Here is a collection of some influential research papers in corporate governance and political economy research.This is definitely not a complete list of influential research papers in these active research fields. But this is at least a good starting point to get a bird's eye's view of the literature. There are many influential papers in these fields that I have not read yet. I will try to update the list as often as I can.
0. Survey and The Impact of Corporate Governance on Asset Pricing
Gillan, S. L.,2006. Recent developments in corporate governance: a survey. Journal of Corporate Finance 12,381-402.
Bebchuk, L. A, Weisbach, M. S., 2010. The state of corporate governance research. Review of Financial Studies 23, 939-961.
Gompers, Paul A., Joy L. Ishii, and Andrew Metrick. 2003. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 1007-155.
Core, J., Guay, W, Rusticus, T. 2006. Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ Expectations.
Journal of Finance 61,655--687.
INTERNAL GOVERNANCE
1.Ownership Structure
Theory
Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305–360.
Burkart, M., Panunzi, F., Shleifer, A. 2003. Family firms. Journal of Finance 58, 2167-2201.
Almeida, H. V., Wolfenzon, D., 2006. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups. Journal of Finance 61, 2637-2680.
Bebchuk, L. A., Neeman, Z. 2010. Investor protection and interest group politics. Review of Financial Studies 23, 1089-1119.
Burkart, M., Lee, Samuel. 2008. One share-one vote: the theory. Review of Finance 12, 1-49.
Shleifer, A., Vishny R. W. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94, 461-488.
Empirical Studies on Separation of Ownership and Control
Adams, R., Ferreira, D., 2008. One share-one vote: the empirical evidence. Review of Finance 12, 51-91.
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., Yeung, B., 2005. Corporate governance, economic entrenchment and growth. Journal of Economic Literature 43 657-722.
Khanna, T., Yafeh, Y. 2007. Business groups in emerging markets: paragons or parasites?Journal of Economic Literature 45,331-372.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54,471-517.
Masulis, R., Pham, P. K., Zein, J., 2011.Family business groups around the world: financing advantages, control motivations, and organizational choices. Review of Financial Studies 24, 3556-3600.
Holderness, C., 2009. The myth of diffuse ownership in the United States. Review of Financial Studies 22, 1377-1408
Villalonga, B., Amit, R.,2009. How are U.S. family firms controlled? Review of Financial Studies 22, 3047-3091.
Pyramids
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81-112.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57,2741-2771.
Faccio, F., Lang, L. 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 65,365-395.
Lin, Chen, Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., Xuan, Y., 2011. Ownership structure and the cost of corporate borrowing . Journal of Financial Economics 100, 1-23.
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K.M., 2010.Incentive and entrenchment effects in European ownership. Journal of Banking and Finance 34: 2212-2229.
Franks, J., Mayer,C. 2001. Ownership and control of German corporations. Review of Financial Studies 14,943-977.
Chernykh, L. 2008. Ultimate ownership and control in Russia. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 169-192.
Carney, R. W., Child, T. B. 2013. Changes to the ownership and control of East Asian corporations between 1996 and 2008: The primacy of politics. Journal of Financial Economics 107, 494-513.
Kim, W., Sung, T., Wei, S., 2011. Does corporate governance risk at home affect investment choices abroad? Journal of International Economics,25-41.
Dual-class firms
Nenova,T., 2003. The value of corporate voting rights and control: a cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 325-351.
Doidge, C., 2004. U.S. cross-listings and the private benefits of control: evidence from dual-class firms. Journal of Financial Economics 72,519-553.
Smart, S. B., Zutterr, C. J., 2003. Control as a motivation for underpricing: a comparison of dual and single-class IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 85-110.
Smart, S. B., Thirumalai, R.S., Zutter, C.J., 2008. What's in a vote? The short- and long-run impact of dual-class equity on IPO firm values. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45, 94-115.
Masulis, R., Wang, C., Xie, F. 2009. Agency problems at dual class companies. Journal of Finance 64,1697-1727.
Gompers, P. A.,Ishii, J., Metrick, A., 2010. Extreme governance: an analysis of dual-class firms in the United States. Review of Financial Studies 23, 1051-1088.
Lin, Chen, Ma, Y., Xuan, Y., 2011. Ownership structure and financial constraints: evidence from a structural estimation. Journal of Financial Economics 102, 416-431
Institutional Ownership
Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, 2001. "Institutional Investors And Equity Prices."Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 229-259.
(Data: ExecuComp, 1992-1997;CDA Spectrum 13-f (Thomson Financial), 1992-1996.
Finding: Institutional ownership-->higher executive pay-performance sensitivity; lower executive compensation.)
Chen, X., Harford, J., Li, K., 2007. Monitoring: which institutions matter? Journal of Financial Economics 86, 279-305.
Gompers, P. A., Metrick, A., 2001. Institutional investors and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 229-259.
Yan, X., Zhang, Z. 2009. Institutional investors and equity returns: are short-term institutions better informed? Review of Financial Studies 22, 893-924.
Aggarwal, R., Erel, E., Ferreira, M., Matos, P.2011.Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 100, 154-181.
(Main finding: increase in institutional ownership--> better firm-level governance;higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity: higher firm value)
Investor protection and ownership structure
Franks, J., Mayer, C., Rossi,S. 2009. Ownership: evolution and regulation. Review of Financial Studies 22,4009-4056.
Family Firms
Fahlenbrach, R., 2009. Founder-CEOs, investment decisions, and stock market performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 439-466.
Anderson, R., Mansi, S., Reeb, D.M.,2003a.Founding-family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 263-285.
Anderson, R., Reeb, D.M., 2003b.Founding family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P500.Journal of Finance 58,1301–1329.
Li, F. , Srinivasani, S.2011. Corporate governance when founders are directors. Journal of Financial Economics 102, 454-469.
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K. M., Perez-Gonzalez, F., Wolfenzon, D., 2007. Inside the family firm:the role of families in succession decisions and performance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 647-691.
Bertrand, M., Johnson, S., Samphantharak, K., Schoar, A. 2008. Mixing family with business: a study of Thai business groups and the families behind them. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 466-498.
Anderson, R. Duru, A. Reeb, D.M. 2009. Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States. Journal of Financial Economics 92, 205-222.
Ali, A., Chen, T., Radhakrishnan, S. 2007. Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44, 238-286.
Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., 2008. Do family firms provide more or less voluntary disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research 46, 499-536.
2. Board of Directors
Survey Papers
Adams, R.,Hermalin,B.,Weisbach,M.,2010. The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literature 48, 58-107.
Hermalin,B.,Weisbach,M.,2003. Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review 9, 7-26.
Theory
Adams,R.,Ferreira,D.,2007.A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance 62,217-250.
Harris,M.,Raviv,A.,2008.A theory of board control and size. Review of Financial Studies 21,1797-1832.
Raheja,C.2005. Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate boards. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40, 283-306.
Laux, V., 2008. Board independence and CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting Research, 46, 137-171.
Kumar, P., Sivaramakrishnan, 2008. Who monitors the monitor? The effect of board independence on executive compensation and firm value. Review of Financial Studies 21, 1371-1401.
Determinants of Board Structure
Linck, J., Netter, J., Yang, T. ,2008. The determinants of board structure. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 308-328.
Boone, A., Field, L., Karpoff, J., Raheja, C., 2007. The determinants of corporate board size and composition: an empirical analysis.
Journal of Financial Economics 85, 66–101.
Effects of SOX, NYSE and NASDAQ Governance Rules
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., 2007. Corporate governance and firm value: The impact of the 2002 governance rules. Journal of Finance 62, 1789-1825.
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., 2009. CEO compensation and board structure, Journal of Finance 64, 231-261.
Guthrie, K, J. Sokolowsky, K. Wan, forthcoming. CEO compensation and board structure revisited, Journal of Finance.
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J.,Ozbas, O., 2010. When are outside directors effective?Journal of Financial Economics 96,195-214.
Linck, J., Netter, J., Yang, T., 2009. The effects and unintended consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the supply and demand of directors. Review of Financial Studies 22, 3287-3328.
Independent Directors
Nguyen, B.D., Nielsen, K.M. , 2010, The value of Independent directors:Evidence from sudden deaths. Journal of Financial Economics 98, 550-567.
Ahmed, A. S., Duellman. S., 2007. Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 411-437.
(Main findings: the percentage of inside directors is negatively related to conservatism ; the percentage of outside directors’ shareholdings is positively related to conservatism.)
Monitoring vs. Advising
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J., Ozbas, O., 2010. When are outside directors effective? Journal of Financial Economics 96, 195-214.
Faleye, O.,Hoitash, R., Hoitash,U. 2011. The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics 101,160-181.
Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M., Raposo,C., 2011. Board structure and price informativeness. Journal of Financial Economics 99, 523-545.
Board Size
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N.D., Naveen, L., 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all?Journal of Financial Economics 87, 329-356.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40,185-211.
Director Ownership
Chen, Q. Goldstein, I, Jiang, W. 2008. Directors’ Ownership in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry. Journal of Finance 63, 2629-2677.
Director Compensation
Ryan, H., Wiggins, R. A., 2004. Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, bargaining power, and board independence. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 497-524.
Adams, R., Ferreira,D.,2008. Do directors perform for pay? Journal of Accounting and Economics 46,154-171.
CEO-Directors (NOT Duality)
Fich, E., 2005. Are some outside directors better than others? Evidence from director appointments by Fortune 1000 firms. Journal of Business 78,1943-1972.
(Abstract: I analyze 1,493 first‐time director appointments to Fortune 1000 boards, during 1997–99, to investigate whether certain outside directors are better than others. Reactions to director appointments are higher when appointees are CEOs of other companies than when they are not. CEOs are more likely to obtain outside directorships when the companies they head perform well. Well‐performing CEOs are also more likely to gain directorships in organizations with growth opportunities. Because, for these firms, a large portion of their value hinges upon realizing their growth potential, I conclude that CEOs are sought as outside directors to enhance firm value.)
Stulz, R., Fahlenbrach, R., Low,A., 2010. Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors? Journal of Financial Economics 97, 12-32.
CEO-Chair Duality
Goyal, V. K., Park, C. W. , 2002. Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 49-66.
Founder-Directors
Li，F., Srinivasan, S., 2011. Corporate governance when founders are directors. Journal of Financial Economics 102, 454-469.
(Main finding: Founder-director firms-->higher pay-performance sensitivity; lower CEO pay; higher CEO turnover-sensitivity).
Social Networks
Hwang, B. H., Kim, S. 2009. It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial Economics 93, 138-158.
Cai, Y., Sevilir, M. 2012. Board connections and M&A transactions. Journal of Financial Economics 103, 327-349.
Fracassi, C., Tate,G. 2012. External networking and internal firm governance. Journal of Finance 67,153-194.
Political Connections
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J. 2009. Do politically connected boards affect firm value?Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331-2360.
Financial Expertise
DeFond, M., Hann, R., Hu, X., 2005. Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of boards of directors? Journal of Accounting Research 43, 153-193.
(Main results from the abstract: (1) "Positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees." (2) "This positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise.")
Guner, A. B., Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2008. Financial expertise of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 323-354.
(Main results from the abstract: (1) "When commercial bankers join boards, external funding increases and investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases." (2) "However, the increased financing flows to firms with good credit but poor investment opportunities. "(3) "Investment bankers on boards are associated with larger bond issues but worse acquisitions." (4) "Increasing financial expertise on boards may not benefit shareholders if conflicting interests (e.g., bank profits) are neglected.")
Inside Directors
Masulis, R.W., Mobbs, S., 2011. Are all inside directors the same? Evidence from the external directorship market. Journal of Finance 66,823-872.
Staggered Board
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A. 2005. The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics 78, 409-433.
Meeting Frequency
Vafeas, N., 1999. Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 113-142.
3. CEO
CEO Ownership
Kim, E. H., Lu, Y.,2011. CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics 102,272-292.
CEO Compensation & Perks
Butler, A. W., Gurun, U. , Educational networks, mutual fund voting patterns, and CEO Compensation. forthcoming at Review of Financial Studies.
(Main finding: mutual fund manager-CEO educational networks-->voting against shareholder proposal to limit CEO compensation-->higher CEO compensation).
Bebchuk, L, Cremers,K., Peyer, U.,2011. The CEO pay slice. Journal of Financial Economics 102,199-221.
Conyon, M.,Peck, S.,1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal 41, 146-157.
Morse, A., Nanda,V., Seru,A.2011. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of Finance 66,1779-1821.
Faulkender, M. Yang, J. 2010. Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups. Journal of Financial Economics 96, 257-270
Benmelech, E., Kandel, E., Veronesi, P.2010. Stock based compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives. Quarterly Journal of Economics 125,1769-1820.
Yermack, D. 2006. Flights of fancy:corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns. Journal of Financial Economics 80,211-242.
Gormley, Todd A., David A. Matsa, and Todd Milbourn. “CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk-Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Forthcoming.
CEO Turnover
Weisbach, M. S., 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-460.
Denis, D., Denis, D. Sarin, A. Ownership structure and top executive turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 45, 193-221.
(Managerial ownership-->less likely top executive turnover and lower pay-performance sensitivity; outside blockholder ownership-->more likely top executive turnover)
Parrino, R., 1997. CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-Sectional analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 46, 165-197.
Denis, D., Serrano, J. 1996. Active investors and management turnover following unsuccessful control contests. Journal of Financial Economics 40, 239-266.
Huson, M., Malatesta, P.,Parrino, R. 2004. Managerial succession and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 74, 237-275.
Goyal, V.,Park,C.,2002.Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance 8,49-66.
Brookman, J.,Thistle, P., 2009. CEO tenure,the risk of termination and firm value. Journal of Corporate Finance 15,331-344.
CEO Entrenchment and Power
Bebchuck, L., Cohen, A., Ferrell, A. 2009. What matters in corporate governance? Review of Financial Studies 22, 783-827.
Morse, A., Nanda,V., Seru,A.2011. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of Finance 66,1779-1821.
Adams, R., Almeida, H., Ferreira, D., 2005. Powerful CEOs and their Impact on corporate performance. Review of Financial Studies 18, 1403-1432.
(Main Finding: Powerful CEO-->Higher stock return volatility)
Westphal, J., Zajac, E. 1995. Who shall govern? CEO/Board power, demographic similarity, and new director selection. Administrative Science Quarterly 40, 60-83.
Westphal, J., Zajac, E. 1996. Director reputation, CEO-Board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks. Administrative Science Quarterly 41, 507-529.
Social Networks
Engelberg, J., Gao, P., Parsons, C. A., 2012.Friends with money. Journal of Financial Economics 103, 169-188.
(Data: BoardEx and Dealscan. Main finding: social networks between banks and firms-->lower interest rate-->better subsequent credit rating and stock return)
Engelberg, J., Gao, P., Parsons, C. A., 2012. The Value of a Rolodex: CEO Pay and Personal Network, conditionally accepted. Review of Financial Studies.
Other CEO Characteristics
Fahlenbrach, R., 2009. Founder-CEOs, investment decisions, and stock market performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 439-466.
Bertrand, M., Schoar, A.,2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118,1169-1208
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K. M., Perez-Gonzalez, F., Wolfenzon, D., 2007. Inside the family firm:the role of families in succession decisions and performance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 647-691.
4.Corporate Policies
Diversification
Dennis, D., Dennis, D. Sarin, A. 1997. Agency problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversification. Journal of Finance 52, 135-160.
(Managerial ownership and outside block ownership-->less likely diversified)
Rajan, R., H. Servaes, and L. Zingales. 2000. The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment. Journal of Finance 55, 35–80.
Aggarwal, R.K. and A.A. Samwick, 2003. Why do managers diversify their firms? Agency reconsidered. Journal of Finance, 58, 71-118.
Hoechle, D., Schmid, M., Walter, L., Yermack, D. 2012, How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics 103, 41-60.
Stow, J. and Xing, X., 2006. Can growth opportunities explain the diversification discount? Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 783-796.
Duchin, R. 2010. Cash holdings and corporate diversification. Journal of Finance 65, 955-992.
(Key finding: multidivision firms hold significantly less cash than stand-alone firms because they are diversified in their investment opportunities)
Hann, R. N., Ogneva, M., Ozbas, O. 2013. Corporate diversification and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance 68, 1961-1999.
Mergers and Acquisitions
Netter, J., Poulsen, A., Stegemoller, M., 2009. The rise of corporate governance in corporate control research. Journal of Corporate Finance 15, 1-9.
Moeller, S., Schlingemann, F.,Stulz,R. 2005. Wealth destruction on a massive scale?A study of acquiring-firm returns in the recent merger wave. Journal of Finance 60, 757-782.
Masulis, R., Wang, C., Xie, F. 2007. Corporate governance and acquirer returns. Journal of Finance 62, 1851-1889.
Wang, C., Xie, F. 2009. Corporate governance transfer and synergistic gains from mergers and acquisitions. Review of Financial Studies 22, 829-858.
Rossi, S., Volpin, P. F. 2004. Cross-country determinants of mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 74, 277-304.
Cash Holdings
Harford, J., Mansi,S.,Maxwell,W.,2008. Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 535-555.
Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith,J. 2007. Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 83, 599-634.
Mikkelson,W.,Partch, M., 2003. Do persistent large cash reserves hinder performance?Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 275-294.
Opler,T.,Pinkowitz,L, Stulz,R., Williamson, R. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52,3-46.
Risk Taking
John,K., Litov, L., Yeung, B. 2008. Corporate governance and risk-taking. Journal of Finance 63,1679-1728.
Low, A., 2009. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 92, 470-490.
Earnings Management
Xie, B., Davidson, W. N., DaDalt, P. J., 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 295-316.
EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE
5. Political Economy
Business owners in politics
Bunkanwanicha, P. , Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2009. Big business owners in politics. Review of Financial Studies 22, 2133-2168.
Political Connections
Fisman, R. 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91, 1095-1102.
Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., McConnell, J. J. 2006. Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance 61, 2597-2635.
Duchin, R., Sosyura, D. 2011. The politics of government investment. Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
(From abstract: "Using hand-collected data on firm applications for TARP funds, we find that politically connected firms are more likely to be funded, controlling for other characteristics. Yet investments in politically connected firms underperform those in unconnected firms. Overall, we show that connections between firms and regulators are associated with distortions in investment efficiency.")
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., Laeven,L. 2008. Political connections and preferential access to finance:The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 554-580.
Faccio, M. 2006. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review 96, 369-396.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J. 2009. Do politically connected boards affect firm value?Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331-2360.
Chaney, P., Faccio, M., Parsley, D., 2011. The quality of accounting information on politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51, 58-76.
Fan, J. P., Wong, T. J. Zhang, T. 2007. Politically-connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Eocnomics 84, 330-357.
Li, A., Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q. 2008. Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Entrepreneurs. Journal of Development Economics 87, 283-299, 2008.
Politics and Asset Prices
Boutchkova, M.,Doshi, H., Durnev, A., Molchanov, A., 2012. Precarious politics and return volatility. Review of Financial Studies 25, 1111-1154.
Belo, F., Gala, V., Li, J. forthcoming.Government spending, political cycles and the cross-section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics.
Pastor, L., Veronesi, P. forthcoming. Uncertainty about government policy and stock prices. Journal of Finance.
Qi, Y., Roth, L., Wald, J., 2010. Political rights and the cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 95,202-226.
Butler, A. W., Fauver, L., Mortal, S., 2009. Corruption, political connections, and municipal finance. Review of Financial Studies 22, 2673-2705.
Government Regulation and Entrepreneurship
Klapper, L., Laeven, L., Rajan, R. 2006.Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics 82,591-629.
Others
Cohen, L., Coval, J., Malloy, C.2011. Do powerful politicians cause corporate downsizing? Journal of Political Economy 119, 1015-1060.
6. Law and Finance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-27.
Shleifer, A. Wolfenson, D. 2002. Investor protection and equity markets. Journal of Financial Economics 66,3-27.
7. Shareholder Activism
Davis, G., Kim, E. H.2007. Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds. Journal of Financial Economics 85, 552-570.
Morgan, A., Poulsen, A., Wolf, J., Yang, T., 2011. Mutual funds as monitors:evidence from mutual fund voting. Journal of Corporate Finance 17, 914-928.
Levit, D., Malenko, N., 2011. Nonbinding voting for shareholder proposals. Journal of Finance 66, 1579-1614.
Cunat, V., Gine, M., Guadalupe, M., forthcoming. The vote is cast: the effect of corporate governance on shareholder value. Journal of Finance.
Brav, A., Kim, H., Jiang, W. 2010. Hedge Fund Activism: A Review. Foundations and Trends in Finance 4, 1-66.
Klein, April and Emanuel Zur, 2009, Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds and other private investors, Journal of Finance 64, 187-229.
Clifford, Christopher, 2008, Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists, Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 323-336.
Greenwood, Robin and Michael Schor, 2009, Hedge fund investor activism and takeovers, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 362-375.
Cheffins, B.R. , Armor, J. 2011, The Past, Present and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds. Journal of Corporation Law 37, 51-103.
8. Media
Dyck, A., Volchkova,N., Zingales, L. 2008 The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from Russia. Journal of Finance 63,1093-1134.
Core, J.E., Guay W., Larcker, D. F., 2008.The power of the pen and executive compensation, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 1-25.
9. Product Market Competition (Horizontal Relationship Between Firms)
Giroud, X.,Mueller,H.,2010.Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?Journal of Financial Economics 95,312–331.
Giroud, X.,Mueller,H.,2011.Corporate governance,product market competition, and equity prices. Journal of Finance 66,563–600.
Valta, 2012.Competition and the cost of debt, Journal of Financial Economics 105, 661-682.
10. Supply Chain (Vertical Relationship Between Suppliers and Customers)
Cohen, L., Frazzini, 2008. A. Economic links and predictable returns. Journal of Finance 63, 1977-2011.
Raman, K., Shahrur, H., 2008. Relationship-specific investments and earnings management: Evidence on corporate suppliers and customers. The Accounting Review 83, 1041-1081.
Hertzel, M. G., Li, Z., Officer, M. S., Rodgers, K. J., 2008. Inter-firm linkages and the wealth effects of financial distress along the supply chain.
Journal of Financial Economics 87, 374-387.
Kang, J., Tham, M, Zhu, M.2012. Spillover effects of earnings restatements along the supply chain. Working paper.
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