[under review]

I analyze the nature of the so-called lunchbox moment and propose how immigrant parents can best help their children navigate the oppressive pressure to assimilate.

the ethical costs of immigration

I argue that intergenerational conflicts are prevalent among immigrant families and unjustly disadvantage immigrant parents and children’s pursuit of ethical goods such as well-being and flourishing. I also argue that the state has a duty to mitigate these ethical costs faced by immigrant families and offer a tentative proposal for how to do so.

the privilege to be loved the "right" way

I argue that immigrant children are saddled with a distinctive interpretive burden in deciphering their parents' love language, and that this burden can impede their flourishing. I also argue against the claim that children have a right to be loved.

an evolving promise: a normative account of parental commitment

I argue that to become a parent requires a commitment not just to providing for one's future children but also to continually expand one's own values.

why tiger parenting does not warrant gratitude

I elucidate the nature of so-called tiger parenting, clarify how it is only partially reflective of core Confucian values (Analects 論語 16.13), and argue that children of tiger parents don't owe their parents gratitude for their intrusive parenting even if they benefit from it.

proleptic love for the unborn

I argue that aspiring/prospective parents can love early fetuses (and even embryos) as persons, and that this kind of love can be appropriate regardless of whether the fetuses will end up becoming persons. I also show that this position is compatible with the view that fetuses are not persons with full-fledged moral status.

why altruistic surrogacy can be exploitative

I argue that surrogacy is often exploitative due to the epistemic barriers that prospective surrogates face regarding surrogacy itself and the nature of their future relationship with the intended parents. I show that my account can explain (1) why transnational surrogacy tends to be more problematic than intranational surrogacy, (2) likewise for commercial and altruistic surrogacy, and (3) why altruistic surrogacy can still be exploitative.

resisting the existence is resistance narrative

I argue that although resistance can be unintentional, there are serious moral reasons against dismissing or negating oppressed individuals' interpretations of their own existence as non-resistance.

the centrality of sexual identity

I (attempt to) explain why some people think that their sexual orientation is central to who they are, why some don't, and why both sides can be justified.

the epistemic argument for nothing about us without us

I disambiguate different formulations of—and arguments for—the disability rights movement's slogan Nothing About Us Without Us and argue that the inclusion of disabled people should not and need not rely on the epistemic argument.

separating doxastic wrongs and doxastic wronging

I argue that extant accounts of doxastic wronging unjustly blame victims of sexual harassment and marginalized aspiring academics for doxastically wronging themselves. I also propose a solution to this problem. (Hint: it’s in the title.)

mitigating factors for doxastic wrongs

I develop the demandingness objection against doxastic wronging and, in response to it, propose three excuses / mitigating factors for doxastic wrongs. 

why Christian faith can't be doxastic venture

I argue that Christian faith cannot be doxastic venture. In other words, Christian faith cannot consist of theistic belief (the belief that God exists) that rests on inadequate evidence. 

friendly atheism

I argue that it's logically coherent to believe that God doesn't exist and that some theists are rationally justified.