Abstracts and Papers

Conference Papers/Abstracts of Keynotes

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Abstracts of Submitted Papers

Session 1
A. Dominic Dimech. Hume's Residual Scepticism

Abstract: In this paper, I motivate and defend a reading of Hume’s sceptical crisis on which the crisis itself has a transformative effect on Hume’s philosophy in a specific way: the crisis leads Hume from a non-sceptical position to both theoretical and practical scepticisms. That is to say, on my view the key to Hume’s sceptical crisis is seeing how Hume’s sceptical conclusions regarding the epistemic merit of our beliefs (his theoretical scepticism) are tempered, resulting in a position of moderate scepticism. This dynamic can be understood in terms of an encounter with radical scepticism leaving a residue of qualified, but still significant, scepticism—hence, I dub this the ‘residually sceptical’ reading of Hume. While this may seem to fit other ‘harmonising’ readings of Hume’s scepticism and naturalism, this is actually a more profoundly sceptical reading of Hume than has been in vogue recently. I take passages from THN 1.4.7 and EHU 12 as my targets of analysis and I describe the advantages of my view other both recent non-sceptical readings of Hume and more classical sceptical readings of Hume.

B. James Chamberlain. Hume, emotivism, and ‘the reality of moral distinctions’

Abstract: There is textual evidence to suggest that Hume is an emotivist, such that he understands all moral utterances as expressions of sentiments. However, few scholars find this interpretation plausible. I argue that this is partly because Hume takes morality seriously. By this I mean, first, that Hume insists that some things are morally right or wrong no matter what anyone might think or feel about them and, second, that he treats this a matter of great importance. There is, I argue, a widespread assumption that Hume cannot be an emotivist and take morality seriously. Drawing on Simon Blackburn’s expressivist theory, I argue that this assumption is false. I accept that, if Hume is an emotivist, then he denies that moral judgements are truth-apt. However, I argue, he can coherently endorse emotivism while insisting that any harmful or disagreeable mental qualities of which others approve are vicious. In his moral Enquiry, Hume carefully distinguishes descriptive from evaluative language. Therefore, I argue, his theory entails that evaluative claims, like the claim that harmful qualities are vicious, cannot conflict with his metaethical claims. Furthermore, since it is useful to insist that harmful and disagreeable qualities are vicious, Hume approves of our doing so.

Session 2
A. Donald Baxter. Hume's Metaphysics of Simples and Complexes

Abstract: While Hume is famous for opposing “divinity or school metaphysics” (EHU 12.34), he does not oppose metaphysics in general. In the Treatise he engages in metaphysics in the sense of the science of the most general features of the world as it appears to us. The principles on which he bases his metaphysics derive from our experience of our ideas and of how our minds work. Thus they are part of Hume’s “science of human nature” (T Intro.9). Here I will assume those principles and detail the Humean metaphysics that follows from them, given certain observations and definitions, namely that only simple, metaphysically independent things exist.

This metaphysics of simples does not exhaust his metaphysics, however. Based on certain “permanent, irresistable, and universal” principles of the imagination (T 1.4.4.1), Hume also provides the materials for a metaphysics of complexes, though with a characteristically Humean wrinkle. Strictly speaking, no complex is something that exists, for Hume. A complex is just many simples; each of the simples is what exists. Loosely speaking, however, complexes exist. Complexes are fictions we naturally and unavoidably employ. Thus for Hume a fictitious metaphysics of complexes is built on his fundamental metaphysics of simples.

B. Rachel Cohon. The Role of Gossip in Hume's Artificial Virtues

Abstract: Gossip is common among human beings everywhere, and people enjoy it. It is also regarded nearly everywhere as ethically suspect or worse. Hume does not use the word ‘gossip’ in his Treatise of Human Nature, and he rarely mentions what we would unequivocally call gossip. But I argue that he finds gossip to be indispensable for the creation and maintenance of three of the artificial virtues and their associated moral duties: so-called female chastity, justice with regard to property, and fidelity to promises. This is because each involves the creation of a pattern of behavior that did not previously exist, conformity to which is initially motivated by self-interest. Only once a pattern of behavior has become widespread and reliable can it have beneficial effects; and only then can community members come, via sympathy, to approve it (which is what makes it a virtue) or disapprove defections (which makes conformity to it a duty). But how are participants initially moved to resist temptations to defect? They experience disadvantages from defecting, Hume says. I argue that these disadvantages come about mainly because of gossip. So gossip, for Hume, plays a crucial role in the creation of some key aspects of morality itself.

Session 3
A. Peter McLaughlin. Regular and Irregular Philosophical Arguments in Hume

Abstract: In Part 3 of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion Hume takes a ‘regular’ philosophical argument and reformulates it so as to produce a new and persuasive but ‘irregular’ argument. This paper reconstructs Hume’s irregular use of his paradigm of regular philosophical argument to shore up a failing argument from design. It analyses the difference between two forms of ‘articulate-voice’ argument in order to explain why the irregular form is both persuasive and convincing enough to explain Hume’s vacillation on the argument from design in the Dialogues.

B. Alison McIntyre. Teleological Hedonism in the Service of Anti-egoism: a New Look at the Stone Passage in Bishop Butler’s Sermon XI

Abstract: Bishop Butler’s Sermon XI “Upon the Love of our Neighbour” is often celebrated for containing a vigorous refutation of egoism and a short cryptic argument in the 6th paragraph that seems to oppose hedonism. There is a long philosophical tradition of interpreting Butler as challenging hedonism in this short cryptic argument by advancing an extreme form of anti-hedonism: the view that when we are motivated by a desire we are never motivated by the prospect of the pleasure that would arise in gratifying that desire. This tradition misinterprets Butler in a variety of ways, but most significantly by ignoring Butler’s defense of the idea that our creator, as the designer of the human constitution, uses pleasure and pain to direct our behavior. Butler opposes egoism by arguing, on teleological grounds, that the point of particular passions like resentment and desire of esteem is to promote important ends that involve public benefit rather than private good. This is compatible with his claim that these passions motivate us because they make attaining their objects the occasion of pleasure.

C. Charles Goldhaber. Layered Irony in Sor Juana and Hume's Compositions on Skepticism

Abstract: I compare a 1689 poetic ballad by the Mexican Hieronymite nun Sor Juana In ́es de la Cruz, “Let us pretend I am happy,” with David Hume’s 1742 essay, “The Sceptic.” I argue that each composition conveys two competing messages within it. At the surface level, both compositions employ skeptical reasoning to argue against the usefulness of learning for attaining happiness. But, in addition to this, both compositions invite ironic readings on which learning is a primary source of joy and orientation to those inclined to it--a point both philosophers emphasize in their other writings, including Sor Juana’s letter defending women’s right to study. Ultimately, I argue, both Sor Juana and Hume hold an intermediary position between the surface-level pessimism and ironic optimism. By their own lights, this middle position is more properly skeptical than the others, insofar as skepticism should moderate our confidence in even skeptical conclusions. Moreover, as I explain, layered irony is a fitting device for producing the intermediary position, and so is a welcome element in creative compositions on skepticism.

Session 4
A. Bridger Ehli. Body, Coherence, and Hume's Galley

Abstract: Section 1.4.2 of the Treatise offers both a constancy-based and a coherence-based explanation of the belief in body. Why does the section offer two explanations of the belief rather than one? Hume says that the psychological mechanism of the coherence explanation is “too weak” to support “so vast an edifice” as the belief in body. I argue that this claim stems from Hume’s holding that the belief in body is psychologically irresistible, such that its denial can be sustained “in words only.” The constancy explanation is required in order to explain that property of the belief.

B. Gozde Yildirim. "Hume and Hutcheson on Mixed Characters"

Abstract: This paper analyzes Hume’s account of mixed characters. Hume criticizes Hutcheson for not accommodating mixed characters. The root of this problem, Hume thinks, is Hutcheson’s benevolence monism: virtue and vice are associated exclusively with benevolence and its lack, respectively. Thus, while Hutcheson can recognize degrees of virtue or vice, he cannot recognize characters that are virtuous in some respects and vicious in others. Hume thinks that such a theory cannot explain our commonsense judgments regarding others’ characters, but his account succeeds where Hutcheson’s fails. My aim in this paper is to explain and evaluate Hume’s views on mixed characters. I first focus on Hutcheson’s account of virtuous and vicious characters. I argue that unlike Hume, Hutcheson aims to find qualities which unify actions. I then explain why Hume thinks the inability to account for mixed characters is a serious problem for Hutcheson and I show how Hume thinks that his theory does accommodate mixed characters. I suggest that Hume uses his notion of character to emphasize the diversity and variety of human traits and actions. Where Hutcheson aims to find unity among diversity, Hume seeks to discover diversity among unity.

C. Ryu Susato. Ramsay’s portrait of Rousseau in Hume’s parlour: A Humeana in George Chalmers’s Notes

Abstract: E. C. Mossner, Hume’s biographer, asserts that the portraits of Hume and Rousseau painted by Allan Ramsay were hung in Hume’s parlour until the philosopher’s death. Regrettably, Mossner did not provide specific source citations, and many subsequent scholarly works have uncritically echoed Mossner’s claims without conducting independent verification. This study aims to trace the origin of Mossner’s assertion to George Chalmers’s unpublished notes, presently archived in the David Laing Collection at the Edinburgh University Library. Notably, Chalmers documented a brief account regarding Hume’s parlour witnessed by David Callander, who was a nephew of Michael Ramsay of Mungale, an intimate friend of Hume. This affiliation lends considerable credence to Callander’s testimony, notwithstanding potential inaccuracies in other facets of his knowledge about Hume’s works. Furthermore, this study investigates the other two portraits mentioned by Callander as adorning Hume’s parlour and explores early-nineteenth-century commentaries on Hume and Rousseau’s portraits, which were eventually bequeathed and displayed in a room belonging to Baron Hume, the nephew of the Scottish philosopher and historian.

Session 5
A. John Wright. Hume on Natural Philosophy

Abstract: It is striking to find that while all Hume’s writings are best described as moral philosophy, throughout he comments on contemporary natural philosophy. In this paper I explain these comments and show a development in his understanding of contemporary science beginning with the strong influence of Cartesian mechanistic philosophy in his Treatise of Human Nature to his developing understanding of Newtonian Philosophy in his later writings. I argue that key Treatise concepts such as “force” into which he analyzes belief, both of sensation and imagination, cannot be stripped of their mechanistic connotations. While his understanding of the anti-mechanistic elements of Newtonian natural philosophy in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding becomes apparent, he nevertheless is clearly a critic of that philosophy. This becomes particularly apparent in his criticism of Newtonian natural religion in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

B. Haruko Inoue. The taxonomy of the moral sentiments

Abstract: The taxonomy of the moral sentiments vis-à-vis the passions in Hume’s system creates a muddle producing roughly four different views: the moral sentiments are indirect passions (Árdal), direct passions (Kemp Smith), instinctual passions (Elizabeth Radcliffe), and not passions at all (Loeb). The aim of this paper is to prove that the first three views do not fit in Hume’s system, and to establish that, although the moral sentiments are not the species of the passions, it does not follow, as Loeb supposes, that the connection between Books II and III are less intimate than Árdal and Kemp Smith think. Rather, I argue that this connection is significantly intimate, in virtue of the fact that the moral sentiments share the double-relation mechanism with indirect passions for their production, and that it is this analogy between the two productive systems that enables Hume to assert in the Abstract (Abs. 3; SBN 646) that his system of the passions provides the foundation of his moral system.

C. Gabriel Bertin de Almeida. Recent Brazilian Fanaticism: How David Hume on Rhetoric Can Help Us Understand It 

Abstract: This paper discusses rhetoric in the work of David Hume, and its importance for the understanding of fanaticism in the recent history of Brazil. It analyzes how the so-called Car Wash investigation, to a lesser degree, and Bolsonarism, more intensely, can be included in the context of current Brazilian fanaticism, and also how David Hume can help us understand these better.

Session 6

A. Miren Boehm. Hume's Return to Philosophy: Blind Submission, Sceptical Principles, and the Title Principle

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to offer a reading of Hume’s return to philosophy after his famous epistemological crisis in “Conclusion of this book” (T 1.4.7). I identify Hume’s “sceptical principles” with principles of “true philosophy” and I argue that Hume’s “blind submission” follows from these principles. I offer a novel reading of the so-called “Title principle” and argue that both, “sceptical principles” and the “Title principle” are essential tools of Hume’s experimental philosophy.

B. Otto Lehto and Alexander Schaefer. Hume's Four Conceptions of Justice

Abstract: The narrow conception of justice traditionally attributed to Hume limits itself to respect for the rules of property. This paper challenges the increasingly common idea that this view is exceedingly narrow and unsatisfactory. We address this “Humean Problem of Justice” (HPJ). First, we consider Ian Cruise’s (2020) recent argument that Hume’s theory is, in fact, broader than usually acknowledged, and reject this interpretation on textual grounds. However, some of Hume’s readers, like Baier (2010), are right to claim that he is sometimes ambiguous or expansive about the precise scope of justice. To bring clarity to this issue, we identify four conceptions of justice that appear in Hume’s political writings (J1-J4). Despite the polysemy, we show that the narrow conception is, indeed, Hume’s core conception on plausible textual grounds. We show how its textual prevalence, separation from other virtues, special social function, and indispensability ground its plausibility. Our paper does not directly address all the worries of those who think that Hume's conception is insufficient or outdated. However, we suggest that Hume’s approach merits reconsideration due to its surprising relevance to a society characterized by dynamism and diversity. Its narrow scope might be a feature, not a bug.

C. Andre C. Willis. A Possible Influence of Hume’s Ethical Thought? Or, New Narratives in American Pragmatism

Abstract: This paper attempts to shift the narrative of American Pragmatism’s capacity to deal with moral evil and human suffering. The work of Josiah Royce has historically been the primary site for discussions about pragmatism and moral evil. On the account below, if we suffuse the moral thinking of William James—which is based on demands—with David Hume’s account of moral resentment, we make James’s account more robust. The paper briefly describes James’s thoughts about Hume’s empiricism, personal identity and religion, as it puts forward “James’s Humeanism”, a thick account of James’s moral vision that is unafraid of asserting provisional moral truths in the face of moral conflict. James’s Humeanism extends Hume’s ethical thinking into contemporary moral debates.

Session 7
A. David Landy. Shepherd on Judgment, Predication, and the Representation of Causal Relations

Abstract: Reason plays a central role in Shepherd’s account of our cognitive architecture, providing for our representation and knowledge of causal relations. Unfortunately, Shepherd says little about what she takes reason to be. Nonetheless, recent scholarship has begun to make inroads in extracting an account of reason from Shepherd’s texts, and it is to that effort that I here contribute. In particular, I will suggest a way of understanding precisely how Shepherd takes reason to perform this crucial function.

Shepherd holds that reason represents objects as causally related. She also holds that causal relations are necessary relations. Finally, she holds that reason is not a mere associative faculty (à la Hume), but rather a structural feature of representations themselves. Putting all of these features together, I propose that Shepherd holds that one represents two objects as necessarily connected by licensing inferences between judgments about those objects, not because such inferences are valid in virtue of their logical form, but rather because of the particular concepts employed in them. So, for example, in licensing the inference from ‘This fire is close to that wax’ to ‘This fire will melt that wax’ we represent the fire as necessarily connected to the wax.

B. Margaret Schabas. Hume on Economic Inequality

Abstract: Insofar as Hume adhered strongly to the rule of law, property rights, and the system of ranks, it would be misleading to cast him as an egalitarian. In his brief judgment of ancient Sparta, he called a regime advocating equality “pernicious” (EPM 20). Nevertheless, for his own commercial society, Hume sought to reduce the inequality of income, albeit not necessarily the inequality of wealth. He advocated high wages for labourers, the expansion of manufacturing and urbanization, and strongly opposed the ‘utility of poverty’ doctrine, looking to Ireland as proof that relatively low wages did not foster economic growth. In sum, Hume sought to raise the standard of living of workers, particularly artisans, and increase the numbers in the middle station, particularly those in trade and commerce. As will be argued, Hume believed that a more prosperous and industrious labouring class, all things being equal, would foster a happier nation.

C. Aaron Zubia. Rebellion without Conscience: Hume’s Third Way Between Hobbes and Locke

Abstract: Hume, like Hobbes and Locke before him, thought political power was rooted in belief, or opinion. Hume showed how political authority arose from agreement. And this is one reason scholars (Merrill 2015; Sayre-McCord 1999, 2017) have placed Hume within the contractarian tradition. I argue that Hume, who should be interpreted within this tradition, found a middle ground between Hobbes and Locke. He did so by justifying the right to rebellion in terms of general opinion rather than individual conscience. He thereby bolstered both Hobbes’s defense of peace and Locke’s defense of revolution. The contractarian tradition is skeptical of private judgment. It derives public political power from public, not private reason. As Hoekstra (2001) noted, though, Hobbes did not adequately “eliminate the problem of private judgment” from questions of political legitimacy and obligation. Hume did, even while defending rebellion. This feat remains underappreciated.

Session 8
A. Peter Kearney. Hume’s Pyrrhonian Assent

Abstract: Perhaps the most important interpretative question concerning Hume’s philosophy is what Phillip Cummins called the “integration problem” — how to reconcile Hume’s radical scepticism with his constructive science of human nature. In his 2018 paper, Donald Baxter proposed that the problem be resolved by distinguishing two kinds of assent in Hume, the two kinds being similar to two kinds of assent distinguished in the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus. In this approach, Hume’s radical scepticism consists in his suspending one kind of assent, while Hume assents in a different way in both common life and in his science of human nature. I agree with Baxter that such an approach provides the key to resolving the integration problem. However, I argue that there are substantial problems with Baxter’s account and that it fails to provide a satisfactory interpretation of Hume’s scepticism. I offer an alternative account of two kinds of assent in Hume which, I claim, provides a superior interpretation of Hume’s scepticism and is also more faithful to the nature of Pyrrhonian assent.

B. Xiao Qi. Hutcheson’s Dual Definition of Moral Obligation and Hume’s Dissatisfaction

Abstract: This paper compares Hutcheson’s and Hume’s concepts of moral obligation. While many scholars argue that Hume’s definition and taxonomy of obligation are inherited from Hutcheson, Hume does not fully embrace this legacy. In his works, Hutcheson vacillates between defining moral obligation with the senses of approval and disapproval, whereas Hume restricts it to the sentiment of disapproval, proposing a clearer distinction between obligation and virtue. Hume’s departure from Hutcheson can be attributed to his dissatisfaction with the latter’s treatment of perfect and external rights in the Inquiry. Hutcheson’s definition of moral obligation in this work, which derives it from the sense of approval, encounters significant difficulties in its correlation to rights, especially in his theory of property. Hume’s remarks on obligation in the Treatise reveal his awareness of these difficulties, and he responds to them with his theory of artificial virtues, where he claims that the ideas of right and obligation arise from conventions. Hutcheson’s later definitions, which highlight the sense of disapproval, are more similar to Hume’s, but their definitions are grounded in different approaches to reconciling the languages of virtue and law with the concepts of duty and obligation.

C. Wade Robison. Hume's Plan of Life

Abstract: We have no universal agreement about what Hume was about in writing the Treatise, the Enquiries, the History of England, and his other works. The early view was that after the Treatise failed “even to excite a murmur among the zealots,” Hume turned to pursue his “love of literary fame,” what he called “my ruling passion,” by writing essays about politics and economics, among other matters, and his eventual source of success, the History.
 With some variation, this view of Hume’s works is still with us, but it is mistaken. The real view is Hume’s own, one he set himself in France and “steadily and successfully pursued” his entire life.

Session 9
A. Viacheslav Zahorodniuk. Painted Red: the Soviet Interpretations of Hume’s Epistemology

Abstract: In this article, I discuss the ambiguous nature of the Soviet approach to the history of philosophy through the example of the leading Soviet researcher, Igor Narskyi, and his book The Philosophy of David Hume. On the one hand, his approach conforms to some stereotypes about the Soviet history of philosophy. During his analysis of such basic Hume’s topics as perception and reflection, he accuses Hume of terminological ambiguity and suggests Marx’s notion of “disposition” as the one to describe human perception in the best way. On the other hand, some Narskyi’s ideas are interesting and even ahead of his time. He claims that Hume does not distinguish between ideas and notions in his “representationalist” theory of abstraction and concludes that Hume neglected the role of language and social ties in the formation of general ideas. It is sound with modern tendencies in Hume studies - I will show how researchers such as Karl Schafer, Johnathan Cottrell and Donald Ainslie are answering those accusations by implementing the linguistic reading of Hume.

B. Eva Dadlez. The Art of Blame: Hume on insult and satire

Abstract: Hume’s remarks about insult and satire in Book I of the Treatise can be developed by exploring his later work on emotion in the essay “Of Tragedy.” In the Treatise, Hume maintains that insult and satire can deliver identical criticisms and blame while eliciting distinct emotional reactions from their respective targets. Material on the interaction of discordant emotions from his later essay “Of Tragedy” can be brought to bear on an exploration of the way in which amusement aroused by a satirical presentation may transfigure blame in such a way as to diminish indignation. I propose that the component of humor in satire may be thought to act on the indignation of its target in just the way the eloquence of writers acts on a reader’s distress over tragic incidents. Consider that a satire is typically about dishing out blame. That component of the satire gives rise to resentment. Similarly, one component of tragedy (what it is about –some heartbreaking incident) gives rise to distress. Both of these negative sentiments are mitigated by affective reactions to the mode of delivery. Witty presentation mitigates resentment by giving rise to amusement, and eloquence diffuses distress by giving rise to aesthetic pleasure.

C. Alana Café. Character sketches in Hume’s History of England

Abstract: This paper explores the formal use of character sketches in David Hume’s History of England. Some have argued that sketches, being an old-fashioned form of representing characters, lost importance in the History: they proved to be an incompatible device for organizing a modern composition. Contrary to this view, the results of this paper show that Hume did not discard the sketch form, but rather incorporated it into his historical practice. The innovative sketch of figures of arts and sciences was a way Hume employed to address the state of arts and sciences in a period without deviating from the rules of historical writing, that traditionally did not include the subject. The classic sketch of political figures displayed a structural function. As sketches provided pauses for the entrance or exit of characters, their distribution set scenes of action and marked turning points in the political transactions. These divisions added depth to the chronological order of the narrative chapters in the History and are consistent with Hume’s evaluation of the periods covered. Examining the sketches, this paper may contribute to a more nuanced view regarding Hume’s innovations as an historian and his adherence to classic conventions in the History.

Session 10
A. Thomas Holden. What Hume said to the Tortoise

Abstract: Hume argues that induction (or ‘experimental reasoning’) cannot be justified to someone who is not already willing to accept induction, and as a result, it cannot be justified at all. In Lewis Carroll’s “What the Tortoise said to Achilles,” the Tortoise argues that deduction cannot be justified to someone who is not already willing to accept deduction, and as a result, it cannot be justified at all. In each case, it seems that we require some further premise in order to license the proposed form of inference; but in each case, the appeal to that further premise merely opens up the same sort of inferential gap all over again.

Thus far, Hume and the Tortoise might seem like natural allies. However, Hume suggests that, while induction lacks any basis in reason, demonstrative reasoning--the Humean analogue of deduction--does have such a basis. I examine Hume’s account of the difference between the two cases, and consider how he might reply to Carroll’s ‘paradox of inference.’ Hume’s vindication of demonstrative reasoning turns, I suggest, on his understanding of the reciprocal relationship between our powers of conception and the facts about absolute necessity.

B. Enrico Galvagni. King and Hume on the Creation of Value

Abstract: Although largely forgotten by present-day philosophers, Anglican divine William King (1650– 1729) was well-known in his time. In his De Origine Mali (1702), King presented a provocative account of value as being created by acts of free choice performed by free agents. In a nutshell, beings that are endowed with the faculty of election (God and human beings) are capable of conferring value onto the (in itself value-free) world. David Hume, a philosopher today much better known, was aware of King’s work, which he quotes in his memoranda. In this paper, I argue that Hume’s theory of value presents important similarities with King’s. I provide an overview of King’s theory of election and argue that a conative element of desire is essential to King’s understanding of the construction of value. I reconstruct the tenets of Hume’s account of value and show that it can be seen as a way to recast King’s ideas in a secular, naturalized system. By doing so, this paper sheds new light on one of the most studied moral theories of the early modern period (Hume’s) and contributes to bringing back to life a forgotten but deserving figure in the history of thought (King).

C. Nir Ben-Moshe. Hume and Future Bias: A Sympathy-Based Approach

Abstract: David Hume seems to have endorsed the existence of “future bias,” namely, the idea that we are more concerned with the future than the past. My aim in this paper is two-fold. First, I bring out a certain tension between (a) Hume’s apparent endorsement of future bias and (b) key components of his account of human psychology. In particular, Hume’s endorsement of future bias seems to be at odds with his claim that memory is more lively and stronger than the imagination, since the latter claim would suggest that we would be more concerned with the past than the future. Second, I resolve this tension by showing how Hume’s account of sympathy, which, in the first instance, is not based on the imagination, can explain how the greater liveliness of memory is overcome. The proposed resolution involves the development of a novel psychological explanation of future bias. Accordingly, this paper has important implications both for Hume scholarship and philosophical (and moral) psychology more generally. Indeed, I conclude by arguing that Hume’s moral philosophy may help us determine whether future bias is justified.

Session 11
A. Graham Clay. Other Striking Implications of Hume's Dictum(s)

Abstract: Recently, Hume scholars have been reevaluating the consistency of Hume's system in connection with his Mental Separability Principle. While it is clear that Hume's formulation of the principle implicates him in a range of contradictions, it is less clear what we ought to do about it, if we are to modify the principle to retain as much of his other positions and arguments as possible. In this paper, I continue the reevaluation process by comparing the implications of Hume's formulation of this principle with an adjusted formulation suggested by commentators. I conclude that the adjusted formulation has further advantages that have not been previously noted, but I also flag some of its more concerning implications that may be untenable.

B. Eduardo Andrade. Indolence and the Affective Lives of the Poor in Hume’s Social Philosophy

Abstract: Recent literature on Hume’s ethics and social philosophy have emphasized how his views and methods are situated in the social context of his time (Finlay 2007). Moreover, the explanatory potential of Hume’s principles of sympathy and comparison along with his treatment of the passions has also received increased attention (Taylor 2015). In contrast, some have also argued that his principles of sympathy and comparison can be situated in such a way as to mirror structures of inequality (Hartmann 2022). In this paper, I wish to contribute to these developments by situating Hume’s position on the distinction of ranks against the backdrop of the eighteenth-century’s debate regarding indolence and the promotion of industry. I propose that sympathy and comparison establish an affective power structure – via a distinction of ranks composed of a specific distribution of passions - which both stirs people away from idleness and promote industry. However, it does so at the cost of positioning the poor in an affectively oppressed position in society. Nevertheless, I argue that the passions that constitute the affective lives of the poor could serve as motivators against indolence, thus acquiring a certain form of utility in Hume’s picture of society.

C. Katie Ebner-Landy. David Hume and the Character Sketch

Abstract: To the extent that scholars have addressed Hume’s relationship with character-writing––a tradition of sketching moral and social types begun by the ancient Greek philosopher Theophrastus––they have given us a misleading account. They have suggested, as Annette Baier does, that Hume embraces a Theophrastan approach to character-writing and uses it to inform his own writing. A closer look at Hume’s writings tells a different story. This story unfolds from the 1748 First Enquiry, in which Hume distinguishes two manners of writing moral philosophy: the easy and obvious; and the accurate and abstract. The easy and obvious philosophy represents vice and virtue, places “opposite Characters in a proper contrast,” and is associated with poetry and rhetoric. The accurate and abstract philosophy aims instead “to find those Principles, which regulate our Understandings.” The claim of this paper is that we should understand the easy and obvious manner to refer to the Theophrastan tradition of character-writing, and see Hume as attempting to break from this model. Unearthing this context has two implications. It first clarifies the treatment of character in Hume’s own essays. It secondly positions Hume as playing a role in helping to separate moral philosophy from what we now call literature.

Session 12
A. Paolo Degiorgi. Abstract Ideas and Distinctions of Reason across Hume’s Treatise

Abstract: The last section of book I, part I, of Hume's Treatise, which discusses abstract or general ideas, has not been particularly well-received by the literature. In the first half of my paper, I go over the accounts provided in this section in the attempt to implicitly address at least some of the worries that have been raised in recent articles. I try to stress how Hume’s accounts of abstract ideas and that of distinctions of reason should be read together. In the second half, I expand on an insight that, taken on its own, is not entirely novel, namely that the concepts discussed in I.I.vii play an important role in other sections of Hume’s text. However, while others have focused on the role of abstraction in Hume's accounts of the theoretical notions of space, time, and causation, I focus on how distinctions of reason, and therefore also abstract ideas, pervade the rest of the text, by dwelling on the role that we must attribute to them if we want to fully make sense of Hume's discussion sympathy in book II and that of moral character from book III.

B. Manuel Vasquez Villavicencio. The Pleasures of Truth and Intrinsic Motivation in Hume’s Account of Curiosity and Inquiry

Abstract: In contemporary discussions in the psychology and philosophy of emotions, curiosity is generally conceived as an intrinsic motivation for knowledge. Hume’s characterization of curiosity as the “love of truth” seems to go in that direction. However, I argue that this is not the case. For Hume, objects of curiosity attract and motivate us because of a combination of factors well beyond their mere epistemic dimension. In this paper, I present a reconstruction of those factors and establish their consequences for Hume's understanding of inquiry. The paper has three parts. I firstly discuss three comments Hume introduces regarding the role of truth in the manifestation of curiosity. I aim to show that his understanding of curiosity is incompatible with intrinsic motivation. In the second part of the paper, I state the factors that need to concur for truth to become an adequate source of satisfaction and motivation for Hume. Finally, I discuss the origin of the passion Hume calls “despair of success” and its consequences for his understanding of inquiry.

C. Josef Moural. Was Henry Home the Author of Hume's Mature Theory of Belief?

Abstract: (1) there is a striking similarity between Kames argument against Hume's Treatise in his essay "Of belief" on the one hand and Hume's own mature position in the Abstract, the Appendix and the Enquiry on the other; (2) the most plausible explanation of that similarity is that some germinal version of the argument of Kames's essay "Of belief" was known to David Hume before he composed the Abstract. Consequently,

• In Hume's philosophical development, the shift between the first two books of the Treatise on the one hand and the Abstract on the other is highly important (hence, the editorial practice of inserting the passages from the Appendix into the main text is not preferable)

• Certain components of the philosophical position of the first two books of the Treatise are untenable, Hume realized it and modified his position accordingly

• one of the significant influences leading to Hume's noticing the flaws in his early position were the objections by Henry Home from May or June 1739. Perhaps this influence was decisive.

• Hume was not a philosophical solitaire for all his life, and his communication with Kames – while their friendship lasted – was of genuine relevance to him.

Session 13
A. Hongbin Zhao. Hume's Dichotomy of Causal Inference

Abstract: In this paper, I will present an argument that both in the Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume assumes a distinction between two types of causal inferences: Instinctive Causal Inference (ICI) and Reflective Causal Inference (RCI). Moreover, as a revision of the interpretations put forth by Garrett (1997) and Millican (2012), I will propose that the role of reason in relation to Instinctive Causal Inference should not be to formulate this inference, but rather to accept it, just like the relation between reason and memory. Therefore, although ICI is not part of reason, it is still a reliable source of our knowledge.

B. Lauren Kopajtic. Hume's Interaction Problem

Abstract: This paper re-examines Hume’s well-known arguments in Treatise 2.3.3 against the view that there is a combat between reason and passion, and that reason ought to have “pre-eminence.” I show that Hume’s arguments in 2.3.3 depend on two important assumptions, namely, that combat requires some common parameter, and that the possibilities for a common parameter in this case are impulse and representation. Hume offers arguments against each, concluding that there can be no combat between reason and passion. I then show that Hume’s arguments against his opponents have an unintended but serious consequence, rendering informed action inexplicable by rendering interaction between reason and passion impossible. After a brief comparison of Hume’s interaction problem with the better-known interaction problem, posed by Elisabeth of Bohemia to Descartes, I consider a possible Humean response, exploring whether reason and passion could each separately contribute to action without ever standing in some kind of relation that requires a common parameter.

C. Michael Jacovides. Hume and Maclaurin

Abstract: I aim to show that Hume is acquainted with Maclaurin in the early 1740s after his return to Edinburgh from France. Acquaintance with Maclaurin helps explain Hume’s hyperbolic praise of Newton and the transformation of his attitude towards Newtonian science between the Treatise and the first Enquiry. There are passages in the Enquiry that can’t be understood without understanding Maclaurin’s thought in the background.