BritishForwardPolicy1

Documents included

• • The Development of Forward Policy, John Carl Nelson,The Siege of Herat 1837-1838, 1976

  • The Wahabi Movement, Rajendra Prasad, India Divided, Hind Kitabs, Bombay, 1946

  • Dadabhao Naoroji on the beneficence of British rule, 2 May 1867, Desikachar,SV, Readings in the Constitutional History of India 1757-1947, Delhi : Oxford, 1984

  • Dadabhai Naoroji on the great drain of India's wealth, 4 January 1881, ibid

  • The Forward Policy, Andrew M. Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, University Press of Kansas, 2010

  • The Indian Frontier Question, Sir Henry Fowler, 20 November 1897, Pamphlets and Leaflets of 1897, Liberal Publication Department, London, 1898 (thanks to Arun Gupta)

  • The Indian Frontier, Sir William Harcourt November 26th 1897, ibid

  • The "Forward" Rake's Progress,ibid

  • The "Forward Policy" in India, Article in the New York Times, March 20, 1898

  • R.M. Sayani on the burden of the Imperial Wars, 28 March 1898,Desikachar,SV, Readings in the Constitutional History of India 1757-1947, Delhi : Oxford, 1984

Comment

Responsibility for mass deaths, civic destruction and humanitarian crises caused by religious war lies not just with the soldiers and ideologues of such religious war, but also with those who condoned, promoted or actively supported religious war as instrument of policy.

Religious incitement to violence was a recurring feature of British policy in Afghanistan and the North West Frontier over a span of at least 120 years from the 1820s-1947. This happened under the rubric of the 'forward policy'.

The excerpts included here and here:ForwardPolicy2 shed light on

- the Barelvi jihad, under British tutelage, against Ranjit Singh's Sikh kingdom during the 1820s-1840s and its consequent blowback

- the discussions of Indian, Liberal and Tory politicians 1880-1898 about British forward policy in Afghanistan and the Frontier, and about the attendant enormous costs and blowback

- the fall of the reformist king of Afghanistan Amir Amanullah in 1928-1929 in a religious uprising and various dimensions of British complicity in the uprisings and his fall (ForwardPolicy2)

- British government payoffs via Governor George Cunningham to Frontier mullahs for religious incitement and propaganda during the World War II period(ForwardPolicy2)

Knowing history will not necessarily prevent us from repeating it. Yet it is worth noting a few pathologies that persist to this day.

-Justifications: The forward policy at times was justified as a necessity for the containment of the Russian threat. At other times, the forward policy was deemed a virtue for facilitating imperialist expansion of British territorial influence.

-Costs: The Afghanistan/North West Frontier forward policy in all its forms and avatars came at massive monetary cost to impoverished Indians who had no agency to deal with either cost or consequences. Ultimately, there was also the opportunity cost of religious extremism within society.

-'Bait and Switch' dynamic : Following every period during which the British fomented uprisings against their geopolitical opponents on religious grounds, they themselves spent many years warring the jihadists and their religious rationales in the blow-back end of the cycle.

-Lack of policy debate on consequences of religious incitement:

In the last approximately 200 years, there are on British official and unofficial record, vigorous ongoing internal debates on various consequences of their Indian colonial policy, including administration and constitutional reforms, language policy, economics, the treatment of Indian dissidents, the favouring of various Indian factions.

Yet, though active support or condoning under cloak of 'neutrality', of religious incitement to violence was, on many occasions, official British policy, no debate as with other colonial issues has ever taken place (to this blogger's limited knowledge) on the advisability and attendant dangers of religious incitement of jihadists.

The British instead resorted to misdirection and propaganda as substitute for rational policy discussion on this matter and also to disown all responsibility. Jihadist blow-black was blamed on distant unrelated happenings in Europe, Barelvis were termed as dreaded Wahabis when the British had no more use for their jihadist fervor but bonafide Deobandis and Wahabis were courted at a later date when found expedient.

- Trapping of Afghan and Frontier tribals in a socio-political and legal limbo:

It is curious that, on one hand, by establishing the North West Frontier Province in 1901, the British succeeded in bringing many into the political mainstream, dealing with them as modernizing citizens of a modernizing nation-state, who were deemed capable of making rational choices at some future time.

On the other hand, the British dealt with people from the same ethnic groups living only a few miles away in the FATA (federally administered tribal areas) as anthropological categories; to be manipulated with bribes and religious propaganda or punished with collective punishment of fines and aerial bombing.The Frontier Crimes Regulations encapsulated this anthropological approach. While granting the people of FATA, some reality or illusion of independence, it condemned them to be less than equal citizens than others, and offered them no pathway to peaceful and progressive existence within the national mainstream.

In his reports to the Viceroy, Governor Olaf Caroe quoted with great disdain, Jawaharlal Nehru saying to him in 1946, "there must be a complete change in the method of Frontier control, and what he termed "the romance of the frontier" must come to an end as soon as possible".

The British approach to Afghans was also not much different from an anthropological-expedient one:the glaring lack of British support and sympathy for the modernizing efforts of Amir Amanullah in his later years in the face of religious extremism, is testimony to that.

- Separation between movers and consequences of forward policy has reduced:

When forward policy came into being in the 19th century, the tussle between aggressive imperialism on one hand, and more circumspect policy, on the other, occurred between British political parties and within the British Parliament. The excessive funding at cost of development priorities was extracted from far-away Indian taxpayers. The fighting and killings took place at a large geographical distance away from Britain. The blow-back of 'bait and switch' religious incitement occurred within local Afghan/Frontier/Indian societies which were far removed from Britain or even British settlements in India.

Today, the tussle between aggressive imperialism versus more circumspection occurs within the Pakistani establishment and in its domestic and foreign affairs. The tussle takes place not with the transparency of a parliament or a public debate but in the shadows of covert policy. Public propaganda is used to justify covert policy while misdirection is used to deny it, thereby forestalling any public debate. The excessive funding at the cost of development priorities occurs within the Pakistan state and from its foreign sponsors with ideological axes to grind. The fighting, killings and blow-back of 'bait and switch' religious incitement take place within Pakistan and in Afghanistan, including within their ruling establishments, but due to more global integration, can also harm people thousands of miles away.

Ultimately, in my view, the forward policy and all its machinations did not work. It did succeed in keeping the Soviets from invading India, if such was ever imminent. But the Soviets invaded Afghanistan regardless. The Frontier and Afghanistan were eventually reduced to unstable volatile societies with no easy pathways to peace, modernity, prosperity or even trade. Supporting the construction of the foundations of modern society; helping provide the people of Afghanistan and the Frontier with viable instruments to resist the chaos of religious incitement and banditry, and to join the global mainstream, would have been a much safer and surer policy to achieve the same ends.

(end comment)

Forward Policy

The term 'forward policy' was used by the British since at least the early 1800s.

The Development of Forward Policy, John Carl Nelson,The Siege of Herat 1837-1838, 1976

The Russian victories of 1828 and 1829 first called Britain’s attention to Russia’s dominance of Western Asia. At the same time old fears of an invasion of India by a European power, this time Russia, were revived. Longstanding concern for peace on the Northwestern frontier plus the new need to keep Russian predominance from spreading towards India, led Great Britain to develop what may be called the "Forward Policy". In its earliest form this consisted of a plan to open up the Indus river basin and the adjacent mountains to trade. British commerce would bind the area together and tie it to Britain.This was essentially an expansion of the buffer policy as well as a solution to the conflicts in the area. Trade would be the local pacifying influence, with the extra advantage of offering new markets for British goods and thus stimulating the home economy.

Lord Bentinck, then Governor-General, took the first steps in implementing the new policy. Ih the first place the commercial possibilities of the area had to be explored. To this end a young British officer, Alexander Burnes, made his way in 1832 to Kabul, Bukhara, and back to India through Persia on a fact finding mission. The next step taken was the opening of the Indus river to navigation. The Emirs of Sind were opposed to the idea until the British hinted that they might allow Ranjit Singh to expand at Sind's expense. Sind promptly agreed while Ranjit Singh himself was entirely agreeable to the plan.

..

In 1832 [deposed Afghan king] Shah Shuja wrote to the [British Indian] Governor-General asking for aid so that he could recover his throne and save Afghanistan from Persia, but he was not taken seriously. But when a threat to Herat materialized, the Governor-General changed his mind and gave Shuja a four month advance of his pension, knowing that this would enable Shuja to raise troops and march to recover his throne.

..

By 1834 Shuja had raised an army and was preparing to march. After extorting more men and money from Sind, he negotiated a treaty with Ranjit Singh whereby the Sikhs would get Peshawar in return for their aid. Thus Shuja had high hopes of success when he marched on Kandahar and these were confirmed when he defeated Kohendil Khan, a brother of Dost Mohammed, and took possession of that city. Dost Mohammed had been at war with Kohendil but he put this quarrel aside and marched to help his brother. In doing so, Dost left his eastern flank uncovered, and Ranjit Singh promptly invaded and seized Peshawar while Dost defeated Shuja at Kandahar. Shuja soon returned to India and his British pension.

(end quote)

Meanwhile, the British while officially maintaining neutrality, also supported jihadist opponents of Ranjit Singh.

India Divided, Rajendra Prasad, Hind Kitabs, Bombay, 1946

The Wahabi Movement

..a movement was started by Syed Ahmad of Rai Bareili which had its branches all over India and played a great part in the first half of the nineteenth century. He was born in Rai Bareili and received his education in Delhi and acquired a great fame not only for his learning but also for his piety. Many of the learned Ulema of the time accepted him as their leader and carried on a great agitation against social evils like drinking and prostitution. He sent his disciples and agents to distant places like Hyderabad and places further south and to Bengal.

He became the centre of jehad against the Sikhs of the Punjab, who, it is said, ill-treated the Musalmans, prevented them from fulfilling their religious obligations and desecrated their places of worship. He, therefore, declared their state as Darul-Harb and decided to lead jehad against them. Although the Mahrattas had also established their rule, they had not interfered with the religion of the Musalmans-Muslim Qazis were allowed to function, and the Musalmans regarded their State as also that of the Rajputs as Darul-Islam and not Darul-Harb. Syed Ahmed Brelvi made preparations for jehad against the Sikhs and his disciples spread all over the country to collect men and money for it. He himself had some experience of fighting and took the lead of the army so collected. The British authorities were kept informed of the preparations but did not interfere, as the preparations were directed against the Sikhs whose power was tolerated but looked upon with disfavor by them. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan wrote about these preparations as follows:

'In those days Musalmans used publicly to ask Muslim masses to carry on jehad against the Sikhs. Thousands of armed Musalmans and a large incalculable store of war materials were collected for jehad against the Sikhs. But when the Commissioner and the magistrate were informed of it, they brought it to the notice of the Government. The Government clearly wrote to them not to interfere. When a Mahajan of Delhi misappropriated some money of the jehadis, William Fraser, Commissioner of Delhi, gave a decree for it which was realized and sent to the Frontier.' (Translation of an extract from an article of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan published in the Institute Gazette of 8th September 1871-Quoted by M. Tufail Ahmadi in 'Mussalmanon Ka Roshan Mustaqbil')

'There is no doubt', says Muhammed Jafar Saheb in Sawanat Ahmadia, p 139, that 'if the Sarkar[British Government]were against Syed Sahib, then no help could reach Syed Saheb from Hindustan, But the British Government in those days heartily desired that the power of the Sikhs should be diminished.' In the result Syed Ahmad led an army through Sind and the Bolan Pass into Afghanistan and then attacked the Punjab though the Khyber Pass in 1824 and in 1830. Sultan Mohammed Khan, who was the Governor on behalf of the Sikhs, swore allegiance to him and was continued in his post. Moulvi Mazhar Ali was appointed Qazi. He thus succeeded in securing religious freedom to the people of the Frontier tracts. But there were old feuds between Sultan Mohammed Khan and Qazi Mazhar Ali. After Syed Ahmad had left Peshawar Sultan Mohammad got Qazi Mazhar Ali murdered in open Durbar. In conspiracy with local leaders he also got persons who had been appointed collectors by Syed Saheb murdered. This so much upset Syed Saheb that he left the Frontier towards the end of 1830 with a number of his followers and was ultimately killed in a battle in 1831 at the age of 45.

Although his army dispersed after his death, the jehadis had established their headquarters at Sittana in the Swat valley in the Frontier, from where they continued their fight with the help they received from Hindustan. The British Government connived at this until the Punjab was conquered, as will appear from the following quotations from Sir William Hunter's Indian Mussalmans(quoted in Tufail Ahmad): 'They perpetrated endless depredations and massacres upon their Hindu neighbours before we annexed the Punjab, annually recruiting their camp with Mahommadan zealots from the British districts. We took no precaution to prevent our subjects flocking to a fanatical colony which spent its fury on the Sikhs, - an uncertain coalition of tribes, sometimes our friends and sometimes our enemies. An English gentleman who had large indigo factories in our North-Western Provinces, tells me that it was customary for all pious Musalmans in this employ to lay aside a fixed share of their wages for the Sittana Encampment. The more daring spirits went to serve for longer or shorter periods under the fanatic leaders. As his Hindu overseers now and then begged for a holiday for the annual celebration of their fathers' obsequies, so the Mahommadan bailiffs were wont between 1830 and 1846 to allege their religious duty of joining the crescentaders as a ground for a few months' leave.'

'Upon our annexation of the Punjab', continues Sir William Hunter, 'the fanatic fury, which had formerly spent itself upon the Sikhs, was transferred to their successors. Hindus and English were alike infidels in the eyes of the Sittana Host, and as such were to be exterminated by the sword. The disorders that we had connived at, or at least viewed with indifference, upon the Sikh Frontier, now descended as a bitter inheritance to ourselves.' Their followers were found preaching sedition in different parts of the country so far apart as Rajshahi in Bengal, Patna in Bihar, and the Punjab Frontier. 'Through the whole period the fanatics kept the border tribes in a state of chronic hostility to the British power. A single fact will speak volumes. Between 1850 and 1857 the Frontier disorders forced us to send out sixteen distinct expeditions, aggregating 33,000 Regular Troops; and between 1857 and 1863 the number rose to twenty separate expeditions aggregating 60,000 Regular Troops, besides Irregular Auxiliaries and Police.'

It is unnecessary to go into further details of the doings of the Mujahids beyond stating that the disciples of Syed Ahmad Brelvi continued helping the jehadis. Two of the principal disciples, the brothers Moulvi Wilayat Ali and Moulvi Enayat Ali, belonged to Patna. After the conquest of the Punjab the British compelled the Indian Mujahids to return to Hindustan and Moulvi Wilayat Ali came back to Patna with his followers. He had to give an undertaking that he would not go to the Frontier for some years, after the expiry of which he and his brother sold their property and undertook hijrat to Sittana and thus started a movement for hijrat which lasted for a pretty long time and received an impetus after the rebellion for 1857.

When the British started their forward policy in the Frontier in 1864 it became necessary that all connection between the Frontier people and the people of India should be cut off and during 1864 and 1870 five cases of rebellion were instituted against Indians among whom some of the most important accused were of the Patna family and from amongst their disciples. The charge against them was that they had continued correspondence with their relations on the Frontier and had helped them with money. Some of them were given death sentences which were reduced to transportation for life.

It may be noted that these persons had done nothing more or worse than what the British had not only connived at since 1824 but actually encouraged by realizing hundis on behalf of the Mujahids and remitting the same to them on the Frontier. This movement started by Syed Ahmad Brelvi and carried on after his death by his followers and disciples has been given the name of the Wahabi Movement. Among their teachings about social and religious reform, the Wahabis also preached the great doctrine of jehad. India, having come under the rule of the Christian British, became Darul-Harb against which jehad was obligatory. 'Throughout the whole literature of the sect this obligation shines forth as the first duty of regenerate man.' If jehad was impossible, then hijrat was the alternative.

The situation created by the Wahabi movement was met by two-fold action by the Government. On the one hand, the great State Trials broke up the organization of the Wahabis, and on the other, counter -propaganda against their teaching was started and Fatwas against jehad were obtained and circulated. Sir William Hunter says: 'It has always seemed to me an inexpressibly painful incident of our position in India that the best men are not on our side....And it is no small thing that this chronic hostility has lately been removed from the category of imperative obligation.'

The whole episode is illustrative of the policy of 'divide and rule'. So long as the Sikhs were a thorn in the side of the British, the Musalmans were encouraged to carry jehad against them. Once the Sikhs had been defeated and the Punjab conquered, the jehadis were declared rebels against the British and convicted and sentenced to transportation for life and their entire organization broken up.

(end quotes)

In post-Mutiny India, initially, Dadabhai Naoroji spoke on the beneficence of British rule.

Desikachar,SV, Readings in the Constitutional History of India 1757-1947, Delhi : Oxford, 1984

Dadabhao Naoroji on the beneficence of British rule, 2 May 1867

"..Law and order are its first blessings. Security of life and property is a recognized right of the people, and is more or less attained according to the means available, or the sense of duty of the officials to whom the sacred duty is entrusted. The native now learns and enjoys what justice between man and man means, and that law instead of despot's will is above all.."

(end quote)

Sixteen years later, Dadabhai Naoroji had changed his mind.

Dadabhai Naoroji on the great drain of India's wealth, 4 January 1881

There is security of life and property in one sense or way, i.e., the people are secure from any violence from each other or from native despots. So far, there is real security of life and property, and for which India never denies her gratitude. But from England's own grasp, there is no security of property at all, and as a consequence no security of life. India's property is not secure. What is secure and well secure is, that England is perfectly safe and secure and does so with perfect security, to carry away from India and to eat up in India, her property at the present rate of some £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 a year.

The reality therefore is, that the policy of English rule as it is (not as it can and should be), is an everlasting, unceasing and everyday-increasing foreign invasion, utterly, though gradually, destroying the country. I venture to submit, that every right-minded Englishman, calmly and seriously considering the problem of the present condition and treatment of India by England, will come to this conclusion.

The old invaders came with the avowed purpose of plundering the wealth of the country. They plundered and went away, or conquered and became the natives of the country. But the great misfortune of India is, that England did not mean, or wish, or come, with the intention of plundering, and yet events have taken a course which has made England the worst foreign invader she had the misfortune to have. India does not get a moment to breathe or revive. 'More Europeans,', 'more Europeans,' is the eternal cry, and this very report itself of the Commission is not free from it.

The present position of England in India has, moreover, produced another most deplorable evil, from which the worst of old foreign invasions was free. That with the deprivation of the vital, material blood of the country, to the extent of £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 a year, the whole higher 'wisdom' of the country is also carried away.

I therefore venture to submit, that India does not enjoy security of her property and life, and also moreover, of "knowledge" or "wisdom". To millions in India, life is simply "half feeding" or starvation or famines and disease.

(end quotes)

The preceding quotes are included to place the costs of Britain's forward policy and the second Anglo-Afghan war in the context of the on-going drain of wealth from India.

Waging War in Waziristan, Andrew M. Roe, University Press of Kansas, 2010

The Forward Policy

In 1874, a new conservative government in Britain.. determined to take a firmer stance on the border areas.

Hastened by the campaigns of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British adopted a forward policy from 1879 to 1901.. [With a view ]to push the border as far forward toward Afghanistan as possible, meeting the Russians on militarily advantageous terms..[T]he forward policy sought to extend British influence and political control into tribal territory with a view to establishing law and order. But indirectly, it bred suspicion and British intentions appeared ambiguous. It failed also to negate the necessity for controversial punitive expeditions that continued to be a regular feature of tribal management.. A direct strategy of intervention in tribal territory was also a constant catalyst for civil disobedience. Arthur Swinson posits, "[the forward policy] was to generate more heat, more controversy, more bitterness, than any other Indian policy in the nineteenth century".

In the early days of the policy, government ambitions were limited. Troops garrisoned strategically valuable terrain that belonged to the tribes, and roads were built to allow rapid movement throughout the frontier to foil any potential aggression. These ran through the Khyber and Kurram valleys. Between 1890 and 1897 the policy grew in momentum. Advanced posts were built on the Samana Heights above Kohat, and in the Gomal, the Tochi, and the Kurram valleys. In addition, garrisons were established in the Malakand and Chitral. These initiatives coincided with the payment of government subsidies for route security, intended to provide a lever to apply pressure to the tribes. By the time all forward locations had been constructed and manned, approximately 10,000 British troops were situated in fortified posts beyond the administrative border. Such forward deployments were seen by the tribesmen as a preface to an enduring assault on Pashtun identity and tribal independence. They also led to deterioration in relations with Amir Abdur Rahman, who interpreted these advancements into tribal territory as a threat to his influence along the frontier. As a result, he incited the frontier tribes to rise up against the British..

Following prolonged negotiations[between the amir and a British diplomatic mission lead by Sir Mortimer Durand], a border[the Durand Line] was agreed upon on 12 November 1893. Martin Ewans, a former head of chancery in Kabul, notes "The Amir was reluctant to accept the agreement, which detached many of the eastern Pushtoon tribes from his dominions, but was persuaded to agree when his annual subsidy was increased from 1.2 million to 1.8 million rupees, and he was assured that he could freely import arms and ammunition". The Durand Line enclosed within British territory the lands of Chitral, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, the Khyber, Kurram and Waziristan. .. The Durand Line resulted in British political influence extending over additional 26,000 square miles and an estimated 2.5 million tribesmen. But many in the Afghan government failed to recognize the theoretical divide as a legal frontier and continued to view the Indus River as their eastern boundary...

..Within four years of the Durand Agreement, a significant number of the tribes north of Tochi rebelled...From there, revolt extended to Swat, under Sahdullah Khan, the Mad Mullah, followed by an attack on Shankargarh by the Mohmand tribe. Finally, the Orakzai Afridis captured the Khyber forts and lay siege to the Samana posts. This was the most serious crisis that had confronted India since the Indian Mutiny.. It took two years of heavy fighting before the uprising was finally repressed. The rebellion resulted in at least 1,000 casualties and millions of pounds of sterling expended. In total, 75,000 troops were engaged in pacifying the region.

Collin Davies suggests that the main cause of the disturbances was the active forward policy and influence of fanaticism, reinforced by mullahs calling for jihad. This included the construction of roads in tribal areas that were deeply unpopular...

Pamphlets and Leaflets of 1897, Liberal Publication Department, London, 1898

Sir Henry Fowler, 20 November 1897

The Indian Frontier Question

On January 1st, 1895, the native ruler of Chitral was assassinated by order of his brother. A British officer representing the Government of India was in Chitral with a small escort when the murder took place, and to him the usurper sent a deputation asking to be recognized as his brother's successor. The reply was that the question would be preferred to the Government of India, whose orders must be awaited. In the meantime a detachment of soldiers was sent to Chitral, and Mr.(now Sir George) Robertson, who was the Political Agent at headquarters, started for Chitral. He arrived on February 1st. In the interval a native chief, who was, no doubt, an accomplice in the conspiracy, invaded the State of Chitral with a large force. Sir George Robertson took up his position in the fort, and the troops accompanying him made up a garrison of nearly 400 men. Further fighting took place, and early in March Sir George and his garrison were beseiged. On March 8th I was informed of the necessity of an expedition to rescue Robertson... On that day I telegraphed to the Government of India authorizing them to take any action that they might deem necessary to secure the safety of the British force. That Government, with admirable promptitude, at once mobilized a large army-some 15,000 men- and prepared to cross the frontier. Chitral, a country about the size of Wales, is described by Captain Younghusband, who is intimately acquainted with the locality, as a "sea of mountains,practically bare, except in the lower part, and it is only in small patches at the very bottom of the narrow valleys that any cultivation at all can be found." The State is bounded in the main by the countries inhabited by some of the tribes with whom we are now so sadly familiar. The fort of Chitral is nearly 200 miles from Peshawar, and the army intended to relieve the fort had to march through the territory held by these independent tribes. It was, therefore, of the first importance, not only to avoid conflict with them, but, if possible, to secure their friendly co-operation.

The Chitral Proclamation and its Interpretation.

To attain this object the proclamation, about which so much controversy has raged, was issued in the middle of March. It stated first, that notice had been given to the chief of the besieging army that unless he retired from Chitral by April 1st the Government would use force to compel him; second, that the sole object of the Government was to put an end to the present, and to prevent any future, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory; third, that, as soon as that object had been attained, the force would be withdrawn; fourth, that the Government had no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which they passed, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes; and, fifth, that they would scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility toward the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrained from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. ...

On March 28th, Mr. George Curzon, who had been Under-Secretary of State for India.. wrote to the Times on the situation in Chitral, and in that letter he says:-"I see that the Indian Government have issued a proclamation to the tribes to say that as soon as they have attained their object in Chitral the British force will be withdrawn, and that there is no intention of occupying the intervening territory. Of course this may be technically true; but if this proclamation means, as it will undoubtedly be interpreted to mean, that, having opened up the essential and inevitable route to Chitral, we are going to allow it again to be closed, it will be difficult to find words in which the melancholy fatuity of such a decision.."

.. after the issue of the proclamation the authorities at once commenced negotiations with the Swatis and other tribes concerned, and explained the situation to them,.. one of the principal chiefs had "on the receipt of the proclamation,openly declared himself a friend of the Government.".

Conflicting Policies

The controversy arises as to the conflicting policies which followed the complete success of the military expedition.

The Views of the Indian Government

[In a despatch from the Indian Government] The situation with its dangers was clearly set forth and very powerful arguments were urged in favour of the policy advocated. That policy was the military occupation of the Chitral valley and the construction of the road from Peshawar. With respect to the road, the despatch stated the difficulties to be-first, that the expense might be prohibitive; secondly, that if the opening of the road meant subduing the tribes and holding the line by force it would not only involve great cost, but many embarrassing complications. The Indian Government added that they were not convinced that these difficulties would occur. They stated that the expedition had not aroused a general religious war, that the hostility of the tribes had been exaggerated, that the leading men were amenable to arguments of utility, that the fanatical Mahomedan influence was less strong that it was believed to be, and that it might be possible to come to arrangements with the intervening tribes which, backed by force, would be adequate to keep open a route by which troops and supplies could be sent up to Chitral. .. The despatch concludes with the statement that the Indian Government were fully conscious that the course which they recommended might involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India could ill afford and in an increase of responsibilities with the tribes on the North-West Frontier which they would fain avoid.

The question was primarily a military one-viz., whether Chitral was of such strategical importance as to be essential as a safeguard from invasion. The commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, Sir George White, and the military member of the Indian Government, Sir Henry Brackenbury, were both of the opinion that it was.. On the other hand, distinguished [British] Indian generals of equal weight were of a contrary opinion...Civilian experts, [British] Indian statesmen with long experience on the frontier and of the tribes, were of opinion that to make the road under arrangements with the tribes would lead sooner or later to a control over the whole of the country through which it passed-that a policy of insisting upon open roads and respecting at the same time the independence of the tribes was impossible-that the roads could not be effectually kept open and protected for any length of time by merely tribal arrangements, but would have to be protected throughout by regular troops- and that the construction and holding of the road meant the practical subjection and annexation fo the tribes and their territory between Peshawar and Chitral. After careful consideration it appears to us that the construction and defence of the road with the consent of the tribes would be a dangerous policy, and even if such arrangements could be made they could not be relied on as of practical or permanent value. We were further of opinion that to construct the road without those arrangements would be a violation of the proclamation on the faith of which several of the tribes did not combine against and oppose our march through their territories.

The Liberal Government's Decision

Having regard to all the considerations ..the late Government .. decided that no military force or European Agent should be kept at Chitral, that the road should not be made, and that the army which had effected the relief operations should return to British territory as speedily as circumstances would allow.. the late Government were responsible for the decision to evacuate Chitral. The present Government are responsible for the reversal of that decision. .. My successor, on taking office, announced that the present Government would reconsider the Chitral question, and on August 1st he inquired as to the possibility of the arrangement with the tribes for the road...

The Indian Government replied.. that the reports received by them warranted the confident expectation that peaceable arrangements could be made. They also stated that no addition to the Army was asked. Some days later Lord George Hamilton telegraphed assent of the Government to the proposals..The India Secretary stated his opinion that the reports as to the expectation that peaceable arrangement could be made as to the road and that the Army would not be increased, materially altered the position-..he had thereupon telegraphed their acceptance by the Government...

The Forward Movement- and After

..the point at issue then was..Could this road be peaceably made and maintained under arrangements which had any hope of permanency? The events of the last four months have, I think, decided that question. Eventually agreements were made with some of the tribes for the construction and defence of the road by their levies, for the surrender of their rights to tolls, and for payments to the chiefs... In the debate on the Address Lord George Hamilton stated that the most sanguine anticipations any one could have indulged in had been more than realized. He congratulated the Conservative party on their true political instinct when, by an overwhelming majority, they assented to this forward movement, and declared his belief that there had been no forward movement in recent years made by the Government which had been more beneficial, and which would more tend to put an end to those periodical disturbances and outbreaks of fanaticism which had previously characterized that remote corner of India.

Within less than eighteen months after that rosy picture had been presented to the House of Commons, the tribes in the Swat Valley, through whose country the road had been opened, with whom one of the peaceable arrangements had been made, and to whose chiefs large subsidies had been promised and paid, commenced the recent outbreak. They attacked a fortified post on the road, and as one report stated, "the whole valley was up."

The extent and character of this attack were of such a nature that two brigades, one containing four and the other three regiments, with three mountain batteries were sent forward to support the garrison. After five days' fighting, the force.. about 5,000 men, completely defeated the tribes. By this victory the attack on the Malakand Fort the principal fort on the road by an army of 6,000 men was prevented. A week later several thousand men of another tribe attacked one of our forts only 15 miles from Peshawar. That attack was, after fierce fighting, brilliantly repulsed. The Government promptly poured troops into the district, and by the middle of August our forces had increased to about 37,000 men. At that date, according to one account, "the tribes were all up through a mountain district of 600 miles by 200 miles broad," Then came the treacherous outbreak of the Afridis, a tribe hitherto loyal to the Government, and to whom had been intrusted for nearly 20 years the guardianship of the Khaiber Pass. In September we were attacked at Nawagai. The Khan of that tribe was the chief who "openly declared himself a friend of the Government on receipt of the proclamation." His tribe attacked our forces with 3,000 men. These tribal risings have necessitated military operations on a most gigantic scale. I understood Lord Landsdowne to say on November 9th that our forces on the frontier numbered 70,000 men- more than double the number we had engaged at Waterloo-and a larger number than have been engaged in a conflict in India before. Lord George Hamilton tells us that not even in the recollection of those who passed through the Mutiny has there ever been so spontaneous and unaccountable an outbreak. I ask myself, and I ask you -Is it absolutely unaccountable?

The Causes of the Outbreak

The Indian Secretary is of the opinion that the triple visitations of famine, plague and earthquake, combined with the repulse of the Greek invasion of Turkey, were the main causes of this outbreak. I was not aware that the frontier had been desolated by the famine or the plague. Mr. Balfour tells us that the chief cause was the victory of the Mohammedan Turks over the Christian Greeks. I ask whether there have been any signs of disaffection among the sixty millions of the Queen's Mohammedan subjects in India. Have any of the Mohammedan States sympathized with this alleged religious war? Her Majesty, in her gracious telegram which Lord Salisbury read at Guildhall, expressed "the intensity of the feeling with which she had heard of the affectionate and devoted support which her Throne, her cause, and her Empire had received from the native princes and peoples of India." Among the most illustrious of those native princes are the great Mohammedan chiefs.

The theory that the wild mountaineers of the north-west have embarked in a crusade to destroy British rule in India appears to me to be about as probable as that the growing dissatisfaction with the Government shown in the by-elections is owing to the muzzling of the dogs. At the time when I was considering the retention of Chitral I was officially informed that there was a certain freemasonry among the tribes on the north-west, that those who were too distant from the scene of any expedition to think of joining at once in hostilities against us began to take some interest in their fellow-tribesmen when they heard of any permanent occupations of new tracts, and that in their jealous desire to maintain their complete independence they had a common link of sympathy. It appears to me that this warning was well founded, and that it is within the range of probability that the construction of military forts and the presence of large bodies of troops in districts beyond the frontier aroused the passionate fear of annexation, which is the hereditary patriotism of the tribes. It is a significant fact that one of the tribes... protested against the occupation of Swat, the district through which the road runs, and declared that they would oppose further inroads. It may be that a belief that the Chitral road and its garrisons were the first steps towards the destruction of the independence of the tribes kindled the conflagration which cannot be extinguished except at the fearful sacrifices which the telegrams from India daily record.

..What next?.. Anglo-Indian statesmen, both civil and military, are divided as to the wisest and safest frontier policy. One section, in view of a possible invasion of India by Russian, advocate what is called "the forward policy". They maintain that our frontiers should be extended until they touch the frontiers of Russia and Afghanistan. They consider that the tribes which occupy the vast region of mountains and deserts which lie between us and what may be called neighbouring powers should be subjugated, and their country annexed; and thus India would secure the "scientific frontier" which would be of supreme advantage in case of any attack.

The other section, who have been called the party of "masterly inactivity", maintain that every step forward weakens our defences; that our dominions are completely guarded by the mountain ranges of the Himalayas and the Hindu-Kush, that we should cultivate friendly relations with the intervening tribes, and respect their independence; that to conquer and hold their territory would require a large increase of the Indian army; that the additional expenditure would be an intolerable tax on Indian resources; that our true and safe policy is to develop the trade, the agriculture, the manufactures, railways and canals, and the health and education of the people of India; and that it would be an act of supreme folly to abandon all these enterprises in order to spend vast sums on a military policy the necessity for which has been denied by many of the most eminent Viceroys, the most experienced civilians, and the most illustrious soldiers, who have made and maintained our Indian Empire.

..

If, as Lord George Hamilton suggests, we are to construct roads, erect forts, and hold positions in Tirah and adjoining countries, we are taking the first step which will inevitably lead to conflict, to lavish sacrifice of men and money, and finally to annexation. The attempt to open roads through these regions means a permanent military force; it means interference with the native inhabitants, punishment of offending tribes; that will be followed by further control, by punitive and probably rescuing expeditions, and in the end annexation. And at what cost and to gain what advantage to India? We have yet to deal with the cost of the present expedition. What that cost is, I do not know; but if it approaches the figures I have seen, the Indian Revenue cannot meet it, and I go further, ought not be asked to meet it. Parliament in 1880 voted £5,000,000 towards the cost of the Afghan War. The reasons which justified that vote are more forcible to-day than they were then. To throw upon India, in addition to the enormous cost and the loss by the famine and the plague, the entire cost of the present war would be an injustice which would rankle in every part of the Indian Empire. But I refer to the cost of the policy in the future. By whom is that to be defrayed? By the Indian taxpayer? or by the British taxpayer? Ask the present and the late Finance Ministers of India, ask the Chancellor of Exchequer, and I think you will be told India cannot, and Great Britain will not, undertake that terrible burden..."

Sir William Harcourt November 26th 1897

The Indian Frontier

..it is our duty as a governing Empire to ask ourselves whether that war is necessary, and whether it was wisely undertaken. .. We have a right, and it is our duty, to challenge that policy, because it is a policy which we deliberately condemned when we were ourselves responsible..when we determined that it was not right, that it was not expedient, that we should permanently occupy Chitral, in the mountains of India. It is very desirable that you should really understand what is the frontier policy.

The Two Policies.

There are two opinions upon the subject. There is one.. which is that of the great Indian administrator, Lord Lawrence- that in the frontier of India we should stand behind the mountains, that we should not embroil ourselves with the hostile tribes by whom those mountains are tenanted, that we should have peace with the Afghans, and if there were fears of invasion from Russia or any other Power, that it would be much safer to take our stand in that position than if we advanced our frontier further into the great mountain ranges. But then there came the forward policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Government in 1878. They determined then to make an advance into Afghanistan, and many of you will remember who have read the history of that unfortunate war, and the catastrophe of Cavagnari at Kabul, what evil accrued from that invasion of Afghanistan. The English people had the whole facts of that policy before them at the General Election of 1880. They condemned that policy, which was called the "forward policy,", by that great majority which returned Mr. Gladstone to power. One of the first acts of that Government was to retire from Kandahar. That was fiercely denounced by the Tory party,..

The Occupation of Chitral

[on constructing a permanent road between Peshawar and Chitral and keeping the road open by maintaining garrisons and keeping tribesmen at bay]

..The late Government were advised by men of the greatest experience and judgement, that the formation of such a road meant a practical subjugation of the tribes and the annexation of the county between Peshawar and Chitral. Then he quoted Sir Neville Chamberlain:-'If we remain in Chitral, Bajaur, and Swat the tribesmen will only be kept quiet by our retaining at a great annual cost a sufficient force in the valleys to overawe them. To make a military road, to expect to keep it open without coming into collision with the tribesmen, is to my mind devoid of reasoning.'.. The practical question which will sooner or later have to be determined by this House is whether we are going to extend the Frontier of India by at least 200 or 250 miles on the western side, in order to cover a large tract of country from which we can derive no possible advantage, and from which we can obtain no possible revenue, and in which we may be constantly embroiled with independent tribesmen patriotically defending their native soil."

That was the statement which was made by our Government before any of these difficulties arose with reference to the tribes, and every single circumstance which we then foresaw has been literally fulfilled in every particular.

Lord George Hamilton afterwards, and before any of this fighting began, came forward and.. said..'The tribes were only eager to be annexed, and no forward movement of recent years had so completely put an end to the trouble with the tribes." What an admirable prophecy! He said the only difficulty of the Government was to resist the desire of the tribes for annexation, and that there was an end for every of any trouble with the tribes. What a prophet! Does not that evince the profound want of acquaintance of the present Secretary of State of India with the conditions of our tenure of the scientific frontier and with the feeling of the tribes upon which they act? ..

..and this I have to say- and I say it with regret, because it is the key to the whole of this forward policy- that the military element has captured the Government of India. This it is which has involved us in enormous expenditure; it has led, in my opinion, to unnecessary war; and I must comment on a speech.. made by Sir George White, the Commander-in-Chief in India.. It was received with great applause by the company at Simla. He said:- "The history of all times has show that civilization and barbarism cannot exist co-terminously, and at the same time peaceable, as independent neighbours." What does that mean? Is that consistent with a proclamation to the tribes of India that you intend to respect their independence? What conclusion would they arrive at from such a sentence as that ..? It means war, as far as I can see- war without limit-upon the frontier of India. What is the use, then, in the present of declarations of that kind, of issuing proclamations that the independence of the tribes is to be respected?..

A Scientific Frontier

Is it the intention of her Majesty's Government to maintain posts in these inaccessible valleys in order to establish what they are pleased to call a scientific frontier? It was christened a scientific frontier some five-and-twenty years ago. What sort of frontier has it turned out to be, and what sort of a frontier is it today? A frontier where we have made unfriendly those upon whose friendship we ought to rely and who will be allies of an invader and not his opponents. There is a still more serious aspect of this case. There is a foe far more to be feared in India than any enemy in the front, and that is a discontented people behind.

These wars are wars of enormous expense. When the war in 1878 took place in Afghanistan it was estimated to cost three millions. It did cost, I think, £ 23,000,000, and the burden of that war remains upon the Indian people. That is a far more imminent danger in my opinion than the chimera of a Russian invasion. What do you suppose this occupation of Chitral is costing to-day, and what will it cost? It will cost precious British lives, but what will it cost in money? India which has been plagued with famine and scourged by pestilence, is to be further afflicted by an unnecessary burden-with more debt, more taxation. What did the people of India profit by this transaction? If those millions which have been wasted upon a scientific frontier had been applied to the social advancement of the people of India, to irrigation which might have saved them from famine, would not that have been better for your Indian Empire than the manner in which all of this treasure has been wasted in wars that never cease?

In my judgement, of all the mischievous reactions of which this Government have been guilty of the most mischievous and the most dangerous is that into which they hurried upon their accession to office to reverse the deliberate position at which we had arrived and embarked the British Army and the British fortunes in Chitral and in those mountains where we now find, contending with a handful of warlike tribes, an Army, as Sir H. Fowler told you, far greater than we had engaged at Waterloo, and much larger than was ever in a conflict in India before.

Pamphlet

The "Forward" Rake's Progress.

Mr. John Morley, speaking to his constituents at Arbroath on September 29th, 1897, dealt with the action of the Tory Government in deciding to stay in Chitral, and with the rising on the Indian Frontier. Mr. Morley said:-

"Well what happened afterwards was that our successors, in the plenitude of their wisdom and their foresight, flung themselves into the arms of the 'Forward' party and the military party, with the lamentable results that you see. No doubt- I do not deny it-no doubt other causes contributed to this outbreak(the risings on the Indian Frontier), but not reasonable man can or does doubt that the non-fulfillment of our promises had a power effect in stirring up the frontier tribes against us. There is a regular course only too familiar to us all now in these forward operations. These are the five stages of the 'FORWARD' RAKE'S PROGRESS: (1) you push on into territories where you have no business to be, and, in our case, where you had promised you would not go; (2) your intrusion provokes resentment, and in these wild countries resentment means resistance; (3) you instantly cry out that the people are rebellious, and their act is rebellion-this in spite of your own assurance that you have no intention of setting up permanent sovereignty over them; (4) you send a force to stamp out the rebellion; and (5) having spread bloodshed, confusion and anarchy, you declare, with hands uplifted to the heavens, that moral reasons force you to stay, for, if you were to leave, this territory would be left in a condition which no civilized power could contemplate with equanimity or with composure. THESE ARE THE FIVE STAGES OF THE FORWARD RAKE'S PROGRESS."

After stating that the cost of military operations to poor India was estimated at five millions, and recalling Lord George Hamilton's proud boast that we were in for "a period of quietude and economy on the Indian Frontier." Mr Morley said:-

The military side is the least part of this unfortunate proceeding. Look at its effect upon Indian finance; and many men of the highest authority will tell you that the finance of India, even as it is, is ruinous finance. I saw a statement the other day that the cost of the Imperial policy in India during the last twenty years has been something like 50 millions sterling; and now you have several millions more. You(in Abroath) can protect yourselves; you have your own representatives in the House of Commons, who if any undue burden is proposed-and on that I will have something to say by and bye elsewhere-you can protect yourselves partially through your representative; but the Indian taxpayer is helpless, and I am sure you will agree with me that it is a monstrous thing upon a point where military experts differ that this poor, wretched, famine-stricken country-and this year they have had earthquake and plague was well as famine added to their misfortunes-is to bear an increased burden because some military men say that if you took this valley or that valley your North-Western Frontier would be a little safer. (A voice:'It is all nonsense') I for one agree with my friend who says it is all nonsense. It is not common sense.

To stay in Chitral in order to keep India safe is about as sensible as leaving a safe and comfortable lawn to go sit on a prickly hedge defending your garden. Remember that the Tories stayed in Chitral in the teeth of the decision of their Liberal predecessors to leave it.

Article in the New York Times, March 20, 1898

The "Forward Policy" in India

It is not very often that a debate in a legislative body takes on the character of a discussion of experts. In our own Legislatures, State or National, scarcely any question could elicit a debate having that character. There was a time when the Senate of the United States was a body of the first authority upon any question of law, international or municipal. But that time has gone by, by reason in part of the diminution of the professional eminence of the lawyers in the Senate, and in still greater part by the increasing infusion of members who are not lawyers at all, but bosses or speculators.

And, of all legislative bodies, the British House of Lords is one of the last from which anybody would expect the authority which belongs to expert knowledge. Yet in fact the recent debate in that body on the "forward policy" in India has this character in a very eminent degree. It was opened by an elaborate exposition and defence of the policy by Lord ROBERTS of Kandahar, who is generally esteemed in England to be the foremost authority on the subject. There were, as one of the speakers remarked, five ex-Viceroys of India in the House when the debate took place, and of these five three actually took part in it- the Earl of NORTHBROOK, the Marquis of LANDSDOWNE, and the Marquis of RIPON. The debate was, in effect, a council of the most eminent and experienced Anglo-Indians. The one deduction which prevented it from being as instructive as it was authoritative was that the speakers took for granted as was quite natural, an understanding of the geography and ethnology of India and of the circumstances of the British occupation which not all of their hearers and comparatively few of their readers could reasonably be expected to possess.

As might have been expected;the differences developed in the debate were differences only in degree. All the speakers seemed to agree that it was necessary for Great Britain to control the main passes into Afghanistan, so as to be able to send troops through them in case of need. The dispute was only upon the question what was necessary to be done in order to accomplish this purpose. Upon this point Lord ROBERTS took up the extreme "forward" position that it was necessary for Great Britain to gain "political control" over what he called "the robber-haunted no man's-land" which surrounds the passes and forms the frontier between India and Afghanistan. The alternative policy of paying no attention to the tribesmen until they compelled attention to themselves by outrages, and then limiting action to "punitive expeditions" which would withdraw when their immediate purpose was accomplished, he declared to be ineffectual.

It is evident that the political control might often involve a military occupation, and that the chance of such an occasion would involve an increase in the Indian garrison and consequently in the expense of the Indian Government. The financial aspect of the question he declined to go into because he did not think it his business, but he was clear that it would cost less to acquire permanent control over the highlands than "to allow matters to drift until we are obliged, in order to resist aggression in Afghanistan, hurriedly to mobilize a sufficient force to subdue the hostile tribes through whose country we should have to pass before we could reach those strategical positions which it is essential we should be able to occupy without delay."

The sharpest criticism of this position was that of Lord RIPON, who labored the financial point and declared that India could not stand the additional burden of the forward policy would put upon her. But, upon the whole, the experts appeared to agree with Lord ROBERTS. What the debate makes clear is that the difference is not very great. The general principle, laid down by Lord SALISBURY at the beginning of the session, that it was "Manifest destiny," as history has shown, for barbarous hill tribes ultimately to accept civilization of the dwellers upon the plains below them was accepted by all the speakers. Great Britain can accelerate or retard that tendency, but in the long run it is sure to have its way. The dispute between the "forward policy" and the policy of standing still cannot last for many years before it is settled by the progress of events.

Desikachar,SV, Readings in the Constitutional History of India 1757-1947, Delhi : Oxford, 1984

R.M. Sayani on the burden of the Imperial Wars, 28 March 1898

As to the war, I do not wish to enter into a detailed discussion of the subject, but I will content myself with observing that the frontier policy and the consolidation of the frontier concern the welfare and prestige of England, and that the massing of troops on the North-West frontier and the outpouring of blood and treasure in that quarter can be justified on one ground only, namely, as a means of checking the advance of Russia in that direction, which, if allowed unchecked, might seriously threaten the British supremacy. Indeed, the so-called forward policy has its origin and continuance in the suspicion of Russians designs, and it is this suspicion that has given birth to the policy and the consequent constant wars on our frontiers. It is true the Secretary of State of India is reported to have said during the last week that the cost of these border wars should be borne by India alone, probably on the ground that the Indian frontier is a matter of purely local interest; but it is to be hoped the English people will soon be satisfied that that is not the true position of affairs, and that these wars are the direct and natural outcome of the Imperial policy of England, and that England should, in all fairness, pay the whole or at all events a considerable share of the consequent cost. ...

... In fact, it is the aggressive military policy that has necessitated heavy expeditions and added to our military increase in men and military unproductive railways to such an alarming extent that Government has been obliged to complain. 'Millions of money', say the Government of India in their despatch to the Secretary of State dated the 25th of March, 1890, 'have been spent on increasing the army in India, not against domestic enemies, or to prevent the incursions of the warlike peoples of adjoining countries, but to maintain the supremacy of British power in the East. The scope of all these great and costly measures reaches far beyond Indian limits, and the policy which dictates them is an Imperial policy. We claim, therefore, that in the maintenance of the British forces in this country a just and even liberal view should be taken of the charges which should legitimately be made against Indian revenues.'...

.. To the reasons already stated above in favour of a contribution it may be added that the defence of India against an European enemy is a matter of Imperial concern, that England derives from India important advantages, both direct and indirect, that the Indian army supplies a great addition of military power to England, that a large part of the British army us practically trained at the expense of India, and that the whole of the men passed into the reserve from the 70,000 troops in this country have been maintained entirely out of Indian revenues from the date of their first recruitment, that the army of India affords a great reservoir of military strength to England, that India contributes largely to the maintenance of a force which is not available for Indian requirements.