Forming the Division
The German military pioneered the use of large-scale airborne formations, first during the Battle of France in 1940 and later in the Invasion of Crete in 1941. The Allied governments were aware of the success of these operations (but not of the heavy German casualties incurred, particularly during the invasion of Crete) and decided to form their own airborne formations. This decision would eventually lead to the creation of five American and two British airborne divisions, as well as many smaller units. The 11th Airborne Division was officially activated on 25 February 1943 at Camp Mackall in North Carolina under the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing.
Composed on formation of the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment and the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, the division mustered 8,321 men—about half the usual strength of a regular American World War II infantry division.
Once activated, the division remained in the United States for training and exercises. As the division, like all airborne units, was intended to be an elite formation, the training regime was extremely arduous. There were 250 feet (76 m) and 34 feet (10 m) towers were built from which prospective airborne troops would jump off of to simulate landing by parachute, lengthy forced marches and practice jumps from transport aircraft; to pause in the doorway of an aircraft during a practice jump resulted in an automatic failure for the candidate. The resultant failure rate was accordingly high, but there was never a shortage of candidates, especially for the American divisions, as the rate of pay was much higher than that of an ordinary infantryman. As the division trained, a debate developed in the United States Army over whether the best use of airborne forces was en masse or as small compact units. On 9 July 1943, the first large-scale Allied airborne operation – the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) – was carried out by elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and the British 1st Airborne Division. The 11th's commanding officer, Maj. Gen. Swing, had been temporarily seconded to act as airborne advisor to General Dwight D. Eisenhower for the invasion of Sicily, and had observed the airborne assault, which went badly. The 82nd Airborne Division had been inserted by parachute and glider and had suffered high casualties, leading to a perception that it had failed to achieve many of its objectives.
Eisenhower had reviewed the airborne role in Operation Husky, and had concluded that large-scale formations were too difficult to control in combat to be practical. Lt. Gen. Leslie J. McNair, overall commander of US Army ground forces, had similar misgivings: once an airborne supporter, he had been greatly disappointed by their performance in North Africa and more recently Sicily. However, other high-ranking officers believed otherwise, notably General George Marshall. He persuaded Eisenhower to set up a review board and to withhold judgement on the effectiveness of divisional-sized airborne forces until a large-scale maneuver could be tried in December.
When Swing returned to the United States to resume command of the 11th Airborne in mid-September 1943, he had an additional role. McNair ordered him to form a committee – the Swing Board – composed of US air force, parachute and glider infantry and artillery officers to arrange a largescale maneuver that would effectively decide the fate of divisional-sized airborne force. As the 11th Airborne Division was in reserve in the United States, and had not yet been earmarked for combat, the Swing Board chose it as the test formation. The maneuver would also provide the 11th Airborne and its individual units with further airborne training, as had occurred several months previously in a large-scale maneuver by the 101st and the 82nd Airborne Divisions.
"I do not believe in the airborne division. I believe that airborne troops should be reorganized in self-contained units, comprising infantry, artillery, and special services, all about the strength of a regimental combat team. To employ at any time and place a whole division would require a dropping over such an extended area that I seriously doubt that a division commander could regain control and operate the scattered forces as one unit."
– The conclusion of General Eisenhower's review of the performance of American airborne forces during Operation Husky
Knollwood Maneuver
The objective for the 11th as the attacking force was to capture Knollwood Army Auxiliary Airfield near Fort Bragg in North Carolina, after which the maneuver was named. The defending forces, composed of a composite combat team from the 17th Airborne Division with a battalion from the 541st Parachute Infantry Regiment attached, were to try to defend the airport and the surrounding area and repel the airborne assault. The entire operation would be observed by Lt. Gen. McNair. His observations and reports to the U.S. War Department, and ultimately Eisenhower, would do much to decide the success or failure of the exercise.
The Knollwood Maneuver took place on the night of 7 December, with the troops of the 11th Airborne Division being delivered to thirteen separate objectives by 200 C-47 Dakota transport aircraft and 234 Waco CG-4A gliders, with eighty-five percent of the airborne troops being delivered to their target without navigational error. The transport aircraft were divided into four groups, each taking off from a different airfield in the Carolinas, with two groups dropping paratroopers and two towing gliders, and between them deployed 4,800 airborne troops in the first wave. These airborne troops then seized the Knollwood Army Auxiliary Airfield from the defending troops and secured the area in which the rest of the division landed, all before daylight. Having secured their initial objectives, the 11th Airborne Division then conducted a coordinated ground attack against a reinforced infantry regiment, as well as several aerial resupply and casualty evacuation missions in coordination with transport aircraft. The exercise was judged to be a great success by those who observed it. McNair reported that the success of the maneuver pleased him, and highlighted the great improvements in airborne training that had occurred in the months between the end of Operation Husky and the Knollwood Maneuver. Due to the success of the units of the 11th Airborne Division during the exercise, the divisional-sized airborne force was deemed to be effective and was allowed by Eisenhower to remain.
