Causation, Laws of Nature and Science

"Causation, Laws of Nature and Science" is a workshop to be held on the 6th December at the Dianoia Institute of Philosophy. The workshop is located in the Level 4 Conference Room, at 250 Victoria Parade, East Melbourne. The conference is free to attend, and no registration is required.

The workshop is a hybrid event. For zoom details, please contact: samuel.baron@acu.edu.au.

Workshop Program

10:00am -- 11:00am

"How Agent-Centric BBSA Leads to Strong Conventionalism About Kinds"

Peter W. Evans

(University of Queensland)

11:00am -- 12:00pm

"Symmetries and Subsystems: Understanding the Significance of Symmetry-variant Quantities"

Michael Hicks

(Universities of Birmingham and Glasgow)

12:00pm -- 2pm

LUNCH

2pm -- 3pm

"Downwards Causation: A Worry for Non-reductive Biology?"

Ding Si Qiao

(University of Sydney)

3pm -- 4pm

"Is Causal Set Theory Causal?"

Baptiste Le Bihan and Sam Baron

(University of Geneva and Dianoia)

7:00pm Workshop Dinner

ABSTRACTS

"How Agent-Centric BBSA Leads to Strong Conventionalism About Kinds"

This talk examines the better best system account of laws (BBSA) in light of Rovelli's (2017) argument concerning the significance of variable choice for characterising a simple physical system. I argue that these considerations suggest the BBSA should embrace a strong conventionalism about kinds predicated on an agent-centric approach to the systematisation process. I end by pointing out the similarities between this view and Hicks' Pragmatic Humeanism.

"Symmetries and Subsystems: Understanding the Significance of Symmetry-variant Quantities"

TBA

"Is Causal Set Theory Causal?"

Causal set theory is a promising approach to quantum gravity. Despite its name, there is disagreement among both philosophers and physicists as to whether causal set theory is causal and, if so, how. Here we argue that causal set theory is indeed causal, in this sense: on one natural way of spelling out the dynamics of the theory, the dynamical evolution of a causal set is a causal process. We argue for this claim by drawing on the interventionist theory of causation.

"Downwards Causation: A Worry for Non-reductive Biology?"

Increasingly, a number of biologists are urging their fellow researchers to adopt ‘non-reductive’ strategies in order to advance understanding in their fields. This has gradually led to biologists venturing into philosophy, while drawing increasing interest from the philosophical community. The significance of causal explanations in biology, and the vast amount of philosophical literature on reductionism and causation, has resulted in the perception of ‘downwards causation’ (DC) being a central problem for non-reductive biology. Subsequently, both biologists and philosophers are engaging with the (supposed) incoherence of DC as a barrier for non-reductive biology to overcome. In this talk, I will demonstrate why this is not the case. I will show that the source of discontent for non-reductive biologists rest on a disconnect between how reductionism is specified in theory and how it is implemented in practice: I call this the ‘isolatable parts thesis’ (IPT). IPT can be simply summarized as the idea that the ‘parts’ of an organism can be unproblematically studied in isolation (from the other parts) in order to generate adequate explanations. I will also demonstrate how IPT has led to a further point of disconnect: how causal relations between the ‘levels’ of an organism are understood. In light of this, I argue that the standard worries over DC are simply not applicable, and that a different concept of reduction – one that incorporates IPT – is needed for theorizing about causation in contemporary non-reductive biology.