Chapter 12

WAR PRODUCTION


There is still a lingering belief in some quarters that the full forces of the British Motor Industry were marshalled for war-production sometime before the outbreak of the great conflict of 1939, and that the button merely had to be pressed for the whole of its machinery to be set in motion to produce war material in accordance with a predetermined plan, and on a scale that was scheduled to dwarf all efforts of 1914-18.

The shadow factory scheme, in which certain large manufacturers pooled their resources by building new factories on new sites and equipping them with machinery specially designed for the purpose intended, has long since become an open secret, but what is not commonly known is that no general scheme for using the production resources of the motor industry existed. Apart from a couple of inspections by the Authorities of the Wolseley factory during 1937, the Company was left severely alone, actually until after the war broke out, indeed it would hardly be an exaggeration to state that the Wolseley Company had to offer its services for war production and use its own initiative in preparing for the gigantic task which it subsequently performed.

Let us take a brief glance at the conditions of the Wolseley Company as they existed prior to that fateful Sunday morning of September 3rd, 1939, when the British Empire was rocked by the words of the then Prime Minister.

As related in the last chapter, the new "Wolseley-Ten" was introduced to an eager public shortly after the Munich crisis of 1938.

The interest shown in Wolseley productions and specially in this particular model was increasing almost beyond expectations. The "Ten" with its many refinements and outstanding performance was so different from the orthodox "Ten" that the Company foresaw an equallv good reception awaiting a still smaller car, and so during 1938 plans were laid down to introduce a " Wolseley-Eight which would register just as marked a breakaway from the average Eight " as the " Ten " had from other productions.

The development of this new car, the smallest in the Wolseley range, passed through the usual channels; it was subjected to the exhaustive tests which every Wolseley car has to undergo, and in due course preparations were made for its introduction on a date approximately one week after September 3rd. In addition to normal production, the factory had been " tooled-up " to cope with the extra demand for this new model.

Apart from the general uneasiness throughout the country at the possibility of war, there was nothing to suggest that in a matter of months fuzes, shells and mines would be taking the place of the steady flow of motor-cars leaving the Wolseley assembly lines.

A few hours after Neville Chamberlain's announcement to the people of Britain that their country was once more at war, the gates of the factory were opened to admit the cars of the senior executives, who had been hastily summoned by telephone by the late Mr. Oliver Boden, Lord Nuffield's Vice-Chairman. It was quite obvious to those who attended the meeting that this was to be a mechanized war, and that the country would need the full exploitation of its engineering capacity. Unarmed, the country had been committed at Munich to a policy of appeasement. Still unarmed, Britain was now committed to a war against a nation that had spent six years in the mobilization of its powerful resources. Just how the huge machine shops and assembly facilities of the Wolseley plant could best contribute towards this mechanized war was the chief item on the agenda. At the same time, no one knew what would follow the declaration of war-whether the nerve centres of British industry would be attacked from the air by bombs, or the population by gas-but in the interests of its employees, the Company decided to carry on with all possible speed the building of the large number of shelters necessary for the full complement of workpeople, and to recruit men for the Fire Brigade and other services. How this was done will be described in the next chapter.

The introduction of the new " Wolseley-Eight " was, of course, cancelled, but it was decided to continue production of other models while the supply of raw material on hand and in course of treatment lasted; to cut off deliveries of materials from suppliers and so allow car production to " work itself out." In the meantime, everything possible was to be done to obtain orders for any type of munitions for which the production facilities were suitable.

It was also agreed to take over from Morris Commercial Cars the assembly of their special design of six-wheeled War Office vehicles, so allowing them to concentrate on an increased production of other vehicles for the War Office. This transfer had the advantage of enabling the Wolseley Company to keep a considerable portion of their chassis and body building lines in production.

Similarly, the orders for Bren Gun Carriers which were already in production at another Company in the Nuffield OrganizationNuffield Mechanisations and Aero Ltd.-were transferred to Wolseley. Both types of vehicles were required very urgently, and the first Carrier left the Wolseley Company early in the following January, a remarkable feat. The Planning Department of the Company, which in peacetime had a high pitch of efficiency, was largely responsible for this achievement. Another advantage was the large and well-equipped Tool Room the Company possessed.

During the whole of the war this enabled them to cope with their own jig and tool design and production, and this removed a bottleneck which so frequently slowed up production in the case of factories not so well equipped.

The contract for the production of six-wheeled vehicles was completed towards the end of 1942, by which time nearly 6,000 of these versatile machines had been built. The Bren Gun Carrier production continued throughout the entire war years, and constituted one of the major contributions of the Wolseley Company to the war effort. Although all Carriers are popularly known as " Bren Gun Carriers," there are in fact several different types. The Wolseley production included Scout Carriers, Universal Carriers,3-in. Mortar Carriers and the Loyd Artillery Tractor, in the production of the latter Wolseley being the parent producer for the whole country.

There is an amusing story told of the early days of the Wolseley Carrier production. At the time of the transfer of the original contract from Nuffield Mechanisations and Aero Ltd., an official of the Ministry of Supply came down and was shown the building in which the Wolseley Company proposed to assemble these Carriers. Having carried out his inspection, he announced that the building was much too small for the fifteen Carriers a week called for in the contract. After much discussion he agreed to allow the Company to attempt what was to him the impossible, and went on his way. When, some three years later, the contract rate had risen to well over a hundred a week, this output still came from the same building.

When the whole country's Carrier production was threatened by a shortage of steel castings for the suspension units, the Cornpany was asked to design an alternative that could be fabricated from pressings and tube welded into a unit. So successfully was this achieved that these Fabricated Forks were finally used almost universally on all British built Carriers.

In addition to the production of various types of Carriers, some thousands of these machines built overseas were modified and converted to the latest designs at the Wolseley factory. The grand total of Carriers delivered during the war years from this one factory was over 22,000, and the Company are justly proud that they produced more track vehicles than any other Company in the country. In recognition of this work, Mr. Joe Banham, who was in charge of the Carrier Assembly shops, was awarded the B.E.M.

To return, however, to the first few weeks of the war. Just as the last Wolseley cars were being completed on the assembly lines, the Company received information that there was an urgent need for 600 ambulances for use of the Midland Air Raid Precaution Services, which were then coming into being under the able administration of Lord Dudley. Since ambulances could not be obtained, he approached the Wolseley Company with a view to their designing and manufacturing an ambulance body which could be fitted to a chassis of the private-car type. A prototype was designed, and mounted on a standard 21-h.p. Wolseley chassis which was taken from the Company's garage fleet and submitted for inspection. It was accepted at once. Then arose the question of acquiring the -necessary chassis, so in response to a furtherappeal from Lord Dudley, the Wolseley Company undertook to purchase, inspect, test, and generally equip 600 secondhand cars of private type of various makes considered suitable for the purpose intended. This resulted in vast numbers of strange cars arriving at the Wolseley Works for treatment, which included modifications to springing, overhaul of braking and lighting systems, and, of course, the fitting of the new ambulance body.

The building of these vehicles presented a most unusual sight in a motor-car factory, since it necessitated a complete reversal of the normal procedure. Instead of the cars gradually becoming more complete as they passed down the assembly lines, these vehicles started as complete cars and were dismembered as they proceeded. The bodies were cut in half just behind the centre door pillar, and the back portion was thrown away to be replaced by the wood and canvas ambulance body.

When complete, each vehicle was a thoroughly serviceable ambulance for the use of the Minister of Health. The average cost per vehicle was £50. In addition to this, some hundreds of sp--cial vans were produced from converted saloon private cars for Army Signals to the order of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

The first contract which the Company undertook in the production of actual munitions, and the way in which it was obtained, will to-day sound almost fantastic. News reached the Company in quite a roundabout way that the Ministry of Supply were frantically seeking capacity for the production of a shell fuze. The Sales Manager left for London to find out who started the rumour and if it were true. The reception which he received made it quite obvious that the rumour had good foundation, and within a comparatively short time, a draft contract was agreed, and Wolseley were launched on their first big share of the munitions drive.

The story of the Fuze Department and its achievements would fill many pages, but the Company is content to place on record that many millions of the 119 and other types of fuzes were produced, before the Department which specialized in fuze production was closed down immediately after the end of the war.

From such small beginnings and almost chance contacts, there developed the production of that great mass of war material against Ministry of Supply contracts undertaken by the Wolseley Company, which, by t'le time victory was won, amounted to no less than twothirds of the £30,000,000 war output of the Company.

In spite of the final analysis of the Company's war production, showing such a preponderance towards Ministry of Supply contracts, it was actually the Admiralty contracts that held the dominating position with the Company for the early war years. Almost within days of the outbreak of war the Company obtained from a Midland firm a sub-contract to produce 4-in. shells for the Admiralty, and from this humble beginning there started an association between the Admiralty and the Wolseley Company of which the Company is very proud.

Apart from further direct contracts for various sizes of shells, amounting 'to some two million in total, it was in connection withthe production of " Under Water Stores " that Wolseley was most closely concerned, the two principal items being Mine Units and Depth Charge Pistols. The importance of this work can be appreciated from the fact that in the early days of the war when one of the three Ministries became the responsible authority for each factory, it was the Admiralty that became the parent Ministry of Wolseley. In addition, the volume of Admiralty work being undertaken in the factory resulted in the Area Headquarters of the Admiralty Progress Department, dealing with Under Water Stores, being established at the Works.

It was in December, 1939, that the first contract was received tobuild 20,000 of the largest and latest type of mine, and 10,000 sinkers. The remaining 10,000 sinkers were to be manufactured by another Birmingham firm, and delivered to Wolseley Motors for assembly with the mines. It should be explained that a mine sinker is a large unit rather like a water tank, some three feet cube, mounted on small trolley wheels. The mine itself is clamped into position on the sinker, and the whole unit is launched together. On reaching the water the mine is automatically detached and floats on the surface whilst the sinker descends towards the sea bed. Just before the sinker reaches the bottom an ingenious mechanism locks the drum on which the wire, connecting the mine to the sinker is wound, and the mine is pulled down below the surface. Even more ingeniously, the depth below the surface is controlled irrespective of the contour of the sea bed. Thus, a minefield sown over an undulating sea bed, would still have all the mines at the same depth below the surface.

It is worth mentioning in connection with the production of mine sinkers that for a Company of the Nuffield Organization to produce these was an example of the old saying of " history repeating itself," since it was for the production of mine sinkers in the 1914-18 war at his works at Cowley that Lord Nuffield first developed his technique of " Quantity Production."

As can be imagined, these mine units are large and bulky, and the space required for their assembly and storage is considerable. It was, strangely enough, this very factor that made their manufacture in the Wolseley factory particularly appropriate. It will be obvious that the conversion of a great factory engaged in the production of motor-cars to that of munitions is one which presents difficulties of a complex and formidable kind. The magnitude of the task can be better appreciated when the fact is borne in mind that the areas occupied by the assembly, chassis, and the building, painting, trimming and mounting of the bodies, as well as the space required for showrooms and despatch of the finished cars, amounted at the Wolseley factory to approximately half the total factory area of 1,096,983 square feet.

From the outset, no doubt existed in the minds of the Management that Government contracts for war material would fully occupy the machine shops and ancillary departments, such as heat treatment, plating, etc., but the problem had to be solved of finding work for the extensive assembly areas, because few armaments require the space the Company had at its disposal in this respect. The mine contract was, therefore, just what was required to help fill these large assembly areas. What had been the body trimminglines were turned over to this work, and in addition one of the 300 feet body mounting conveyor lines was taken up and reinstated at right angles to the mine and sinker lines to transport the finished units to the railway despatch sidings. Production began in May, 1940, with the original target of 1,000 a week, but by August a request was received to increase the output to 1,200 per week, and in October output actually reached the record figure of 1,248 units in one week.

As can well be imagined, the despatch of this number of such bulky articles was in itself a major problem. Six units only could be carried in an ordinary railway truck, and so for one week's output over 200 trucks were required. Every evening complete train-loads of trucks fully loaded with their cargo of mine units were shunted out of the Company's vast railway sidings, and every night a special express train, known to the local railway authorities as "the ghost train," started on its long journey to the mine depot in Scotland.

The ebb and flow of the war was often reflected in the contracts placed for war material. It was not uncommon for a great number of some special weapon to be ordered and an urgent request made for speedy delivery. This would entail tremendous efforts being put forth, special machines and tools would be installed for its production, and in due course the particular article would begin to flow from the production lines at an ever-increasing tempo. Then, suddenly, the course of the war would change and entail an alteration in design, or even render further deliveries unnecessary. Production would have to stop altogether, or slow down, with the resulting strain on the nerves of those engaged in production.

Owing to the necessity for preserving strict secrecy, the contractors could rarely be informed for what particular exploit anything they produced was needed. It transpired afterwards that this vast production of mines was needed by the Admiralty for the sowing of a gigantic minefield from the cast coast of Great Britain to the coast of Norway. Before this project could be carried out the Germans had invaded Norway and it was too late, and so just as the mine production reached its peak, telegrams and letters began to arrive urging a decrease in the rate of production, and in March, 1941, orders were received to stop production entirely.

As can well be imagined, this created many difficulties in absorbing the considerable labour force, but for some weeks this was switched over to the modification of mine units in stock. By the beginning of April, however, the position became really serious, and there is no knowing in what direction the solution of the problembuild 20,000 of the largest and latest type of mine, and 10,000 sinkers. The remaining 10,000 sinkers were to be manufactured by another Birmingham firm, and delivered to Wolseley Motors for assembly with the mines. It should be explained that a mine sinker is a large unit rather like a water tank, some three feet cube, mounted on small trolley wheels. The mine itself is clamped into position on the sinker, and the whole unit is launched together. On reaching the water the mine is automatically detached and floats on the surface whilst the sinker descends towards the sea bed. Just before the sinker reaches the bottom an ingenious mechanism locks the drum on which the wire, connecting the mine to the sinker is wound, and the mine is pulled down below the surface. Even more ingeniously, the depth below the surface is controlled irrespective of the contour of the sea bed. Thus, a minefield sown over an undulating sea bed, would still have all the mines at the same depth below the surface.

It is worth mentioning in connection with the production of mine sinkers that for a Company of the Nuffield Organization to produce these was an example of the old saying of " history repeating itself," since it was for the production of mine sinkers in the 1914-18 war at his works at Cowley that Lord Nuffield first developed his technique of " Quantity Production."

As can be imagined, these mine units are large and bulky, and the space required for their assembly and storage is considerable. It was, strangely enough, this very factor that made their manufacture in the Wolseley factory particularly appropriate. It will be obvious that the conversion of a great factory engaged in the production of motor-cars to that of munitions is one which presents difficulties of a complex and formidable kind. The magnitude of the task can be better appreciated when the fact is borne in mind that the areas occupied by the assembly, chassis, and the building, painting, trimming and mounting of the bodies, as well as the space required for showrooms and despatch of the finished cars, amounted at the Wolseley factory to approximately half the total factory area of 1,096,983 square feet.

From the outset, no doubt existed in the minds of the Management that Government contracts for war material would fully occupy the machine shops and ancillary departments, such as heat, treatment, plating, etc., but the problem had to be solved of finding work for the extensive assembly areas, because few armaments require the space the Company had at its disposal in this respect. The mine contract was, therefore, just what was required to help fill these large assembly areas. What had been the body trimming lines were turned over to this work, and in addition one of the 300 feet body mounting conveyor lines was taken up and reinstated at right angles to the mine and sinker lines to transport the finished units to the railway despatch sidings. Production began in May, 1940, with the original target of 1,000 a week, but by August a request was received to increase the output to 1,200 per week, and in October output actually reached the record figure of 1,248 units in one week.

As can well be imagined, the despatch of this number of such bulky articles was in itself a major problem. Six units only could be carried in an ordinary railway truck, and so for one week's output over 200 trucks were required. Every evening complete train-loads of trucks fully loaded with their cargo of mine units were shunted out of the Company's vast railway sidings, and every night a special express train, known to the local railway authorities as " the ghost train," started on its long journey to the mine depot in Scotland.

The ebb and flow of the war was often reflected in the contracts placed for war material. It was not uncommon for a greatnumber of some special weapon to be ordered and an urgent request made for speedy delivery. This would entail tremendous efforts being put forth, special machines and tools would be installed for its production, and in due course the particular article would begin to flow from the production lines at an ever-increasing tempo. Then, suddenly, the course of the war would change and entail an alteration in design, or even render further deliveries unnecessary. Production would have to stop altogether, or slow down, with the resulting strain on the nerves of those engaged in production.

Owing to the necessity for preserving strict secrecy, the contractors could rarely be informed for what particular exploit anything they produced was needed. It transpired afterwards that this vast production of mines was needed by the Admiralty for the sowing of a gigantic minefield from the cast coast of Great Britain to the coast of Norway. Before this project could be carried out the Germans had invaded Norway and it was too late, and so just as the mine production reached its peak, telegrams and letters began to arrive urging a decrease in the rate of production, and in March, 1941, orders were received to stop production entirely.

As can well be imagined, this created many difficulties in absorbing the considerable labour force, but for some weeks this was switched over to the modification of mine units in stock. By the beginning of April, however, the position became really serious, and there is no knowing in what direction the solution of the problem would have been found had it not been for the Germans who solved it. The large stock of mines was occupying valuable space, and the Company was at its wits’ end to know how to dispose of all the surplus mine units on hand. On April 10th, the entire building containing the whole of the mine unit production lines was blown up and completely destroyed in one of the worst air attacks which Birmingham sustained. The surplus mine difficulty was solved.

By the end of 1941 the fortunes of war had again changed. and once more the Company was asked to recommence the production of mine units, but on a much reduced scale. On this occasion the chassis lines were converted to this work, and so enabled them to continue in production after the termination of the contract for the six-wheeled vehicles. In all, the Wolseley Company delivered over 23.900 mine and sinker units, and in addition received contracts for over 36,000 Mine Mechanism Plates for mines built by other contractors. This device is a unit which ensures that the mine will not become active until a reasonable time after it has bjen laid, to avoid the danger of the ship that laid it falling a victim to its own mines. If, too, a mine broke loose or was swept up, the mechanism plate ensured that the mine automatically became dead, since a floating live mine can be just as much a danger to one's own ships as to the enemy.

Bcfore leaving the story of mine production, it is interesting to record an incident, which, although humorous when viewed in retrospect, might have had very serious consequences. One day the Company were told that a mine which had been damaged at one of the depots was being returned to them for rectification. In due course the damaged mine arrived, and an examination disclosed that a lug had been broken from the casing and required rewelding. After the welding was complete, it was decided to take the cover plate off the mine so as to renew the paintwork on the inside, which was bound to have been blistered by the welding temperature. To the utter dismay of the welder, the mine was found to contain its charge-case of 500-1b. of T.N.T. How it happened that this had never been removed at the depot before sending the mine for repair must remain a mystery, and so perhaps should the manner in which the Company solved the problem of the disposal of such a large quantity of high explosive, which officially they had no right to have in their possession.

As already mentioned, the other important store produced for the Admiralty was the Depth Charge Pistol, far less spectacular in size, yet far more important in the part it played in the winning of the war. Probably of all their war contracts the Wolseley Company are most proud of the part they played in the production of these Depth Charge Pistols. It should be explained that in armament parlance a pistol is nothing like what its name suggests. It is, in fact, a fuze, and a Depth Charge Pistol is the hydrostatically controlled fuze by means of which the depth charge can be set to explode at a predetermined depth below the surface of the sea. The early contracts that the Wolseley Company received were for the production of a type of pistol that had been in existence for some years, for use with depth charges thrown from the decks of destroyers or other vessels.

Gradually, however, as the U-Boat warfare became more and more intense, it was decided that the principal weapon against them was to be the depth charge, dropped from aeroplanes.

This new use for a long-established weapon of war brought in its wake an entirely new set of technical problertis. The shock on impact of the depth charge landing at some 150 to 200 miles an hour from several hundred feet, disclosed weaknesses in the original design of the pistol, and further complications arose from the cavitation effect caused by the bulk of the depth charge displacing the water on impact. Again, an entirely new range of depths of explosion was required to deal with the greater depths at which the latest German submarines operated. There were also the special problems due to the possibility of the carrier acrop'ane having to make a forced landing in the sea, with the risk of the subsequent explosion of its depth charges and the killing of the crew.

All this resulted in much hard work and brilliant designing by the special section of the Admiralty engaged on this work, but designs on paper are, in themselves, useless. Prototyp2s have to be manufactured for research tests, and later, samples of a minimum of one hundred units have to be produced for full-scale trials b.-fore any new design could be released for quantity production. It was this highly specialized production of prototypes in the Wolseley factory which gives rise to the justifiable pride of all who participated in this work. On the one hand, the Admiralty experts knowin(, all the intricacies of the functional requirements, and on the other hand, the Wolseley engineers with their intimate knowledge of manufacturing possibilities, and even more important, impossibilities.

From this happy liaison, more than one entirely new design of Depth Charge Pistol was born, and before victory was finally won, over 135,000 of these intricate pieces of mechanism had left the Wolseley factory. For this work, Mr. van Eugen, the Chief Designer of the Wolseley Company, received the M.B.E.

As can well be imagined from the foregoing brief descriptions of some of the work carried out for the Ministry of Supply and Admiralty, there was little room left for Ministry of Aircraft Production contracts, at least in the early war years. It will be seen, however, that this state of altairs changed quite suddenly, and during the latter part of the war, probably the largest portion of the Wolseley output was against Ministry of Aircraft Production contracts.

Very early in the war, the Company undertook the manufacture of several component parts of the Browning Gun Control, as subcontractors to the Ministry of Aircraft Production through the Dunlop Rubber Co. In addition, a very considerable number of Oil Control units for aircraft of various types were manufactured under sub-contracts for the Lockheed Company. Usually small in size and unspectacular in appearance, these components and units required the highest possible degree of accuracy in machining, and throughout the war a special department was allocated to this important work.

The first direct contract the Company received from the Ministry of Aircraft Production was, however, for the production of a bomb fuze, or Pistol Bomb D.A. No. 27 Mk. 11, to give it its official designation, and some 55,000 of these were produced.

The most spectacular of the Wolseley contracts for the Ministry of Aircraft Production started towards the end of 1941. It has already been mentioned that the Company received severe damage in an air raid in April, 1941, and part of the damage sustained on that occasion consisted of the total destruction of the whole of the building that originally housed the car test, final view, and trim and mounting lines, as well as the whole of the trim stores, an area of four and a quarter acres. Rebuilt in record time and with all the skill of the latest design in steel frame buildings, the new shop which arose from the devastation consisted of three huge bays, 100-ft., 110-ft. and 120-ft. wide respectively, with a clear span for each bay. When completed the centre bay 110-ft. wide and some 440-ft. long was unoccupied, and the Wolseley executives were anxiously searching for some contract that would occupy this considerable area. Suddenly, one Sunday morning, an official of the Ministry of Aircraft Production arrived. He understood that in the new shop there was considerable floor area which could be utilized for the assembly of a great number of very large units. He examined the area, nodded his head, and departed as mysteriouslyas he had arrived. A few days later more Ministry officials arrived. They talked of the biggest aircraft wing which had then been contemplated. The matter was discussed in detail, and the Company was told that the construction of huge gliders, to carry a considerable number of troops, was to be put in hand. Wolseley's undertook the work.

The Company became part of a wing group of four firms consisting of the L.M.S., the L.N.E.R., and the Craven Carriage Works at Sheffield. The first order received was for 165 pairs of wings, and the first sub-assemblies were completed on November 15th, 1941. The contract rate stipulated five sets per week, but subsequently by dint of great exertion was increased to twelve sets per week. Just as this rate of production was achieved, and the work was proceeding smoothly at the new rate, the Company received one of those messages that all manufacturers throughout the war came to dread -" stop production."

Far away from the busy factory scene, an important meeting had been held. The military experts studying the trend and development of the war had decided that for some reason their plans for the use of troop-carrying gliders were no longer practicable. Perhaps the progress of the fighting had removed the necessity for their use-perhaps some move of the enemy had rendered their plans useless. Whatever the reason, the result was the same. Usually without any warning the contractor would receive instructions to stop production, and with a sigh of resignation started the weary business of closing down the contract, and searching for another to take its place, before his labour force was directed elsewhere.

And so it was in the case of the Horsa Glider Wing contract. The Company, anxious to carry on for as long as possible with that type of work, discovered that there was still outstanding a considerable order for spares. None of the other Companies in the group seemed interested, and so Wolseley took over from the group the whole of the outstanding spares requirements. This lasted for several weeks, and whilst engaged on this work, a change in operational requirements arose, as suddenly as the previous canlcellation. Horsa Glider production became overnight a top priority. Not only were the Gliders urgently required, but in quantities far greater than before.

By this time, Wolseley were the only firm left in the production of wings, and they were accordingly asked to become the parent of a new group, with the huge target of twenty-five sets per week. This work was put in hand at once, and the Company undertook to produce, themselves, fifteen of the twenty-five sets per week. An idea of the magnitude of the undertaking can be gathered from the fact that each wing measured 32-ft. from tip to foot, and when on edge in the building jigs, just cleared the 15-ft. 6-in. high roof.

On February 25th, 1944, the Company received a visit from Sir Stafford Cripps, the then Minister of Aircraft Production, who congratulated the workers on the building of these wings, the total number produced, including spares, amounting to 1,800 sets. It was certainly a proud day for all the workers when they heard the first news of the use of the Horsa Glider in the glorious epic of the landings in Sicily.