Rejection of Hobbes' Commonwealth
From the perspective of Rousseau, Hobbes' commonwealth turns subjects into slaves, "the human species is divided into so many herds of cattle, each with its ruler, who keeps guard over them for the purpose of devour them."10 According to Rousseau, all human beings are born free and equal; these are natural rights that cannot be alienated. Hence civil society can be based on neither slavery nor the right of the strongest. Greater power may well force people to obey; but it never turns "strength into right, and obedience into duty,"11 and it is binding only until an even greater force overcomes it. Because no obligation is involved, in effect, no "right" of the strongest exists.
As for slavery, Rousseau says,
To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man's nature; to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his acts. Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience. Is it not clear that we can be under no obligation to a person from whom we have the right to exact everything? Does not this condition alone, in the absence of equivalence or exchange, in itself involve the nullity of the act? For what right can my slave have against me, when all that he has belongs to me, and, his right being mine, this right of mine against myself is a phrase devoid of meaning?12
The Social Contract and The General Will
Since neither slavery nor the right of the strongest provide sufficient grounds for civil society, its foundation must be some initial agreement, or social contract. Moreover, this social contract must be such that it preserves every person's natural, unalienable right to be free and equal. While the character of this freedom and equality may alter as human beings move from a state of nature to a civil society, the basic rights remain.
In the concept of the common interest, Rousseau locates the social bond that makes civil society possible. In so far as persons recognize and agree to serve the common interest, they gain the benefits of social union―such as greater strength, more security, and a better life―without sacrificing freedom and equality. The common interest is determined by the general will, that is, the collective judgment of all the citizens acting as a single people. In The Social Contract, Rousseau describes the social union this way,
If, then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms:
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole."
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons, formerly took the name of "city," and now takes the name of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive, Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign ;power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the state. . . .13
Acts of sovereignty are always expressions of the general will. In entering into the social contract, the citizens retain their freedom and equality because acts of sovereignty are genuine expressions of their will and because they are equal with everyone else:
. . . Thus, from the very nature of the compact, every act of Sovereignty, i.e., every authentic act of the general will, binds or favours all the citizens equally; so that the Sovereign recognizes only the body of the nation, and draws no distinction between those of whom it is made up. What, then strictly speaking, is an act of sovereignty? It is not a convention between a superior and an inferior; but a convention between the body and each of its members. It is legitimate, because based on the social contract, and equitable, because common to all; useful and stable, because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power. So long as the subjects have to submit only to conventions of this sort, they obey no one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective rights of the Sovereign and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what point the latter can enter into undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with each.14
Freedom and The General Will
In entering into the social contract and departing from the state of nature, citizens surrender their natural freedom, that is, their unlimited right to do whatever they want and to take whatever they can get, in exchange for civil and moral freedom. Civil freedom includes the right to express oneself through the general will and the right to own property legitimately according to a juridical title. Moral freedom consists in acting according to self-imposed law, namely, the general will. In addition, Rousseau presumes that we retain a natural freedom to do what we want in private matters unrelated to the common interest, although he insists that the sovereign, or the general will, is the sole judge of what the common interest includes. Thus, while the character of our freedom changes when we enter civil society―from natural freedom to civil freedom, moral freedom, and a much more limited variation of natural freedom―we still retain freedom itself at the same time that we gain the benefits that social union makes possible.
The general will, quite clearly, is a fundamental element in Rousseau's position; it is the essential link between the common interest and freedom as well as equality that makes the social contract possible. Hence we need to know (1) the way the general will functions, (2) how far it extends, and (3) the ways of protecting it from corruption.
A body politic asserts the general will when all the people in sovereign assembly vote to determine the common interest on general policy matters relevant to the direction of the state. The voting process itself, according to Rousseau, cancels out individuals' competing, private interests so that only the common interest remains. For example, any selfish voting on the part of the wealthy to protect their own interests is cancelled out by selfish voting on the part of the poor to protect their interests. The majority's decision is not only binding on the minority but also it is an expression of the minority's will. Rousseau says,
. . . the vote of the majority always binds all the rest. This follows from the contract itself. But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. How are the opponents at once free and subject to laws they have not agreed to?
I retort that the question is wrongly put. The citizen gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his opposition, and even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them. The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free. When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so. If my particular opinion had carried the day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will; and it is in that case that I should not have been free [emphasis added].15
Accordingly if, as a member of the minority, I refuse to abide by the general will, then it is necessary that I be "forced to be free." In other words, steps should be taken to force me to conform to the general will; and these steps, far from taking away my freedom, serve rather to guarantee it. In arguing this way, Rousseau makes a fundamental addition to the understanding of what "freedom" means. While we ordinarily associate "freedom" with the "absence of interference from others," Rousseau asserts that it means, in addition, "the ability to do what we want provided that we know what we really want." Thus the expression of freedom sometimes requires opportune conditions, forced upon us by others, so that we do what we really want.
As for the scope of the general will, it does have limits. First, while all citizens must abide by the general will, persons cannot be forced to enter into the social contract itself and thereby become subjects to the sovereign authority as expressed through the general will. Rousseau adds, however, that once the state is established, continued residency within its jurisdiction signifies a willingness to accept sovereign authority. Secondly, while the majority vote in the assembly determines the general will, Rousseau suggests that the size of the majority required should approach closer to unanimity for at least the more serious, more important matters (so long as no immediate, pressing decision is necessary). Finally, the general will should establish laws of a general nature but should not deal with particular actions or particular individuals. According to Rousseau,
. . . the Law may indeed decree that there shall be privileges, but cannot confer them on anybody by name. It may set up several classes of citizens, and even lay down the qualifications for memberships of these classes, but it cannot nominate such and such persons as belonging to them; it may establish a monarchical government and hereditary succession, but it cannot choose a king, or nominate a royal family. In a word, no function which has a particular object belongs to the legislative power.16
This insistence upon confinement of the general will to the general rather than the particular leads to an important distinction by Rousseau between sovereignty and government such that government administers what the sovereign legislates.
Distinction Between Sovereignty and Government
The people as a whole, expressing their sovereignty through the general will, establish the laws; however they turn over the administration of these laws to the government. The government, consisting of those persons legitimately empowered by the people to rule (that is, "magistrates"), has a duty to serve the general will by properly executing the policies established by law; moreover, the people, as sovereign, always retain the right to dissolve or reform the government at any time.17
Whether the government is a monarchy, aristocracy, or a democracy depends upon the people's will. The most suitable form of government varies with different conditions. Nevertheless Rousseau prefers an elective aristocracy, in which the people elect the best, most qualified persons to run the government. Note that the people can appoint or elect individuals to run the government, although they cannot transfer the right of sovereignty to representatives. Ideally, Rousseau envisions this process: (a) The people acting as sovereign establish the laws for the government to administer and the rules for forming the government; (b) the people then transform themselves into citizens of a democracy in order to elect magistrates; (c) transformation into an elective aristocracy occurs when these legitimately empowered magistrates take over the reins of government; (d) yet the people as sovereign always retain the right to disband and reform the government or even dissolve the social contract.
Preservation of The General Will and Sovereignty
Now that the nature, function, and scope of the general will is clear, we can turn to the problem of its protection. Rousseau deals with two particular threats, namely, a possible inability to ascertain what the general will is and the possible usurpation of power by government. Given the proper conditions, the general will can be ascertained simply by taking a vote of the people in an assembly. Rousseau trusts the independent judgment of common people, uncorrupted by artificial inequalities created within society. Thus he says,
As long as several men in assembly regard themselves as a single body, they have only a single will which is concerned with their common preservation and general well-being. In this case, all the springs of the State are vigorous and simple and its rules clear and luminous; there are no embroilments or conflicts of interests; the common good is everywhere clearly apparent, and only good sense is needed to perceive it. Peace, unity, and equality are the enemies of political subtleties. Men who are upright and simple are difficult to deceive because of their simplicity; lures and ingenious pretexts fail to impose upon them, and they are not even subtle enough to be dupes. When, among the happiest people in the world, bands of peasants are seen regulating affairs of State under an oak, and always acting wisely, can we help scorning the ingenious methods of other nations, which make themselves illustrious and wretched with so much art and mystery?
A State so governed needs very few laws; and, as it becomes necessary to issue new ones, the necessity is universally seen.. The first man to propose them merely say what all have already felt, there is no question of factions or intrigues or eloquence in order to secure the passage into law of what every one has already decided to do, as soon as he is sure that the rest will act with him.
Theorists are led into error because, seeing only States that have been from the beginning wrongly constituted, they are struck by the impossibility of applying such a policy to them.18
However problems may arise. First, if, instead of exercising independent judgment in searching out the common interest, the citizens break up into factions or special interest groups competing for power, then a genuine expression of the general will may not result from the assembly vote. According to Rousseau, a great deal of dissension and debate in the assembly is a likely sign that special interests are taking precedence before the general will. Consequently, the rise of factions should be avoided. Secondly, the general will may be frustrated if the people, no matter how wellintentioned, make judgments without adequate information. Thus, a society is fortunate if it has a small number of lawgivers―that is, persons who exhibit "greatness of soul" rather than ambitious demagoguery―who guide the public enlightenment of the people properly. The lawgiver formulates laws and guides the citizens to an understanding of their own will; but the citizens themselves vote to determine the general will. Thirdly, a problem arises when the state becomes so large that the people cannot perceive, or associate with, the common interest and cannot easily meet in public assemblies. Accordingly, Rousseau prefers smaller states. (In the contemporary world, the availability of newspapers, radio, and television may alleviate this problem to some degree.)
If members of government fail in their duty to carry out the general will and instead usurp the sovereign power for themselves, then they thereby dissolve the social contract and no longer have any right to the obedience of the citizens. The best protection against such usurpation, according to Rousseau, consists in increasing the frequency of public assemblies as the power of government grows. Moreover, the citizens must retain an active interest in public affairs. If the desire for wealth and affluence supplants dedication to public service and citizens "prefer to serve with their purses rather than their persons," if love of country declines, and if the pursuit of private interests dominates the citizens' concerns, then the result will be a weakening of the sovereign power. For Rousseau, government should serve the people; but the people must be sure that they do not, by default, transfer to government the responsibilities of sovereignty. Such a transfer would be inimical to the expression of the general will, contrary to the duties of citizenship, and incompatible with the preservation of freedom and equality.
"Man is born free and is everywhere in chains." This is the tragedy and injustice Rousseau set out to rectify in The Social Contract. His success or failure turns upon three fundamental claims: (1) government is the people's servant, not master; (2) genuine sovereignty resides in the expression of the general will; and (3) the expression of the general will preserves every citizen's freedom and equality. This notion of the general will may disturb many of us. If we cast it aside however, we still need to deal with the question whether the demands of social union are compatible or incompatible with the requirements of freedom and equality.
Hobbes and Rousseau: A Comparison
Both Hobbes and Rousseau grant about the same powers of sovereignty. For example, of the seven major measures that tend to weaken the commonwealth according to Hobbes, the first six would equally well be threats to the power of sovereignty as conceived by Rousseau. There exists however a fundamental difference between them on the issue of sovereignty. Whereas Rousseau separates the sovereign from the government, Hobbes does not. Rousseau insists that sovereignty always resides with the people as a whole and government is only legitimate, that is, only exerts power legitimately, to the extent that it is the agent of the people as they express themselves through the general will. Hobbes, on the other hand, associates sovereignty with government itself and wants to make government as centralized and powerful as possible.
Underlying this basic difference is Rousseau's insistence that civil society must be based upon preservation of everyone's freedom and equality in contrast with Hobbes' insistence that civil society must be based upon power and fear. On an even deeper level, their opposition results from differing conceptions of human nature: Rousseau's basic trust in human beings and his desire for their possessing freedom of expression in contrast with Hobbes' declaration that human beings are so aggressive and power-seeking that an overwhelming power must exist to keep them in check, if we want to live in peace. For Hobbes, avoiding a state of civil war, the worst possible catastrophe, is always the foremost goal; for Rousseau, the preservation of human freedom and equality, without which we cannot maintain our humanity, is the foremost goal. As we might expect then, there is considerable difference between them as to what subjects should be willing to "put up with" from their government. We can also see why European heads of state shuddered at the thought of The Social Contract.
Rousseau would reject the coercive element associated with Hobbes' view of the social contract. Hobbes stresses the point that subjects enter into the commonwealth out of a sense of fear, so much so that it makes no difference in our obligations to the sovereign whether we entered through a voluntary assembly or through the fact of being conquered. Rousseau, on the other hand, asserts that our obedience to a conqueror should last only until the time we can escape from or overcome the usurper's power. Moreover, Rousseau thinks that, in entering the social contract from a state of nature, we exchange elements of natural freedom for civil and moral freedom; and we cannot assign this worthwhile exchange simply to the motivation of fear.
Another difference arises with respect to self-preservation. In Hobbes' view, we can never surrender the right of self-preservation in civil society because it is the basic reason for our entering into civil society in the first place. Accordingly, we have a right to defend ourselves if the sovereign attacks us, even if we had committed murder; we also have the right to meet our obligations to the common defense in wartime by sending a substitute who is willing to fight for us. Rousseau however does not grant so inclusive a right to self-preservation. If we are willing to let others die to defend us, then we must also sometimes be willing to die to defend others; and if we accept a law requiring the death penalty for murderers as a way of protecting ourselves from being murdered, then we should also consent to die should we ourselves become murderers.
From Rousseau's standpoint, Hobbes' commonwealth establishes a state of slavery for subjects, a state unfit for human beings. Instead of government serving the people, the rulers will sacrifice the people for the sake of their private interests. Hobbes, on the other hand, would regard Rousseau's social contract as a delusionary vision. To entrust sovereignty to the people as a whole and to expect them to recognize and abide by the common interest―hoping thereby to attain a life of peace, harmony, and well-being for all―passes beyond the bounds of reasonableness. Instead of a society functioning according to the general will, we would end up with chaos and civil war.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(1) The Myth of the Social Contract
Both Hobbes and Rousseau attribute the origin of civil society to voluntary agreements entered into by its members. Unfortunately, this voluntary agreement is a misleading myth. Habit, convenience, social training, economic status, and social circumstance have far more to do with the explanation why persons accept authority in a society than any alleged voluntariness. While the more heroic members of the populace may exhibit voluntariness, the overwhelming majority will resign themselves to accept a particular form of authority rather than choose it. Faced with perceived dissatisfaction or injustice, the overwhelming majority lack both the resources and the resourcefulness to move elsewhere. Even when some new form of government is instituted, the average person has little to choose with respect to its makeup.
In some very abstract sense, of course, everyone makes some choice and even resignation is a choice of sorts. But to associate such minimal choices with the voluntary agreements that supposedly establish civil society, as Hobbes and Rousseau maintain, distorts the meaning of "voluntariness" and distracts attention from the socio-economic conditions that produce dissatisfaction and injustice. Instead of focusing on a mythical "social contract" as a way of guaranteeing rights, we should change the underlying conditions that produce misery.
A Possible Reply: Whether or not voluntary entrance into a social contract is a specific, noteworthy historical event in the life-history of a nation is not a crucial issue. What is most important is the granting of natural, unalienable rights to every individual and the forming of a civil society in accord with those rights. A civil society so constituted assures both satisfaction and justice to its members; hence it has the implied consent of its members even without the specific act of entering into the social contract voluntarily. While this specific act may indeed he desirable as a clear signification of the social bond, it is not necessary.
The social contract is neither mythical nor misleading nor meaningless. It signifies that civil society is in accordance with the natural rights of individuals and thus that the society has an organizational structure worthy of voluntary allegiance and consent.
(2) Hobbes and the Abuse of Power
Those who heed Lord Acton's dictum, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely," will remain unimpressed by Hobbes' assurance that subjects have nothing to fear from the absolute power of a monarch, because of the realization that the greater strength and well-being of subjects furthers the monarch's own private interests. The absolute power of dictators has a way of corrupting even the best of intentions and of creating misery for subjects. For precisely these reasons, subjects demand some check on the accumulation of power by any one governmental official.
Hobbes wants absolute, centralized power in the state so that the subjects may be protected from their own aggressiveness; the subjects however want protection from a dictator so that they may be protected from abuse of power. The real solution to the problem consists in instituting a system of checks and balances whereby government has sufficient force to control any aggressiveness at the same time that power is sufficiently diffused to prevent any particular governmental official from accumulating enough personal power to abuse subjects. Hobbes thinks that the diffusion of power merely produces a tendency toward chaos and the pursuit of private interests by governmental officials. When a system of checks and balances works properly however, the tendency to pursue private interests instead of' the common interest by one official is checked by the power of other officials. The system may be less orderly than Hobbes would like. But at least subjects do not suffer under the unchecked aberrations of a dictator.
A Possible Reply: The greatest threat to a society is not the "aberrations of a dictator" but rather the disintegration of the state itself into a condition of war. Subjects can endure the temporary abuses of a single dictator better than they can survive and enjoy war. If a particular monarch fails to see the identity between private interest and well-being of the commonwealth as a whole, we have no sound reason to think that successors to the sovereign power will be similarly blind. Rather than taking steps likely to plunge people into a state of war, subjects should take their chances even with a cruel dictator, with the hope that they can expect more enlightenment in a successor.
(3) Rousseau's Framework for Totalitarianism
Despite Rousseau's declarations in favor of human freedom and equality, he lays out a system that easily lends itself to totalitarianism. His concept of the "general will" is the tool that makes totalitarianism possible. The general will makes possible the suppression of minorities under the guise of "forcing them to be free." Yet the general will is not always identical even with the will of the majority. According to Rousseau, if private interests predominate, then the vote of the majority may not be truly an expression of the general will. Rousseau also asserts that "[the public] must be taught to know what it wills."19 And if all this is not enough, Rousseau refers to crises where "the general will is quite clear" and "a supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority,"20 should be appointed. We can easily imagine how an aspiring dictator or totalitarian group could use these notions to destroy the people's freedom and equality. The basis for suppressing minorities, for rejecting the will of the majority, for controlling what people think, and for usurping power under the guise of a "crisis" is readily at hand.
To be sure, Rousseau does not desire a totalitarian state. He genuinely believes that the imposition of the general will upon unwilling minorities leads them to do what they "really" want; he genuinely hopes that the vote of the majority coincides with the general will; he genuinely demands a lawgiver who "enlightens" the people without possessing legislative or executive power; and he insists upon the "temporary" nature of any suspension of sovereign authority. Unfortunately, Rousseau fails to take account of the real world. Totalitarian governments are very adept at extending the period of a crisis; they insist upon retaining for themselves, with their considerable power, the task of "enlightening the public;" they find excuses for denying the will of the majority; and they offer self-serving interpretations of what the people "really" want.
A Possible Reply: Any ambiguities that may arise with respect to determining the general will should not sustain for any length of time the legitimacy of a totalitarian government. The usurping of the people's sovereignty cannot be hidden for long. And as soon as the usurpation is evident, the government is no longer entitled to the obedience of subjects. Far from establishing a framework for totalitarianism, Rousseau shows instead why totalitarian governments have no legitimacy.
Civil society only makes sense if it is organized to serve the common interest. A "society" organized to serve private interests is not really a civil society at all. The concept of the "general will" provides a means of stating what the common interest is. Rousseau is well aware that, in practice, the common interest is served, or the general will is expressed, in varying degrees. In addition to analyzing the nature of civil society, Rousseau issues a warning: Civil society tends toward disintegration as the common interest is less well-served. Hence, the general will is not some occult notion appealing to mystics; rather, it is a practical way of grasping what holds a healthy, civil society together.
(4) Rousseau's Romanticism
Rousseau's vision of a society where simple, straightforward people are "difficult to deceive because of their very simplicity," where peasants always act wisely, where few laws are necessary, and where the need for a new law is readily obvious to all has little to do with the real world. The overwhelming majority of people lack the ability, wisdom, and dedication to assert sovereign authority responsibly in the assemblies Rousseau envisions. Factions, pursuit of private interests, dissension, excessive debate in assemblies, the tendencies of well-intentioned but poorly-informed people, and the large size of states―all dangers admitted to by Rousseau himself cannot he avoided for any extended period of time. Although Rousseau's romantic vision may well please us, we should also recognize its impracticality.
Rousseau's contention that charges of impracticality are attributable to "glib theorizers" who only look at badly constituted states is very weak. We have only to look at Rousseau's own catalog of dangers (mentioned above) to realize that the real world, not the misperceptions of glib theorizers, establishes the impracticality of his vision of the state.
A Possible Reply: To focus upon impracticality as this objection does, a person must lose sight of the basic issue of the social contract. Rousseau wants to show that the social contract is only legitimate if it accomplishes a necessary objective, namely, the preservation of human freedom and equality through expression of the general will. No other alternative is available. Hence, while a list of practical dangers can warn us about what to avoid in order to preserve the social contract, it cannot establish the impracticality of Rousseau's conception of sovereignty, because the admission of impracticality is a denial of the possibility of civil society. In other words, regardless of' practical difficulties, we should strive to accomplish what Rousseau advocates because his position is the only one that establishes legitimate grounds for a civil society.