Substantive: Sales Force Management, Brand Management, Marketing Strategy
Methodological: Econometric Models, Field Experiments, Causal Inference
Drawing on my background in mathematics, I leverage a methodological toolkit of econometric models, field experiments, and causal inference methods. These allow me to research complex business challenges in sales management and marketing strategy, and provide evidence-based recommendations with the potential to advance both academic theory and marketing practice.
Under 4th round review at the Journal of Marketing
Winner, 2024 ISBM Doctoral Support Award Competition (US$5,000)
Runner-Up, 2025 AMA Sales SIG/USCA Doctoral Dissertation Proposal Award (US$1,000)
Winner, 2024 NASMEI Research Grant (US$1,200)
Presentations:
Thought Leadership on the Sales Profession Conference, ISMS Marketing Science Conference, Chicago Booth India Quantitative Marketing Conference, NASMEI Marketing Conference
Abstract:
Many firms struggle to design effective incentives for sales managers. Yet despite a vast literature on salespeople’s incentives, little theoretical or empirical research has examined managers’ incentive structures. The authors address a common dilemma that firms face: Should managers’ incentives be based on achieving an aggregate target (Aggregate Target Scheme, ATS) or instead be linked to the target achievement of each individual territory or salesperson (Individual Target Scheme, ITS)? A quasi-experiment reveals that, despite ATS’s flexibility and apparent alignment with firm objectives, an ATS-to-ITS transition improved not only performance balance but also overall performance. A follow-up scenario-based experiment with sales managers suggests that these effects may stem from the reallocation of resources from high to low performers but provides no evidence of an increase in managers’ overall resource investment. Subsequently, a survey of sales leaders indicates that a sales star bias—a managerial tendency to overallocate resources toward high performers relative to their marginal returns—likely drives suboptimal resource allocation under the flexible ATS. Finally, another field study documents that, following an ATS-to-ITS transition, managers increased joint fieldwork, especially with the lowest performers, and performance again improved. These results provide insights into managerial incentive design and offer recommendations for firms.
Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Marketing
2025 USCA PhD Research Travel Grant (US$1,000)
Finalist, 2024 Deakin University Visualise Your Thesis Competition
Presentations:
Thought Leadership on the Sales Profession Conference, Biennial Enhancing Sales Force Productivity Conference, Marketing Dynamics Conference, Winter AMA, Industrial Marketing Management Asia and Oceania Summit, Chicago Booth India Quantitative Marketing Conference, NASMEI Marketing Conference
Abstract:
Sales contests are widely used to motivate salespeople and command substantial investments by firms. However, they are conceived as merely short-term programs, with post-contest consequences largely unexplored. Furthermore, firms struggle to design contests that motivate low-performing salespeople. The authors investigate whether the choice of the contest metric—an overlooked design dimension—can create lasting impact and engage low performers. Through a quasi-experiment in the field, 176 salespeople were assigned to either a traditional-style contest focusing on outcome-based metrics (Outcome Sales Contest, OSC) or a novel design with added behavior-based metrics (Balanced Sales Contest, BSC). Across parametric and semi-parametric models, the authors find that BSC salespeople increase their customer visits more during the contest and that this behavior persists even after contest incentives are withdrawn. Importantly, balanced contests achieve these benefits without a performance compromise. Moreover, these effects are concentrated among lower-performing salespeople, who increase their visits more under BSC both during and after the contest and increase their performance more post-contest. Drawing on these results, this research demonstrates that contest metrics can be designed to induce persistent behavioral change and engage a broader base of salespeople.
Preparing for submission to the Journal of Marketing Research
Winner, 2026 AMA OFRSIG Young Scholar Research Competition (US$1,000)
Presentations:
Winter AMA, Organizational Frontline Research Symposium, Global Sales Science Institute Conference, Chicago Booth India Quantitative Marketing Conference
Abstract:
Delegating pricing authority to salespeople is a critical decision in the sales management realm that can considerably impact sales force motivation and firm performance. Through theoretical models and limited empirical designs, past literature has explored the advantages and disadvantages of price delegation, painting a mixed picture of its effectiveness. Critically, previous research identifies that price delegation may lead to moral hazard concerns (mispricing, mistargeting), which adversely affect firm performance. To tackle this issue, the authors align the interests of salespeople with those of the firm through an incentive-aligned price delegation (IAPD) scheme. They leverage data from 15,746 sales transactions and 68,692 service transactions across five years from a field experiment conducted across two automobile dealerships to examine the impact of IAPD on the short-term and long-term outcomes of the firm in a context where price negotiations are already prevalent. The results suggest that despite salespeople extending slightly higher discounts, IAPD improves both short-term (sales volume and profits) and long-term (post-purchase service volume and revenues) performance. Moreover, salespeople respond positively and increase their incentive earnings, creating a win-win situation for the firm and its salespeople.
2026 IIM Udaipur Seed Grant (US$5,200)
Winner, 2026 AMA DocSIG Mathew Joseph Emerging Scholar Award
2025 AMA-Sheth Foundation Doctoral Consortium Fellow, The Ohio State University
Baylor Fellow, 2024 AMA New Horizons Sales Faculty Consortium
2014 NIUS Physics Fellow (Batch XII), Government of India
DST-INSPIRE Fellow, Government of India: 2014 – 2019