Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(1) The Moral Bankruptcy of Social Contract Theory.
John Rawls tries to establish a theory of justice based upon a social contract that free, equal, rational persons pursuing their self-interest can agree to. The result would be a humane society with ample benefits for all. Despite Rawls' good intentions however, Robert Nozick undermines his position by showing, at the very least, that individuals may opt for a quite different society based upon the entitlement theory of justice. The resulting society would be morally bankrupt: Under the guise of the "rights of individuals," an elitist class would be able to exploit considerable numbers of people while remaining insensitive to much human suffering.
The demand for a humane society with ample benefits for all, that is also just, must rest upon some other foundation than a social contract entered into by independent individuals.
A Possible Reply: From a Rawlsian standpoint, the objection makes the mistake of assuming that Nozick succeeds in undermining Rawls' social contract approach. There are numerous reasons for rejecting Nozick's position. For example, as soon as we recognize the real purpose of society to be a cooperative endeavor by which persons try to better themselves rather than a way of just affirming the preexisting rights of individuals, we are already on the way to recognizing the superiority of Rawls' theory of justice.
From Nozick's perspective, charges that exploitation and insensitivity will commonly occur in the minimal state are unfounded. Too often, charges of exploitation arise due to envy or due to a failure to appreciate fully the risks and difficulties faced by individuals who succeed. For example, workers frequently expect to share bountifully in their employers' success without taking any risks themselves or making sacrifices in the case of failure. Nozick also challenges the charge about the insensitivity of wealthy persons. As a group they are just as inclined to help the needy voluntarily as those less well-situated, although they are reasonably concerned about feeling like "suckers" or "saps" when they make sacrifices that others forgo. There need not be an absence of generosity in the minimal state.
(2) Mixed Up Priorities in Rawls' Principles of Justice.
Rawls assigns the first Principle of Justice, regarding basic liberties, priority over the second Principle. In actuality however, the issue of basic liberties is inseparable from that of social and economic inequalities. Ample evidence shows that lower social and economic standing leads to a lesser degree of basic liberties. Whether we are dealing with political liberties, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of action, freedom to own personal property, or freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, persons of higher socio-economic status enjoy a decided advantage. Greater access to educational opportunities, health care, business opportunities and so on all go along with higher socio-economic standing. The basic liberties of the seventh child of an impoverished ghetto family are not seriously comparable with those of a Rockefeller. Basic liberties will never be equally shared by all until most social and economic inequalities are rooted out. Rawls' attempt to treat the first Principle of Justice independently of socio-economic standing simply ignores life in the real world.
A Possible Reply: The objection fails to distinguish between what justice requires and an existing state of affairs. In actuality, it may be true that higher socio-economic standing often assures a greater degree of basic liberties. But this fact does not negate the claim that basic liberties should be equally shared by all. What justice demands is clear. Accordingly, a society or government should take those steps necessary to assure basic liberties for all. For example, government subsidization of education and of political campaigns is called for. We need not conclude, however, that nearly all social and economic inequalities must disappear before all share in basic liberties.
Also, if we grant that socio-economic standing is closely related to the degree of basic liberties, we should note as well that the second Principle of Justice requires increased social and economic benefits to the least advantaged group. Thus, as these benefits increase, the degree of basic liberties increases as well.
Finally, we should recognize that, as our basic socio-economic needs are met, we turn increasingly to basic liberties as the key to achieving self-realization. The priority assigned to the first Principle of Justice accords well with this recognition.
(3) Limits on Entitlements.
Nozick's entitlement theory of justice makes the most sense and functions most clearly when persons acquire something through their own efforts. Acquisition through one's own effort is the core concept of the entitlement theory. Any departure from that core concept, however, muddies the waters considerably.
Consider inheritances. Persons entitled to their wealth because of their own efforts would seem to have the right to transfer it as they choose. But if they leave the wealth as an inheritance to persons who exhibit no effort at all, are they not acting contrary to the core concept of the entitlement theory? By so bequeathing the wealth, are they not pronouncing that one's own effort is not a necessary condition for entitlement? Inheritance within the entitlement theory seems to involve internal inconsistency.
Consider natural assets. Nozick assumes that persons are entitled to their natural assets. We would be more accurate, however, if we started by assuming that persons possess natural assets. Entitlement cannot be just assumed. Furthermore, given the core concept of the entitlement theory involving one's own efforts, the mere possession of natural assets does not entitle one to anything. It does not follow, of course, that persons should be deprived of their natural assets. What does follow is the conclusion that persons are not entitled to that portion of their acquisitions that is attributable to their natural assets.
A similar analysis applies for favorable social circumstances. Given the core concept of entitlement, persons do not have a clear right to that portion of their acquisitions that is attributable to their favorable social circumstances.
A Possible Reply: While acquisition through one's own effort is a core concept of the entitlement theory, it does not constitute the whole foundation for the theory. Being entitled to transfer holdings as one chooses, including the right to leave inheritances, is also a core concept of the theory. Being entitled to our acquired holdings would have little meaning, if we could not dispose of them as we chose. Perhaps we can avoid any difficulties here by regarding "voluntary transactions" as the core concept of the entitlement theory.
Regarding natural assets and favorable social circumstances, the best evidence that we are entitled to them is the nearly universal unwillingness to deprive persons of them. For example, nearly everyone would be revolted by the suggestion that we cripple the basketball star because he is not entitled to his natural agility.
(4) Nozick 's Failure to Distinguish Individual Goods from Social Primary Goods.
Nozick correctly points out the absurdity of invoking equality of opportunity as justification for equalizing the chances for two suitors to win a woman's hand in marriage or for depriving a particular child of the daily use of a swimming pool since another child has no pool. Equality of opportunity should not be invoked with respect to the specific goods of individuals, as is the case in these examples. Society has no obligation to equalize opportunities for each specific desire of persons' life-plans (such as wanting to marry a particular person). The demand for equality of opportunity relates to more general goods, such as Rawls' "primary social goods" (for example, liberties, powers, wealth, and self-respect). Equal educational opportunity does not obligate a society to equalize the chances of each person's being admitted as a student to Harvard University in the fall of a given year; instead it obligates a society to take reasonable steps to lower general barriers to a good education, beginning with the worst ones - such as patterns of discrimination, poverty, and absence of facilities, teachers, or textbooks. W hat constitutes "reasonable steps" depends heavily upon a society's resources as well as the abilities, interests, motivation, and experience of individuals.
In criticizing equality of opportunity, Nozick makes the mistake of failing to distinguish between the specific goods of individuals and more general social goods. Consequently, his examples are ineffective.
A Possible Reply: References to "general social goods" or "primary social goods" tend to be misleading by implying the possibility of analyzing society in terms of groups or general attributes. In actuality, there are only individuals with specific, unique desires. Thus equality of opportunity requires a determination of what specific opportunities will be made available to each specific individual. And therefore the marriage and swimming pool examples are relevant and effective in the critique of equality of opportunity.
**3.50 Why is justice important to a society, according to John Rawls? Do you think that love can be an adequate substitute for justice in a society? Would there be any differences between a society based upon love and one based upon justice? Explain your answers in some detail.
**3.51 Explain the meaning of the following terms: social primary goods, pure procedural justice, the original position, a veil of ignorance, principles of justice, basic liberties, the maximin rule, the difference principle, the just savings principle, and chain connection.
**3.511 Describe Rawls' general procedure for arriving at principles of justice. How does he avoid the need to consider how justice will apply specifically to each individual in a society? Briefly describe the main features of the "original position" with its conditions of fairness, background circumstances, formal constraints on justice and special assumptions. Do you think that formulation of this original position succeeds in laying the groundwork for discovering principles of justice? For example, does the veil of ignorance make it more likely that we will seek genuine principles of justice? Why or why not? Is it realistic to proceed from this veil of ignorance? Would you object to any features of Rawls' original position? If so, explain your objections.
**3.512 Ex Explain the two Principles of Justice in your own words. Given the original position, are these two Principles ones that rational persons would agree upon or would they just as likely choose other principles of justice? Explain your answer. Would you be pleased to live in a society based upon these two Principles? Why or why not? Try to be specific about the ways the Principles would affect your life.
*3.513 The account of Rawls' theory of justice in the text describes his way of dealing with a number of particular problems: the justification of inequalities in wealth and power in society, circumstances where basic liberties may be restricted, the significance of natural abilities and favorable social circumstances, and the priority of the first Principle of Justice. Explain in some detail how he handles each of these problems. Would you have any sharp disagreements? If so, explain why.
**3.514 Explain the legitimate functions of government in a society based upon Rawls' theory of justice. Would it be a laissez faire government? Why not?
**3.5141 Given Rawls' theory of justice, what should be definitely opposed among the following: graduated income tax, equal rights amendment, school prayer amendment, right to life amendment, school segregation, busing for purposes of school integration, government-funded political campaigns, government subsidized education, safety standards in the workplace, affirmative action plans, comparable worth wage plans, limitations on free enterprise, loyalty oaths for teachers, and academic freedom? Justify your judgments.
3.52 Suppose that Friedrich Nietzsche were asked to comment upon Rawls' theory of justice. What critical remarks would he be likely to make? For example, would he complain that Rawls' rational persons don't want to take enough risks? Or would he object to the requirement that social and economic inequalities benefit the least advantaged? Discuss the merit of any remarks he might make.
**3.53 Explain in some detail Robert Nozick's entitlement theory of justice. How does the theory justify a minimal stale, but not a welfare state? How should taxation be dealt with? (Give special attention to his examples.) Do you have any sharp disagreements with his position? If so, explain them.
Would you be pleased to live in a society based upon this entitlement theory? Why or why not? Try to be specific about the ways the theory would affect your life.
**3.531 Read over the account in the text of replies Nozick makes to various possible objections. Then evaluate the adequacy of these replies, giving justification. (You may want to also read over the Objections and Possible Replies section before answering.)
3.54 If Karl Marx were asked to comment upon Nozick's entitlement theory, what do you think would be his most fundamental criticism?
*3.541 Given Nozick's entitlement theory of justice, what should be definitely opposed among the possibilities listed in 3.5141? Justify your judgments.
*3.542 Discuss whether your nation approximates more closely to Rawls' theory of justice or to Nozick's entitlement theory at the present time. What do you expect to happen in the future? Why?
**3.543 Compare and contrast the positions of Rawls and Nozick with respect to the individual and society. Are their differences resolvable? Explain. Now read over the objections and possible replies in the text dealing with their positions. Would you state other objections? If so, what are they? Is one position superior to the other? Justify your answer.
1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 3-4.
2. See ibid., p. 127.
3. Ibid., p. 302.
4. Ibid., p. 61.
5. See ibid., p. 250.
6. Nozick uses the example of basketball star Wilt Chamberlain; but he uses it in a more narrow context than is the case with my presentation of his position here. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 160-164.
7. Ibid., p. 170.
8. Ibid., p. 237
Return to Start Page
Return to Philosophical Issues Page
.