Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 1986, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
Return to Philosophical Issues Page
Author's Note: This account is adapted from Ron Yezzi, Directing Human Actions: Perspectives on Basic Ethical Issues (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986) pp.189 - 210.
Topics
Thomas Hobbes
Sovereign Power
Allegiance to the Sovereign
Liberties of Subjects
Warning about Measures that Weaken Sovereign Power
Preference for Monarchy
Rousseau
Rejection of Hobbes' Commonwealth
The Social Contract and The General Will
Freedom and The General Will
Distinction Between Sovereignty and Government
Preservation of The General Will and Sovereignty
Hobbes and Rousseau: A Comparison
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
Thought Excursions
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Censorship
Sources
Individuals and Society:
Hobbes and Rousseau
In contrast with Plato and Aristotle, both Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau assert that individual human beings possess natural, unalienable rights; they envision a form of social organization based upon a social contract among individuals that does not trample upon these natural rights. They disagree, however, as to the nature of this social contract and advocate different conceptions of the state.
Thomas Hobbes
Biographical Sketch
Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679 C.E.), an English philosopher, was educated at Oxford University. He then took up work as a tutor for the wealthy, titled Cavendish family. He served as tutor for other families as well and was tutor to the future King Charles II for a brief time. Because of his philosophical interest in politics and his association with wealthy, titled families during an extended period of political strife and civil war in England, Hobbes feared for his personal safety at various times. Eventually however, he became somewhat of an "institution" in England and lived to the ripe old age of ninety-one.
Hobbes began as a classical scholar. He did not take up philosophy seriously until beyond his fortieth birthday. He was drawn to philosophy by a sudden acquaintance with geometry and a desire to apply the method of geometry to philosophical questions such as the nature of physical bodies, human nature, and the nature of a citizen. He hoped that the application of geometrical method to these questions would both solve long-standing problems intellectually and also contribute to the ending of political strife in England. His best known work, Leviathan (upon which the coverage of Hobbes here is based), begins with human nature as a foundation and then deduces the nature of civil society.
Hobbes had a way of stirring up controversy. As mentioned already, he was involved in political disputes. In addition, he managed to be accused of atheism at various times, entered into a decade-long, acrimonious debate with a Bishop Bramhall over the issue of free will vs. determinism, and topped this with a twenty-year debate with the mathematician John Wallis over Hobbes' attempts to "square the circle." Controversy over his philosophical thought has continued over the centuries.
According to Thomas Hobbes' position, human nature is such that human beings live in a state of war unless there exists a civil government, or commonwealth, possessing awesome power, great enough to keep people under control. Human beings are too power-seeking, competitive, distrustful, and proud to live in peace by themselves. In their natural condition, all human beings arc equal and possess the right of nature which " is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto."1 That is, persons are entitled to seek their self-interest as they see fit. And the result is a state of war. In this natural condition, or state of war, moral absolutes, justice, and property rights are simply meaningless words. Hobbes relies upon the commonwealth as our only really safe refuge from this horrifying state of war.
Sovereign Power
The ultimate motivations for establishing a commonwealth are fear and self-interest. Fearing for our lives and well-being, we enter into covenants whereby we forgo various liberties accorded to us by the right of nature and agree to submit ourselves to a commonwealth, which is:
one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense. And he that carrieth this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and everyone besides, his subject.2
As subjects, we then owe allegiance to this artificial person, or sovereign, and must accord to the sovereign assorted rights necessary to maintain the sovereign power. According to Hobbes, it makes no difference whether we enter into a commonwealth through common agreement ("commonwealth by institution") or through submission to a conqueror ("commonwealth by acquisition" through "despotical dominion"). In either case, our depth of allegiance and the rights of the sovereign should remain the same.
Hobbes' Commonwealth and Rights of Sovereignty3
1. Subjects cannot disband the commonwealth and enter into a new covenant without the permission of the sovereign.
2. There can be no breach of covenant by the sovereign and therefore also no forfeiture of the sovereign power because of the sovereign's actions, no matter how reprehensible.
3. A sovereign chosen through the will of the majority in an assembly has a right to the allegiance of those members in the minority.
4. A sovereign cannot be accused of injustice by subjects, nor punished, nor put to death.
5. A sovereign is entitled to use those means necessary to the peace and defense of the commonwealth―including the power to:
a. Control what opinions or doctrines may be spoken or printed;
b. Prescribe the rules by which subjects are able to acquire and own property of any kind;
c. Hear and decide all controversies regarding the law;
d. Make either war or peace with other nations;
e. Raise and command armed forces;
f. Levy taxes;
g. Choose all counsellors, ministers, magistrates, and officers;
h. Determine and mete out any rewards or punishments to be conferred on subjects.
In laying out the rights of the sovereign in the Leviathan, Hobbes wants to insure the possession of sufficient centralized power so that there will be no resumption of the state of war. These rights grant extensive, lasting, indivisible powers to the sovereign. See the list of rights listed above.
The sovereign cannot breach the covenant, because the sovereign only accepts the power offered by the subjects and is not a party to the covenant itself; hence, in effect, the sovereign is "above" the laws. Moreover, since the sovereign cannot break the covenant, subjects cannot accuse the sovereign of injustice. Indeed, Hobbes goes so far as to insist that the subjects are the real authors of whatever the sovereign does:
. . . because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth anything
by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth: and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign, complaineth of that
whereof he himself is author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself; no nor himself of injury, because to do injury to one's self, is impossible. It is true that they that have sovereign power may commit iniquity, but not injustice, in the proper signification.4
Allegiance to the Sovereign
Just as subjects authorize all that the sovereign does, they also are bound by any assembly vote conferring the sovereign power, regardless of the way they voted themselves―for, according to Hobbes, their participating in the assembly itself signifies their agreement to abide by the will of the majority. From all this, it is clear that Hobbes wants to establish a commonwealth where (1) subjects cannot disavow their allegiance to the sovereign (except under two conditions to be mentioned later); and (2) the sovereign holds enormous power―including control over declarations of war, treaties of peace, foreign policy, legislation, judicial decisions, the armed forces, taxation, appointment of officials, spoken or printed opinions and doctrines, rules for acquisition and ownership of property, and distribution of honors, rewards, or punishments.
Hobbes' reluctance (refusal may be the better word) to allow grounds for disavowal of allegiance to the sovereign is evident in circumstances other than those already mentioned. For example, persons may enter into a covenant, and owe allegiance to the sovereign, simply by their silence, or their refusal to resist the imposition of sovereignty. Thus, there need not be an explicit agreement to become a subject. Similarly, children become subjects of the commonwealth without any opportunity in life to choose whether or not they want to be subjects of that sovereign. Furthermore, conquered peoples who accept a sovereign simply in order to save their lives cannot later claim (1) that they acted out of overwhelming fear and (2) that they thus may disavow their allegiance at an appropriate time―for, as far as Hobbes is concerned, fear is the ultimate motivation for entering into a commonwealth, regardless whether it originates through common agreement or conquest.
No doubt many of us would be wary of the extensive powers of sovereignty and the rigid, irreversible conditions of allegiance that Hobbes lays out. We might well envision the subjects of the commonwealth living in abject misery. We should remember, however, that Hobbes wants to establish a civil government strong enough to prevent a state of war, which is the worst form of misery. Any diminution in the powers of sovereignty or the conditions of allegiance, he thinks, leads sooner or later to a state of war. Hobbes also thinks that the interests of the sovereign and the best interests of the commonwealth as a whole coincide so that subjects need not fear a life of misery due to the powers of sovereignty. The strength and prosperity of the sovereign is not well-served by subjects living in abject misery. And Hobbes specifies ways by which the sovereign can advance the interests of subjects, for example, by making sure that justice is administered equally to all people regardless of their social or economic position.5 Finally, apart from the rights of the sovereign, there are also the liberties of subjects.
Liberties of Subjects
In general terms, the liberties of subjects rest upon the right of selfpreservation and the silence of the law. A list of these liberties appears below. The right of self-preservation is simply the right of nature mentioned earlier. While we can give up some liberties present in the state of nature when we enter into a commonwealth, we cannot surrender the right to preserve ourselves because, according to Hobbes, self-preservation is the basic reason for entering into a commonwealth.
Hobbes' Commonwealth and the Liberties of Subjects6
1. Subjects are at liberty to do whatever is not required or forbidden by the laws.
2. Subjects cannot be commanded to kill, main or wound themselves.
3. Subjects can resist, regardless of the reason, any attempt by the sovereign to kill them.
4. Subjects cannot be commanded to confess to a crime or accuse themselves.
5. Subjects may refuse to obey a command to kill someone else, unless the refusal frustrates the purposes for which sovereignty is established.
6. In time of war, a subject may send someone else willing to serve in the armed forces as a way of discharging duties for the defense of the commonwealth.
7. Subjects may end their allegiance if the sovereign is no longer willing or able to protect them.
8. Subjects may sue the sovereign, if the sovereign violates laws already established.
Most of the liberties of subjects listed above follow from this right of self-preservation. For example, if the sovereign no longer protects us, that is, no longer contributes to our self-preservation, then we can forgo further allegiance. Hobbes is absolutely consistent on this point. Even in an extreme case, for example, where a subject has committed murder and the sovereign takes steps to punish the person, there is no obligation to accept, without resistance, a sentence of death and a subject may take whatever steps are necessary to assure self-preservation.
The right to sue the sovereign at first seems inconsistent with the assertion earlier that the sovereign is not party to the covenant and is therefore above the law. Hobbes distinguishes, however, between acts of sovereign power that are "above" the law and acts not in accord with laws established already by the sovereign. For example, if the sovereign establishes a law requiring payment of debts but then refuses to pay a debt, the subject, by suing, is not really acting contrary to the will of the sovereign because the sovereign established the law about paying debts.7
As we have seen, Hobbes does not want to weaken the commonwealth by allowing subjects to disavow their allegiance to the sovereign. In fact, there are just two conditions which justify such disavowal: (1) the sovereign directly attacks your life; or (2) the sovereign is unwilling or unable to protect you. Only direct threats to your self-preservation, in effect, absolve you of allegiance. In other cases, no matter how ill seems to be your treatment at the sovereign's hands, you maintain your allegiance.
Warning about Measures that Weaken Sovereign Power
Hobbes' goal is always the maintenance of absolute sovereign power to prevent the dissolution of the commonwealth and a consequent state of war. With this goal in view, Hobbes also warns against various measures that "weaken, or tend to the dissolution of, the commonwealth."8 The major such measures include:
1) The sovereign settling for less than absolute power;
2) Granting subjects the right to judge for themselves what are right or wrong actions;
3) Allowing subjects the right to refuse participation in actions they judge as being contrary to their conscience;
4) Allowing subjects the right to claim that their judgments occur through divine inspiration;
5) Requiring that sovereign power be subject to the civil laws;
6) Granting subjects the right to acquire and own property independent of the rules of acquisition and ownership laid down by the sovereign; and
7) Dividing the sovereign power, for example, by establishing separate and equal branches of government.
There are more minor, but still dangerous, threats to the commonwealth as well:
1) Lack of money to finance actions of the sovereign;
2) Concentrations of wealth in persons or groups other than the sovereign;
3) A rise in the popularity of certain subjects who also happen to be powerful, untrustworthy, ambitious persons;
4) Concentration of wealth and power in particular units of government (counties, cities, etc.) or corporations;
5) "Pretenders of political prudence" who constantly dispute against the sovereign power; and
6) Wounds and disunity engendered by an insatiable appetite to expand dominions through conquest.
Basically, Hobbes argues that competing centers of power and the right of private opinion on public issues interfere with the sovereign's ability to carry out those actions necessary for the peace and protection of the commonwealth.
Preference for Monarchy
Hobbes' preference for monarchy (or a dictatorship) as a form of government is probably clear from what has been already stated. If the sovereign power resides in an aristocracy, where a small group rules, or in a democracy, where the many rule, the measures and threats tending toward the dissolution of the commonwealth, which were just mentioned, are likely to arise. Moreover, Hobbes thinks that any vices attributable to monarchy are simply multiplied in the other forms of government. If one person is subject to flattery or persuasion, is not an assembly of persons that much more subject? Will an assembly not be more irresolute than a single person? Will an assembly not be more likely to disagree within itself because of envy or conflicting interests than a monarch? Will an assembly not be less wise and less selective in choosing counsellors than a monarch? Finally, Hobbes argues that private. interest and the public interest are most likely to coincide in a monarchy. A monarch personally has everything to gain through actions conducive to the welfare of the commonwealth as a whole. In other forms of government, however, some corrupt, ambitious individuals holding political power are more likely to benefit personally from actions contrary to the common welfare such as treachery.9
Hobbes' political philosophy follows from his account of human nature; and it is no less controversial. Consequently, attempts to refute his position are not unusual. As we might expect, Jean Jacques Rousseau, who differed fundamentally from Hobbes with respect to human nature, offers a different view of civil society.
Rousseau
Biographical Sketch
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712 - 1778 C.E.), a Swiss-French philosopher, was born in Geneva, Switzerland, the son of a watchmaker. He was a largely self-educated person who led a somewhat irregular, semi-nomadic life that included: (1) a brutal apprenticeship from which he ran away at age 16, (2) service as a footman in a powerful family, (3) support through the patronage of various wealthy or powerful persons, (4) a common law marriage with a servant girl that produced five children (all of whom were placed in orphanages), (5) association with the leading intellectual circles in Paris, (6) flights to avoid persecution for his political views, and (7) continual fallings-out with friends and associates.
In 1742, Rousseau set off for Paris wanting to make his mark as a composer, planning to introduce a new system of musical notation. He never achieved great success in music. Nevertheless, he became famous and controversial with his prizewinning essay on the question, "Has the progress of the sciences and arts contributed to the corruption or to the improvement of human conduct?" Rousseau took the stand that civilization has corrupted human nature, which is basically good. At the heart of the corruption are inequalities and artificiality that civilization produces.
Rousseau has been quite influential through his political thought, his social criticism, and his views on education. In addition to his political works (the most famous being The Social Contract), his major works include a novel (Julie, or The New Heloise), a work on education (Emile), and an autobiographical work (The Confessions).
Rejection of Hobbes' Commonwealth
From the perspective of Rousseau, Hobbes' commonwealth turns subjects into slaves, "the human species is divided into so many herds of cattle, each with its ruler, who keeps guard over them for the purpose of devour them."10 According to Rousseau, all human beings are born free and equal; these are natural rights that cannot be alienated. Hence civil society can be based on neither slavery nor the right of the strongest. Greater power may well force people to obey; but it never turns "strength into right, and obedience into duty,"11 and it is binding only until an even greater force overcomes it. Because no obligation is involved, in effect, no "right" of the strongest exists.
As for slavery, Rousseau says,
To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man's nature; to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his acts. Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience. Is it not clear that we can be under no obligation to a person from whom we have the right to exact everything? Does not this condition alone, in the absence of equivalence or exchange, in itself involve the nullity of the act? For what right can my slave have against me, when all that he has belongs to me, and, his right being mine, this right of mine against myself is a phrase devoid of meaning?12
The Social Contract and The General Will
Since neither slavery nor the right of the strongest provide sufficient grounds for civil society, its foundation must be some initial agreement, or social contract. Moreover, this social contract must be such that it preserves every person's natural, unalienable right to be free and equal. While the character of this freedom and equality may alter as human beings move from a state of nature to a civil society, the basic rights remain.
In the concept of the common interest, Rousseau locates the social bond that makes civil society possible. In so far as persons recognize and agree to serve the common interest, they gain the benefits of social union―such as greater strength, more security, and a better life―without sacrificing freedom and equality. The common interest is determined by the general will, that is, the collective judgment of all the citizens acting as a single people. In The Social Contract, Rousseau describes the social union this way,
If, then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms:
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole."
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons, formerly took the name of "city," and now takes the name of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive, Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign ;power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the state. . . .13
Acts of sovereignty are always expressions of the general will. In entering into the social contract, the citizens retain their freedom and equality because acts of sovereignty are genuine expressions of their will and because they are equal with everyone else:
. . . Thus, from the very nature of the compact, every act of Sovereignty, i.e., every authentic act of the general will, binds or favours all the citizens equally; so that the Sovereign recognizes only the body of the nation, and draws no distinction between those of whom it is made up. What, then strictly speaking, is an act of sovereignty? It is not a convention between a superior and an inferior; but a convention between the body and each of its members. It is legitimate, because based on the social contract, and equitable, because common to all; useful and stable, because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power. So long as the subjects have to submit only to conventions of this sort, they obey no one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective rights of the Sovereign and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what point the latter can enter into undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with each.14
Freedom and The General Will
In entering into the social contract and departing from the state of nature, citizens surrender their natural freedom, that is, their unlimited right to do whatever they want and to take whatever they can get, in exchange for civil and moral freedom. Civil freedom includes the right to express oneself through the general will and the right to own property legitimately according to a juridical title. Moral freedom consists in acting according to self-imposed law, namely, the general will. In addition, Rousseau presumes that we retain a natural freedom to do what we want in private matters unrelated to the common interest, although he insists that the sovereign, or the general will, is the sole judge of what the common interest includes. Thus, while the character of our freedom changes when we enter civil society―from natural freedom to civil freedom, moral freedom, and a much more limited variation of natural freedom―we still retain freedom itself at the same time that we gain the benefits that social union makes possible.
The general will, quite clearly, is a fundamental element in Rousseau's position; it is the essential link between the common interest and freedom as well as equality that makes the social contract possible. Hence we need to know (1) the way the general will functions, (2) how far it extends, and (3) the ways of protecting it from corruption.
A body politic asserts the general will when all the people in sovereign assembly vote to determine the common interest on general policy matters relevant to the direction of the state. The voting process itself, according to Rousseau, cancels out individuals' competing, private interests so that only the common interest remains. For example, any selfish voting on the part of the wealthy to protect their own interests is cancelled out by selfish voting on the part of the poor to protect their interests. The majority's decision is not only binding on the minority but also it is an expression of the minority's will. Rousseau says,
. . . the vote of the majority always binds all the rest. This follows from the contract itself. But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. How are the opponents at once free and subject to laws they have not agreed to?
I retort that the question is wrongly put. The citizen gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his opposition, and even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them. The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free. When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so. If my particular opinion had carried the day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will; and it is in that case that I should not have been free [emphasis added].15
Accordingly if, as a member of the minority, I refuse to abide by the general will, then it is necessary that I be "forced to be free." In other words, steps should be taken to force me to conform to the general will; and these steps, far from taking away my freedom, serve rather to guarantee it. In arguing this way, Rousseau makes a fundamental addition to the understanding of what "freedom" means. While we ordinarily associate "freedom" with the "absence of interference from others," Rousseau asserts that it means, in addition, "the ability to do what we want provided that we know what we really want." Thus the expression of freedom sometimes requires opportune conditions, forced upon us by others, so that we do what we really want.
As for the scope of the general will, it does have limits. First, while all citizens must abide by the general will, persons cannot be forced to enter into the social contract itself and thereby become subjects to the sovereign authority as expressed through the general will. Rousseau adds, however, that once the state is established, continued residency within its jurisdiction signifies a willingness to accept sovereign authority. Secondly, while the majority vote in the assembly determines the general will, Rousseau suggests that the size of the majority required should approach closer to unanimity for at least the more serious, more important matters (so long as no immediate, pressing decision is necessary). Finally, the general will should establish laws of a general nature but should not deal with particular actions or particular individuals. According to Rousseau,
. . . the Law may indeed decree that there shall be privileges, but cannot confer them on anybody by name. It may set up several classes of citizens, and even lay down the qualifications for memberships of these classes, but it cannot nominate such and such persons as belonging to them; it may establish a monarchical government and hereditary succession, but it cannot choose a king, or nominate a royal family. In a word, no function which has a particular object belongs to the legislative power.16
This insistence upon confinement of the general will to the general rather than the particular leads to an important distinction by Rousseau between sovereignty and government such that government administers what the sovereign legislates.
Distinction Between Sovereignty and Government
The people as a whole, expressing their sovereignty through the general will, establish the laws; however they turn over the administration of these laws to the government. The government, consisting of those persons legitimately empowered by the people to rule (that is, "magistrates"), has a duty to serve the general will by properly executing the policies established by law; moreover, the people, as sovereign, always retain the right to dissolve or reform the government at any time.17
Whether the government is a monarchy, aristocracy, or a democracy depends upon the people's will. The most suitable form of government varies with different conditions. Nevertheless Rousseau prefers an elective aristocracy, in which the people elect the best, most qualified persons to run the government. Note that the people can appoint or elect individuals to run the government, although they cannot transfer the right of sovereignty to representatives. Ideally, Rousseau envisions this process: (a) The people acting as sovereign establish the laws for the government to administer and the rules for forming the government; (b) the people then transform themselves into citizens of a democracy in order to elect magistrates; (c) transformation into an elective aristocracy occurs when these legitimately empowered magistrates take over the reins of government; (d) yet the people as sovereign always retain the right to disband and reform the government or even dissolve the social contract.
Preservation of The General Will and Sovereignty
Now that the nature, function, and scope of the general will is clear, we can turn to the problem of its protection. Rousseau deals with two particular threats, namely, a possible inability to ascertain what the general will is and the possible usurpation of power by government. Given the proper conditions, the general will can be ascertained simply by taking a vote of the people in an assembly. Rousseau trusts the independent judgment of common people, uncorrupted by artificial inequalities created within society. Thus he says,
As long as several men in assembly regard themselves as a single body, they have only a single will which is concerned with their common preservation and general well-being. In this case, all the springs of the State are vigorous and simple and its rules clear and luminous; there are no embroilments or conflicts of interests; the common good is everywhere clearly apparent, and only good sense is needed to perceive it. Peace, unity, and equality are the enemies of political subtleties. Men who are upright and simple are difficult to deceive because of their simplicity; lures and ingenious pretexts fail to impose upon them, and they are not even subtle enough to be dupes. When, among the happiest people in the world, bands of peasants are seen regulating affairs of State under an oak, and always acting wisely, can we help scorning the ingenious methods of other nations, which make themselves illustrious and wretched with so much art and mystery?
A State so governed needs very few laws; and, as it becomes necessary to issue new ones, the necessity is universally seen.. The first man to propose them merely say what all have already felt, there is no question of factions or intrigues or eloquence in order to secure the passage into law of what every one has already decided to do, as soon as he is sure that the rest will act with him.
Theorists are led into error because, seeing only States that have been from the beginning wrongly constituted, they are struck by the impossibility of applying such a policy to them.18
However problems may arise. First, if, instead of exercising independent judgment in searching out the common interest, the citizens break up into factions or special interest groups competing for power, then a genuine expression of the general will may not result from the assembly vote. According to Rousseau, a great deal of dissension and debate in the assembly is a likely sign that special interests are taking precedence before the general will. Consequently, the rise of factions should be avoided. Secondly, the general will may be frustrated if the people, no matter how wellintentioned, make judgments without adequate information. Thus, a society is fortunate if it has a small number of lawgivers―that is, persons who exhibit "greatness of soul" rather than ambitious demagoguery―who guide the public enlightenment of the people properly. The lawgiver formulates laws and guides the citizens to an understanding of their own will; but the citizens themselves vote to determine the general will. Thirdly, a problem arises when the state becomes so large that the people cannot perceive, or associate with, the common interest and cannot easily meet in public assemblies. Accordingly, Rousseau prefers smaller states. (In the contemporary world, the availability of newspapers, radio, and television may alleviate this problem to some degree.)
If members of government fail in their duty to carry out the general will and instead usurp the sovereign power for themselves, then they thereby dissolve the social contract and no longer have any right to the obedience of the citizens. The best protection against such usurpation, according to Rousseau, consists in increasing the frequency of public assemblies as the power of government grows. Moreover, the citizens must retain an active interest in public affairs. If the desire for wealth and affluence supplants dedication to public service and citizens "prefer to serve with their purses rather than their persons," if love of country declines, and if the pursuit of private interests dominates the citizens' concerns, then the result will be a weakening of the sovereign power. For Rousseau, government should serve the people; but the people must be sure that they do not, by default, transfer to government the responsibilities of sovereignty. Such a transfer would be inimical to the expression of the general will, contrary to the duties of citizenship, and incompatible with the preservation of freedom and equality.
"Man is born free and is everywhere in chains." This is the tragedy and injustice Rousseau set out to rectify in The Social Contract. His success or failure turns upon three fundamental claims: (1) government is the people's servant, not master; (2) genuine sovereignty resides in the expression of the general will; and (3) the expression of the general will preserves every citizen's freedom and equality. This notion of the general will may disturb many of us. If we cast it aside however, we still need to deal with the question whether the demands of social union are compatible or incompatible with the requirements of freedom and equality.
Hobbes and Rousseau: A Comparison
Both Hobbes and Rousseau grant about the same powers of sovereignty. For example, of the seven major measures that tend to weaken the commonwealth according to Hobbes, the first six would equally well be threats to the power of sovereignty as conceived by Rousseau. There exists however a fundamental difference between them on the issue of sovereignty. Whereas Rousseau separates the sovereign from the government, Hobbes does not. Rousseau insists that sovereignty always resides with the people as a whole and government is only legitimate, that is, only exerts power legitimately, to the extent that it is the agent of the people as they express themselves through the general will. Hobbes, on the other hand, associates sovereignty with government itself and wants to make government as centralized and powerful as possible.
Underlying this basic difference is Rousseau's insistence that civil society must be based upon preservation of everyone's freedom and equality in contrast with Hobbes' insistence that civil society must be based upon power and fear. On an even deeper level, their opposition results from differing conceptions of human nature: Rousseau's basic trust in human beings and his desire for their possessing freedom of expression in contrast with Hobbes' declaration that human beings are so aggressive and power-seeking that an overwhelming power must exist to keep them in check, if we want to live in peace. For Hobbes, avoiding a state of civil war, the worst possible catastrophe, is always the foremost goal; for Rousseau, the preservation of human freedom and equality, without which we cannot maintain our humanity, is the foremost goal. As we might expect then, there is considerable difference between them as to what subjects should be willing to "put up with" from their government. We can also see why European heads of state shuddered at the thought of The Social Contract.
Rousseau would reject the coercive element associated with Hobbes' view of the social contract. Hobbes stresses the point that subjects enter into the commonwealth out of a sense of fear, so much so that it makes no difference in our obligations to the sovereign whether we entered through a voluntary assembly or through the fact of being conquered. Rousseau, on the other hand, asserts that our obedience to a conqueror should last only until the time we can escape from or overcome the usurper's power. Moreover, Rousseau thinks that, in entering the social contract from a state of nature, we exchange elements of natural freedom for civil and moral freedom; and we cannot assign this worthwhile exchange simply to the motivation of fear.
Another difference arises with respect to self-preservation. In Hobbes' view, we can never surrender the right of self-preservation in civil society because it is the basic reason for our entering into civil society in the first place. Accordingly, we have a right to defend ourselves if the sovereign attacks us, even if we had committed murder; we also have the right to meet our obligations to the common defense in wartime by sending a substitute who is willing to fight for us. Rousseau however does not grant so inclusive a right to self-preservation. If we are willing to let others die to defend us, then we must also sometimes be willing to die to defend others; and if we accept a law requiring the death penalty for murderers as a way of protecting ourselves from being murdered, then we should also consent to die should we ourselves become murderers.
From Rousseau's standpoint, Hobbes' commonwealth establishes a state of slavery for subjects, a state unfit for human beings. Instead of government serving the people, the rulers will sacrifice the people for the sake of their private interests. Hobbes, on the other hand, would regard Rousseau's social contract as a delusionary vision. To entrust sovereignty to the people as a whole and to expect them to recognize and abide by the common interest―hoping thereby to attain a life of peace, harmony, and well-being for all―passes beyond the bounds of reasonableness. Instead of a society functioning according to the general will, we would end up with chaos and civil war.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(1) The Myth of the Social Contract
Both Hobbes and Rousseau attribute the origin of civil society to voluntary agreements entered into by its members. Unfortunately, this voluntary agreement is a misleading myth. Habit, convenience, social training, economic status, and social circumstance have far more to do with the explanation why persons accept authority in a society than any alleged voluntariness. While the more heroic members of the populace may exhibit voluntariness, the overwhelming majority will resign themselves to accept a particular form of authority rather than choose it. Faced with perceived dissatisfaction or injustice, the overwhelming majority lack both the resources and the resourcefulness to move elsewhere. Even when some new form of government is instituted, the average person has little to choose with respect to its makeup.
In some very abstract sense, of course, everyone makes some choice and even resignation is a choice of sorts. But to associate such minimal choices with the voluntary agreements that supposedly establish civil society, as Hobbes and Rousseau maintain, distorts the meaning of "voluntariness" and distracts attention from the socio-economic conditions that produce dissatisfaction and injustice. Instead of focusing on a mythical "social contract" as a way of guaranteeing rights, we should change the underlying conditions that produce misery.
A Possible Reply: Whether or not voluntary entrance into a social contract is a specific, noteworthy historical event in the life-history of a nation is not a crucial issue. What is most important is the granting of natural, unalienable rights to every individual and the forming of a civil society in accord with those rights. A civil society so constituted assures both satisfaction and justice to its members; hence it has the implied consent of its members even without the specific act of entering into the social contract voluntarily. While this specific act may indeed he desirable as a clear signification of the social bond, it is not necessary.
The social contract is neither mythical nor misleading nor meaningless. It signifies that civil society is in accordance with the natural rights of individuals and thus that the society has an organizational structure worthy of voluntary allegiance and consent.
(2) Hobbes and the Abuse of Power
Those who heed Lord Acton's dictum, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely," will remain unimpressed by Hobbes' assurance that subjects have nothing to fear from the absolute power of a monarch, because of the realization that the greater strength and well-being of subjects furthers the monarch's own private interests. The absolute power of dictators has a way of corrupting even the best of intentions and of creating misery for subjects. For precisely these reasons, subjects demand some check on the accumulation of power by any one governmental official.
Hobbes wants absolute, centralized power in the state so that the subjects may be protected from their own aggressiveness; the subjects however want protection from a dictator so that they may be protected from abuse of power. The real solution to the problem consists in instituting a system of checks and balances whereby government has sufficient force to control any aggressiveness at the same time that power is sufficiently diffused to prevent any particular governmental official from accumulating enough personal power to abuse subjects. Hobbes thinks that the diffusion of power merely produces a tendency toward chaos and the pursuit of private interests by governmental officials. When a system of checks and balances works properly however, the tendency to pursue private interests instead of' the common interest by one official is checked by the power of other officials. The system may be less orderly than Hobbes would like. But at least subjects do not suffer under the unchecked aberrations of a dictator.
A Possible Reply: The greatest threat to a society is not the "aberrations of a dictator" but rather the disintegration of the state itself into a condition of war. Subjects can endure the temporary abuses of a single dictator better than they can survive and enjoy war. If a particular monarch fails to see the identity between private interest and well-being of the commonwealth as a whole, we have no sound reason to think that successors to the sovereign power will be similarly blind. Rather than taking steps likely to plunge people into a state of war, subjects should take their chances even with a cruel dictator, with the hope that they can expect more enlightenment in a successor.
(3) Rousseau's Framework for Totalitarianism
Despite Rousseau's declarations in favor of human freedom and equality, he lays out a system that easily lends itself to totalitarianism. His concept of the "general will" is the tool that makes totalitarianism possible. The general will makes possible the suppression of minorities under the guise of "forcing them to be free." Yet the general will is not always identical even with the will of the majority. According to Rousseau, if private interests predominate, then the vote of the majority may not be truly an expression of the general will. Rousseau also asserts that "[the public] must be taught to know what it wills."19 And if all this is not enough, Rousseau refers to crises where "the general will is quite clear" and "a supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority,"20 should be appointed. We can easily imagine how an aspiring dictator or totalitarian group could use these notions to destroy the people's freedom and equality. The basis for suppressing minorities, for rejecting the will of the majority, for controlling what people think, and for usurping power under the guise of a "crisis" is readily at hand.
To be sure, Rousseau does not desire a totalitarian state. He genuinely believes that the imposition of the general will upon unwilling minorities leads them to do what they "really" want; he genuinely hopes that the vote of the majority coincides with the general will; he genuinely demands a lawgiver who "enlightens" the people without possessing legislative or executive power; and he insists upon the "temporary" nature of any suspension of sovereign authority. Unfortunately, Rousseau fails to take account of the real world. Totalitarian governments are very adept at extending the period of a crisis; they insist upon retaining for themselves, with their considerable power, the task of "enlightening the public;" they find excuses for denying the will of the majority; and they offer self-serving interpretations of what the people "really" want.
A Possible Reply: Any ambiguities that may arise with respect to determining the general will should not sustain for any length of time the legitimacy of a totalitarian government. The usurping of the people's sovereignty cannot be hidden for long. And as soon as the usurpation is evident, the government is no longer entitled to the obedience of subjects. Far from establishing a framework for totalitarianism, Rousseau shows instead why totalitarian governments have no legitimacy.
Civil society only makes sense if it is organized to serve the common interest. A "society" organized to serve private interests is not really a civil society at all. The concept of the "general will" provides a means of stating what the common interest is. Rousseau is well aware that, in practice, the common interest is served, or the general will is expressed, in varying degrees. In addition to analyzing the nature of civil society, Rousseau issues a warning: Civil society tends toward disintegration as the common interest is less well-served. Hence, the general will is not some occult notion appealing to mystics; rather, it is a practical way of grasping what holds a healthy, civil society together.
(4) Rousseau's Romanticism
Rousseau's vision of a society where simple, straightforward people are "difficult to deceive because of their very simplicity," where peasants always act wisely, where few laws are necessary, and where the need for a new law is readily obvious to all has little to do with the real world. The overwhelming majority of people lack the ability, wisdom, and dedication to assert sovereign authority responsibly in the assemblies Rousseau envisions. Factions, pursuit of private interests, dissension, excessive debate in assemblies, the tendencies of well-intentioned but poorly-informed people, and the large size of states―all dangers admitted to by Rousseau himself cannot he avoided for any extended period of time. Although Rousseau's romantic vision may well please us, we should also recognize its impracticality.
Rousseau's contention that charges of impracticality are attributable to "glib theorizers" who only look at badly constituted states is very weak. We have only to look at Rousseau's own catalog of dangers (mentioned above) to realize that the real world, not the misperceptions of glib theorizers, establishes the impracticality of his vision of the state.
A Possible Reply: To focus upon impracticality as this objection does, a person must lose sight of the basic issue of the social contract. Rousseau wants to show that the social contract is only legitimate if it accomplishes a necessary objective, namely, the preservation of human freedom and equality through expression of the general will. No other alternative is available. Hence, while a list of practical dangers can warn us about what to avoid in order to preserve the social contract, it cannot establish the impracticality of Rousseau's conception of sovereignty, because the admission of impracticality is a denial of the possibility of civil society. In other words, regardless of' practical difficulties, we should strive to accomplish what Rousseau advocates because his position is the only one that establishes legitimate grounds for a civil society.
Thought Excursions
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Censorship
. . . it is annexed to sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions and doctrines we are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published. For the actions of men proceed from their opinions; and in the wellgoverning of opinions consisteth the wellgoverning of men's actions, in order to their peace and concord.
Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. XVIII
. . . censorship may be of utility in preserving morality, but it can never restore it. Censors should be appointed while the laws are in their vigour; for when they have fallen into decay, all is over; nothing justifiable can have force when the laws have lost it.
The business of censorship is to preserve morality by preventing the opinions of men from being corrupted, to maintain their integrity by judicious aids, and sometimes even to fix opinions when they waver. . . .
Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. IV, Ch.VII
Problem: In the United States today, some groups actively advocate censorship of what is taught in schools or available in libraries or shown on TV. Readings and discussions on topics such as nonreligious values, anti-Americanism, communism, sex roles, homosexuality, same-sex marriage, sex education, obscenity, pornography, sexual behavior, racism, and the contemporary family are prime targets for these groups. They want censorship to avoid what they see as a decline in the nation's morality, particularly with respect to the corruption of young people. To what extent, if any, would Hobbes and Rousseau support their efforts?
The passages quoted above show that neither Hobbes nor Rousseau opposes censorship as a matter of principle. Each thinks that censorship serves an important function within society. Each would probably also grant the importance to society of the topics mentioned.
There are however other matters in need of discussion.
In Hobbes' case, the sovereign is the ultimate judge of what should be censored. Thus, although these groups may present their case for censorship to the sovereign or a designated representative, they are obligated to abide by the sovereign's decision. Accordingly, in the case of a decision against censorship, they must cease their activities rather than holding rallies, harassing officials, or taking political power into their own hands. They cannot appeal to an alleged higher authority such as conscience or God. Note also that the standard of judgment in censorship cases, for Hobbes, is the preservation of peace. As a result, matters requiring the censoring judgment of the sovereign arise only to the extent that they threaten the peace of the commonwealth. Hence some issues that bother groups in the United States today may not warrant action by the sovereign because they pose no threat to peace.
Regarding the possibility that the sovereign's censoring power may prevent true doctrines from being known, Hobbes takes the position that preserving peace and promoting true doctrines are so compatible that a sovereign has nothing to gain from censoring what is true. Even if, through poor governance, censorship leads to acceptance of false doctrines, subjects are still better off with false doctrines than with rapid promotion of new truths that upset the peace and challenge the sovereign's authority.
In Rousseau's case, any censorship must express the judgment of the people. Accordingly, public officials exceed their authority if they censor at their own personal discretion; and factions have no right to impose their group's beliefs on a whole society, no matter how convinced they are of the rightness of their views. In cases where groups in the United States advocate censorship then, Rousseau would first want to determine whether they express the people's judgment or the judgment of some faction. Although these groups may well be very active and effective in promoting their views, they do not necessarily express the people's judgment.
Also Rousseau would want to determine whether any proposed censorship will be a preventive, or corrective, measure. He has no confidence in the effectiveness of censorship as a corrective measure once the level or morality has declined. New laws will not restore morality when respect for the old laws is lacking. For Rousseau, respect for law, a sense of public spiritedness, and a high moral tone are precious commodities in a society that, once squandered away, cannot be replaced or restored through strict enforcement of more laws. Thus, to the extent that groups advocating censorship see their efforts as a restoration of a lost morality, they will not find much comfort in Rousseau's position on censorship.
Neither Hobbes nor Rousseau places any limit upon what subject matter may be censored. Neither recognizes an unalienable right to free speech or a free press. On the other hand, each wants to avoid censorship based upon caprice or prejudice, Hobbes by using the preservation of peace as the overriding standard of judgment and Rousseau by using the people's will. On the whole, groups advocating censorship in the United States today can take some comfort in the fact that both Hobbes and Rousseau advocated censorship; but they cannot presume that Hobbes and Rousseau agree with their views of what should be censored.
Further Thought: Of the topics listed earlier as prime targets for censorship, which do you think that Hobbes or Rousseau would include as likely candidates for censorship? Which do you think they would exclude?
Do you find Hobbes' and Rousseau's justifications for censorship convincing? Do they have adequate ways of assuring that censorship does not go too far? Would you personally find their positions on censorship threatening? Under what conditions, if any, would you advocate censorship in society?
Given Rousseau's view that censorship cannot restore morality and generalizing the point he makes on this issue, do you think that Rousseau would support a "law and order" approach as a way of restoring traditional values in your nation today? Why should you answer, "No"? If Rousseau is correct, what alternatives are open to people in a society: Should they accept inevitable decline? Reorganize the society with a new social contract? Eliminate the social conditions which corrupted the people's public spiritedness?
6.20 What is the "right of nature," according to Hobbes? Do think that human beings really possess such a right?
6.21 Consider the rights of the sovereign in Hobbes' commonwealth. How does Hobbes guarantee that persons cannot justify casting off their allegiance to the sovereign, except for extreme circumstances? Why does Hobbes think that his view of sovereignty will avoid a state of war? Do you agree with him?
6.211 Evaluate the statement, "I would rather live in a state of war than he a subject in Hobbes' commonwealth."
6.212 Consider the liberties of subjects in Hobbes' commonwealth. How is the right of nature relevant to establishing many of these liberties? Would you be satisfied to live in a commonwealth with these liberties'?
6.213 Hobbes admits the possibility of suing the sovereign even though the sovereign is not a party to the covenant and is supposedly "above" the law? How sound is his reasoning? Do you think that a subject's suit would get a fair hearing when it is the sovereign who appoints the judges? Do citizens with a complaint against government agencies or officials get a fair hearing in contemporary society?
6.22 Consider the conditions under which one can disavow allegiance to the sovereign, according to Hobbes. Are these conditions too broad? Too narrow? If the conditions are too narrow, what additional ones would you add'?
6.23 Reread the accounts of dangers which threaten the strength and survival of the commonwealth, according to Hobbes. Then evaluate the following refutation of his position: Governments such as those in Great Britain and the United States have existed for centuries with many of the debilitating threats Hobbes warns against. Yet the governments have survived. If Hobbes' position were correct, then these governments could not have survived the lessening of the sovereign's power that Hobbes fears. Hence their continued survival refutes Hobbes' claim that the sovereign must possess absolute power for the commonwealth to exist.
If you think that this refutation makes sense, then consider what mistakes Hobbes makes in working out his position. For example, is his account of human nature at fault? Or is a system of checks and balances more effective in controlling human aggressiveness and the thirst for power than Hobbes admits? Are there other possibilities?
6.231 Evaluate Hobbes' preference for monarchy over aristocracy or democracy. Consider the reasons for his preference and then consider their adequacy.
6.232 Suppose someone argues that the internal state of peace in Hobbes' commonwealth will he meaningless because the sovereign will continually embroil the nation in wars. Wars with other nations will always he an attractive alternative because they tend to distract subjects from the misery they suffer due to the excessive power of the sovereign. Moreover, a sovereign assured of unchecked, absolute power within the commonwealth will he all the more likely to satisfy a personal, restless urge to acquire even more power through foreign conquests. Hence Hobbes' fundamental goal in establishing the commonwealth, namely, a state of peace, will not be achieved. Subjects who do not die fighting in these foreign wars will spend their lives supporting those who do; and the condition of subjects will not be much different from what their lives would he like in the state of nature―except that they have the additional burden of owing allegiance to a despotic, and probably despicable, sovereign.
6.24 According to Rousseau, civil society must he based upon a "social contract" because neither the right of the stronger nor slavery can justify it. Consider how he shows this. Are there alternatives, besides these three, that might justify civil society'? If so, what are they? Evaluate Rousseau's position on this issue.
6.241 Rousseau asserts that no "right of the strongest" exists and hence that "might does not make right." Explain his reasoning. What is the difference between obedience as a matter of "duty" and obedience as a matter of "power." Explain the difference theoretically and practically. Do you agree with Rousseau here?
Suppose someone argues that white Americans were justified in taking land away from the Native Americans Indians by conquest because the various tribes had themselves acquired the land previously by conquest. What do you think that Rousseau would say about this argument?
6.242 Restate carefully each point Rousseau makes in rejecting slavery. Rousseau thinks that Hobbes' commonwealth turns subjects into slaves. How could he draw this conclusion based on his reasons for rejecting slavery? Evaluate his rejection of slavery.
6.25 According to Rousseau, human beings possess natural, unalienable rights to freedom and equality and thus no civil society can take these rights away. Consider how Rousseau proposes to establish a civil society that retains these rights for everyone. The following terms should he useful in your explanation: social contract, common interest, general will, sovereignty, the people as a whole, and government. What are the strongest and weakest points in Rousseau's position regarding the preservation of freedom and equality in civil society''
6.251 Evaluate Rousseau's conception of "freedom." Note that he distinguishes natural, civil, and moral freedom. Note also that freedom is not simply "the absence of interference from others."
6.252 Evaluate Rousseau's conception of the "general will." You should consider what he has to say about what the general will is, how it functions, how far it extends, and the ways of protecting it.
6.253 To what extent, if any, do you think that the general will is functioning in your country today? Are there realistic ways of bringing your country into greater compliance with the general will? If so, what are they? Would it be desirable to have greater compliance?
6.254 According to Rousseau, the expression of the general will may be frustrated by an inability to ascertain what it is or by government's usurpation of power. Consider what Rousseau has to say about these dangers and how he proposes to minimize them. Are his proposals realistic?
6.255 Rousseau raises an important, controversial issue by asserting that coercion is sometimes compatible with freedom. This claim runs contrary to our common notions because we usually associate freedom with absence of interference from others and coercion seems to be quite incompatible with that. Are there instances, however, where we interfere with others and, in so doing, claim to enhance their freedom rather than take it away? For example, if a seven-year old child "freely" decides to quit attending school, we may force the child to continue, claiming thereby to enhance freedom by assuring greater opportunities for the child later in life. Similarly, we may force an unwilling mental patient to take treatment, claiming that the patient will be more free after the treatment. In such instances, we are associating freedom with "the ability to do what you want provided that you know what you really want," which is what Rousseau is concerned with. In other words, if we have sound reason to doubt that persons know what they really want, then we may force them to act differently than they prefer; and, in the process, we may be enhancing their freedom rather than taking it away. Needless to say, there are numerous possibilities for abuse of freedom to occur with this interpretation. But we can also see how it makes sense.
Evaluate the compatibility of coercion with freedom, as described above. Also evaluate Rousseau's application of this compatibility with respect to the general will.
6.256 By distinguishing two senses of freedom, Rousseau lays the basis for one of the most fundamental differences dividing political conservatives and liberals at the present time. Political conservatives, interpreting freedom as the absence of interference from others, try to minimize the influence of government so as to minimize interference. Political liberals, on the other hand, interpreting freedom to mean also the ability to do what you want, support measures by government. From the liberal standpoint, government must take steps to insure that the social conditions are present that provide genuine opportunities for people to do what they want; from their standpoint, freedom as non-interference is largely meaningless for people who lack the real opportunity to do what they want. Consequently, liberals advocate and support numerous social welfare programs. Discuss this issue.
6.26 Consider how Rousseau conceives the relationship between sovereignty and government. Note that the best form of government varies according to different social conditions, although Rousseau prefers elective aristocracy. Do you think that the principle, "Government should serve the people," can be satisfied in any way other than the relationship Rousseau advocates? Evaluate Rousseau's position on the relationship between sovereignty and government.
6.27 Compare and contrast the positions of Hobbes and Rousseau regarding what ought to be the relation between the individual and society. Is either position superior?
6.271 Both Hobbes and Rousseau think that minorities are obligated to abide by the vote of the majority in an assembly; but they offer different justifications. What are they? Whom would you agree with more?
6.272 In various nations―in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America―many people claim to be victims of oppressive governments. What advice do you think that Hobbes and Rousseau would offer these people, based upon your knowledge of their positions? Whose advice would be more acceptable?
6.28 Evaluate the objection that the social contract is a misleading myth. Be sure to consider the possible reply in offering your evaluation.
6.281 Evaluate the objection that Hobbes' commonwealth would lead to abuse of power by the sovereign. Could one accept pretty much Hobbes' view of human nature and then conclude that a system of checks and balances is more reasonable than Hobbes' absolute powers of sovereignty? Be sure to consider the possible reply in making your evaluation.
6.282 Both the specific objections to Rousseau's position are based upon charges of impracticality―either that totalitarianism rather than freedom and equality will be the practical result or that people actually lack the ability, wisdom, and dedication that Rousseau presumes. Consider these objections in some detail and then evaluate them, being sure also to consider the possible replies.
6.283 According to both Hobbes and Rousseau, human beings are by nature born equal and free. (In Hobbes' case, the "right of nature" is basically a claim to freedom). Suppose, however, someone argues that their position is plainly contrary to fact because every human being is born relatively helpless and unequal and hence that they cannot claim "natural" rights to freedom and equality. Could Hobbes and Rousseau still maintain their claims concerning the existence of natural rights? Could they assert, for example, that the question whether or not human beings possess natural rights depends upon their nature as normal adults rather than upon their condition at birth?
Sources
Footnotes
1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in Edwin A. Burtt, ed., The English Philosophers From Bacon to Mill (New York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 286.
2. Ibid., p. 177.
3. See ibid., Ch. XVIII.
4. Ibid., pp. 179-180.
5. See Leviathan, Ch. XXX.
6. See ibid., Ch. XXI.
7. See ibid., p. 202.
8. See ibid., Ch. XXIX.
9. See ibid., p. 186.
10. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1913), p.5.
11. Ibid., p. 6.
12. Ibid., p. 8.
13. Ibid., p. 13.
14. Ibid., p. 26.
15. Ibid., p. 88.
16. Ibid., p. 30.
17. See ibid., p. 47.
18. Ibid., p. 85.
19. Ibid., p. 31.
20. Ibid. p. 102.
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