Substantive: Sales Force Management, Brand Management, Marketing Strategy
Methodological: Econometric Models, Field Experiments, Causal Inference
Drawing on my background in mathematics, I leverage a methodological toolkit of econometric models, field experiments, and causal inference methods. These allow me to research complex business challenges in sales management and marketing strategy, and provide evidence-based recommendations with the potential to advance both academic theory and marketing practice. My work has been recognized with more than US$9,000 in prestigious grants.
Under 3rd round review at the Journal of Marketing
Winner, ISBM Doctoral Support Award Competition 2024 (US$5,000)
Winner, NASMEI Research Grant 2024 (US$1,200)
Runner-up, AMA Sales SIG/USCA Doctoral Dissertation Proposal Award 2025 (US$1,000)
Presentations:
Thought Leadership on the Sales Profession Conference, ISMS Marketing Science Conference, Chicago Booth India Quantitative Marketing Conference, NASMEI Marketing Conference
Abstract:
Many firms find it challenging to design effective incentive schemes for their sales managers. However, little theoretical or empirical research has examined sales managers’ incentive structures despite a vast literature on incentive design for salespeople. The authors address a common dilemma that firms grapple with: Should sales managers’ incentives be based on achieving an aggregate target (Aggregate Target Scheme, ATS) or instead be linked to the target achievement of each individual territory or salesperson (Individual Target Scheme, ITS)? A quasi-experiment in which a firm transitioned from ATS to ITS reveals that ITS not only improved performance balance across managers’ territories but also increased overall performance. A follow-up scenario-based experiment with sales managers suggests that this was not driven by an increase in managers’ overall resource investment but rather a reallocation from high to low performers. Subsequently, a survey of sales leaders identifies that managers are prone to a non-pecuniary bias toward high performers that drives a suboptimal resource allocation under ATS. Finally, a second field study reveals that an ATS-to-ITS transition leads managers to reallocate resources across both salespeople and activities, resulting in overall performance improvement. These results offer novel insights into managerial incentive design and actionable recommendations for firms.
Under 1st round review at the Journal of Marketing
Winner, USCA PhD Research Travel Grant 2025 (US$1,000)
Finalist, Deakin University Visualise Your Thesis Competition 2024
Presentations:
Thought Leadership on the Sales Profession Conference, Biennial Enhancing Sales Force Productivity Conference, Marketing Dynamics Conference, Winter AMA, Industrial Marketing Management Asia and Oceania Summit, Chicago Booth India Quantitative Marketing Conference, NASMEI Marketing Conference
Abstract:
Sales contests are widely used to motivate salespeople and command substantial investments by firms. However, they are conceived as merely short-term programs, with post-contest consequences largely unexplored. Furthermore, firms struggle to design contests that motivate low-performing salespeople. The authors investigate whether the choice of the contest metric — an overlooked design dimension — can create lasting impact and engage low performers. Through a quasi-experiment in the field, 176 salespeople were assigned to either a traditional-style contest focusing on outcome-based metrics (Outcome Sales Contest, OSC) or a novel design with added behavior-based metrics (Balanced Sales Contest, BSC). Across parametric and semi-parametric models, the authors find that BSC salespeople increase their customer visits more during the contest and that this behavior persists even after contest incentives are withdrawn. Importantly, balanced contests achieve these benefits without a performance compromise. Moreover, these effects are concentrated among lower-performing salespeople, who increase their visits more under BSC both during and after the contest and increase their performance more post-contest. Drawing on these results, this research demonstrates that contest metrics can be designed to induce persistent behavioral change and engage a broader base of salespeople.
Preparing for submission to the Journal of Marketing Research
Winner, AMA OFRSIG Young Scholar Research Competition 2026 (US$1,000)
Presentations:
Winter AMA, Chicago Booth India Quantitative Marketing Conference, Organizational Frontline Research Symposium (upcoming), Global Sales Science Institute Conference
Abstract:
Delegating pricing authority to salespeople is a critical decision in the sales management realm that can considerably impact sales force motivation and firm performance. Through theoretical models and limited empirical designs, past literature has explored the advantages and disadvantages of price delegation, painting a mixed picture of its effectiveness. Critically, previous research identifies that price delegation may lead to moral hazard concerns (mispricing, mistargeting), which adversely affect firm performance. To tackle this issue, the authors align the interests of salespeople with those of the firm through an incentive-aligned price delegation (IAPD) scheme. They leverage data from 15,746 sales transactions and 68,692 service transactions across five years from a field experiment conducted across two automobile dealerships to examine the impact of IAPD on the short-term and long-term outcomes of the firm in a context where price negotiations are already prevalent. The results suggest that despite salespeople extending slightly higher discounts, IAPD improves both short-term (sales volume and profits) and long-term (post-purchase service volume and revenues) performance. Moreover, salespeople respond positively and increase their incentive earnings, creating a win-win situation for the firm and its salespeople.