Sample case expositions

A case exposition is a more or less complete statement of the facts and holding of a judicial opinion for use in a larger work of legal analysis, such as a memo, scholarly paper, or legal brief. The actual facts and law included in the exposition can, and should, vary with the purpose of the larger subject being considered. Judicial opinions can involve a court’s examination of several issues, while only one or a few of those issues are relevant to the current subject. The court’s ruling must be presented carefully, including all matters essential to the court’s decision on the one or two issues discussed. The examples below are taken from judicial decisions, showing that courts, too, must engage in case exposition and legal analysis.

Types of case exposition

Alternating among different types of case exposition maintains the reader’s interest and engagement. Generally, the exposition must:

• introduce the case by a proper name and citation
• state sufficient facts to establish the case’s relevance to the subject
• state a discrete legal ruling from the case
• discuss the court’s rationale (its application of legal principle to case fact)
• give the disposition of the case in light of the ruling and rationale
• give proper in-text citations for all cited material, especially direct quotations

Enough theory. Examples, please!

A “supporting case” exposition

In this type of exposition, a general legal rule is asserted in the opening sentence. The supporting case is then cited as authority for the statement, and discussed in greater detail. A direct quote from the court’s ruling can be added.

The Supreme Court has identified limited circumstances where the retroactive application of a judicial decision can violate due process in the same way as an ex post facto law. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). The Court has not incorporated the specific prohibitions of the Ex Post Facto Clause “jot-for-jot” when applying the Due Process Clause to retroactive judicial decision-making, but rather has recognized “the more basic and general principle of fair warning” that the Supreme Court articulated in Bouie. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 1699, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001).

In Bouie, the petitioners were convicted under a state criminal statute which defined trespass as entry after notice from the owner that entry was prohibited. Prior state case law had uniformly held that a conviction under the statute required proof that notice was given to the would-be trespasser before entry. (p. 349 n.1). On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court enlarged the statute by construction to include the case where a person refused to leave premises after receiving notice, and upheld petitioner’s convictions. (p. 349-50, 357).

The Supreme Court in Bouie held the state supreme court’s retroactive application of its decision to affirm petitioners’ trespass convictions violated due process. The Court grounded its decision in the “basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime” (p. 350).

[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, appliedretroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law… If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction … If a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, it must not be given retroactive effect.

(p. 353-354) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

A “law first” exposition

This slightly different exposition introduces the case by name, sets forth the legal ruling, then explains the rationale, and again offers a direct quotation. In the case we’re considering, this exposition followed directly after the previous one!

In Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 1699, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the state supreme court’s decision to abandon the common law “year and a day” rule in upholding the appellant’s second degree murder conviction did not violate Bouie’s priniciple of due process. (p. 466-67). The Supreme Court in Rogers reasoned that the state court’s decision was neither unexpected nor indefensible under Bouie. The Court reasoned that the “year and a day” rule was “widely viewed as an outdated relic of the common law” at the time of the crime; the rule had “only the most tenuous foothold” in state common law and no statutory basis in state criminal law; and though the rule persisted in theory under the state’s common law, it had never actually been applied in a reported case.

Affirming the state supreme court’s decision to abolish the “year and a day” rule and uphold the appellant’s conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded:

There is, in short, nothing to indicate that the Tennessee court’s abolition of the rule in petitioner’s case represented an exercise of the sort of unfair and arbitrary judicial action against which the Due Process Clause aims to protect. Far from a marked and unpredictable departure from prior precedent, the court’s decision was a routine exercise of common law decision making in which the court brought the law into conformity with reason and common sense. It did so by laying to rest an archaic and outdated rule that had never been relied upon as a ground of decision in any reported Tennessee case.

(p. 1703).

A “facts first” exposition

After introducing this case with a citation, the discussion sets forth the facts of a specific issue in the appeal, showing its relevance to a broader discussion. The remainder of the first paragraph provides additional facts. The second paragraph explains in detail how the court ruled.

In Allison v. State, 675 P.2d 142 (1983), the appellant sought reversal of his conviction because a trial juror failed to disclose during voir dire that his mother-in-law had been employed by the District Attorney’s office a year before the trial. This Court remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing. The facts developed at the hearing showed that the juror’s mother-in-law had been employed as a legal researcher and had resigned her position seven months before appellant’s trial to attend law school. While an employee of the District Attorney, she had no contact with appellant’s case. She never spoke with the juror about the trial of appellant’s case, although she was aware of his service as a trial juror. Finally, the juror himself testified that his mother-in-law’s previous employment with the District Attorney’s office had no bearing on his decision in the case. (p. 151-52).

On these facts, the Court in Allison asked whether “in the absence of any demonstration of prejudice … is the assertion by the appellant that he would have exercised a peremptory challenge to remove the juror, had he known before trial what he now knows, sufficient cause to mandate reversal of this case?” (p. 153). The Court answered this question in the negative, finding “no evidence in the record which would lead us to believe that the appellant was prejudiced by the fact that [the juror] sat on his jury” (Id.). The Court distinguished the Manuel case, where it had concluded that a prospective juror’s failure to disclose his marriage to the District Attorney’s chief secretary warranted reversal. The Court reasoned that the employment of a juror’s mother-in-law as a legal researcher for the District Attorney did not “approach being a challenge for a cause;” and was “a far more attenuated relationship between the prosecution and the juror” than the undisclosed relationship in Manuel (Id.).

Direct statement with citation

Not every statement of law in a legal analysis requires an “exposition” of the entire case. A short, direct statement of a legal principle, followed by a “pinpoint” citation to the page where the material is found, can be quite effective.

The admission of photographs is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. Browning v. State, 134 P.3d 816, 837 (2006).

Gruesome crimes make for gruesome crime scene photographs, but the real issue is whether the probative value of relevant evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Pavatt v. State, 159 P.3d 272, 290 (2007).

In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court must determine whether the evidence, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would permit a rational trier of fact to find the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. State, 132 P.3d 1 (2006).

These brief statements of the law are not fact-dependent; in other words, the Court applies this principle of law in all cases (or issues) of the type being considered.