proleptic love for the unborn

I argue that aspiring/prospective parents can love early fetuses (and even embryos) as persons, and that this kind of love can be appropriate regardless of whether the fetuses will end up becoming persons. I also show that this position is compatible with the view that fetuses are not persons with full-fledged moral status.

lunchbox moment: against parental concession

I explain what the so-called 'lunchbox moment' is and argue against paternalistically packing non-ethnic lunches for one’s children for the purpose of preventing them from encountering peer ostracism.

the ethical costs of immigration

I argue that intergenerational conflicts are prevalent among immigrant families and unjustly disadvantage immigrant children’s pursuit of ethical goods such as fulfillment and flourishing. I also argue that the state has a duty to mitigate these ethical costs faced by immigrant children and offer a tentative proposal for how to do so.

against the right to be loved

I argue against the claim that children have a right to be loved and propose that parental love is best conceived as a directed obligation without a corresponding claim right.

Confucian parenting: what it is, and why it is problematic

I show that the Analects 論語 16.13 is consistent with key Confucian beliefs and thus captures the ideals of Confucian parenting. I then present both external and internal criticisms against Confucian parenting and argue that it fails on its own terms.

gratitude and tiger parenting

I argue that children of so-called 'tiger parents' don't owe their parents gratitude for their intrusive parenting even if they benefit from it.

why gestational surrogacy is often exploitative (in progress)

the epistemic argument for nothing about us without us

I disambiguate different formulations of—and arguments for—the disability rights movement's slogan Nothing About Us Without Us and argue that the inclusion of disabled people should not and need not rely on the epistemic argument.

the centrality of sexual identity

I (attempt to) explain why some people think that their sexual orientation is central to who they are, why some don't, and why both sides can be justified.

resisting the existence is resistance narrative

I argue that although resistance can be unintentional, there are serious moral reasons against dismissing or negating oppressed individuals' interpretations of their own existence as non-resistance. 

separating doxastic wrongs and doxastic wronging

I argue that extant accounts of doxastic wronging unjustly blame victims of sexual harassment and marginalized aspiring academics for doxastically wronging themselves. I also propose a solution to this problem. (Hint: it’s in the title.)

mitigating factors for doxastic wrongs

I develop the demandingness objection against doxastic wronging and, in response to it, propose three excuses / mitigating factors for doxastic wrongs. 

why Christian faith can't be doxastic venture

I argue that Christian faith cannot be doxastic venture. In other words, Christian faith cannot consist of theistic belief (the belief that God exists) that rests on inadequate evidence. 

friendly atheism

I argue that it's logically coherent to believe that God doesn't exist and that some theists are rationally justified.