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Split-ticket voting in the United States occurs when a voter chooses candidates from different political parties for multiple offices on the same ballot. This practice stands in contrast to straight-ticket voting, where a voter selects candidates exclusively from a single political party. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Historically a major feature of 20th-century American elections, split-ticket voting has experienced a sharp decline in recent decades due to rising political polarisation. [1]
Historical Trends and Decline
The prevalence of ticket splitting has dramatically shifted over the past 50 years:
The Peak (1970s–1980s): Driven by weakening party alignment and candidate-centred television campaigns, split-ticket voting peaked during this era. In the 1970s and 1980s, over 40% of congressional districts split their tickets. For instance, in 1972 and 1984, voters overwhelmingly re-elected Republican presidents (Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan) while simultaneously delivering massive House majorities to Democrats. [1, 2, 3]
The Modern Decline (1990s–Present): As the American electorate became more consistently and rigidly sorted into liberal and conservative camps, ticket-splitting began dropping precipitously.
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Record Lows (2020–2024): According to survey data from the American National Election Study, presidential/congressional ticket splitting dropped from roughly 30% in 1972 down to 4.5% in 2024. Similarly, the number of "crossover districts" (districts won by a presidential candidate of one party but a House representative of another) reached a modern low of just 16 districts in both 2020 and 2024. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Split ticket voting occurs when voters choose candidates from different political parties in various elections simultaneously. This phenomenon was once common in the United States but has significantly decreased in recent years. In 2016, all Senate races aligned with the presidential election results for the first time in modern US politics. The trend almost repeated in 2020, except for Republican Susan Collins retaining her Senate seat in a state that voted for Biden. This contrasts with historical voting patterns. For instance, in the 1982 midterms, Democrats won most Senate contests in states previously won by Reagan. A similar trend is observed in recent House elections. In 2020, only 16 districts split their votes, representing less than 4% of House districts. In 2016, just 35 House districts voted for a presidential candidate from a different party than their elected House representative. Despite these trends, there are exceptions like Democrat Collin Peterson from Minnesota's 7th District, who won re-election in 2016 despite strong Trump support in his district. Noteworthy about Peterson is his conservative stance, long tenure, and eventual defeat in 2020 against a Republican challenger. Personalities continue to influence voter choices in US politics, with factors such as candidate likability and experience playing a crucial role.
Split ticketing is often linked to several key reasons: - It showcases a preference for individual personalities over party affiliations in certain cases. - Historically, US parties have been quite diverse, though this is less true today. - The abundance of elected positions provides ample opportunities to split one's vote. The primary outcomes of split ticketing are threefold. Firstly, it can result in 'divided government' at either the state or national level. Secondly, it may lead to split Senate delegations, where each party has one senator. While less common now, in the 2020–22 Senate, states like Ohio, Montana, and West Virginia had split Senate representation. Lastly, as evidenced by Peterson, it can impact voting patterns and actions. Elected officials from split regions must be cautious in their voting decisions and level of support for the president. Notably, some Republican senators from 'split states' were among the least ardent supporters of Trump. The decline in split ticketing can be attributed to the growing ideological gap between Democrats and Republicans on core political values. Additionally, Americans today are more consistently aligned with either liberal or conservative viewpoints than in the past. Put simply, the United States has become more partisan, highly polarized, and less inclined to vote across party lines.
Recent Exceptions and Key Dynamics
Despite its overall decline, split-ticket voting still occurs and can pivot tight elections:
The 2024 Election Dynamics: While overall crossover rates remained near historical lows, specific swing states bucked the trend. In states like Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsin, Donald Trump won the state's presidential electoral votes, yet Democratic candidates won the concurrent U.S. Senate seats. North Carolina also maintained its tradition of voting for a Republican president while electing a Democratic governor. [1, 2, 3]
Who Splits Tickets? Data analyzed by Yale University researchers shows that ticket-splitters typically consist of political independents, moderates, and weak partisans. These voters are highly responsive to unique candidate qualities, incumbency advantages, or hyper-local controversies (such as a preferred party candidate facing a criminal indictment). [1, 2]
Systemic and Political Impacts
Divided Government: Ticket splitting is the primary mechanism that creates a divided government, where the presidency and chambers of Congress are controlled by opposing parties.
Primary Systems: Primary structures alter ticket-splitting opportunities. In traditional closed primaries, voters are restricted to a single party's ballot.So called Jungle primary. However, states utilizing "top-two" or "top-four" primary systems place all candidates on one ballot, allowing voters to split their ticket early in the electoral cycle.
Pressure on Moderates: The death of the split ticket means that lawmakers representing the few remaining "crossover" states or districts face intense pressure. They must carefully balance party-line loyalty against the distinct political appetites of their non-aligned constituent bases.
[1, 2, 3]