Ryuji Sano

Ryuji SANO

 (日本語)

Associate Professor

Department of Economics, Yokohama National University

Tokiwadai 79-4, Hodogaya, Yokohama, 240-8501 Japan

Email: sano-ryuji-cx[atmark]ynu.ac.jp

           (Replace [atmark] with @.)

Ph.D in Economics (The University of Tokyo, 2011)

• CV

• SSRN

• UTMD

Research Interests

Auction Theory, Market Design, Mechanism Design

Publications

1. Post-auction Investment by Financially Constrained Bidders, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.213, 105742, 2023

   • wp version

2. Dynamic Slot Allocations with Different Patience Levels, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 130, pp. 465-473, 2021

   • wp version includes analysis of the case without contingent contracts and a formal proof regarding unobservable entry

3. Dynamic Communication Mechanism Design, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 57, pp. 163-180, 2021

   • wp version

   • An old version, formerly entitled "Iterative Revelation Mechanisms", includes additional analysis on subgame perfect equilibrium.  

4. An Equilibrium Analysis of a Core-Selecting Package Auction with Reserve Prices, Review of Economic Design, Vol. 22, pp. 101-122, 2018

   • wp version, formerly entitled "An Equilibrium Analysis of a Package Auction with Single-Minded Bidders"

5. Sequential Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects (with Akitoshi Muramoto), Economics Letters, Vol. 149, pp. 49-51, 2016 (wp version) 

6. Vickrey-Reserve Auctions and an Equilibrium Equivalence, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 65, pp. 112-117, 2013 (wp version)

7. Non-Bidding Equilibrium in an Ascending Core-Selecting Auction, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 74, pp. 637-650, 2012

8. Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions with Single-Minded Bidders, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 72, pp. 602-606, 2011

Working Papers

• A Virtual Valuation Approach to Optimal Multi-object Auction Design (ver. May 2024)

  • An old version (2022)

• A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Deadlines and Multi-unit Demands (2017) 

• A Dynamic Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Different Lengths of Use (2015)

• Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Ascending Combinatorial Auctions (2015)

Work in Progress

1. Beyond quasilinearity: Exploring nonlinear scoring rules in procurement auctions (with Makoto Hanazono, Jun Nakabayashi, Masanori Tsuruoka)

2. Sequential auctions with budget constraints (with Akitoshi Muramoto)

Ph.D Thesis

"Incentives and Equilibrium in Auctions with Package Bidding" The University of Tokyo, March 2011.