Trump is the result of a loss of confidence in democracy
On the premise that content societies do not produce politicians like Trump, is Trump therefore a manifestation of discontent? Since politicians like Trump have become more common across the world, this explanation points to broader discontents. While confidence in stability and progress towards greater prosperity and equality has seemed less certain from the late 19th Century, in the last few decades reasons for pessimism have grown. From the expiry of any residual post-Cold War optimism that an era of peace might ensue to the inequity of globalisation and huge disparities of wealth across the world and within nations, with the resulting increase in migration and destruction of traditional working-class communities. Add an increasing awareness of the environmental catastrophe which is unfolding before our eyes[7] and if you like, the consequences of late consumer capitalism and its necessity to maintain consumption through the production of discontent and distraction[8]. Many analysts have pointed to a crisis of capitalism, a crisis of liberal democracy[9] and an age of anxiety[10]. Recently climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, international instability, and the cost of living crisis are the backdrop to our lives and social media as well as and a constant news cycle means that we constantly made aware of impending threats, both real and imagined. Certainly the idea that liberal democracy was an inevitable consequence of economic development has become altogether less certain[11].
Critical analysis of Capitalism reflects a loss of optimism.Whether it's pumping oil, mining resources or shipping commodities across oceans, the global economy runs on extraction. The backbone of globalisation is still low-cost labour and rapacious corporate control. Extractive capitalism is what made - and is still making - our unequal world.
Professor Laleh Khalili reflects on the hidden stories behind late capitalism, from seafarers abandoned on debt-ridden container ships to the nefarious reach of consultancy firms and the cronyism that drives record-breaking profits.
It is therefore unsurprising that this uncertainty should be reflect in politics. The last few years have certainly been a bad time for incumbents- or at least incumbents seeking high office. Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election was just the latest in a long line of losses for incumbent parties in 2024, with people in some 70 countries accounting for about half the world’s population going to the polls. “There’s an overall sense of frustration with political elites, viewing them as out of touch, that cuts across ideological lines,” said Richard Wike, director of global attitudes research at the Pew Research Centre. The Conservatives in the UK, the French National Assembly and the rapid decline of Macron’s party, in Germany the collapse of Olaf Scholz’s coalition means that Germany will have no functioning government when Donald Trump assumes office in January. In Asia, a group of South Korean liberal opposition parties, led by the Democratic Party, defeated the ruling conservative People Power Party in April’s parliamentary elections.
India’s Narendra Modi, meanwhile, had been widely expected to easily sweep to a third straight term in June 2024 but instead voters turned away from his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in droves, costing it its majority in parliament, though it was able to remain in power with the help of allies. Likewise, Japanese voters in October punished the Liberal Democratic Party, which has governed the country nearly without interruption since 1955. Since the pandemic hit in 2020, incumbents have been removed from office in 40 of 54 elections in Western democracies, said Steven Levitsky, a political scientist at Harvard University, revealing “a huge incumbent disadvantage.”[12]
This era of discontent and frustration with politics as usual might also explain the rise of populist politics[13], which have genearlly appeared in history at times of discontent, uncertainty and fear.[14] Periods marked by wars, terrorist threats, economic struggles, political gridlock, cultural conflicts, and falling incomes which weaken trust in the political system, creating an opening for candidates like Trump. Trump’s campaign was unusual in that it attacked the pillars of its democracy, the press, the courts, and the peaceful transfer of power and the rule of law characterising the whole system as ‘the swamp’ and in this characterisation millions of Americans saw their own view of a do-nothing Congresses, lobbying scandals, corporate greed, which coalesced into a broad ill-defined rejection of politics as usual. Trump’s aggression and alarmism contributed to his outsider status even when running for re-election. He was able to personify a break with the usual and in many ways Biden’s political longevity made him an avatar for business as usual.
AGE OF REVOLUTIONS: Progress and Backlash from 1600 to the Present with Fareed Zakaria
Zakaria details the revolutions that have convulsed our times: globalization in overdrive, digital transformation, the rise of identity politics, and the return of great power politics with a vengeful Russia and an ascendant China. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jingping see a world upended by liberalism – and want to turn back the clock on democracy, women’s rights, and open societies. Even more dangerous than aggression abroad is democratic decay at home. This populist and cultural backlash that has infected the West threatens the very foundations of the world that the Enlightenment built – and that we all take too easily for granted.
The book warns us that liberalism’s great strength has been freeing people from arbitrary constraints―but its great weakness has been leaving individuals isolated, to figure out for themselves what makes for a good life. This void – the hole in the heart – can all too easily be filled by tribalism, populism, and identity politics. Today’s revolutions in technology and culture can even leave people so adrift that they turn against modernity itself.