Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy

brought to you by Ron Yezzi

Emeritus Professor of Philosophy

Minnesota State University, Mankato

© Copyright 1986, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi

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Author's Note: This account is adapted from Ron Yezzi, Directing Human Actions: Perspectives on Basic Ethical Issues (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986) pp.246 - 267.

Topics

Rawls

Justice and the Basic Structure of a Well-Ordered Society

The Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance

The Two Principles of Justice

The Maximin Rule

The Difference Principle

Basic Institutions

Political Liberalism

Nozick

The Entitlement Theory of Justice

Replies to Some Objections

Comparison of Positions

Rawls, Nozick, and Envy

Some Ojections and Possible Replies

Thought Excursions

Individuals and Society:

Rawls and Nozick

Both Marx and Dewey reject attempts to settle the issue of the individual and society by reference to a fundamental "social contract" among independent individuals—as occurs, for example, in the thought of Hobbes and Rousseau―because they reject such a vision of the origins of society. In recent twentieth century philosophy however, there has been a revival of social contract theory. Although ending with fundamental disagreements, the philosophers John Rawls and Robert Nozick both take a social contract approach in dealing with the relations of the individual to society. In Rawls' case, the social contract approach is quite explicit; in Nozick's case, it is not so much intended as it is a de facto result of individuals entering into associations in order to protect themselves.

Biographical Sketch

John Rawls (1921 - 2002 C.E. ), an American philosopher, received his Ph.D, degree from Princeton University in 1950. He taught at Princeton, Cornell University, and MIT before moving on to Harvard University in 1962--where he became the James Bryant Conant University Professor of Philosophy in 1979.

His major work A Theory of Justice, published in 1971, has been the most widely discussed work in social and political philosophy during the last half of the twentieth century. More so than most recent philosophical works, it has succeeded in attracting the attention of many persons in other disciplines beside philosophy. In 1990, he published a sequel, Political Liberalism, where he applied and extended his theory of justice to accommodate the particular practical demands of a functioning democracy.

Rawls

Justice and the Basic Structure of a Well-ordered Society

John Rawls asserts that principles of justice must underlie the basic structure of a well-ordered society. In a A Theory of Justice, he says,

Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. . . .an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice.¹

(Be sure to note the way this passage states an anti-Utilitarian position.) The priority of justice follows from the nature of society itself. Although social cooperation makes possible greater benefits for all than individuals can attain by their own solitary efforts, conflicts inevitably arise because individuals prefer to maximize benefits for themselves; consequently, principles of justice are necessary to resolve possible conflicts by specifying clearly rights and duties and by determining the basis for distribution of benefits and burdens. A society is well-ordered when the principles (1) are commonly known and accepted and (2) are not violated, and are publicly known not to be violated, by the basic social institutions—making allowances, to some degree, for the fact of human imperfection.

Accordingly, the specification, establishment, and communication of principles of justice are fundamental to the well-being of society and, also, of individuals. This is the task Rawls sets for himself in A Theory of Justice.

The Original Position and The Veil of Ignorance

To simplify his task, Rawls wants to avoid any specific determination of the end-results of the application of justice to every individual in a society. For example, he wants to avoid the need to specify what occupation and income Mary Deere and John Doe and so on should have. Accordingly, he sets out to establish principles of justice that (1) are not dependent on the specific desires of every individual person and (2) set up a procedure that is just, thereby eliminating the need to determine whether specific end-results are also just. He accomplishes (1) by discussing the principles of justice only in terms of the chief social primary goods, that is, ones that all rational persons presumably want. As the chief social primary goods, Rawls lists rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and self-respect. Regardless of the specific details of their life-plans, all rational persons presumably want these goods. He accomplishes (2) through principles of justice in accord with pure procedural justice, that is, a procedure that, when properly followed, is just and that thereby releases the issue of justice from consideration of end-results such as the ultimate distribution of income and wealth for every individual in a society.

To achieve pure procedural justice, Rawls proposes a social contract approach in which we envision an hypothetical original position where free and equal persons rationally settle upon principles of justice. The fact that the original position never actually exists is irrelevant. Justice results in so far as the original position is fair and the proposed principles of justice are ones that all rational persons would agree upon. Of course, the description of the original position requires reasonable ground rules to assure that it is fair and that it leads to a theory of justice with practical relevance.

Rawls lays out four kinds of ground rules: Conditions of Fairness, Background Circumstances, Formal Constraints on Justice, and Special Assumptions. See the accompanying chart.

The Conditions of Fairness include freedom and equality, rationality, and a veil of ignorance. To assure fairness, the persons entering into any agreement must be free and equal, that is, they are not constrained by moral, physical, or psychological ties to others. The persons must also be equally rational in their ability to advance their own interests. Finally, to assure the absence of any temptation to exploit any personal, social, or natural advantage, the persons entering into an agreement function under a veil of ignorance--that is, they know nothing about any particular circumstances that would enable them to forecast what their personal prospects would be under any proposed principles of justice. Thus they do not know whether they will be born wealthy or poor, living in a advanced technological society or a technologically hindered one, in good or ill health, with greater or lesser native intelligence, whether their character will be optimistic or pessimistic, risk-taking or risk-adverse, and so on. By eliminating time and personal circumstance from consideration, the veil of ignorance makes possible unanimous agreement on principles of justice.

Although a veil of ignorance exists, various Background Circumstances are known. First, a situation of moderate scarcity is present—that is, resources are limited so that all persons cannot have all they want, but not so limited that fruitful social cooperation is impossible. Secondly, persons possess general knowledge; that is, they know "general facts about human society," understand politics and economics, know "the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology." Thus, although they lack knowledge of particular personal circumstances, they know the general facts needed to choose principles of justice. Thirdly, their knowledge as functioning human beings in the future however is imperfect—Their knowledge is necessarily incomplete, their powers of reasoning, memory, and attention are always limited, and their judgment is likely to be distorted by anxiety, bias, and a preoccupation with their own affairs.² Although imperfect knowledge does not hinder our ability to enter into an initial agreement, it is a fact worthy of consideration in deciding upon the principles of justice that will be binding in the future. Fourthly, although persons do not know the particular details of their life-plans, they all have an interest in obtaining as many social primary goods as possible. Fifthly, persons are mutually disinterested; that is, they pursue their own interests rather than those of others. This does not mean that they are necessarily selfish however, since pursuit of their own interests may well involve benefits for others. The point here is that Rawls wants to presume as little as possible and therefore does not claim benevolence as a condition for arriving at principles of justice. And sixthly, persons include in their interests concern for at least a few future generations—a reasonable presumption since persons are likely to care about some individuals in the next generation (as parents perhaps) and since, because of the veil of ignorance, they do not know to which generation they themselves will belong.

The Formal Constraints have the effect of eliminating some possibilities. Thus, for example, the requirement that principles of justice be general in form eliminates the identification of any specific individual(s) as a dictator or a "free rider," that is, a person not bound to the principles of justice as everyone else. Likewise, the priorities requirement for settling conflicting claims eliminates the possibility of a general egoism where all persons are authorized to decide for themselves what conflicting claims are just or not. And the finality requirement eliminates appeals to some authority other than the principles of justice themselves, such as custom or personal prudence.

Initially, Rawls makes two Special Assumptions. First, persons pursue an absolute, rather than relative, maximization of their interests. In other words, they want to do what is best for themselves without being concerned with their standing relative to others. Accordingly, they are not motivated by affection or rancor or envy or vanity. The envious person is distraught at having less than others; the vain person is insistent on having more than others. But being concerned with relative standing is eliminated by this special assumption. Secondly, persons have a capacity for a sense of justice. Thus, persons entering into the agreement have assurance that others are able to recognize and abide by the principles of justice.

The Two Principles of Justice

Given this account of the original position, what principles of justice would rational persons agree upon? John Rawls proposes the following:

Principles of Justice³

First Principle

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second Principle

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

Furthermore, he proposes that the First Principle takes priority before the Second; and that, for the Second Principle, (b) takes priority before (a). Under basic liberties, he includes, "roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law."⁴ Social and economic inequalities refer, respectively, to differences in authority as well as in responsibility and in income as well as wealth. The just savings principle refers to the setting aside for future generations an investment in machinery and other means of production and an investment in the learning and education necessary to pass on technical skills as well as the gains of culture and civilization.

The Maximin Rule

Why does Rawls propose these two principles in particular? First of all, they best serve our interests even under the worst possible outcomes, an application of the maximin rule. Because of the veil of ignorance, we have no way of presuming any probability of our faring especially well in society; yet we are making an exceptionally burdensome commitment, one that we can never revoke later. Under these circumstances, application of the maximin rule very likely assures us of a "satisfactory minimum" of well-being at the same time that it protects us from alternatives that might be even more unbearable. Secondly, these principles contribute to social stability by establishing a sound basis for continuing social cooperation--namely, by defining a basic structure for society that affirms what everyone desires as primary goods. For example, according to the Second Principle, there are differences in wealth; but those poorer off are willing to cooperate with those well off because cooperation maximizes their own material standard of living. Thirdly, public recognition of these two principles supports everyone's sense of self-respect, a primary good, and thereby also enhances their ability to show mutual respect for others.

Note that the two principles do not require absolute equality in every respect. In establishing the basic structure of society, all persons will demand an equal right to basicliberties because they will be unwilling to risk the loss of any one of them in pursuit of their own specific life-plan. On the other hand, there is no reason why they should not accept social or economic inequalities so long as they serve to maximize their own social and material well-being. Rawls does point out however two conditions where basic liberties may be curtailed for some. In order to protect the total system of liberty in a society, it may sometimes be necessary to take some restrictive action—as might happen, for example, if some advocate(s) of intolerance were to threaten public order and stability very seriously.

Such a condition is acceptable, according to Rawls, because it preserves, rather than denies, liberty by protecting “the total system of liberty." The second condition for curtailment of liberty is one of paternalism, in which some deficiency such as a severe injury or mental disturbance justifies the curtailment. According to Rawls, such paternalism is justified because, in the original position, we presumably would want this action to be taken if we should suffer serious incapacitation in the future. Paternalistic measures however must abide by principles of justice and must serve the best interests of persons in terms of primary goods and their reasonably stable goals and preferences. ⁵

The Difference Principle

Regarding the Second Principle's requirement that social and economic inequalities be of the greatest benefit to the least advantaged group, what Rawls calls "the difference principle," some might question its fairness for others. Rawls argues, however, that we can usually presume the existence of a "chain connection" whereby what benefits a representative person in the least advantaged group will spread upward to benefit a representative person of the next least advantaged group, and soon throughout the society. As for those better situated, they have no simple right to greater social or economic position―because their position is largely due to natural abilities or favorable social circumstances, neither of which depends upon merit or credit for anything they did themselves.

To allow the distribution of social position and wealth to depend upon natural abilities and social circumstances is "arbitrary from a moral point of view" and therefore unacceptable. Even if persons exhibit a great deal of effort, they are not thereby more morally deserving of higher social position and wealth because their ability to exhibit great effort is itself dependent on natural endowment and the social background they enjoy. Rawls also points out that persons are not less deserving morally just because their abilities and efforts are no longer in demand because of social circumstances―for example, the talented, hard-working folk singer who gathers smaller audiences because folk singing has become less popular.

Can the social or economic position of the least advantaged group be improved in exchange for a lesser right to equal liberties? No, according to Rawls, because the First Principle is prior to the Second. In support of this priority, he notes that the demand for liberty and some control over our social governance becomes ever more important once our material needs are met. Again, as our material needs are satisfied, the good of self-respect takes on increasing importance; and equal liberties better serves self-respect than further increases in economic or social position. Rawls however does offer one qualification about the priority of liberty: If social conditions are so adverse that realization of equal liberties is impossible until there is a raising of the level of civilization, then the priority of liberty does not hold. Under such conditions though, action should be taken with the intent of raising the level of civilization to the point where equal basic liberties are indeed realizable.

Basic Institutions

Even with principles of justice, a society still needs basic institutions that support them. Foremost among these institutions is government. For social cooperation to continue, persons must have some reasonable confidence that others will also abide by the principles of justice; but they cannot always rely simply on others to do this voluntarily out of a sense of justice. Accordingly, a government is necessary to enforce the acceptance of proper burdens and to establish penalties for transgressions. For example, government should insure that citizens pay their fair share of taxes. The establishment of a just constitution that secures basic liberties and of a just procedure for political participation and legislation also are tasks of government. Moreover, in keeping with the difference principle, government will need to provide a welfare program that guarantees that basic needs are met. In addition, government must take steps to offset accumulations of wealth and power that frustrate the principles of justice. For example, in order to achieve really fair equality of opportunity, government should subsidize education "to insure equal chances of education and culture for persons similarly endowed and motivated." It should prevent monopolistic restrictions and economic barriers that stifle equal opportunity in various economic activities, for example, the free choice of an occupation. To insure equal opportunity in the political process, government should regularly fund programs providing free public discussion and should underwrite the costs of political parties to free them from private economic interests. In general, Rawls allows for fairly extensive activities by government. Government should be democratic; and a free market is usually efficient and protective of basic liberties economically (although government must step in to take appropriate action when the market is ineffective or breaks down.) His view seems to favor the social structure current in the United States at present. But Rawls sees no insurmountable obstacles to a socialistic government's being democratic and also allowing considerable market forces to operate.

Political Liberalism

Rawls’ successor book to A Theory of Justice is entitled, Political Liberalism. He raises the question how a democratic society of free and equal persons, as envisioned in A Theory of Justice, can maintain its stability when there will very likely be profound basic differences arising because of differing comprehensive views based on religion, philosophy, and morality. In other words, once free and equal persons embrace their own world views as properly descriptive and prescriptive guides to action, how can they then allow other competing comprehensive views to coexist or even to flourish?

Rawls does not think that we can expect common agreement regarding the competing comprehensive views. Given a society of free and equal persons, they will come up with a number of reasonable, but different, views; and any attempt to impose one’s view on others is likely to be a source of social instability, even civil war.

The solution to the problem, according to Rawls, is the development of “an overlapping consensus” among those holding different comprehensive views whereby they develop a political conception of justice not tied to any particular comprehensive view.

Rawls uses the term "justice as fairness" to characterize his theory. A position fundamentally opposed to this is Robert Nozick's "entitlement theory."

Nozick

Biographical Sketch

Robert Nozick (1938 - 2002), an American philosopher, received his Ph. D. degree from Princeton University in 1963. He taught at Princeton, the Rockefeller University, and at Harvard University.

After some early association with the political left, Nozick took on a much more conservative position, which is discussed and defended in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Anarchism, as well as the welfare state, are rejected by Nozick.

Robert Nozick thinks that many well-meaning, but misguided persons, in the name of "justice,^" are enticed into advocating a welfare state that turns out to be a travesty of justice. Concerned about vast inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power in society, these persons want to establish a more just distribution through governmental action. Unfortunately, according to Nozick, the proposed redistribution infringes upon the rights of individuals who are entitled to what they possess, thereby producing injustice instead of justice. (He is not simply insensitive to the misfortunes of people, for example, those living in dire poverty in the midst of a nation of plenty; but he is insistent that no injustice takes place that requires a more equal distribution of society's goods.

The Entitlement Theory of Justice

When might a person be entitled to something? Consider this example:⁶ A really outstanding player in the National Basketball Association voluntarily enters into a salary agreement guaranteeing him a percentage of each ticket sold at home games. A lot of people want to watch and enjoy this player on the court; and they are aware of the percentage agreement. As a result, at the end of the season, the star player has an enormous income, higher than any other player and even higher than nearly everyone else in the society. Is he entitled to his income? Unless we want to deny individuals the right to engage in voluntary exchanges, we should conclude that he is entitled to it. The player and the team management voluntarily entered into the salary agreement; the fans, knowing of the percentage agreement, voluntarily bought tickets, thereby exchanging their money for his services rather than for candy bars or magazines or something else; persons unenthusiastic about basketball voluntarily refrained from buying tickets and thereby were not forced in any way to contribute to the player's income. Besides this player's being entitled to his high income, it should also be clear that any society allowing similar voluntary exchanges will possess a number of individuals who accumulate considerable wealth to which they are similarly entitled.

Now suppose that government wants to tax the income of these wealthy individuals. How far can government go without producing injustice? Government can compel these individuals to pay the reasonable costs of protective services it provides, such as protection from violence, fraud, and theft. These protective services are legitimate functions of government in that individuals will not want to continue indefinitely providing such services solely through their own personal effort. Moreover, to provide adequate protective services, government must retain a monopoly on the use of force in society; without such a monopoly, those unable to pay for protective services will fend for themselves in unreliable or unfair ways that threaten the interests and rights of others; therefore government can tax wealthier individuals to cover the costs of providing protective services to non-paying, poor individuals. Thus, in so far as government taxes for the purpose of providing protective services, it produces no injustice. When it taxes to redistribute income from the wealthier to the needier, however, the situation is quite different. It is no longer a matter of taxation to benefit the taxpayers themselves; rather it is a matter of taxation to compel some to benefit others. Government cannot perform this redistributive function without violating the rights of some individuals, namely, those who are entitled to the wealth they accumulated.

As is evident in the basketball example, the player is entitled to his accumulated income which arose through voluntary exchanges. He has the right to hold or transfer that income as he himself chooses. He may voluntarily choose to help the needy. Government, however, cannot compel him to aid the needy without infringing upon his rights and thereby producing an injustice. Compulsory taxation to aid the needy here amounts to a kind of forced labor in that the player is compelled to transfer a part of the proceeds of his labor to others. Nozick points out that we would regard as an injustice any governmental attempt to force people to give up some of their leisure time to do work to aid the needy. So why should working persons be forced to surrender part of their income to aid the needy? In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, he says, "Why should the man who prefers seeing a movie (and who has to earn money for a ticket) be open to the required call to aid the needy [through taxation on income], while the person who prefers looking at a sunset (and hence need earn no extra money) is not?"⁷

The outlines of Nozick's entitlement theory of justice now start to become clear. Individuals have rights that are not to be infringed upon. In particular, they have the right to accumulate what they want through their own voluntary choices and effort, so long as they do not resort to violence, theft, or fraud; and they are entitled to hold or transfer what they accumulate as they choose. (In some extreme situations, Nozick grants some limits on our choices. For example, if you own the only water hole in a desert, you cannot charge what you will when it means that persons will die of thirst. He thinks, however, that such extreme situations are so rare as not to be deserving of any great attention.) The sole, legitimate functions of government consist in those protective services necessary to prevent interference with the choices of individuals. Accordingly, government can take steps to assure enforcement of contracts and to protect citizens from violence, theft, and fraud; but it cannot take steps to redistribute wealth by depriving some citizens of what they are rightly entitled to. Only a minimal state is justifiable.

Replies to Some Objections

Nozick is aware that many will find his position unpalatable; and he tries to eliminate a variety of possible objections, three of which will be considered here.

Some will object that wealth frequently accumulates because of natural assets or favorable social circumstances as much as because of individual choice and effort and, therefore, that persons are not simply entitled to their accumulated wealth. For example, the basketball star's agile, seven-foot body is not due to individual choice and effort; or a child's huge family inheritance does not arise through that individual's choice and effort. According to Nozick though, no sound reason exists to deny our being entitled to our natural assets; and if we are entitled to these assets, we are also entitled to any acquisitions that follow from them. As for inheritances, Nozick thinks that we give too little attention to the giver and too much to the recipient. If persons are entitled to their wealth, they are also entitled to transfer it as they choose. And if they choose to transfer by passing on an inheritance, then the recipient is entitled to all that wealth without any injustice occurring. Consequently, governmental redistribution of wealth is not justifiable because of differences in natural assets or social circumstances.

Some will object that equality of opportunity is lacking in the minimal state and therefore that injustice occurs. Nozick, however, is somewhat sceptical about the importance assigned to equality of opportunity by people; most people are concerned with what they eventually get rather than with the initial opportunities present. Also, given the diversity among people and the numerous opportunities available in a society, he is sceptical about the possibility of finding a common standard for determining when equality of opportunity is lacking and needs support. More importantly, Nozick stresses that we cannot deprive some of what they are entitled to as a way of providing equality of opportunity; accordingly, when inequalities of opportunity are present, we do better to look upon them as instances of misfortune rather than of injustice. He offers the following example:

If the woman who later became my wife rejected another suitor (whom she otherwise would have married) for me, partially because (I leave aside my lovable nature) of my keen intelligence and good looks, neither of which did I earn, would the rejected less intelligent and less handsome suitor have a legitimate complaint about unfairness? Would my thus impeding the other suitor's winning the hand of fair lady justify taking some resources from others to pay for cosmetic surgery for him and special intellectual training, or to pay for to develop in him some sterling trait that I lack in order to equalize our chances of being chosen? (I here take for granted the impermissibility of worsening the situation of the person having better opportunities so as to equalize opportunity; in this sort of case by disfiguring him or injecting drugs or playing noises which prevent him from fully using his intelligence.) No such consequences follow. (Against whom would the rejected suitor have a legitimate complaint? Against what?)⁸

Given his stand on equality of opportunity, we could expect Nozick also to oppose such measures as busing or forced school integration to upgrade the educational opportunities of minorities, preferential admission standards for minorities entering colleges and professional schools, quotas or preferences for them in employment. Nozick does not oppose minorities' desires for betterment in society; but he opposes a betterment achieved by unjustly denying the entitlements of others.

Some will object that exchanges in the minimal state will not really be voluntary in many instances. For example, a person desperate for work will accept an extremely low wage from an employer; but, under such desperate circumstances, we can hardly say that a worker enters into a voluntary exchange, particularly if the employer is not equally desperate. Nozick, however, argues that the mere presence of undesirable alternatives does not establish that an action is non-voluntary. So long as others are acting within their rights, a person cannot claim an injustice simply because the result is a set of undesirable alternatives for that person. Employers are entitled to offer as wages whatever they are willing to pay to get some work done; workers are entitled to accept or refuse the offer. If workers accept a low wage because of desperate circumstances, we cannot conclude that the employers therefore exceeded their rights. Hence no injustice occurs. The undesirable alternatives are misfortunes workers have to bear and try to overcome through further choices and effort.

Flaws with the Welfare State

Underlying his support for the minimal state is Nozick's conviction that much current social and political philosophy advocating a welfare state suffers from two fatal flaws. First, there is a tendency to make judgments in terms of what benefits a collective whole instead of insistence upon the rights of individuals. Collective wholes do not have rights; only individuals have rights. Secondly, there is a tendency to locate an undesirable situation, for example, one group living in dire poverty while another possesses enormous wealth, and to pronounce the situation unjust without duly considering the historical series of events that led to this particular situation. Poverty in the midst of wealth is not necessarily an injustice. If the wealthy accumulated their possessions in morally unobjectionable ways--namely, through their own voluntary choices, exchanges, efforts in company with similar voluntary activities by others—their wealth exists beside others' poverty without any injustice occurring. When we do focus upon the rights of individuals and the historical series of events by which individuals acquire what they have, we arrive at an entitlement theory of justice quite different from the theory of "justice" that underlies the welfare state.

Rawls and Nozick: A Comparison

From Robert Nozick's standpoint, Rawls' theory of justice is unnecessary. It is unnecessary because a quite adequate theory of justice, namely, the entitlement theory, exists prior to the elaborate construction by which Rawls moves from the original position to his two Principles of Justice. Whether acting cooperatively or non-cooperatively, individuals are entitled to what they acquire through their own choices and effort or through voluntary exchanges with others—provided they do not resort to violence, theft, or fraud; they are further entitled to transfer these acquisitions as they choose. This entitlement theory achieves justice by upholding firmly the rights of individuals, whereas Rawls' theory leads to a denial of these rights in various instances. For example, the second Principle of Justice permits and promotes the sort of redistribution that deprives some persons of their entitlements.

From John Rawls' standpoint, Nozick's entitlement theory exhibits an oversimplifying fixation upon the rights of individuals. For Rawls, society does not exist simply to affirm the preexisting rights of individuals; rather it is a cooperative endeavor by which individuals hope to achieve a better life than their solitary efforts might attain. Hence the task of working out a theory of justice consists in determining just terms of social cooperation to which free, equal, rational individuals can agree. The elaborate conditions of the original position, such as the veil of ignorance, try to set the stage for arriving at just terms of social cooperation by establishing a relatively neutral starting-point; and the two Principles of Justice arrived at adequately accomplish the task of forming a social contract.

Rawls and Nozick also disagree with respect to the significance of natural assets and favorable social circumstances. From a moral standpoint, Rawls sees no reason why persons should be entitled to more simply because they possess superior natural assets or happen to have the benefits of especially favorable social circumstances. And he thinks that recognition of this by favored persons will make them more willing to accept the difference principle (the second Principle of Justice). Nozick, on the other hand, sees no reason why persons are not entitled to their natural assets or the benefits of favorable social circumstances. The less favored may complain about their misfortune, but not about injustice.

According to the first part of Rawls' difference principle, social and economic inequalities need to be justified by the benefits they confer upon the least advantaged group in society. This requirement helps assure the social cooperation of the least advantaged group. Nozick, however, thinks this requirement is unjust because it does not recognize the legitimacy of some individuals^' entitlements. Furthermore, he thinks that the more productive individuals in society—by reason of their "new inventions, new ideas about production or ways of doing things, skill at economic tasks, and so on"—confer sufficient benefits upon the less productive without suffering the additional burden of having to maximize benefits to the least advantaged group.

Given their differences, we should not be surprised that Rawls' theory of justice allows for, and demands, much more extensive activity by government than is the case with Nozick's minimal state. In many ways, Rawls' theory can be taken as one basic philosophical defense of political liberalism in the twentieth century (to be contrasted with John Dewey's), whereas Nozick's theory can be taken as a philosophical defense of political conservatism.

Rawls, Nozick, and Envy

Both John Rawls and Robert Nozick deal with the issue whether or not the social demand for equality results through envy, a disreputable emotion. When social reformers demand a redistribution of wealth and power from rich to poor, are they acting in the name of justice, as they claim, or are they merely acting out of envy toward those who have acquired a higher social or economic standing?

Strict egalitarianism, the demand for equal distribution of all primary goods, according to Rawls, may derive from envy. But he does not advocate strict egalitarianism. According to the second Principle of Justice, social and economic inequalities are allowable provided that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. He grants, however, the strong egalitarian tendencies in his Principles of Justice, namely, the requirements for equal basic liberties and for fair equality of opportunity with respect to offices and positions. Even the social and economic inequalities allowed by the second principle will not be excessive in practice, given the requirement that they must be of the greatest benefit to the least advantaged.

The root of envy, according to Rawls, is a "lack of self-confidence in our own worth combined with a sense of impotence.^" He does not think that a well-ordered society based upon his Principles of Justice rests upon or promotes envy. The ground rules laid out in the original position have nothing to do with envy. Moreover, the society is not likely to foster a loss of self-worth or sense of impotence. Constructive alternatives to better one's situation are assured by the second Principle; so there should be no sense of impotence. A view of society as a cooperative endeavor, a common sense of justice, a recognition that greater wealth or social standing is not indicative of greater moral worth, and the right to equal basic liberties assured by the first Principle of Justice all serve to enhance confidence in one^'s own worth; so there should be no seriously widespread problem of a loss of self-worth. Accordingly, envy is not a matter of concern in Rawls' theory of justice.

Nozick sees envy as a serious problem for any theory of justice with strong egalitarian tendencies. He regards arguments for equality as a value to be very weak or non-existent and thus suspects that egalitarian theories of justice may well be merely rationalizations which hide the underlying emotion of envy. For Nozick, given his entitlement theory of justice, inequalities in wealth and power are to be expected and are not to be tampered with, when persons are entitled to what they accumulate.

Besides suspecting that envy underlies egalitarian demands regarding the distribution of wealth and power, Nozick also suspects that movement toward greater equality does not serve to reduce envy. Envy originates from a low sense of self-esteem; and a sense of self-esteem results from a measure of one's own standing relative to others. If being the best high school student in Gopher Prairie greatly enhances Mary's sense of self-esteem, won't she later experience a lowered sense of self-esteem at an excellent university where she is just one good student among many? Given the way we measure self-esteem and given its importance to our sense of well-being, Nozick doubts that equality can reduce envy. Whenever society establishes equality in one area to raise the sense of self-esteem and thereby eliminates the cause of envy, persons will look to some other area of difference to measure self-esteem. And there are always numerous areas of difference. For example, equalize wealth and persons will no longer be envious of anyone's wealth; but they can still be envious with respect to such attributes as "aesthetic appreciateness, aesthetic attractiveness, intelligence, athletic prowess, physical grace, degree of sympathy with other persons, quality of orgasm." The list could go on and on.

The best way to avoid envy, according to Nozick, consists in having a highly individualistic society with sufficient diversity that there are no commonly agreed upon measures of self-esteem. As long as each person can perform sufficiently well some activity that some other people also value, there is a greater likelihood that the person can achieve a genuine sense of self-esteem without envy. As we might expect, such a highly individualistic society would also be his minimal state.

Further Thought: John Rawls does not think that the ground rules in the original position have anything to do with envy. But how can he be sure of this, especially in the light of Robert Nozick's suspicions about rationalizations? Nozick does not think that a movement toward equality will reduce envy because there are so many possible areas of difference by which persons can measure self-esteem. But are some areas of difference more crucial than others? For example, are differences in wealth more likely to lead to envy than differences in aesthetic appreciativeness? If so, would Nozick's position be weakened? Is Nozick correct in associating self-esteem with a measurement of one^'s standing relative to others?⁹ To what extent do you think that envy underlies demands for equality? Justify your answer.

Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies

(1) The Moral Bankruptcy of Social Contract Theory.

John Rawls tries to establish a theory of justice based upon a social contract that free, equal, rational persons pursuing their self-interest can agree to. The result would be a humane society with ample benefits for all. Despite Rawls' good intentions however, Robert Nozick undermines his position by showing, at the very least, that individuals may opt for a quite different society based upon the entitlement theory of justice. The resulting society would be morally bankrupt: Under the guise of the "rights of individuals," an elitist class would be able to exploit considerable numbers of people while remaining insensitive to much human suffering.

The demand for a humane society with ample benefits for all, that is also just, must rest upon some other foundation than a social contract entered into by independent individuals.

A Possible Reply: From a Rawlsian standpoint, the objection makes the mistake of assuming that Nozick succeeds in undermining Rawls' social contract approach. There are numerous reasons for rejecting Nozick's position. For example, as soon as we recognize the real purpose of society to be a cooperative endeavor by which persons try to better themselves rather than a way of just affirming the preexisting rights of individuals, we are already on the way to recognizing the superiority of Rawls' theory of justice.

From Nozick^'s perspective, charges that exploitation and insensitivity will commonly occur in the minimal state are unfounded. Too often, charges of exploitation arise due to envy or due to a failure to appreciate fully the risks and difficulties faced by individuals who succeed. For example, workers frequently expect to share bountifully in their employers' success without taking any risks themselves or making sacrifices in the case of failure. Nozick also challenges the charge about the insensitivity of wealthy persons. As a group they are just as inclined to help the needy voluntarily as those less well-situated, although they are reasonably concerned about feeling like "suckers" or "saps" when they make sacrifices that others forgo. There need not be an absence of generosity in the minimal state.

(2) Mixed Up Priorities in Rawls' Principles of Justice.

Rawls assigns the first Principle of Justice, regarding basic liberties, priority over the second Principle. In actuality however, the issue of basic liberties is inseparable from that of social and economic inequalities. Ample evidence shows that lower social and economic standing leads to a lesser degree of basic liberties. Whether we are dealing with political liberties, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of action, freedom to own personal property, or freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, persons of higher socio-economic status enjoy a decided advantage. Greater access to educational opportunities, health care, business opportunities and so on all go along with higher socio-economic standing. The basic liberties of the seventh child of an impoverished ghetto family are not seriously comparable with those of a Rockefeller. Basic liberties will never be equally shared by all until most social and economic inequalities are rooted out. Rawls' attempt to treat the first Principle of Justice independently of socio-economic standing simply ignores life in the real world.

A Possible Reply: The objection fails to distinguish between what justice requires and an existing state of affairs. In actuality, it may be true that higher socio-economic standing often assures a greater degree of basic liberties. But this fact does not negate the claim that basic liberties should be equally shared by all. What justice demands is clear. Accordingly, a society or government should take those steps necessary to assure basic liberties for all. For example, government subsidization of education and of political campaigns is called for. We need not conclude, however, that nearly all social and economic inequalities must disappear before all share in basic liberties.

Also, if we grant that socio-economic standing is closely related to the degree of basic liberties, we should note as well that the second Principle of Justice requires increased social and economic benefits to the least advantaged group. Thus, as these benefits increase, the degree of basic liberties increases as well.

Finally, we should recognize that, as our basic socio-economic needs are met, we turn increasingly to basic liberties as the key to achieving self-realization. The priority assigned to the first Principle of Justice accords well with this recognition.

(3) Limits on Entitlements.

Nozick's entitlement theory of justice makes the most sense and functions most clearly when persons acquire something through their own efforts. Acquisition through one's own effort is the core concept of the entitlement theory. Any departure from that core concept, however, muddies the waters considerably.

Consider inheritances. Persons entitled to their wealth because of their own efforts would seem to have the right to transfer it as they choose. But if they leave the wealth as an inheritance to persons who exhibit no effort at all, are they not acting contrary to the core concept of the entitlement theory? By so bequeathing the wealth, are they not pronouncing that one's own effort is not a necessary condition for entitlement? Inheritance within the entitlement theory seems to involve internal inconsistency.

Consider natural assets. Nozick assumes that persons are entitled to their natural assets. We would be more accurate, however, if we started by assuming that persons possess natural assets. Entitlement cannot be just assumed. Furthermore, given the core concept of the entitlement theory involving one's own efforts, the mere possession of natural assets does not entitle one to anything. It does not follow, of course, that persons should be deprived of their natural assets. What does follow is the conclusion that persons are not entitled to that portion of their acquisitions that is attributable to their natural assets.

A similar analysis applies for favorable social circumstances. Given the core concept of entitlement, persons do not have a clear right to that portion of their acquisitions that is attributable to their favorable social circumstances.

A Possible Reply: While acquisition through one's own effort is a core concept of the entitlement theory, it does not constitute the whole foundation for the theory. Being entitled to transfer holdings as one chooses, including the right to leave inheritances, is also a core concept of the theory. Being entitled to our acquired holdings would have little meaning, if we could not dispose of them as we chose. Perhaps we can avoid any difficulties here by regarding "voluntary transactions" as the core concept of the entitlement theory.

Regarding natural assets and favorable social circumstances, the best evidence that we are entitled to them is the nearly universal unwillingness to deprive persons of them. For example, nearly everyone would be revolted by the suggestion that we cripple the basketball star because he is not entitled to his natural agility.

(4) Nozick 's Failure to Distinguish Individual Goods from Social Primary Goods.

Nozick correctly points out the absurdity of invoking equality of opportunity as justification for equalizing the chances for two suitors to win a woman's hand in marriage or for depriving a particular child of the daily use of a swimming pool since another child has no pool. Equality of opportunity should not be invoked with respect to the specific goods of individuals, as is the case in these examples. Society has no obligation to equalize opportunities for each specific desire of persons' life-plans (such as wanting to marry a particular person). The demand for equality of opportunity relates to more general goods, such as Rawls' "primary social goods" (for example, liberties, powers, wealth, and self-respect). Equal educational opportunity does not obligate a society to equalize the chances of each person's being admitted as a student to Harvard University in the fall of a given year; instead it obligates a society to take reasonable steps to lower general barriers to a good education, beginning with the worst ones - such as patterns of discrimination, poverty, and absence of facilities, teachers, or textbooks. W hat constitutes "reasonable steps" depends heavily upon a society's resources as well as the abilities, interests, motivation, and experience of individuals.

In criticizing equality of opportunity, Nozick makes the mistake of failing to distinguish between the specific goods of individuals and more general social goods. Consequently, his examples are ineffective.

A Possible Reply: References to "general social goods" or "primary social goods" tend to be misleading by implying the possibility of analyzing society in terms of groups or general attributes. In actuality, there are only individuals with specific, unique desires. Thus equality of opportunity requires a determination of what specific opportunities will be made available to each specific individual. And therefore the marriage and swimming pool examples are relevant and effective in the critique of equality of opportunity.

Thought Excursions

**3.50 Why is justice important to a society, according to John Rawls? Do you think that love can be an adequate substitute for justice in a society? Would there be any differences between a society based upon love and one based upon justice? Explain your answers in some detail.

**3.51 Explain the meaning of the following terms: social primary goods, pure procedural justice, the original position, a veil of ignorance, principles of justice, basic liberties, the maximin rule, the difference principle, the just savings principle, and chain connection.

**3.511 Describe Rawls' general procedure for arriving at principles of justice. How does he avoid the need to consider how justice will apply specifically to each individual in a society? Briefly describe the main features of the "original position" with its conditions of fairness, background circumstances, formal constraints on justice and special assumptions. Do you think that formulation of this original position succeeds in laying the groundwork for discovering principles of justice? For example, does the veil of ignorance make it more likely that we will seek genuine principles of justice? Why or why not? Is it realistic to proceed from this veil of ignorance? Would you object to any features of Rawls' original position? If so, explain your objections.

**3.512 Ex Explain the two Principles of Justice in your own words. Given the original position, are these two Principles ones that rational persons would agree upon or would they just as likely choose other principles of justice? Explain your answer. Would you be pleased to live in a society based upon these two Principles? Why or why not? Try to be specific about the ways the Principles would affect your life.

*3.513 The account of Rawls' theory of justice in the text describes his way of dealing with a number of particular problems: the justification of inequalities in wealth and power in society, circumstances where basic liberties may be restricted, the significance of natural abilities and favorable social circumstances, and the priority of the first Principle of Justice. Explain in some detail how he handles each of these problems. Would you have any sharp disagreements? If so, explain why.

**3.514 Explain the legitimate functions of government in a society based upon Rawls' theory of justice. Would it be a laissez faire government? Why not?

**3.5141 Given Rawls' theory of justice, what should be definitely opposed among the following: graduated income tax, equal rights amendment, school prayer amendment, right to life amendment, school segregation, busing for purposes of school integration, government-funded political campaigns, government subsidized education, safety standards in the workplace, affirmative action plans, comparable worth wage plans, limitations on free enterprise, loyalty oaths for teachers, and academic freedom? Justify your judgments.

3.52 Suppose that Friedrich Nietzsche were asked to comment upon Rawls' theory of justice. What critical remarks would he be likely to make? For example, would he complain that Rawls' rational persons don't want to take enough risks? Or would he object to the requirement that social and economic inequalities benefit the least advantaged? Discuss the merit of any remarks he might make.

**3.53 Explain in some detail Robert Nozick's entitlement theory of justice. How does the theory justify a minimal stale, but not a welfare state? How should taxation be dealt with? (Give special attention to his examples.) Do you have any sharp disagreements with his position? If so, explain them.

Would you be pleased to live in a society based upon this entitlement theory? Why or why not? Try to be specific about the ways the theory would affect your life.

**3.531 Read over the account in the text of replies Nozick makes to various possible objections. Then evaluate the adequacy of these replies, giving justification. (You may want to also read over the Objections and Possible Replies section before answering.)

3.54 If Karl Marx were asked to comment upon Nozick's entitlement theory, what do you think would be his most fundamental criticism?

*3.541 Given Nozick's entitlement theory of justice, what should be definitely opposed among the possibilities listed in 3.5141? Justify your judgments.

*3.542 Discuss whether your nation approximates more closely to Rawls' theory of justice or to Nozick's entitlement theory at the present time. What do you expect to happen in the future? Why?

**3.543 Compare and contrast the positions of Rawls and Nozick with respect to the individual and society. Are their differences resolvable? Explain. Now read over the objections and possible replies in the text dealing with their positions. Would you state other objections? If so, what are they? Is one position superior to the other? Justify your answer.

Sources

Footnotes

1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 3-4.

2. See ibid., p. 127.

3. Ibid., p. 302.

4. Ibid., p. 61.

5. See ibid., p. 250.

6. Nozick uses the example of basketball star Wilt Chamberlain; but he uses it in a more narrow context than is the case with my presentation of his position here. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 160-164.

7. Ibid., p. 170.

8. Ibid., p. 237

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