At a considerable distance from Stirner's anarchism lies the individualism of the Utilitarian John Stuart Mill. Accepting the Principle of Utility, Mill recognizes "the greatest good for the greatest number of people" as the fundamental guiding principle of morality. He does not, however, find any conflict between the Principle of Utility and individualism. Instead, he argues that the Principle supports individualism―in a general way, by sanctioning justice and, in a more specific way, by sanctioning individual freedoms.
Of all the rules governing morality that are grounded upon the Principle of Utility, Mill regards the requirements of justice as being the most fundamental, because they are essential to preserving peace and preventing harm among persons. In its most basic senses, justice forbids (1) the wrongful exercise of power over another person, and (2) the withholding of what is rightfully due a person. Accordingly, the requirements of justice establish various protections for the individual―such as moral or legal rights to personal liberty and property, guarantees of impartial and equal treatment before the law, prohibitions against undeserved or disproportionate punishments, and condemnation of breaches of faith, whether of friendship or of promise. For example, the individual suffers injustice if victimized by preferential treatment to others in the distribution of opportunities to obtain the goods available in a society, or if punished with a long prison sentence for a relatively minor offense. Thus, if we recognize and support the "essentials of human well-being" as the Principle of Utility demands, then we must abide by rules of justice and thereby grant various rights to individuals.
Justice as a moral sentiment develops from an initial, natural tendency to retaliate against harm to ourselves that is generalized through the enormous human capacity (a) to include all human beings within the range of our sympathy and (b) to use our intelligence so as to recognize a threat to the security of society as a threat to ourselves. Note that justice becomes a moral sentiment only "when moralized by the social feeling" in such a way that we act consciously in "directions conformable to the general good." In Utilitarianism, he says,
It is common enough certainly, though the reverse of commendable, to feel resentment merely because we have suffered pain; but a person whose resentment is really a moral feeling, that is, who considers whether an act is blamable before he allows himself to resent it―such a person, though he may not say expressly to himself that he is standing up for the interest of society, certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule which is for the benefit of others as well as for his own. If he is not feeling this―if he is regarding the act solely as it affects him individually―he is not consciously just; he is not concerning himself about the justice of his actions . . . .4
Justice as a moral sentiment is further enhanced through the strengthening of our social feelings.
Individual Freedom and Self-Regarding Actions
In addition to this general support of individualism that the preceding account of justice establishes, Mill offers further Utilitarian grounds for individualism in his defense of specific, individual freedoms in probably his most famous work, On Liberty. There he argues for freedom of thought and discussion, freedom of action, and freedom of association. Mill maintains that society or government has no right to interfere with actions affecting only oneself, that is, self regarding actions. He says,
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.5
Mill firmly opposes the stifling of the individual by government officials as well as by public opinion, the "tyranny of the majority" (whether the "majority" be a numerical majority or an influential minority accepted as the majority). In defending individual freedoms, he bases his arguments on "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being."
Freedom of Thought and Discussion
Under freedom of thought and discussion, Mill includes liberty of conscience, liberty of feeling, liberty of opinion and sentiment on scientific, moral, and theological subjects, as well as the liberty to express and publish opinions. He asserts that allowance of these liberties benefits the general good regardless whether opinions are true, false, or partly true and partly false.
Since human judgments are fallible, we cannot presume to know with certainty that a particular opinion, no matter how much it conflicts with accepted views, is absolutely false and useless. An opinion, presently not accepted, may turn out later to be true, in which case the common good would have suffered by any suppression of it. Indeed, our fallibility is such that we need the freest possible discussion of opposing opinions because our best assurance of the truth of any particular opinion is its shown superiority in tests against all possible opposing opinions. Moreover, in the testing process, the common good is best served by a climate in which individuals are free to state boldly their opinions rather than suppressing them for fear of public punishment. According to Mill, "No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead.―Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to thing."6 Not only great thinkers but average ones as well are best able to develop their potentialities within a climate of free expression. Even if particular opinions are simply false, the common good benefits from their free expression because this forces holders of true opinions to defend and thereby better understand their opinions so they hold them as "living truths" rather than as "dead dogmas." Finally, Mill points out that generally false opinions often contain some portion of truth, in which case their free expression serves the common good as a corrective device leading to the improvement of otherwise acceptable opinions. Thus, for Mill, the freest possible thought and discussion of opinions serves the interest of truth, and therefore the common good, whether opinions happen to be true, false, or partly true and partly false.
Freedom of action entails our being able to act according to our own inclinations and judgments, without hindrance from others, so long as we act at our own risk and peril. Mill wants to guarantee us the freedom to plan our lives so as to suit our own character; moreover, he considers this freedom so important on Utilitarian grounds that he denies society or other persons the right to interfere even when we engage in such publicly disreputable activities as drunkenness, gambling, idleness, and fornication, provided, of course, that we do not harm others in the process.
Mill supports his position in a variety of ways. First, he argues that society benefits by allowing individuals to experiment with different ways of living so as to test them in practice. Thus, everyone may well have something to learn from allowing individuals freedom of action. And Mill adds, "The initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual. The honor and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open."7
Secondly, freedom of action fosters development of all our human capacities, including creativity and character, so as to improve the individual as well as society-at-large:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it, and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them.8
Thirdly, given the many differences in tastes among human beings, their happiness requires tolerance for individual differences in actions.
Fourthly, "the only unfailing and permanent source" of progress or improvement in human existence, as is evident from observation of different societies, resides in the freedom to pursue different paths, to challenge various customs, and to he innovative.
And finally, regarding matters that concern only themselves, individuals are most likely to be their own best judges:
But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect; while with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself must be grounded on general presumptions; which may he altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, individuality has its proper field of action.9
These justifications for individual freedom of action, according to Mill, apply equally well for freedom of association, whereby we join with others in common pursuits. So long as no harm to others occurs and the union involves no force or deceit, we should regard freedom of association as simply an extension of our individual freedom of action.
Limitations and Exceptions Regarding Individual Freedom
Clearly, John Stuart Mill favors as much individual freedom as he deems reasonably possible. Yet, he also insists upon the need to recognize limitations and exceptions with respect to this freedom.
The chief limitation is the requirement that we not harm others in the process of expressing our freedom. For Mill, this limitation entails fairly extensive obligations. Obviously, we are not free to lie, murder, rape, or steal. Our obligations however extend much further. Drunkenness, idleness, gambling, and fornication cease to be self-regarding actions if we have distinct obligations towards others, for example, toward members of our family or toward an employer. Accordingly, we cannot refuse to support our families or be drunk on duty (in the case of a soldier perhaps) as a matter of asserting individual freedom. Whenever, through express promises or conduct, we create expectations and calculations seriously affecting the lives of others, we are subsequently obligated to take their interests into account and must not regard what we then do as self-regarding actions. We also are obligated to avoid actions by which we clearly would become a burden to others. And where we enjoy society's protection, we cannot, on the grounds of "individual freedom," evade our social obligations, such as contributing to the common defense or testifying in court. Moreover, we are obligated to avoid harm to others by coming to thee aid of the defenseless and by saving the lives of those in danger, unless we have reason to believe that some greater harm would ensue from our engaging in such actions. This principle of avoidance-of-harm-to-others also applies to cases where we may presume to act in others' behalf on the grounds that their interests are identical with our own. On this point, Mill specifically mentions dominance over wives and children as instances where there may be an unwarranted claim to individual freedom.
Inability to Judge One's Own Best Interests
To these limitations, we must also add various exceptions. While we may ordinarily presume that individuals are their own best judges of their best interests, this presumption does not hold for children, the mentally ill, and the mentally deficient. In such cases, we may withhold the right of individual freedoms.
Mill also asserts that there can be some societies so backward and barbarous as to be incapable of benefiting from individual freedom, in which case despotism is suitable for them at least until they achieve a higher level of development. (Mill would insist however that a more advanced society, in its relations with these backward ones, has an obligation to foster those conditions allowing for eventual assumption of individual freedoms by the persons in these "backward" societies.")
Another exception to the granting of individual freedom occurs when a person uses this freedom to become a slave, for "the principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free."10
Similarly, an exception may be made where someone enters freely into an irrevocable contract at a time when it may not be possible to foresee the consequences in the distant future clearly. In his Principles of Political Economy, Mill says,
The practical maxim of leaving contracts free, is not applicable without great limitations in case of engagements in perpetuity; and the law should be extremely jealous of such engagements; should refuse its sanction to them, when the obligations they impose are such as the contracting party cannot be a competent judge of; if it ever does sanction them, it should take every possible security for their being contracted with foresight and deliberation; and in compensation for not permitting the parties themselves to revoke their engagement, should grant them a release from it, on a sufficient case being made out before an impartial authority. These considerations are eminently applicable to marriage, the most important of all cases of engagement for life.11
Specific Limitations and Exceptions
The preceding catalog of limitations and exceptions establishes the basis for some direction, and even punishment, of individuals by society or government. In both On Liberty and Principles of Political Economy, Mill provides examples of legitimate governmental interference based upon the principle of avoiding-harm-to-others or the claim that individuals are not always the best judges of their own interests. In addition to whatever interference may be justified through immediate extrapolation from the catalog of limitations and exceptions with respect to individual freedoms already stated, Mill mentions the following:
a) governmental regulation of commerce and trade;
b) requirements for warning labels on dangerous substances such as poisons;
c) registration of the sale of articles well-suited for criminal purposes, such as burglary tools and firearms perhaps;
d) prohibitions against public indecency;
e) prohibition or regulation of public houses for gambling, drinking, or prostitution;
f) taxation to assure governmental revenues;
g) heavier taxation on items such as alcohol to discourage its immoderate use;
h) required education of children;
i) prohibitions on marriage when a couple cannot show they have the means of supporting a family and the nation suffers from overpopulation;
j) laws regulating contracts and property;
k) enforcement of laws through the judiciary and police;
l) regulations regarding the use of natural resources and of public lands and waters;
m) restrictions regarding the number of hours in a workday;
n) establishment of a stable system of public welfare for the needy; and
o) governmental performance of public services such as geographical or scientific exploration when individuals are unlikely to undertake such activities.
Speaking generally about the function of government, Mill says,
It may he said generally, that anything which it is desirable should be done for the general interests of mankind or of future generations, or for the present interests of those members of the community who require external aid, but which is not of a nature to remunerate individuals or associations for undertaking it, is in itself a suitable thing to be undertaken by government: though, before making the work their own, governments ought always to consider if there be any rational probability of its being done on what is called the voluntary principle, and if so, whether it is likely to be done in a better or more effectual manner by government agency, than by the zeal and liberality of individuals.12
Thus, while Mill supports individualism and individual freedoms, he recognizes numerous occasions where governmental or societal interference, punishment, regulation, and assistance are justified. Indeed, he recognizes so many such occasions as to raise doubts perhaps about the depth of his support for individualism and individual freedoms.
Before forming hasty judgments about possible hypocrisy and inconsistency in Mill's position, we should be very clear about his intent. Mill supports as much individual freedom as he deems reasonably possible. He adamantly supports freedom of thought and opinion, except in cases such as inciting a mob to riot where free expression is the immediate cause of evil actions. Regarding freedom of action, he supports non-interference for self-regarding actions, except in cases where persons are clearly incapable of judging their own best interests. Regarding actions affecting others, he supports freedom of action, except in cases where harm to others occurs.
Whenever society or government interferes with individual freedoms, the burden of justification lies with society or government rather than the individual having to justify non-interference. For example, Mill says,
Even in those portions of conduct which do affect the interest of others, the onus [burden] of making out a case lies on the defenders of legal prohibitions. It is not a merely constructive or presumptive injury to others, which will justify the interference of law with individual freedom.... Scarcely any degree of utility, short of absolute necessity, will justify a prohibitory regulation, unless it can also be made to recommend itself to the general conscience; unless persons of ordinary good intentions either believe already, or can be induced to believe, that the thing prohibited is a thing which they ought not to wish to do.13
Furthermore, when government assists individuals, for example, through public education, there must be clear evidence that the activities government supports are unlikely to be done by individuals themselves.
Mill warns against the dangers of governmental interference. He insists that, generally, individuals do a better job of accomplishing tasks than government. Even when government can do a better job, there are advantages in the long run to granting individuals the practical experience of doing things for themselves. And finally, there is the ever present danger of accumulating government power, especially when government attracts to itself the most talented and ambitious persons as the primary means of their social advancement. In other words, a governmental monopoly of talent and ambition, aside from the dangers of despotism, establishes a bureaucracy not easily criticized by common citizens and not easily reformed even by the most innovative political leaders. Mill is not optimistic about the prospects of a free press and elected legislature maintaining adequate constraints on a giant bureaucracy.
All in all, Mill clearly intends to support individualism and individual freedoms very strongly, although he also recognizes the need for justified limitations and exceptions.
Regarding the precise form of government, Mill thinks that some accommodation is necessary for different circumstances.
Ideally, representative democracy is the best form of government. By encouraging the fullest possible participation by all citizens, representative democracy best accomplishes the fundamental task of the state, namely, to organize and use the moral, intellectual, and practical abilities of the citizenry to serve the public good in the present and to promote advancement of these abilities in the future. The submissive citizenry characteristic of a despotic government does not insure that everyone's interests will be taken into account and offers little hope that the moral, intellectual, and practical abilities of everyone will be utilized and developed.
Mill however possesses no Rousseau-like optimism about people's natural abilities and wisdom. He worries about the tyranny of majorities over minorities and favors proportionate representation. He also advocates measures such as literacy tests for voting and granting of additional votes to the educated over the uneducated. And he takes the position that some peoples, due to lack of motivation or ability, are not ready for representative democracy. (Readers interested in further details on these matters should read Mill's Considerations on Representative Government, especially chapters III-VIII.)
Stirner and Mill: A Comparison
From the standpoint of a Max Stirner, Mill's individualism lacks authenticity. By basing individualism on an external concept, namely, the Principle of Utility, instead of an internal principle such as ownness, Mill fails to establish a genuine individualism. Stirner would argue that Mill's numerous limitations and exceptions with respect to individual freedoms constitute a simple demonstration of intellectual bankruptcy, a bankruptcy ultimately traceable to concern with "the greatest good for the greatest number." Such concern is inherently inimical to individualism. It leads to a fixation on the avoidance of harm to others that can only produce the suppression or destruction of the individual. For Stirner, the only genuine individualism is a natural expression of self-assertion and power arising from a recognition of ownness. Moreover, Stirner would condemn Mill's use of arguments to defend individual freedoms as being a denial of individualism. To recognize a need to justify individual freedoms to others is in itself contrary to ownness. From Stirner's perspective, we recognize and assert ownness ourselves; we do not rely on, or beg, others to grant it to us. While Mill's arguments supposedly support individualism, they actually confer status and respect on others at our own expense, because the process of convincing others confers worth on them by making their judgments important to us.
John Stuart Mill, on the other hand, would find Stirner's position seriously deficient in several respects. First, he would assert that Stirner's judgments (1) show a lack of sympathy for fellow human beings, (2) make no use of intelligence to discern an identity of interest between the community and the individual, and (3) exhibit a lack of social feeling. Given such shortcomings, he would point out that Stirner's supplanting of justice with selfishness is hardly surprising. Secondly, Mill would assert that Stirner's position, in effect, demands that we treat all we do as self-regarding actions, even though such treatment is contrary to the natural desires of the overwhelming majority of human beings. Thirdly, regarding arguments for individual freedoms, Mill would assert that they establish a correct course of action toward individuals and that the process of reasoning with others and gaining their sympathy contributes to the improvement of the general welfare. Fourthly, he would find Stirner's position unworkable in practice, both with respect to the well-being of communities and with respect to the prospects of acceptance by people generally. From Mill's perspective, Stirner points the way toward a state of discord which is hardly likely to benefit the cause of individualism.
Whereas Stirner interprets individualism as concerned solely for oneself, Mill interprets it as a concern for self-development that contributes to the general progress of human beings. Moreover, Mill's interpretation entails responsibilities toward others that Stirner obviously denies. Hence there are fundamental differences between them. We should be aware however that what an individual does may at times be in accord with both interpretations. That is to say, we may not always observe a difference in practice between an individual exhibiting ownness and one engaging in what Mill regards as a self-regarding action. Nevertheless, we would expect eventually to note differences in practice simply because the two positions are basically incompatible.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(1) Stirner's Flight from Reality
Stirner's position is so extreme and so out of touch with reality that we must be strongly tempted to seek a psychological explanation of why he maintains the position rather than to refute it. A simple recounting of his flight from reality is enough to show the need for psychological explanations.
Stirner regards society and the state as implacable enemies of the individual―when, in fact, individual life only develops within the context of society or the state. Moreover, he fails to recognize the real differences existing among societies―in particular, differences by which some protect individuals while others suppress them. He insists upon a necessary conflict between the common interest and self-interest―when, in fact, the common interest and self-interest coincide in by far the majority of situations in life. He demands that we assert ourselves through our own might―when, in fact, the vast majority of persons are so lacking in power that the attempt to assert it would only guarantee their enslavement to the few who are stronger. He advocates only a selfish union with others―when, in fact, others will not join with us in common endeavors without the expectation of reciprocal feelings and obligations.
Just as Stirner's position does not bring us closer to reality, it also does not bring us closer to a better life. Unless we start to enjoy a life of misery, we are not likely to look to Stirrer's position for our salvation. His egoism sets no limits on what we can do. Yet murder, rape, thievery, and child abuse are never going to become morally acceptable as part of the good life for the overwhelming majority of persons. And, as society becomes more complex, we become increasingly aware that a better life is only possible within the context of society and the state. To he sure, the individual can he abused by them. But this possibility should not blind us to the numerous ways by which they also make a better life for individuals a reality as well.
A Possible Reply: This objection presumes exactly what Stirner denies, namely, that there exists some common reality and common good that everyone should accept. Egoism does not rely upon a demonstration of ifs correctness to others; egoism relies upon independence from others. And a statement of the egoist position is a manifesto of self-assertion rather than an attempt to set up a new system of universal human values or a new scientific world-view. What others conclude about egoism is simply irrelevant to the egoist.
(2) Mill's Lack of Concern fur Individuals
Although Mill's advocacy of freedom for self-regarding actions is very noble in theory, it shows an unfortunate lack of concern in practice for those persons who need help in order to avoid self-harm. The alcoholic, the drug addict, the idler, the relentless fornicator, the "ne'er do well," and the skid row derelict may he harming only themselves; but, as fellow human beings, they are worthy of our respect and deserving of our assistance. We should not allow them to harm themselves; and we should not show callousness and insensitivity in the presence of others' misery. Accordingly, we cannot accept Mill's insistence upon freedom for all self-regarding actions.
A Possible Reply: Mill himself denies that his position leads to callousness and insensitivity. We should be concerned about the well-being of others; indeed we cannot accept the Principle of Utility without being concerned. Accordingly, in order to prevent individuals from harming themselves, we can resort to warnings, dire predictions, arguments, entreaties, and persuasion to convince them to act otherwise; but we cannot compel them to do so. He says,
It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct it life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort. . . . Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should be forever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims toward wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it.14
Mill stresses the point that, regardless of the desirability of helping others, individuals are the best judges of their own best interests.
(3) Mills Mistaken "Do-Gooder" Attitude
If Mill took seriously his claim that individuals are the best judges of their own best interests, he would not advocate any warnings, dire predictions, arguments, entreaties, or persuasion to convince persons to act differently. For if they are their own best judges, they do not need advice or remonstration. Actually, Mill is just another "do-gooder" who happens to have a distaste for overt compulsion.
Mill's mistaken "do-gooder" attitude also is evident when we consider the principle that we are free to act so long as we do not harm others. When we realize that we live in a world of limited resources, we recognize that there is very little we can do in our own interests without harming others. If I eat well, I am harming those without food; if I accept a job, I am harming the unsuccessful applicants; if I become wealthy, I am harming those with very little. We could multiply such examples indefinitely. Consequently, if we want to avoid harm to others, we must become do-gooders constantly serving the interests of others and we no longer have any significant freedom to pursue our own interests. Freedom and a "do-gooder" attitude are incompatible. Mill makes the mistake of trying to advocate both.
A Possible Reply: Regarding the relationship between use of limited resources and inevitable harm to others, Mill would insist upon a more careful understanding of what we mean by "harm." We may take actions that cause pain and misery for others without doing "harm." We need to associate harm with unjustified pain and misery. Likewise, to determine harm, we need to consider long-range as well as short-range consequences. For example, my accepting a job may cause pain and misery to unsuccessful applicants; but, in the long run, the method by which I acquired the job may well serve the best interests of society and the other applicants as well. Mill puts the matter this way:
In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they have a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit―namely, fraud or treachery, and force.15
As for the objection that Mill fails to take seriously his own claim that individuals are the best judges of their own best interests, he could reply that there is a considerable difference between advice or complaints and compulsion. Telling individuals that they are acting wrongly is far different front forcing them to act otherwise. Thus prohibition against compulsion but not against advice or complaint protects an important area of freedom for individuals. Furthermore, since judgments are not infallible, the fact that individuals are likely to be their own best judges is no guarantee that they always are. Accordingly, they can benefit from, and hence should welcome, advice or even complaints from others at times.
(4) The Non-existence of Self-Regarding Actions
Suppose that we agree with Mill and grant individual freedom for self-regarding actions. What precisely does this freedom include? When we think about it, there are very few self-regarding actions, simply because we do not live in isolation as hermits. Does the son or daughter whose choice of a career disappoints the parents engage in a self-regarding action? Do the alcoholic, the drug addict, or the "ne'er do well" whose habits cause misery to family and friends engage in self-regarding actions? Does the brilliant medical student who decides to become a beachcomber or salesclerk and therefore deprives others in society of needed medical assistance engage in a self-regarding action? Does the idle spendthrift who consumes inherited wealth in frivolous pursuits instead of helping the poor engage in self-regarding actions? If persons violate no specific obligations toward others but only set an example likely to affect others, can we say that they still engage in self-regarding actions? And if not, are we not constantly setting examples by what we do? Are even wholly private acts self-regarding actions when they commonly affect our character development and thereby indirectly influence our public acts? When we think the matter through carefully, we must conclude that non-trivial self-regarding actions are exceedingly rare phenomena. Thus, even if we agree with Mill's granting of individual freedom for self-regarding actions, we gain very little freedom for human beings. And Mill's stalwart defense of individual freedoms leads to a hollow victory.
A Possible Reply: First, we should remember that actions which produce pain and misery for others do not necessarily cause harm. For example, any misery suffered by the friends of a drug addict may be outweighed by the greater benefits for themselves and society generally achieved through the granting of freedom to individuals. Thus, in so far as an action causes pain and misery, but not harm, to others, it retains its self-regarding character. We also must be wary lest we place too stringent obligations toward others on individuals. For example, if all persons must forgo their own interests and serve instead the interests of parents, friends, the disadvantaged, the nation, etc., then a general increase in the misery of individuals will very likely result.
Mill himself, in dealing with the sorts of examples raised in this objection, stresses most strongly the likelihood that the public, when it interferes, will do so "wrongly" and in "the wrong place." He maintains that individuals are more likely to judge their own best interests than the public at large. Accordingly, we must be skeptical of attempts to "save" people from themselves, even in fairly extreme cases. Mill also states that society has ample opportunities to influence individuals during their younger, formative years and thus has only itself to blame if their actions as adults are unsatisfactory. As for the claim that individuals who supposedly only hurt themselves actually set a bad example for others in the process of being self-indulgent, Mill replies that, to the contrary, the "painful and degrading consequences" of their actions will serve as a warning to others. In other words, the example set by self-indulgent drunkards will not encourage others to drink but rather will dissuade them because of the obviously harmful consequences of their self-indulgence.
While some real difficulties arise in delimiting self-regarding actions, we face even greater difficulties by denying their existence. Individual freedom will be lost and society will have to set itself up in judgment of what everyone does, resulting in both greater misery and more incompetent judgments.