Research Articles

I take a look at counterfactual approaches to XAI. I argue that they generally fail to provide total causal information to users. I then outline a way of causally certifying the information delivered using Woodward's account of causation.

Baptiste and I argue that there is a version of the causal theory of spacetime that survives philosophical objections against it. On this view, spacetime is grounded in, rather than identical to, a causal structure.

I outline a new argument for Platonism based on intra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of one mathematical fact by another. The success of the argument is just as important as its failure. For if it fails, it does so because one or more popular assumptions about explanation is false.

Kristie, Jonathan and I consider the triviality argument against presentism and show that it presupposes an implausible thesis about linguistic representation.

I argue that inference to the best explanation can be used to establish the existence of true contradictions. 

Baptiste and I argue that a particular kind of presentism is incompatible with the existence of black holes and so faces empirical refutation.

I defend a novel account of mathematical explanation in terms of mathematical properties. Physical systems have mathematical properties, and it is the relationships between the mathematical properties of physical systems that underwrites the explanatory power of mathematics.

I argue that it is at least open that spacetime does not exist. I look at the three main arguments in favour of the existence of spacetime, and find them all wanting. I then show how eliminating spacetime can help us make sense of the metaphysics of quantum gravity.

Sara, Maureen and I carry out a conceptual analysis of the concept of a medical drug. We argue that there is likely no single medical drug concept.

I argue against a certain form of spacetime functionalism on the grounds that it cannot  accommodate the manner in which general relativity is only approximately true. I offer an alternative picture of spacetime emergence that is compatible with approximation.

Kristie, Jonathan and I outline a range of principles of grounding harmony, that connect grounding to location. We show that the strongest form of these conflicts with certain metaphysical views, like priority monism.

Yi-Cheng and I argue against A/B Symmetry, the idea that if one temporal dimension has a particular nature (A or B-theoretic) then all temporal dimensions have that nature. This assumption plays a crucial role in regress arguments against the A-theory, but we maintain that there is no reason to accept it.

Baptiste and I first clarify the problem with using mereology to model spacetime emergence, and then argue that the problem can be overcome. We show that mereology can be used to provide how-possibly explanations of spacetime emergence, and sketch out an example using causal set theory. Along the way we sketch out a new version of causal set theory that uses twin partial orders of causation and parthood.

Baptiste and I argue that there is no straightforward way to argue for extended simples based on loop quantum gravity or string theory.

Using grounding, I provide a semantics for a certain kind of counterfactual, a 'would' counterfactual of ontological dependence.

I argue for the explanatory power of mathematics in science based on the existence of unified explanations of physical and mathematical phenomena.

I argue that the problem of empirical coherence facing theories of quantum gravity must take matter into account. I provide a functional analysis of matter based on Helon models of particles.

Kristie, Mark, Ruby and I argue in favour of the view that moral non-naturalists can avail themselves of moral explanations. We do this by leveraging the relationship between moral and mathematical explanations.

Kristie, Jonathan and I provide an argument in favour of temporal fictionalism: the view according to which our everyday thought and talk about time is false, but we should nonetheless engage in the pretense that it is true.

I consider the thesis that the one and only building relation that structures reality is composition. I argue that if spacetime is emergent, then this thesis is false. Mereology breaks down when it is used to build spacetime from non-spatiotemporal parts.

James and I offer a grounding-free account of metaphysical explanation by generalising Kitcher's unificationist theory of explanation over to the metaphysical case. 

Pete and I consider the proposal that the difference between time and space is enshrined in the laws of nature. We consider a couple of proposals along these lines before outlining our own view: temporal perspectivalism.

Jonathan and I introduce a contingent form of priority monism and then show that the nomic argument for priority monism does not support even a contingent version of the view, due to the lack of scale invariant laws of gravity.

David and I argue against presentism on the basis that certain models of time travel undermine the presentist's ability to call on the phenomenology of passage to defend their view.

Dave, Mark and I develop a counterfactual account of intra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of one mathematical fact in terms of another.

Kristie, Jonathan and I argue that grounding and causation can be differentiated on the following basis: causation requires time to chain over space, but grounding does not.

Mark and I defend the explanatory power of logical impossibilities.

I outline a problem for counterfactual accounts of mathematical explanation, and then solve it by unifying the counterfactual and unificationist approaches.

I consider the metaphysics of spacetime emergence and argue for three claims: (i) mereology is not a good way to model the emergence of spacetime; (ii) mental state functionalism is not much better and (iii) a 'partial' spacetime functionalism does better.

Jamin and I consider a deflationary approach to truthmaking, one that is analogous to the deflationary approach to truth. The basic idea being to get truthmaking without any ontological cost. We argue that there is no viable deflationary approach to truthmaking

I outline a case of mathematical explanation in which the explanandum is a purely physical fact and the explanans is a mathematical fact. The case is based on perceptual bistability (e.g., the duck-rabbit).

I consider an argument from Jonathan Tallant that aims to show that presentism is at odds with endurantism. I sketch a presentist-friendly account of endurance.

Kristie, James, Br. Chua and I argue that non-aboutness truthmaking is just as good as the alternatives.

Mark Colyvan and I defend the claim that the best explanation for why time travellers cannot initiate self-defeating causal chains is a logical one.

This paper offers a theory of extra-mathematical explanation in science which involves combining the deductive-nomological model with relevance logic.

I consider the use of infinite idealizations in phase transitions and use indispensability considerations to address an apparent paradox.

Jonathan and I argue that revising ockham's razor into a principle of theory choice in terms of simplicity with respect to the fundamentals only is a mistake.

A non-technical survey article on the relationship between special relativity and the dynamic theories of time aimed at a philosophical audience.

I argue against the sceptic of metaphysics that metaphysics can be justified on the same grounds as pure mathematics. Along the way I outline some important applications of metaphysics in science.

A proof that the addition of n time dimensions cannot solve the grandfather paradox, for all n > 1.

A response to a range of arguments which purport to show that the experience of temporal flow can provide no evidence for the existence of temporal flow.

A  preliminary demonstration that counterfactual reasoning can be used as a basis for understanding mathematical explanation in science.

This paper explores the prospects for generalising theories of scientific explanation over to mathematical explanations in science.

A modal argument for the conclusion that priority monism is false based on the possibility of island universes featuring disconnected spacetimes.

I offer a model for determining the norms by which metaphyiscs ought to be practiced. I suggest a Rawlsian approach, in which metaphysicians are placed behind a veil of ignorance.

Mark and I argue that there are logical explanations of physical facts that arise in time travel cases. We claim that these are of a piece with mathematical explanations.

I consider the question of how to maintain realism about the mathematical parts of an explanation compatible with anti-realism about the ideal parts. I split the difference using a notion of counterfactual dependence.

I argue that the existence of mathematical explanations and the tractability of mathematical epistemology stand or fall together.

I argue that some uses of primitives in metaphysics should not be allowed on the grounds that they stymie progress.

I offer a way of developing a fully tensed truthmaker theory in terms of fundamentally distinct categories of being.

Kristie and I defend a functionalist account of the folk concept of time.

A survey article on the relationship between the phenomenology and metaphysics of time in philosophy and ongoing work in cognitive science and psychology.

An article outlining a range of hypotheses for the under-representation of women in philosophy along with the evidence available for each hypothesis.

A brief survey of a study conducted by the authors at the University of Sydney on the reasons female students choose not to go on with philosophy.

I argue that 'cheating' approaches to truthmaking for presentism face a serious problem from the factivity of knowledge.

Together, Kristie and I argue that it is possible for there to be causation without time. We base the argument on an interpretation of quantum entanglement.

Kristie and I try to sort out what it would take for time not to exist. We argue, roughly, that time is whatever has the necessary features to support our temporal phenomenology. So if nothing has those features, then time does not exist.

I defend a novel version of presentism, according to which the past and the future are grounded in the present.

I argue that the explanatory contribution of mathematics to science can be distinguished from the explanatory contribution of idealizations by using a counterfactual test for explanatory relevance.

Kristie and I argue for the possibility of causation in timeless theories of quantum gravity.

I present a new case of mathematical explanation in science based on the random foraging techniques used by open sea predators.

Jamin and I argue against versions of presentism that attempt to explain the truth of claims about the past by appealing to the way things were.

I argue that the motivations for platonism preclude the adoption of a certain kind of presentism.

Christina and I argue that accepting Pascal's wager may be a transformative experience, one that takes a person out of existence.

Kristie, James and I defend the idea that there are fundamental (i.e., ungrounded) truths.

I argue that presentists cannot solve the truthmaker problem by simply tensing the truthmaker relation.

I present a new form of the indispensability argument for mathematical platonism that draws on Armstrong's criterion of ontological commitment.

I argue in favour of the view that truthmaking for claims about the past is constrained by aboutness.

Jamin and I argue that certain solutions to the problem of negative existentials for truthmaking are unstable.

Kristie and I provide an overview of the different ways of formulating eternalism.

Kristie, Richard, Raamy and I argue for an account of negative properties based on omissions.

I argue that certain solutions to the truthmaking objection against presentism require connections between the past and the present that are anathema to presentism.

I argue that the problems that presentists face based on causation can be solved by appealing to extended presentism: the view according to which the now has a non-trivial duration.

Pete, Kristie and I analyse some timeless theories of quantum gravity and argue that they are timeless by the lights of temporal metaphysics as well.