to deny other Provinces, which do not desire to take optional subjects at the Centre, the right to form themselves into a group for a similar purpose. This would indeed be no more than the exercise of their autonomous powers in a particular way.

14. Before putting forward our recommendation we turn to deal with the relationship of the Indian States to British India. It is quite clear that with the attainment of independence by British India, whether inside or outside the British Commonwealth, the relationship which has hitherto existed between the Rulers of the States and the British Crown will no longer be possible. Paramountcy can neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new Government. This fact has been fully recognised by those whom we interviewed from the States. They have at the same time assured us that the States are ready and willing to co-operate in the new development of India. The precise form which their co-operation will take must be a matter for negotiation during the building up of the new constitutional structure, and it by no means follows that it will be identical for all the States. We have not therefore dealt with the States in the same detail as the Provinces of British India in the paragraphs which follow.

15. We now indicate the nature of a solution which in our view would be just to the essential claims of all parties and would at the same time be most likely to bring about a stable and practicable form of Constitution for all India.

We recommend that the Constitution should take the following basic form:

(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States which should deal with the following subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications; and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects.

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all members present and voting.

(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the Provinces.

(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.

(5) Provinces should be free to form groups with Executives and Legislatures, and each group could determine the Provincial subjects to be taken in common.

(6) The Constitutions of the Union and of the groups should contain a provision whereby any Province could by majority vote of its Legislative Assembly could call for a reconsideration of the terms of the Constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten-yearly intervals thereafter.

16. It is not our object to lay out the details of a constitution on the above lines, but to set in motion the machinery whereby a constitution can be settled by Indians for Indians.

It has been necessary however for us to make this recommendation as to the broad basis of the future constitution because it became clear to us in the course of our negotiations that not until that had been done was there any hope of getting the two major communities to join in the setting up of the constitution making machinery.

17. We now indicate the constitution-making machinery which we propose should be brought into being forthwith in order to enable a new constitution to be worked out.

18. In forming any assembly to decide a new constitutional structure the first problem is to obtain as broad-based and accurate representation of the whole population.. After a most careful consideration of the various methods by which these points might be corrected, we have come to the conclusion that the fairest and most practicable plan would be-

(a) to allot to each Province a total number of seats proportional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as the nearest substitute for representation by adult suffrage

(b) to divide this provincial allocation of seats between the main communities in each Province in proportion to their population

(c) to provide that the representatives allocated to each community in a Province shall be elected by members of that community in its Legislative Assembly.

We think that for these purposes it is sufficient to recognise only three main communities in India: General, Muslim, and Sikh, the 'General' community including all persons who are not Muslims or Sikhs. As smaller Minorities would upon a population basis have little or no representation..we have made the arrangements set out in paragraph 20 below to give them a full representation upon all matters of special interest to Minorities.

19. (i) We therefore propose that there shall be elected by each Provincial Legislative Assembly the following numbers of representatives, each part of the Legislative Assembly(General, Moslem or Sikh) electing its own representatives by the method of proportional representation with single transferable vote:

TABLE OF REPRESENTATION

Total for British India ... ....292

Maximum for Indian States.. 93

----

Total 385

----

...

(iii) Representatives thus chosen shall meet in New Delhi as soon as possible.

(iv) A preliminary meeting will be held at which the general order of business will be decided, a chairman and other officers elected and an Advisory Committee (see paragraph 20 below) on the rights of citizens, minorities, and tribal and excluded communities set up. Thereafter the Provincial representatives will divide up into three Sections shown under A, B and C in the Table of Representation in sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph.

(v) These Sections shall proceed to settle Provincial Constitutions for the Provinces included in each Section and shall also decide whether any group constitution shall be set up for those Provinces and if so with what Provincial subjects the group should deal.

Provinces should have power to opt out of groups in accordance with the provisions of subclause(viii) below.

(vi) The representatives of the Sections and the Indian States shall reassemble for the purpose of settling the Union Constitution.

(vii) In the Union Constituent Assembly resolutions varying the provisions of paragraph 15 above or raising any major communal issue shall require a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities. The Chairman of the Assembly shall decide which, if any, resolutions raise major communal issues and shall, if so requested by a majority of the representatives of either of the major communities, consult the Federal Court before giving his decision.

(viii) As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come into operation it shall be open to any Province to elect to come out of any group in which it has been placed. Such a decision shall be taken by the Legislature of the Province after the first general election under the new Constitution.

20. The Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities, and tribal and excluded areas should contain full representation of interests affected, and their function will be to report to the Union Constituent Assembly upon the list of Fundamental Rights, the clauses for the protection of minorities, and a scheme for the administration of the tribal and excluded areas, and to advise whether these rights should be incorporated in the Provincial, Group, or Union constitution.

21. His Excellency the Viceroy will forthwith request the Provincial Legislatures to proceed with the election of their representatives and the States to set up a Negotiating Committee. It is hoped that the process of constitution-making can proceed as rapidly as the complexities of the task permit so that the interim period may be as short as possible.

22. It will be necessary to negotiate a Treaty between the Union Constituent Assembly and the United Kingdom to provide for certain matters arising out of the transfer of power.

23. .. We attach the greatest importance therefore to the setting up at once of an Interim Government having the support of the major political parties...The Viceroy has already started discussions to this end and hopes soon to form an Interim Government in which all the portfolios, including that of War Member, will be held by Indian leaders having full confidence of the people...

24. To the leaders and people of India who now have the opportunity of complete independence we would finally say this. We and our Government and countrymen hoped that it would be possible for the Indian people themselves to agree upon the method of framing the new constitution under which they will live. Despite the labours which we have shared with the Indian Parties, and the exercise of much patience and goodwill by all, this has not been possible. We therefore now lay before you proposals which, after listening to all sides and after much earnest thought, we trust will enable you to attain your independence in the shortest time and with the least danger of internal disturbances and conflict. These proposals may not, of course, completely satisfy all parties, but you will recognise with us that at this supreme moment in Indian history statesmanship demands mutual accomodation.

We ask you to consider the alternative to these proposals. After all the efforts which we and Indian Parties have made together for agreement we must state that in our view there is small hope of peaceful settlement by agreement of the Indian Parties alone. The alternative would therefore be a grave danger of violence, chaos, and even civil war. The result and duration of such a disturbance cannot be foreseen; but it is certain that it would be a terrible disaster for many millions of men, women and children. This is a possibility which must be regarded with equal abhorrence by the Indian people, our own countrymen, and the world as a whole.

We therefore lay these proposals before you in the profound hope that they will be accepted and operated by you in the spirit of accomodation and goodwill in which they are offered. We appeal to all who have the future good of India at heart to extend their vision beyond their own community or interest to the interests of the whole four hundred millions of the Indian people.

(end excerpts)

Comments

[The Cabinet Mission was composed of three members of the British Cabinet, Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Pethick-Lawrence and A. V. Alexander].

The reason why the lengthy paragraph 19 has been included in these excerpts is that one key element of the stated disagreements between Congress and Muslim League/Cabinet Mission over the 'long-term' part of the Mission Plan lay in paragraphs (v) (viii) and (vii)(there were serious disagreements over the 'short-term' part, the Interim government, as well).

In my opinion, either with intentions to keep the Plan alive or with intention to grant Jinnah parity between 'Hindustan' and Pakistan by hook or crook (as they had promised), the British did try to fudge the issue by saying one thing in public and promising another in private while blaming everyone else for intransigence. Many historians have tried to fudge the issue as well, but it was really quite simple.

Assam and N.W.F.P provinces had Congress-majority legislatures at the time and moreover Assam had non-Muslim majority population. The Congress could not support forcing Assam to remain within Section C without the option to opt out of it, and similarly could not support forcing N.W.F.P to remain in Section B. The Sikhs were also included against their stated will in Section B.

Muslim League and the Mission however insisted that given the above paragraphs, no changes were possible in the Plan and that the Congress must accept the Plan on those terms. This meant that under the Cabinet Mission Plan, only after the separate Section Constitutions were brought into force, and then, only if a majority of the combined Bengal and Assam representatives had previously agreed to it while writing their Section Constitution, could Assam have the choice to opt out of Section C. This was unlikely to happen since the Section C would be Muslim majority. If a sovereign independent Pakistan did finally come into being (as Jinnah and the Muslim League kept asserting throughout this period that it would) the Mission Plan compelling Assam to remain in the Pakistan-intended grouping Section C was inconsistent with the statement on freedom of provinces to form groups which the Mission expressed in para(15(5)) and that on 'self-determination' in para (6). This was true with respect to the Sikhs as well.

Clearly, the Mission Plan was meant to placate Jinnah by keeping alive the option for the League to walk away with two wings(Section B and C) of the country at a time of its choosing. It is interesting to note the limits placed by the Mission on self-determination and rights of minorities.

It is also interesting to note when a majority was considered a legitimate majority by Jinnah and when it was not. A majority was considered legitimate by Jinnah only when it was a Muslim majority. He labeled it yet another sign of Congress and Hindu perfidy when the Assam legislature passed by majority a resolution opposing joining Section C - clearly he thought it just that the Secction C majority should prevail over Assam. But I am getting ahead of my excerpts :).

Also see:

CMP (19) - What did parity and communal veto mean in numbers?

CMP(12B) Behind the scenes-Gandhi, June-July 1946

CMP(12C) Behind the scenes-Jinnah, June-July 1946

29-05-07: Included more portions of the Plan statement and slightly edited my comments.