Never Again, Never Forget

The Ghost of our Past

53 years ago, Martial Law was declared by then-President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. under the premise of preventing an imminent “communist rebellion”. Under the regime, Congress was padlocked, freedom of expression was curtailed, the press was suppressed, due process was fragrantly violated, and political and economic power was concentrated in the president and his cronies who benefited from rampant corruption of the economic and political systems of the country and the repression of dissidents and political enemies. The Martial Law years are soaked in the blood of Filipinos against the backdrop of the lavish lifestyles of those in power who extracted the wealth of the nation for their personal benefit. There were 11,103 victims of human rights violations from the declaration of Martial Law to the end of the Marcos regime in 1986 (HRVVMC, n.d.). To this day, the stolen wealth of the people has yet to be completely returned by those who stole it from them. Several participants and enablers of the Marcos dictatorship are also yet to take accountability for their crimes. 

Infrastructure projects under Martial Law 

The years of the dictatorship are well known for the extravagance of the Marcos family and the contentious use of public funds for vanity projects that brought little economic benefits to the people. This usage made even more odious when considered in the context of the suffering of the ordinary Filipino under Martial Law. These large infrastructure projects were undertaken to prop up the regime and to project an image of prosperity and progress to conceal the rot that has set in the once democratic institutions of the country and the tear in the social fabric of Filipino society. 

According to De Dios et al. (1984) in their report on the Philippine economic crisis of the 1980s, capital outlays of the national government substantially increased during the Martial Law years. The total increased from ₱5.2 billion in the period of 1970-1976 to ₱15.3 billion in the period of 1977-1980. There was a decrease in total capital outlays in the period 1981-1983 to ₱14.4 billion, although the amount is still substantial. From these figures we can see that government spending on infrastructure was prominent during the Marcos regime. In fact, it was only in 1972, when Martial Law was declared, that the total annual amount of capital outlays reached the billion peso mark at ₱1.2 billion.

Macroeconomic theory states that government expenditures stimulate economic growth through what is called the multiplier effect in which a single peso of government expenditures results in a greater change in national income (Mankiw, 2018). An example of this is the construction of a bridge that improves connectivity between different cities and municipalities, thereby facilitating more efficient transportation of goods and services and stimulating economic activity in the country. Indeed, infrastructure spending is not bad in itself but it is crucial to consider whether such expenditures generate the desired economic benefit. In the case of the Martial Law years, particularly in the period 1977-1980, the share of other capital outlays, which are projects not under the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation, and Communications (MPWTC) and the Ministry of Public Highways (MPH), increased to 20.2% of total capital outlays (De Dios et al., 1984). Some of the most famous infrastructure projects of the Marcos dictatorship were built in this period. These included the Manila Bay reclamation, the building complex we now know as the CCP complex, the Batasan building, the three national medical centers in Quezon City, and many more impressive edifices.

This increase in the share of other capital outlays, as represented by these flagship projects, was problematic because the buildings did not significantly contribute to an increase in the national output (De Dios et al., 1984). As such, the projects were not economically justified as it increased the government deficit with no clear benefit in return. Not only were these projects economically unsound, they were mired with corruption and other anomalies that invite scrutiny. Take for example the infamous Manila Film Center which cost the government $25 million. The construction of the film center was rushed to ensure its availability for the Manila International Film Festival in 1982 (Ateneo Martial Law Museum, n.d.). In 1981, the roof of the center collapsed and 169 workers were buried under the rubble. The tight construction schedule and the political pressure of the first lady’s prioritization of the project are theorized to have caused the accident. Although completed in time for the festival, the event fell short of reaching the projected $52 million revenue. Moreover, the $4 million operating costs of the center were shouldered by the Central Bank of the Philippines.

Another notable infrastructure project under the Marcos dictatorship is the Bataan Nuclear Powerplant which was constructed to alleviate the energy needs of the country during the energy crisis of the 1970s (Verafiles, n.d.). The project began construction in 1976 and was initially priced at $500 million but the costs of the project ballooned to $2.3 billion upon its completion in 1984, a remarkable 360% increase. Construction was paused in 1979 due to a nuclear accident in the USA which raised questions about the safety of the facility being built in Bataan. A report was commissioned by the government to determine the safety of the project. Despite the government commissioned report detailing how the Bataan Nuclear Powerplant lacked proper safeguards against accidents like the one that transpired in the US, Marcos ordered the resumption of the construction of the powerplant.

These are only a few of the projects that ballooned government debt and brought little to no economic benefits to the country. Make no mistake, however, that only these grand infrastructure projects ingrained in the memories of Filipinos were mired with corruption. Even more simple infrastructure projects under the MPWTC and the MPH were fertile grounds for Marcos’ cronies to plunder. One such crony was Rodolfo Cuenca who owned the Construction & Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). Cuenca’s company was favored by the Marcos regime through awards of the biggest and most lucrative government infrastructure projects (Ateneo Martial Law Museum, n.d.). The government favored the CDCP even when other bidders were more competitive. The rot of corruption in the system was deep as it was wide and it blew a hole in the finances of the country just so Marcos and his cronies could line their pockets.

Debt Crisis

By the turn of the decade, the weakness of this debt-fueled growth was exposed. The very loans that financed Marcos’ showcase had become a heavy burden. From 1970 to 1982, the country’s external debt ballooned more than tenfold, from $2.3 billion to $24 billion (Dohner & Intal, 1989). Nearly half of this debt was short-term, meaning this was meant to be paid within a year, leaving the Philippines highly vulnerable to global shocks.

These shocks came quickly. International interest rates nearly doubled at the start of the decade, while world oil prices surged, driving the cost of imports. Philippine exports, already lagging behind ASEAN neighbors, contracted by an average of five percent per year between 1980 and 1983 (Dohner & Intal, 1989). With fewer goods sold abroad the country earned fewer dollars, precisely what it needed to pay its debts. The mismatch between rising debt obligations and declining export earnings created a severe balance of payments deficit, this meant that more dollars were leaving the country than the amount coming in. To make matters worse, the Marcos administration insisted on fixing the peso’s exchange rate. In practice, this meant the Central Bank was burning through its own dollar savings just to hold up the illusion of a stable peso.  By 1982, reserves had fallen so low that the Philippines could not even cover a single month of imports (De Dios, et al. 2021). 

The peso collapsed in response, sliding from ₱10 to the dollar in the early 1980s to ₱20 by 1984 (Malin, 1985). Because almost all of the country’s loans were in dollars, this depreciation meant the cost of repayment in peso effectively doubled. Ordinary Filipinos bore the brunt. A weaker peso made imported essentials such as fuel, medicine, and food far more expensive. Inflation exploded to 50 percent in 1984, wiping out household savings and gutting the value of wages (Malin, 1985). Practically, this meant that a family who spent ₱1,000 a month on groceries in 1983 suddenly needed ₱ 1,500 for the same basket of goods the following year. Salaries didn’t rise to match, so every peso in a worker’s pocket was worth dramatically less.

The assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr. in August 1983 deepened the crisis. Political instability triggered massive capital flight, with wealthy Filipinos and foreign investors rushing to pull their money out of the country. In October 1983, the Marcos administration declared a moratorium on eternal debt payments, the only Asian country to do so (Dohner & Intal, 1989). This effectively cut the Philippines off from international credit markets and forced it to seek an emergency rescue from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In truth, the shock of Aquino’s murder only hastened what was already inevitable, years of fiscal irresponsibility finally unravelled. For more than a decade, the government had borrowed recklessly, run persistent deficits, and squandered funds on unproductive projects and crony deals. The country’s finances had long been hollowed out even before 1983, and at long last the fragile economy has been pushed to the edge. 

The IMF agreed to a standby arrangement in late 1984—a rescue loan meant to stabilize a collapsing economy—but only in exchange for harsh austerity: higher taxes, deep cuts in government spending, the removal of subsidies, and the dismantling of state monopolies in sugar and coconuts (Malin, 1985). These measures may have calmed foreign creditors, but they crushed ordinary Filipinos. The removal of subsidies made rice, fuel, and other essentials more expensive. Spending cuts gutted already weak public services just when families needed them most.

The economy imploded, contracting by 7.3 percent in both 1984 and 1985—the steepest collapse since World War II (De Dios et al., 2021). Real incomes nosedived, falling by 18 percent between 1983 and 1986 (Dohner & Intal, 1989). For millions of families, it meant jobs lost, savings wiped out, and a sudden freefall into poverty. An economic collapse of this scale would entail factories shutting down, jeepney drivers seeing few passengers, and fresh graduates facing a job market with vanishing opportunities (De Dios et a., 2021).

Meanwhile, the social costs rippled outward. Hunger stalked Negros as the sugar industry imploded. Businesses shuttered across Manila. Small farmers and laborers found themselves caught between rising costs and collapsing wages. Even the financial system buckled as crony-linked banks failed, forcing costly state bailouts that widened the fiscal hole (Nascimento, 1990). Insurgency movements gained momentum, feeding off public despair.

Economists would later call the 1980s a “lost decade,” with per capita incomes not returning to pre-crisis levels until the early 2000s (De Dios et al., 2021). The so-called “New Society” that Marcos had promised stood exposed: a broken economy, a hollowed-out state, and a population paying the price for decades of corruption and debt-driven illusions. The gleaming edifices of the 1970s remained, but beneath them lay a country shackled to debt—monuments to a dictatorship that built showcases while burying the nation’s future.

Mirroring our Past

In the spirit of fairness, it should be noted that there have been a number of benefits to the Filipino people that have come as a result of the Edifice Complex Projects of Marcos Sr.'s  administration. However, all of these benefits are tinged and outweighed by the harsh reality that these infrastructures are built upon a foundation of corruption and the suffering of the lowest in our society, both then and now. This mirage of progress and stability has become shiny and beneficial enough that people are willing to forget and even forgive the cruelty and damage done to the country, the economy, and the people. The bloodiness of this point in Philippine history has become so dulled and taken as a matter of fact in the public consciousness that the tragedies surrounding these complexes, of construction workers dying due to rushed production schedules and thousands of the urban poor displaced from their homes, have become so easy to gloss over.

In recent times, the Filipino people seem doomed to face a crisis similar to the corruption that plagued the country during Martial Law. Recent flood control projects have shown a great number of similarities to the funding strategies and illusions of progress during Martial Law. Among the reports of suspected embezzlement surrounding these projects, the most apparent indicator was the fact that since July of 2022, ₱545 billion were allocated for flood control projects, however, ₱100 billion of those funds, or around 20% of the total budget, were undertaken by only 15 contractors out of a total of 2,409 contractors (Presidential Communications Office, 2025). It is in areas such as Bulacan and Tarlac where these contracts were undertaken that investigations found walls and embankments in disrepair and ultimately ineffective against flooding. The reported costs of each of these projects ranged from ₱20 million to ₱50 million. As a result, damage to infrastructure and the homes of the people in the affected areas and communities has amounted to ₱500 million just after Typhoon Crising and the Habagat Season (Patinio, 2025).

Further accusations of corruption and embezzlement have since risen out from these initial reports and it is here where many parallels start to show between the Martial Law years and the current administration. Families such as the Discayas have been heavily marked with suspicion after the discovery of their ownership of companies that undertook two of the top three most expensive flood control projects in the country. The release of videos online that showed their vast collection of 28 luxury cars and broadcast their ostentatious lifestyle only fueled public distrust and fury. Furthermore, videos showcasing the luxury brands and products owned by the children or relatives of these flood control contractors and politicians began circulating on various social media platforms, further exposing that it is not just a few in these tight-knit political circles that benefit from the plundering of taxpayer money. All the while, the human cost of this corruption only continues to worsen, with the death toll from the multiple tropical cyclones in July amounting to 37 people with 8 others remaining missing. Over a 100,000 individuals needed shelter at evacuation centers and there were heavy losses to infrastructure and agriculture amounting to ₱10 billion and ₱1.9 billion in damages respectively (ABS-CBN News, 2025).

However, unlike the evolution of public perception of the Martial Law era projects, the reaction of the Filipino public towards this issue is more united in opposition and fury. The flaunted opulence of families and individuals like the Discayas and the impunity of government officials involved in the anomalous flood control projects while thousands of people lose their homes and livelihoods to flooding has sparked widespread outrage. Filipinos on various social media platforms have expressed a feeling of betrayal due to the misuse and embezzlement of their taxes. Public outrage that was first directed to contractors and construction tycoons soon engulfed the lawmakers and politicians who allowed this corruption to continue for so long (Guinto & Simonette, 2025). 

Never Again, Never Forget

Then and now, our country is being plundered by people in power who use their positions and connections in government to enrich themselves at the expense of the general welfare of the people. Nearly four decades after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, we live in a post-EDSA society where our democratic institutions have been restored. We have the power to vote, enjoy a free press, and no longer live under the shadow of a martial rule. Yet, we are still haunted by our past. Corruption drains our national coffers, impunity still shields the powerful from justice, and our leaders treat public office as an entitlement rather than a privilege and a responsibility.

Let us learn from our history. The crisis of Martial Law reminds us that unchecked power, corruption, and unaccountability lead only to collapse and we, the people, will pay the price. To forget is to risk repeating the same mistakes. To remember is to remain vigilant and to demand better from those who govern us. Above all, we must act, animated by the lesson taught to us by the spirit of ‘86: that power ultimately resides in us, the sovereign people.

NEVER AGAIN

NEVER FORGET

Disclaimer: The views expressed by the authors are their own and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the organization, department, or the university. Any errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors. 

References

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