Glossary for the BAL-Looping Framework of Consciousness


 

Part 1: The Foundational Engine (The Basic Animal Brain)

 

Brain at Large (BAL)

The brain at large (BAL) is the entire control system – brain and body working as one. It regulates all activity of the organism, using sensory input and internal feedback to guide actions toward achieving and maintaining its goals.

The BAL includes every process that supports the organism’s operation. It isn’t confined to the brain – many functions run through constant exchange with the body, which is why the boundary between them isn’t very useful in practice.

Another way to think of this is to imagine a Venn diagram where the BAL represents the entire frame – the complete operating system of the organism. Later, we will examine one particular area within this larger space: the language faculty, which in functional terms is called the proxy transfer device (PTD).

See also: Goal-Seeking System, Internal Model

 

Goal-Seeking System

The BAL is constantly working to bring the organism from its current state to a goal state – a configuration that satisfies internal or environmental demands (e.g., satiety, warmth, safety, social inclusion). These are not goals in the psychological sense, but functional targets shaped by the organism’s evolutionary and developmental history.

The BAL is not a passive responder to input. It is an active, cybernetic operator that adjusts the organism’s behavior to bring the sensed world into alignment with its internal needs. But it cannot do this by simply reorganizing itself. A goal state is not something the system can declare or imagine – it must be achieved in the world.

As an imperative imposed by evolutionary constraints, the BAL must close the gap through action, not mere internal rearrangement. Any achievement of any goal state must be matched with information streaming in through the sensory system, confirming it.

See also: Brain at Large, Internal Model, Thermostat Analogy

 

Internal Model

To guide the organism’s actions consistent with its needs, the BAL embodies information about the environment. According to cybernetic theory, it does this by building and maintaining an internal model – a continuously updated set of learned configurations that reflect patterns the BAL either possesses innately or has built through interaction with the environment.

This model is not a symbolic map or abstract representation. It is a functional counterpart to the environment: a real-time structure that behaves in ways that match the relevant parts of the world. The model embodies the cause-and-effect relationships and temporal dynamics of the environment – how things connect, influence each other, and unfold over time. Like an interlocking logical machine, it captures not just where things are positioned in space, but how they are situated in time and in terms of causation.

The internal model changes as the BAL interacts with the environment. Its value is measured by how well it supports the organism’s continued operation, not by how closely it matches an idea or description.

See also: Neuronal Proxy, Proxy Configuration, Goal-Seeking System

 

Status Quo Ante

The brain at large carries forward an expected state of its surroundings rather than rebuilding its internal model from scratch each moment. This status quo ante is a baseline sense of “how things normally are,” and it works because it is efficient: by holding on to what is already familiar, the BAL avoids the constant effort of full re-analysis.

Instead of continuously reconstructing the whole internal model in a Sisyphean effort, the BAL makes quick checks to see whether the present still matches what it knows. Very often, everything lines up and the system can move forward, using its operational resources for other purposes.

But when it discovers something different from that expected state – a new object in a familiar room, an unexpected sound, a change in someone’s manner – it immediately narrows its attention. The difference is examined until it is understood and absorbed into the model, which then becomes the new “normal.”

This habit of mind explains many everyday moments: when one notices that furniture has been moved; when one sees a cat pause at something unfamiliar in its territory; or when one drives along a customary route while thinking of other things until some unexpected situation pulls the focus sharply into the present.

The status quo ante shapes all BAL activity, not just sensory perception. Social exchanges, bodily states, even abstract reasoning lean on the same strategy: hold on to the familiar, and turn full attention to what changes.

This way of working has been in place for hundreds of millions of years and runs constantly, with or without looping. It is one of the BAL’s most basic ways of keeping its inner model of the world in step with both the outer environment and its own internal state.

See also: Internal Model, Overview and Focus, Search Templates


Neuronal Proxy

This phrase is used in its most straightforward sense. “Neuronal” because it involves neurons, and “proxy” because it’s a stand-in – an element that takes the place of something, at a different location. A neuronal proxy is something within the brain’s internal model that stands in for a discrete element in the external environment.

A neuronal proxy is not a single neuron or even a localized cluster of neurons. It is defined functionally, not anatomically. A proxy may be a widely distributed pattern spanning multiple brain regions, a dynamic network that shifts over time, or a complex configuration involving millions of neural connections. What makes it a “proxy” is not its physical location but its functional role: it reliably corresponds to a specific, discrete element in the organism’s world.

Any given proxy is a stable, innate or functionally learned configuration that arises through interaction with the environment and becomes part of the internal model. Each proxy corresponds to a distinct entity, quality, or relationship – for example: red, dog, behind, rough, above, or warm. These function as atomic building blocks (components) that maintain their discrete identity while combining with other proxies into larger configurations.

Proxies are not ideas or symbols. They are operational structures – patterns of activation that consistently emerge in relevant contexts and influence behavior. A proxy for “red” remains functionally identical whether applied to an apple, a car, or a sunset. A proxy for “behind” works the same way whether describing spatial relationships between trees, people, or buildings. Their usefulness lies in this stability and reusability: when a particular element is encountered again in the external environment, the BAL can use the same neuronal proxy, treating it as a familiar, discrete component.

A helpful analogy is the Micronesian stick chart – a navigational tool that is not a graphic map, but rather made of sticks, pieces of rope, and shells, with each part corresponding to a real feature such as an ocean swell, current, or island. In the same way, a proxy is a stand-in for something specific in the environment, serving as a discrete functional element the BAL can use whenever that same condition is encountered.

See also: Proxy Configuration, Proxy Activation, Internal Model

 

Proxy Configuration

This phrase refers to an interrelated grouping of proxies. The largest possible proxy configuration is the brain’s internal model, while any connected grouping of it can be referred to as a proxy configuration.

A proxy configuration is simply a group of stand-ins that are active at the same time and connected in ways that match their real-world relationships. Together, they form a small model of some part of the organism’s environment. These groupings change constantly as the BAL responds to new situations.

Configurations are not language or pictures. They are functional structures in the brain – interrelated stand-ins (internal proxies) that together give the BAL something it can work with when guiding the organism’s behavior.

See also: Neuronal Proxy, Proxy Activation, Interfunctional Complementation

 

Proxy Activation

Activation refers to the event by which a proxy from the BAL’s total repertoire becomes active – brought into the working model the BAL is running at that moment. Any event that brings a proxy from potential into active use constitutes activation.

Proxies never work alone. Once one is activated, it always joins others in a configuration that models some part of the organism’s environment. The BAL can then work from that model to guide behavior in real time.

Proxies can be activated in three main ways:

1. Direct environmental input – This is universal in animals. Something in the world triggers the stand-in directly through the senses.

2. Interindividual communication – Humans can use structured signals (speech, symbolic gestures) to activate matching stand-ins (proxies and proxy configurations) in another person’s BAL. Many animals do signal to one another, but their signals don’t transmit a detailed scene. A bark might mean “danger” or “come,” but not “three birds on the branch” versus “two birds on the rock.” So, while many species communicate, only humans can transfer well-formed proxy configurations.

3. Internal reuse of incipient activity in the outgoing speech channel, by way of internal attention to expressive resonance – The BAL can activate its own stand-ins (proxies) through looping: proxy activations are triggered by incipient activity in the output channel that is mirrored into the input channel through cross-channel coupling. Functionally, think of the BAL “eavesdropping” on what it is poised to express and using that as input. (Here and elsewhere I use “resonance” as shorthand for this production-comprehension coupling.)

See also: Neuronal Proxy, Proxy Configuration, Looping

 


Part 2: The Gateway to Expression and Shared Meaning

 

Proxy Transfer Device (PTD)

The PTD is the functional system that allows one BAL to transfer its internal proxy configurations to another BAL. When people speak to one another and truly understand each other, they are using their PTDs to activate matching proxy configurations across two different brains.

In nonfunctional terms, it is called the language faculty. But the word “language” carries a lot of luggage, which is not needed in the framework, since many aspects of language – like syntax, grammar, etc. – all collapse within the transfer, being irrelevant to the framework.

The PTD operates through two coordinated channels. The outgoing channel takes an active proxy configuration within one person’s BAL and converts it into an external signal – whether spoken words, written symbols, gestures, or other structured expressions. The incoming channel receives such signals from another person and converts them back into proxy configurations within the receiver’s BAL.

This transfer process is what makes genuine communication possible. When you say “red cup” and someone understands you, their PTD has successfully activated proxies for “red” and “cup” that functionally match the ones that were active in your BAL when you spoke. The match between proxy configurations is what constitutes shared meaning.

Functionally, the PTD has two channels. The outgoing channel formats and sends messages, when you speak, gesture, or write. The incoming channel receives messages and converts them into internal proxy configurations, when you listen to speech or read.

The PTD is not limited to spoken language – it includes any structured system that can reliably transfer specific proxy configurations from one BAL to another.

See also: PTD Channels, Looping, Coterminous Principle, Difference from Inner Speech Models

 

PTD Channels (o-series and i-series)

The PTD has two channels: an outgoing channel (o-series) for sending messages and an incoming channel (i-series) for receiving them.

The outgoing channel begins with a configuration of neuronal proxies active in the BAL and converts them into a linear series of signs that can be sent out as a message. In humans, this message might be speech, writing, or a gesture. The process ends in muscle movements that produce the signal.

The incoming channel starts with the raw signal: sound waves when hearing speech, or visual symbols when reading. These arrive as a linear stream of discrete elements, which are then combined back into a proxy configuration in the BAL. The message is always coded in linear form for transmission, but the result is always a multidimensional structure the BAL can work with directly. Once this structure is formed, meaning has been transferred.

What makes this process work is that both channels handle the same basic currency: neuronal proxy configurations. The outgoing channel breaks them down into a linear sequence for transmission; the incoming channel rebuilds them into the original multidimensional form. 

See also: Proxy Transfer Device, Message Conversion, PTD Resonance

 

Realm of Effation

The Realm of Effation is everything humans have ever put into language or language-like form – spoken, written, recorded, remembered, or taught. It is made up of messages that can be converted to proxy configurations within a BAL, when received through the input channel of a PTD.

This is not an abstract “cloud” of ideas. It is a functional space: all the messages that exist in a form that could activate proxy configurations in someone else’s internal model. In a sense, many fields such as law, literature, mathematics, history, and science all live here in the form of tangible material traces, which have been expressed by a PTD, and can potentially be received by another.

The realm of effation includes all proxy configurations that have ever been “effated,” that is, which have been expressed by the outgoing channel of a PTD. So this realm also includes incipient activity in the PTD – the activity which is detected and converted into meaning during looping.

The notion of the realm of effation is not new. Shakespeare knew of it, for example, when he wrote in his Sonnet 18, “So long as men can breathe or eyes can see,/ So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.” The “this” is the message embodied in the sonnet – a thought that began internally, passed through the PTD, and became eternal in the Realm of Effation. Written down, it can reactivate proxy configurations in any reader’s BAL. The realm is functional, not metaphysical: it consists of all expressions that can be reliably converted into proxy configurations through the incoming channel of a PTD.

See also: Proxy Transfer Device

 

Message Conversion

When a message comes in through the PTD’s input channel, it travels as a linear stream – spoken words, written symbols, or gestures in sequence. The final step is when this stream is converted into stand-ins (a configuration of neuronal proxies) inside the BAL. At this point the linearity is lost; the message is converted into a multidimensional configuration of interrelated neuronal proxies within the BAL.

This is the moment when the meaning of the message is grasped. The outside signal stops being an external code (or incipient code in the case of looping) and becomes part of your internal model.

See also: PTD Channels, Proxy Activation

 

PTD Resonance

Within the PTD, the expressive (output) and receptive (input) channels are tightly coordinated. Production-comprehension coupling is an established mechanism in both infants and adults. In this glossary the term “resonance” is used as a shorthand for this coupling across corresponding stages.

In the PTD, this bidirectional influence produces a kind of “handshake” between channels: each element in the outgoing stream is paired with a corresponding element in the incoming stream. During its operation as an interindividual communication device, this resonance is important for maintaining the proper functioning of the system.

This same resonance also allows for a remarkable step during the infant’s development. The BAL discovers that it can use feedback from this resonance – the incipient activity in the output channel can be sensed via the resonance in the input channel. This allows the BAL to capture the gist of the message even as it is forming.

Finally, the BAL learns that it does not have to actually speak in order to receive this meaning – it can truncate the flow in the output channel, stopping short of issuing the commands to the motor staging areas used in speech. It thus receives its potential expression as input. This shift is not a rewiring but a functional repurposing: a system evolved for outward communication is exapted for an internal function, allowing proxies to be activated directly.

See also: Neuronal Reuse, Looping, PTD Channels, Gist


 

Part 3: The Mechanism of Subjective Experience

 

Neural Reuse

Neural reuse is a well-established principle: preexisting neural pathways can be exapted – used for new functions. The emergence of looping is a classic example, but the mechanism is simpler than an active “rewiring” of circuits.

The PTD and the resonance between its output and input channels (see PTD Resonance) evolved to enable interindividual communication. The operation of looping then arises when the BAL learns to leverage this existing system for a new, internal function. During early child development, the BAL discovers that it can sense its potential expression in the output channel via the resonance in the input channel. It learns to pay attention to this, and finally learns to truncate activity in the output channel before any word is actually spoken. It then learns to rely on this process in various ways, using it as an important cognitive tool.

The reuse, therefore, does not depend on any “rewiring” or creation of a new pathway. Rather, it arises when the BAL discovers how to make different use of an existing one. In this sense, looping is both reuse and repurposing – the BAL creates a new cognitive tool when it begins to use a system designed for outward transfer of meaning in a new way: for the inner emergence of meaning.

See also: Looping, PTD Resonance, Proxy Transfer Device

 

Looping

Once the system for interindividual communication had evolved, something remarkable became possible. When the brain at large (BAL) begins to express something, that incipient activity already points to the meaning that will be communicated. Could this incipient activity be leveraged somehow – accessed internally in lieu of being expressed?

This would be extraordinarily useful. The BAL normally can only activate proxies through actual interaction with the external world – which takes time, energy, and can be risky. Suddenly, through this internal reuse, the BAL would gain a “lazy” way to activate proxies: it can trigger them directly by “eavesdropping” on its own expressive preparations. This would open up untold possibilities – internal experimentation, mental time travel, hypothetical reasoning, complex planning, and focused examination of experience itself – all without having to even move a muscle and engage with the external world.

Before the brain learns to loop, the mechanism is already present in the PTD: tight coupling between channels. The BAL is already equipped to work with messages that pass through the incoming channel. The developmental step is its discovery that it can truncate the output and pay attention to this coupling (referred to in the framework as “resonance”) – using it for newfound purposes. Resonance between the expressive and receptive pathways of the proxy transfer device (PTD) creates the bridge: because the two channels can align in one-to-one correspondence, activity in the outgoing channel produces a mirrored pattern in the incoming channel. The BAL can then work with this mirrored pattern just as it would any other incoming message.

This reuse does not involve hearing words or replaying sounds. Instead, it delivers the “gist” (the i5 stage) – the final integrated meaning that normally follows the decoding of another person’s message. In looping, that meaning comes from one’s own incipient expression, without it ever being externalized. This is a clear example of repurposing: what evolved for outward signal transfer is put to other uses by the BAL, in ways that account for all modes of subjective experience. This single mechanism underlies every mode of subjective experience, without exception: imagination, thought, recollection, conscious perception, etc.

All the functions that are part of this framework are already demonstrably established as existing in brain operation with the exception of one: that the resonance in the input channel can propagate inward to reactivate proxies in a process of neural reuse. This action of neural reuse is called BAL-looping.

See also: Neuronal Reuse, PTD Resonance, Gist, Difference from Inner Speech Models


Semantic Formatting

When the BAL prepares to express something through the PTD’s outgoing channel, the signal undergoes a transformation referred to in the framework as semantic formatting. The significance of this goes beyond its use in the communication process – it’s what gives conscious perception and subjective experience its distinctively meaningful, communicative quality.

The exact mechanism of this formatting remains unknown, but its effects are unmistakable: looped content arrives with the same semantic richness we experience when understanding another person’s words.

For a fuller exploration of this insight – that conscious perception has an inherently communicative, semantic structure – see “A Fourth Dialogue Between Hylas and Philonous” (available online at https://sites.google.com/view/7dialogs/epilogue-i and forthcoming on PhilPapers), where the dialogue format makes the nature of semantic formatting much clearer than can be achieved through dry prose alone.

Semantic formatting transforms neural activity into the language-like structure that becomes our subjective experience. It’s the bridge between the BAL’s purely functional operations and the meaningful, communicative quality of what we actually experience when we perceive, remember, or imagine.

See also: Looping, PTD Channels, Gist

 

Coterminous Principle

Within the BAL-looping framework, both subjective experience and the expression and reception of language operate through the same system – the PTD. The output and input channels of the PTD are used, respectively, to convey our proxy configurations to another individual and to convert incoming language messages to proxy configurations in our own BAL. Furthermore, when we subjectively experience any sort of content, we use the PTD internally through looping – the incipient message in the output channel returns to the BAL through the input channel to activate proxies. Since both processes run through the same PTD machinery, they naturally have identical boundaries.

This perfect overlap is so universal that we tend to take it for granted. It seems so natural that any clearly formed part of our subjective experience can be described in words, and that words are sufficient to describe any clearly formed part of it, this situation hardly seems to warrant an explanation. And yet it is possible to conceive of another situation where, for example, only 70 percent of my clearly formed subjective experience would be conveyable in words to another person, or I could subjectively experience 30 percent more clearly formed content than I could convey in words to another person. In other words, this coterminous relationship would not necessarily be inevitable if our brain architecture were different.

What about experiences that feel “beyond words” – like 1. a sudden feeling at sunset that seems inexpressible, or 2. when I find it hard to express the subjective difference between the colors red and blue? These moments don’t violate the principle. They occur when the BAL aims to 1. have the PTD output channel semantically format a given proxy configuration, but the formatting doesn’t complete cleanly, or 2. when it aims to convey something that human language is not capable of expressing.

Case 1 could arise, for example, in the familiar situation of trying to describe your recollection of what it felt like to wake up in the house you grew up in. There is something definitely on the verge of forming there in the recollection, but it never settles into clear describable elements. Case 2 can arise because language evolved for practical use in dealing with our environment and other people, not for describing subjective experience. We can say, “Give me the blue one,” and talk generally about warm versus cool colors, but beyond that, language does not have the capability of describing the subjective difference between red and blue. But note that our incapacity to express the difference in this case also matches our subjective experience, as there is no subjective content concerning the difference either. We experience redness, and we can say the word “redness,” we can talk about the warmth of the color, and name things that are red, talk about colors close to red, and also experience all of this same content on introspection – and all of this is coterminous in regard to expressibility versus experienciability. Yes, there are things we experience that are not resolvable into words, but these things are felt to be on the edge actual subjective content. In these cases, the coterminous quality is preserved by the existence of incipient semantic formatting taking place in the o-channel, which remains incomplete and cannot be resolved by the i-channel into proxy activation. We have incipient expressibility, and incipient experience. Even so, the BAL senses its effort to express it, and assigns the word “ineffable” to this.

Another way to look at this is to consider: whenever I wish to express something about my subjective experience there is recursion involved. Subjective experience already requires one full cycle through the PTD: incipient activity in the output channel resonates across to input channel and then reenters the BAL where it activates proxies. Then, after this first complete cycle, when I wish to talk about that subjective experience to someone else, I have to add another cycle (but in a straight line, instead of looping), expressing outward through my o-channel, with the aim that it will enter the i-channel of another individual and ultimately end up at proxy activation in their BAL. In this light we see that any case of ineffability essentially involves one complete first cycle that did not fully resolve, so it is not surprising that the second cycle does not resolve either. It should be noted that in the case of ineffability,  the outcome of cycle 1 was an inability to form a clear result upon proxy activation, and in cycle 2 there is an inability to create an output from the o-channel which upon entry to another individual will convey the proxy configuration  that I am aiming to communicate. If complete resolution was not achieved in the first loop of the dual operation, it is in no wise surprising that I will find it impossible to complete the second part as well, just as the coterminous principle predicts.

The coterminous principle tells us that even if vast regions of potential content lie outside both expressibility and experienciability, it would nonetheless be impossible to imagine what would occupy these missing spaces, so we cannot notice the gaps. It is somewhat like what mathematicians have proven about numbers: while it seems that any degree of precision is possible through the use of fractions with longer and longer integers in the numerator and denominator, mathematicians have actually proved that between any two rational numbers there is an infinite number of irrationals. Perhaps the same is true in looping versus expressibility. By forming semantic components into words, speaking them, and having them enter another individual, it seems that I can express any content whatsoever. But perhaps not: expression in words might be akin to the case of rational numbers in mathematics. Perhaps it seems as though we can express any value with them, but perhaps there are many semantic niches outside the potential to be expressed by words. Stating this another way, the semantic formatting in the o-channel prior to the stage where words are formed may have a finer resolution than the same message after the words are formed. Perhaps by looping semantic components prior to the word level I can reach contents that lie within the gaps that exist between the points of meaning expressible by words. But there is still another level: the level of all potential content that cannot reach as far as the incipient semantic formatting stage in the o-channel available for looping. It is conceivable that such potential content exists, but remains inherently unimaginable, since imagination itself relies on looping.

This explains the situations that are described as involving something ineffable. But note that they are never far from effable. They are always on the verge of effability, and the sensation is that either the word is nearly emerging when the aim is to speak, or the idea is nearly emerging if the aim is to loop.

See also: Proxy Transfer Device, PTD Channels, Looping, Semantic Formatting, Gist

 

 

Part 4: The Structure of Subjective Experience

 

Temporal Spanning

All of our subjective experience runs through the same looping mechanism. Only one mode can be active at a single time. This means that it is impossible for you to consciously perceive your surroundings, recall a memory, or imagine a future scene at the same time. The loop can only be running one proxy configuration at a given moment.

This may seem counterintuitive at first. In daily life we feel certain we can walk down the street thinking of childhood while also consciously perceiving trees, cars, and people. After a walk, we can recall all of these things, and we don’t notice any gaps between them.

But the truth is apparent on careful introspection, and it’s also a logical consequence of the looping framework. The system can switch seamlessly between modes, but they are never simultaneous. Just as that device of a bygone era – a radio – can only be tuned to a single station, likewise, the loop can only run one mode of experience at a given moment.

This impression of simultaneity comes from a principle in the framework called temporal spanning, which creates a false sense of continuity between separate episodes of looping. Because the brain has no way to register these switches, it seems as though one thought carries through other experiences without interruption.

See also: Overview and Focus, Looping Uncertainty Principle

 

Overview and Focus

The terms overview and focus describe two different ways the loop operates, but they follow the same fundamental constraint as set forth in the temporal spanning principle: only one at a time. It is impossible to have a broad, general awareness of your environment (overview) at the same moment that you engage in intense, detailed examination of a specific element (focus).

Overview mode occurs when the loop processes a wide-ranging proxy configuration – taking in the general sense of a room, the overall mood of a conversation, or the broad contours of a problem. Focus mode occurs when the loop narrows to a specific configuration – examining the texture of a fabric, parsing the meaning of a particular phrase, or working through a detailed logical step.

When we are focusing on the details, the overview is not immediately present, but remains as a potential. The same applies in reverse: when we are considering the overview, the details remain in potential.

Overview and focus are not different systems or competing processes. They are two ways the same looping mechanism can operate – like a camera that can zoom out for a wide shot or zoom in for a close-up, but cannot do both simultaneously.

See also: Temporal Spanning, Looping

 

Looping Uncertainty Principle

When we recall a past experience, we are not retrieving it as it was originally looped. The reactivation happens through our current expressive–perceptual apparatus, and if that apparatus was different at the time, the original experience could have been entirely different – in ways we can no longer access. The problem isn’t just fading memory, but the impossibility of stepping back into the prior system that first looped that moment.

Even if you anchor the experience with a marker – like a photograph, drawing, or journal – your perception of that marker is still filtered through your present apparatus. The colors, details, emotional tone – they are all being remapped by what you are now, not what you were then.

Joseph Conrad captures this impossibility in Heart of Darkness: “No, it is impossible; it is impossible to convey the life-sensation of any given epoch of one’s existence… We live, as we dream – alone.”

In the BAL-looping framework, this becomes practical and unavoidable: each moment of subjective experience is inseparable from the system that generates it. When we recall, we are never re-looping the same moment – we are looping through a different, present system.

See also: False Stability Assumption, Looping Indeterminacy, The Naïve Archaeologist

 

Looping Indeterminacy

When we look back over our day, or in longer-term recollections, we have no way to assess whether we were looping at that former time in question. Recollection itself is looping, so every recalled moment appears in a format of looping. The only possible exception is when we have some tangible record (video, written, whatever) that indicates that looping was present, or perhaps when we have a clear recollection of reflection on our awareness at that moment. Otherwise, the true extent of looping in past experience remains indeterminate.

See also: Looping Uncertainty Principle, False Stability Assumption

 

False Stability Assumption

We instinctively assume that the way we experience things now is how we have always experienced them. When we recall the past, the present apparatus delivers it in a way that feels continuous, hiding any changes that may have occurred in the machinery of perception and looping.

This quiet bias – the belief in stability – differs from the uncertainty principle, which concerns the impossibility of verifying what past experience was actually like. The false stability assumption is our tendency to assume no verification is needed because “things have always been this way.” We project our current experiential apparatus backward, assuming it was the same when we were younger, or even just yesterday.

This makes us confident that our recollections reflect how things actually felt at the time, when in fact they may have been very different, and only appear similar now because they are being reprocessed through the present looping system.

This is a corollary of the looping uncertainty principle.

See also: Looping Uncertainty Principle, Looping Misattribution Error, Looping Indeterminacy

 

Interfunctional Complementation

When the BAL reconstructs a memory, it doesn’t retrieve a single trace. It assembles a usable configuration from multiple proxy systems: visual proxies (what you saw), motor proxies (how you moved), proprioceptive proxies (where your body was), physiological proxies (heart rate, blood pressure, etc.), emotional proxies (how you felt), and auditory, linguistic, spatial, and social proxies.

This is interfunctional complementation – the reuse of proxy elements across different functional subsystems to form a coherent structure. The more systems engaged in the original experience, the more stable and versatile the configuration becomes.

In Jude the Obscure, when newly purchased pigs try to breach the fence (supposedly with the aim of heading back to their original farm), Arabella explains: “This comes of driving ‘em home… They always know the way back if you do that. They ought to have been carted over.”

Arabella intuitively recognized that walking the pigs home created a richly layered configuration – built from sight, motion, smell, effort, terrain, balance – which could later be reengaged. This redundancy isn’t just for memory; it can support any future task that draws on the same pattern – whether it’s pigs retracing their steps or a person recalling what they did at the restaurant.

See also: Proxy Configuration, The Naïve Archaeologist


 

Part 5: Correcting Widespread Mistaken Impressions

 

Conscious-Perception-as-a-Window Fallacy

The widespread “intuitive” impression is that conscious perception is a kind of window onto the world – that we experience reality as it is, in real time, through a transparent inner lens.

The BAL-looping framework reverses this entirely. What we experience as conscious perception is not a direct input stream, but a looped construction – an outgoing report the BAL would give about the current environment, built from proxies.

Looping is not triggered by incoming sensory data. It is triggered by the BAL preparing a PTD-formatted output about that data. We are not watching the world; we are watching ourselves prepare to describe the world.

Conscious perception is not a window. It is not on the input side but rather on the output side, as it is our potential expression.

See also: Looping, PTD Channels

 

Tape Illusion of Memory

In the BAL-looping framework, recollection is not a playback of past events generated from a mnemonic record, but a construction put together by a sort of sleuth work based on traces left by functional processes. The process of recollection takes place whenever the BAL decides to use the PTD for this purpose, as a cognitive tool. The PTD is engaged to generate an incipient expression about the recent past, based on traces of actual brain function found among many functional systems – visual, motor, proprioceptive, physiological, emotional, auditory, spatial. That incipient expression is withheld from reaching the motor stage, and loops across through PTD resonance to activate neuronal proxies, generating the subjective experience of the recollection.

The brain keeps no mnemonic record as such. Like an archaeologist, it works from practical traces – evidence left behind by actual activity, rather than purposefully laid down for later retrieval. So the subjective experience that arises during recollection does not necessarily bear one-to-one correspondence with some previous subjective experience. It is a generative process whose results are not like a tape playback but more like the report of a detective or an archaeologist based on the physical evidence of a crime scene, or recovered artifacts.

Nevertheless, we can often get the impression that recollection is the replay of a previous experience, and as this assumption does not normally lead to obviously misconstrued conclusions, there is generally no reason to doubt it. Generally, it is only in exceptional cases – as in the various phenomena discussed in “Dialogue IV” of Seven Dialogues between Haplous and Synergos, or in dreams, as discussed in “Dialogue III” of that same work – that this replay assumption is cast into doubt. These doubts are raised by anomalous results where it seems impossible or highly improbable that the subjective content could have occurred during the span of time being recalled, as in the case of Alfred Maury’s famous guillotine dream.

Considering that dream, Freud, Maury himself, and many analysts since, have concluded that its extensive content must have been constructed in just a few instants. They reach that conclusion based on the normally unquestioned impression that recollection refers back to an earlier subjective experience, and on the assumption that where an overview exists, the details likewise coexist with it. Their reasoning goes like this: 1. the strike of the board was unforeseeable during sleep, 2. the dream contents are predicated on the strike of the board, and 3. Maury had the dream available for recollection already in the first moments after awakening, so 4. the extensive content of his elaborate dream must have arisen in the few seconds between the strike of the board and the first moment at which the dream stood before his mind as a recallable whole.

The BAL-looping framework does not take either assumption for granted. It accepts the possibility that recollections can be confabulated on demand, just as reasons for actions can be confabulated by the right hemisphere in split-brain cases. It also accepts that an overview can be generated in recollection independent of any of the details. In ordinary waking experience, this would be extremely rare, as traces for constituent details generally preexist for any corresponding overview. In waking life, the traces examined during recollection were previously laid down detail by detail, and only afterward can a more general overview emerge. Following a period in which no episodic experience was taking place, however, the situation is different: the brain may generate a confabulated overview before any details are present. That overview can be like a nebulous skeleton, not yet fleshed out with details. The details are then filled in afterward, as the PTD shifts into detail mode. And once again, they arise for the first time ever during the recall process, never having occurred in subjective experience before.

Once we break free from the Tape Illusion, our explanation of Alfred Maury’s guillotine dream no longer needs to assume that anything took place at extraordinary speed. The BAL-looping framework takes a third possibility: the extensive contents of the dream did not arise during sleep, which is implausible because they are predicated on the falling board, nor did they arise in a compressed flash in the instants after his neck was struck, which would require extraordinary speed. Rather, the overview, the details, and the narrative stitching can all arise at normal speed, for the first time ever, during the successive moments in which Maury recalls the dream.

To prevent misreading: this does not mean that the details must arise in the same order as the later narration. Suppose that, after awakening, Maury takes a few moments to grasp what has happened, assures his mother that he is all right, and remarks to her that he has had a dream. He might even begin by saying, “Oh mother, I just had the most extraordinary dream. I was in the French Revolution. I was guillotined – and you were there.” In those first seconds, he might recall her as belonging somewhere deep in the later narrative flow. He might also recall the guillotine, a nebulous skeletal overview of his adventure, or some other detail entirely. But he has still not had a subjective experience of all the other thousands of details. That would require an extraordinary, flash-like speed of processing.

Nor does he need to recount the dream aloud. He could simply lie there in silence, just remembering. As he looks back, whether silently or aloud, more and more details may occur to him for the very first time. There is no restriction on the order of these details. He may jump from the ending to the beginning, or from the overview to some detail in the middle. The restriction is not on order, but on speed: recollection still proceeds at the ordinary speed of subjective experience. He can know the skeleton of the dream early, but the actual subjective emergence of its details happens successively, during the moments of recollection that follow his awakening.

To fully dismantle the Tape Illusion, one must distinguish between three different timeframes. First, there is Narrative Time: the span of time the story claims to cover, such as several days of the French Revolution. This is merely a narrative label. Second, there is Recounting Time: the speed of physical speech, which is typically the slowest clock. Third, there is Subjective Experience Time: the speed of internal PTD resonance, or thought. Subjective Experience Time is generally faster than Recounting Time. Our thoughts naturally race ahead of our words. But this is the normal, familiar speed of human imagination, not an extraordinary flash. Maury may mentally skip through the nebulous skeleton faster than he can talk about it, but he still need not experience the fine details of the whole dream simultaneously.

As a recap: in recollection of any sort, including dreams, the first recollective anchors can fall anywhere: on the ending, on a general overview, on one vivid detail, or on some later scene that only afterward finds its place in the narrative. When we understand how the naïve archaeologist does its sleuth work through interfunctional complementation, we see that the existence of any such anchor, or even any set of such anchors, does not mean that the whole recollected episode has already entered subjective experience. It only means that the BAL has begun to use the PTD recollectively, moving from trace to trace, overview to detail, detail to overview. We therefore see something about recollection in general: in ordinary life, subjective experience often precedes recollection, but the recollective process can also operate without such a prior experience. And in those cases, the resulting recollection may still carry the powerful impression that it is replaying something previously experienced.


See also: Naïve Archaeologist, Overview and Focus, Interfunctional Complementation, Looping Uncertainty Principle.

 

Involuntary Thought Fallacy

Sometimes thoughts come suddenly – uninvited, disturbing, or painful. It can feel like they’re happening against our will.

But these thoughts are not intrusions. They arise when the BAL – the brain at large – uses the looping procedure to try to better understand something that remains unresolved.

If the original experience was too overwhelming, complex, or fragmented, the BAL may never have integrated it fully. So it keeps trying. Looping is the tool it uses to revisit and restructure meaning.

The repetition is not “intrusive.” It is the brain using its own machinery to seek resolution. Understanding this removes the fear of the thought. It is never an invader. It is always you.

See also: Brain at Large, Looping

 

Conflation of PTD Activity with Looping

It’s easy to conflate PTD activity with looping, as though they were the same thing or one always required the other. But they are different processes. Looping requires PTD activity, but PTD activity does not always guarantee the effective presence of looping. Why? Because, although resonance between the output and input channels is always present during speech, the effective presence of looping depends on the BAL actually paying close attention to this resonance. And the BAL does not always pay attention to it; you can speak in a largely “automatic” mode: the PTD executes motor commands (sometimes prearranged, sometimes managed in bursts), while the BAL focuses elsewhere. In such cases, a person can be speaking but with little or nearly no attention by the BAL, meaning the inward reuse is next to nothing.

On the other hand, PTD activity and looping often do coincide. Often while talking, a person will also be looping the same content inwardly, examining what is being said during the act of saying it.

In brief: when the PTD is inactive, there is no looping, but when the PTD is active, there can be looping, or not, depending on the focus of the BAL – whether it is attending to the content being expressed, or not. 

See also: Proxy Transfer Device, PTD Resonance, Looping

 

Looping Misattribution Error

Sometimes we recall experiences we didn’t seem to notice at the time – a fragment of conversation, a visual detail from a routine drive, or an event that occurred while our attention was elsewhere.

This often leads to a misjudgment: that we must have looped it at the time, since we now recall it vividly.

But that vividness results from a looping procedure being carried out in the present. It could be working on evidence that was laid down through sensory input and reinforced by interfunctional complementation, even if the subjective experience at that time was different (fantasy, recollection, imagination, projective inner rehearsal, etc.)

Because the brain has no built-in “gauge” to really know exactly what its subjective experience was at a prior time, the construction/reconstruction of the experience is readily accepted as an accurate version of the subjective experience that was taking place in the past.

See also: The Naïve Archaeologist, False Stability Assumption (a closely related corollary), Looping Uncertainty Principle, Looping Indeterminacy

 


Part 6: Helpful Metaphors and Clarifications

 

Naïve Archaeologist

Recollection works much like the work of an archaeologist. An archaeologist doesn’t consult a library of films or photographs; they examine physical traces from the past – artifacts, fragments, and remains – and then piece together a plausible story.

As the BAL uses looping, it draws on traces left by real experience and assembles them into a coherent recollection. But in certain situations it can behave like a naïve archaeologist. Sometimes it encounters traces that are not from a lived experience at all – for example, after waking from sleep, when there was no subjective experience. In that case, it may be looking at maintenance activity, “placing oneself into the world” routines, physiological markers from current or recent bodily states, current or recent sensory input fragments from the previous day, and standard perceptual templates. It still constructs a convincing narrative, but mistakenly assumes that it corresponds to an actual past experience.

See also: Interfunctional Complementation, Looping Uncertainty Principle

 

Thermostat Analogy

The thermostat analogy illustrates how the BAL operates as a cybernetic system. In a classic thermostat – such as those using a mercury switch on a bimetallic coil – the mechanism doesn’t represent or interpret the external temperature. It embodies it. The coil expands or contracts with heat, tilting the mercury tube, which physically closes or separates an electrical contact. There is no symbolic comparison, no interpretation, and no reaction in the human sense. The system’s configuration itself is the action.

The BAL functions similarly: it forms internal structures – neuronal proxies – that embody aspects of the external world. These proxies, grounded in feedback, allow the system to move toward a goal state mechanically, not by planning or predicting, but by operating from a structure that physically reflects what matters in the environment. Action emerges from embodiment, not from abstraction.

See also: Goal-Seeking System, Neuronal Proxy, Internal Model

 

Placing Oneself into the World

This is one way to refer to the process by which the brain rebuilds and reactivates its internal model when transitioning from sleep back to active awareness. This can also be referred to, more objectively, as building the internal model, but the term “placing oneself into the world” is much more memorable and meaningful to anyone who has caught sight of its effect on dream recall. This is not simply “waking up” in the behavioral sense, nor is it itself a dream or subjective episode, but rather the brain’s reconstruction of its working relationship with the environment.

During sleep, the BAL operates in a fundamentally different mode, called the maintenance mode. The internal model that normally guides active behavior becomes dormant, loses its tone, or undergoes changes during maintenance. Upon returning to active awareness, the brain must rebuild this internal model, essentially “placing itself back into the world” – reestablishing the proxy configurations that orient it in space, time, and circumstance.

This process involves more than simply receiving new sensory input. The brain must rebuild its sense of where it is, when it is, what situation it’s in, and how it relates to its environment. This reconstruction draws on traces and patterns from the previous active state, but it is a process of rebuilding rather than a simple resumption.

The subjective effects of this process can often be felt during dream recall, especially when one wakes up into a situation that has changed (e.g., when one has traveled). One can deduce this underlying process when observing the recollections that occur after waking up. It is one aspect of the “mnemonic basis” (which was not laid down during any sort of subjective experience) that one encounters after a period of sleep. The other aspects are maintenance traces and previous events (mainly from the previous day), seen through the lens of the perceptual templates.

See also: The Naïve Archaeologist, Internal Model, Proxy Configuration, Search Templates

 

Search Templates

These are patterns or configurations that the BAL keeps active in its ongoing scan of the environment. They represent what is most relevant to the organism’s survival, goals, or current concerns. They act like internal filters, bringing certain types of information to immediate attention while leaving the rest in the background.

Templates explain why a person with a romantic interest will notice that “significant other” at once in a crowd, or why someone with a particular fear will quickly spot a possible threat that others overlook. The BAL adjusts these scanning patterns according to what matters most in the moment – whether that is survival (predators, food), social connection (mates, allies), or whatever is occupying the mind at the time.

In neuroscience, this is referred to as “attentional bias” and “perceptual set” – the tendency to favor stimuli that match current concerns, expectations, or emotional weight. Studies show that anxious people scan for threats without thinking about it, people in love notice their romantic interest more readily, and even a simple instruction can create a short-term template that shapes what is noticed.

These same templates influence dream construction. When the brain’s “naïve archaeologist” sorts through fragments left after sleep, it applies the active search templates to interpret them. Someone preoccupied with a loved one may “find” that person in the dream storyline – not because the person was part of sleep’s maintenance processes, but because the search template is active, and influences the reconstruction.

Search templates are one of the brain’s most basic survival tools – a constant, automatic way of picking out what matters most in a flood of sensory input. They work without conscious effort, running in the background to filter and prioritize things according to their relevance to the individual.

See also: The Naïve Archaeologist, Placing Oneself into the World, Proxy Configuration

 

One-Step-Back Strategy

It is common, when trying to explain perception, to picture an inner observer – a self, a soul, or a “homunculus” – inside the head, looking out at the world. The image feels satisfying because it gives the appearance of an answer: we see because someone inside is watching. But this only moves the puzzle back a step. Like the old tale of the Earth resting on a turtle’s back, we are left to ask: What is the turtle standing on? If an inner observer is watching, what explains that observer’s own experience?

The BAL-looping framework does not rely on such an inner observer. It shows that the brain’s own working parts – its internal model of the world, its neuronal proxies, and its looping of expressive configurations – are enough to produce what we call subjective experience.

There are other one-step-back strategies as well. Whenever one sees an explanation, one should ask if it’s a one-step back strategy. Does this really explain anything, or just ratchet up the level of complexity one more level to the point where the average person is left wondering, perhaps it makes sense?

This does not settle the question of whether a soul exists. Kepler and Newton explained planetary motion in terms of natural laws without invoking God’s direct hand, yet this was in no wise taken as a denial of God’s existence. In a similar way, the BAL-looping framework explains perception, recollection, and imagination in terms of natural brain processes. If there is a soul, it is not needed for these explanations – and its existence would be a matter for a different kind of inquiry.

The claim is simple: we can account for subjective experience without invoking a soul. Whether or not a soul exists lies outside the scope of the framework.

See also: Conscious-Perception-as-a-Window Fallacy

 

Difference from Inner Speech Models

The BAL-looping framework is not a theory of inner speech, differing from them in clearly defined ways.

All inner speech theories – from Vygotsky onward – differentiate between inner speech and outer speech. They posit two separate modes of operation: one for communicating with others, and another for internal thought.

BAL-looping does nothing like this. There is only one system: the language faculty, consisting of the speech channel and the listening channel working together, used as a tool by the BAL. When you communicate with some external language context (television, books, your own writing, talking to another person, etc.), you use this system. When you loop, you use this same system. There does exist the difference that in the former case there is an external element in the loop, but the system itself is not different, so there can be no talk of “inner” versus “outer” speech. This distinction of outer versus inner is therefore incompatible with the BAL-looping framework.

And the differences do not stop there. Inner speech theories do not specify a concrete functional mechanism by which inner speech takes place; they merely posit an internal phenomenon without explaining how it actually operates in the brain. BAL-looping identifies the exact mechanism: incipient language output causing resonance in the input channel, which is then neurally reused through the already existing function for the activation of neuronal proxies.

Furthermore, inner speech theories are typically limited to thinking or verbal thought. The BAL-looping framework takes a more radical and comprehensive stance: it holds that all modes of subjective experience – conscious perception, recollection, imagination, and thinking – all arise, without exception, from this single mechanism.

See also: Looping, PTD Channels, PTD Resonance, Gist

 

Functional Parsimony Principle (Extended Entry)

The BAL-looping framework uses only functional elements and the relationships between them that already demonstrably exist in the brain to explain all of subjective experience, including conscious perception. Parsimony, when coupled with explanatory power, has historically led scientists to the discovery of better models; it is often by shedding superfluous theoretical additions that science advances.

Compared to other models or theories of consciousness, the BAL-looping framework achieves this parsimony by obviating the need for an extra functional step in brain operation. Functionally, there are three necessary layers – sensory input, the internal model of the environment, and behavioral output (including speech) – and a common feature among the other models of consciousness is that they introduce an extra layer, which, depending on the theory, could be:

A prediction layer – predictive processing theories add a prediction step. Any such step that is merely a refinement of sensory input is functionally moot, as it adds no explanatory power, since in functional terms it just collapses into that first step of obtaining the input. Where the prediction comes after the internal model of the environment, however, it constitutes an additional functional layer.

A meta-representation layer – the brain has mental states, then adds a meta-level layer that represents those representations

A broadcast layer – the brain has information within specialized modules, which is selected and broadcast to an added global workspace layer

An integration layer – the brain processes information in separate regions, with a posited additional layer where that information is integrated (measured by Φ)

A higher-order thought layer – first-order thoughts exist, then an added layer of thoughts about those thoughts is generated

All of these intermediate steps add another level of brain function. One reason that theorists do this is to account for how the brain can often process information and guide behavior – as in blindsight and split-brain cases, or when in “automatic” mode – without that processing being reportable or accessible. If conscious perception were at the level of the internal model, there would be no accounting for the observed dissociation between reportability and foundational competence. Depending on the theory this layer takes different forms – it can be a layer of predictive processing, a jump to a meta-representation, a broadcast to a global workspace, a series of workups to achieve a state of integrated information, or a hierarchical leap to higher-order thoughts. These theoretical constructs are introduced for various reasons, including to account for the observed dissociation between the brain's direct processing (which guides behavior but may not be reportable) and what can be reported or examined. They correspond to posited distributed neural processes whose existence has never been demonstrated by discrete lesion or excision, while the PTD corresponds to empirically demonstrated neural systems in the language faculty.

The BAL-looping framework’s architecture is leaner, more parsimonious, and materially grounded. It posits sensory input, an internal model, and output – the necessary three – as the main functions, shared with all animals, then adds to the human brain architecture the incontrovertible existence of the output and input channels of the PTD (the language faculty). That is all. Conscious perception, and all modes of subjective experience, are then explained as the brain at large (the BAL) catching wind of incipient activity in the PTD’s output channel, which resonates across to the input channel and is then sensed by the BAL as the gist of the potential expression.

The framework therefore only involves the functional elements and relationships that already demonstrably exist in the brain. The resonance between the output and input channel of the PTD has already been well-established by researchers in neuroscience and linguistics. The only theoretical supposition made by the BAL-looping framework is that this resonance allows the BAL to catch wind of potential expression (this is called looping), a plausible supposition consistent with the evolutionary idea of exaptation and the neuroscientific principle of neural reuse.

There is no theoretical difficulty here, though it may seem to contradict one's initial subjective impression, at least for many people in the modern Western world. Due to our cultural history, many people do not think of their conscious perception as their potential language output; they consider it a window to the world. For a historical example of where parsimony served as a guide for overturning subjective impressions, consider how Copernicus's parsimonious model implied that the Earth was spinning and flying through space, which flew against the common sense of his era. His simpler model revealed a truth that contradicted what only seemed to be “direct experience” – and thus parsimony served as a scientific guide, encouraging us to reexamine mistaken impressions. Of course, parsimony is just one quality among many to be balanced when evaluating a theoretical approach, not an absolute imperative. Internal consistency, explanatory power, agreement with empirical observations, and the capacity to generate novel predictions are likewise important. But all else being equal, parsimony remains a welcome feature in a framework. In the present case, the aim for parsimony has led to a framework in which, when we consciously perceive the world, we are not attending to sensory input, but rather to our own potential expressive output. If this ultimately turns out to be true, then parsimony will once again have done a yeoman’s service.

If the BAL-looping framework is correct, the difference between a human and a squirrel is not an additional layer of prediction, of representation, of broadcast, of information integration, or metathought. It is two channels of a proxy transfer device and then the neural reuse, the evolutionary exaptation, of looping. Nothing more is required.

See also: Internal Model, Neuronal Proxy, Looping, PTD Channels, Difference from Inner Speech Models

 

Gist (extended entry to explain gist as a functional term and to explain how the BAL-looping framework differs from representational accounts of consciousness)

In the BAL-looping framework, the word gist is defined as the activation of neuronal proxies due to an incoming message that arrives through the language input channel. This takes place at stage i5 – the point where a decoded signal becomes an activated configuration within the brain’s internal model.

In standard interindividual communication there is complete exit, and then entry to another individual – a message travels outward through the PTD’s expressive channel, becomes externalized as speech or writing, and enters another individual’s receptive channel, where it is decoded back into a proxy configuration.

In looping, the same functional result occurs without a message ever leaving the first individual. A language output process is begun in the outgoing channel, and this incipient activity gives rise to resonance in the incoming channel through the natural coupling between the PTD’s expressive and receptive pathways. This allows the incipient message to move across from a point partway out the output channel to a point well inside the input channel (both well inward from audio and phonological workup). From there, the signal flows inward along the interior portion of the input channel. At stage i5, this activates the same proxy configuration that would have been activated by interindividual communication. This activation is the gist.

It is important to note that the gist is not in any way representational. Although the PTD channels do involve encoding, the gist itself is not considered a representation, because the framework considers the brain as a cybernetic control system that works in tandem with the external environment, without any observer. Proxy configurations function as operative stand-ins rather than representations, making the framework distinct from representational accounts of mind.

To appreciate the absence of representation, it is helpful to consider the stick charts used traditionally by Micronesian navigators, consisting of sticks, reeds, and shells arranged in a netting. The stick chart is not a picture or graphic representation, rather, the objects in it serve as stand-ins for ocean swells, currents, and islands – the elements in the geography that are significant to the navigators. The case with proxies in the BAL is even more radical, however, as they are not even representations. They are functional stand-ins within an internal model – a control system shaped by evolution, which runs in parallel to the organism’s interactions with its environment. When this internal system achieves its goal states, the organism achieves its corresponding physical goal states. In other words, the two systems run in tandem, functionally coupled, so that success in the internal model corresponds to the organism’s survival and reproduction in the physical world.

That is the functional account. It describes a physical process – output processes, signal pathways, coupling between channels, activations of proxies. Just like in physics, when physicists describe the functioning of the various parts of the atom, once this process is explained in material and functional terms, the scientific description is complete.

Nevertheless, we also know something else. When these functional processes take place, we have subjective experience. It is interesting that this subjective experience takes place, and we can observe correspondences between it and the functional processes. That correspondence is worth noting, even though scientifically the functional account stands complete without it.

So the BAL-looping framework provides a complete functional account of the brain’s processes, but goes further, recognizing that we also have firsthand knowledge of the subjective experience that accompanies these processes. The framework describes both, and the correspondences between them, without attempting to explain “how” one gives rise to the other. It may even be that the functional process and the subjective experience are one and the same.

See also: Looping, PTD Channels, PTD Resonance, Neuronal Proxy, Proxy Configuration, Message Conversion, Semantic Formatting

 

Closing Note

This glossary outlines the key structural elements of the BAL-looping framework, emphasizing functional clarity over abstraction. While the framework is largely complete, the history of its development shows that certain definitions and sections sometimes give way to better ones as understanding deepens. This document may therefore be updated to reflect sharper distinctions, cleaner terminology, or more precise formulations. The aim is not to fix definitions in place, but to provide a stable reference point as the framework continues to clarify how expressive reuse – looping – gives rise to imagination, recollection, conscious perception, and every mode of subjective experience.