Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy

brought to you by Ron Yezzi

Emeritus Professor of Philosophy

Minnesota State University, Mankato

(Author's Note: The account below, with slight modifications, is taken from Ron Yezzi, Philosophical Problems: The Good Life (Mankato: G. Bruno & Co., 1994), pp. 7-24.)

Topics

Introduction

Psychological vs. Ethical Hedonism (Jeremy Bentham)

Quality of Pleasure

Sensual Hedonism

Intellectual Hedonism

Egoistic vs. Universalistic Hedonism (Jeremy Bentham)

Utilitarianism

Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies

Thought Excursions

Hedonism and Strong Drink

Can One Pleasure Be Qualitatively Superior to Another?

Sacrificial Utilitarianism?

The Good Life:

Hedonism

Epicurus, Omar Khayyam, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill

Introduction

A student once asked, “Why is it that, when philosophers talk about the good life, they never mention lounging in a boat with a six-pack of beer and fishing for awhile on a lake in northern Minnesota?” Here was a student with a vision of the good life. Although many may appreciate the attractiveness of his vision, we may still question its value as the ultimate goal to guide us in all we do. Ordinarily, we expect ultimate goals to be less specific so they apply to more situations. There is however an ancient, general ethical position, hedonism, that encompasses this student's “vision” as well as many similar ones.

According to hedonism, the good life consists in striving for and achieving pleasure, while avoiding pain. Hedonism is very probably the simplest and most popular conception of the good life. Nevertheless the relation between human beings and pleasure is complex enough to have spawned a variety of interpretations. Hedonists disagree about (a) how hedonism is grounded in human nature, (b) the kinds of pleasures to be sought, and (c) the range of persons to be included. In addition, there are differences between pursuit of pleasures of the moment and of long-range pleasures, which further complicates our understanding of hedonism. For example, persons pursuing long-range pleasures often forgo pleasures of the moment, and even endure pain in the present, for the sake of greater pleasure at some time in the future—as happens when they struggle through any trials or frustrations in their work for the sake of pleasurable rewards later on.

The popular association of hedonism simply and solely with sensual pleasures is a mistake. This popular misconception is especially evident in the use of the word “epicurean” that means, according to the dictionary, “given or adapted to luxury, or indulgence in sensual pleasures.” The hedonistic philosopher Epicurus can hardly be described as being “epicurean.” For example, in his “Letter to Menoeceus,” he says,

When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. For it is not continuous drinking and revellings, nor the satisfaction of the wealthy table which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit.¹

Contrary to popular expectations, Epicurus also advocated a negative form of hedonism—that is, we achieve pleasure, not by seeking it, but rather, by avoiding pain.

Biographical Sketch

Epicurus (341 - 270 B.C.E.), a Greek philosopher, accepted the materialistic atomism of Democritus but stressed the achievement of happiness rather than of knowledge as the highest goal of life. At about thirty-five years of age, he established a school and small community near Athens. Epicurus was especially revered for his kindness and geniality as well as for the warmth of his friendship with his followers.

Human Nature: Psychological vs. Ethical Hedonism

Hedonists can disagree about whether or not the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain are embedded in our nature as human beings. Psychological hedonists argue that human beings, as a fact of their psychological make-up, do act so as to achieve pleasure and avoid pain. That is, human nature is so constituted that we are compelled to act in this way. The English Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham states this position succinctly in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.²

Biographical Sketch

Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832 C.E.), an English philosopher, studied to be a lawyer but never actually practiced law. Instead, he became a legal theorist―particularly concerned with codification of laws, judicial organization, prison reform, and voting rights. He was the intellectual leader of a group known as the Philosophical Radicals and was very influential in bringing about legal reforms in Great Britain during the nineteenth century.

He is one of the foremost representatives of the philosophical position known as Utilitarianism.

By contrast, ethical hedonists are more likely to grant the possibility that (and sometimes they are insistent that) persons can act without striving to achieve pleasure and avoid pain. They claim though that persons choosing to act this way make a mistake. In other words, our nature as human beings does not compel us to be hedonists; but that is what we ought to be. According to some ethical hedonists, for example, Omar Khayyam, we encounter confusion and frustration, unless we devote ourselves to the pursuit of pleasure; according to others, for example, Henry Sidgwick (1838 - 1900 C.E.), a survey of whatever is good-in-itself shows that pleasure is the standard of value.

Quality of Pleasure

Beyond the psychological-ethical difference lie differences in the kinds, or quality, of pleasures sought. Some hedonists stress sensual pleasures; some stress intellectual pleasures; and others are qualitatively neutral—that is, they make no distinction between them at all. For example, Bentham was qualitatively neutral, insisting that the quantity, not the quality, of pleasure is important.

Sensual Hedonism

In addition to enjoyment of food, drink, and sex, sensual pleasures include such activities as comfortable living (for example, sitting in a comfortable chair or wearing nice clothing), participating in and watching sporting events, watching TV comedies, riding snowmobiles, and petting animals. They also include “lounging in a boat with a six-pack of beer and fishing for awhile on a lake in northern Minnesota.” In some cases, these activities are sources of intellectual pleasure as well; but the sensual pleasure predominates. Omar Khayyam's yearning for “a jug of wine, a loaf of bread, and thou” in the twelfth century as well as Playboy magazine in our own day exemplify sensual hedonism.

Biographical Sketch

Omar Khayyam (1038 - 1122 C.E.), a Persian mathematician and astronomer, wrote a poetic work, the Rubaiyat―on which his reputation as a philosopher and, more particularly, as a sensual hedonist rests. Whether the way of life promoted in the Rubaiyat is more than the wistful reveries of a busy, hard-working thinker is somewhat doubtful. At any rate, Omar Khayyam did not become a noted mathematician and astronomer by following the advice in the Rubaiyat.

Advocates of sensual hedonism such as Omar Khayyam usually argue that sensual pleasures are more important, more concrete, and surer than intellectual ones, which they take to be rather vague and less significant. As was evident in the quotation from Epicurus earlier however, not all hedonists favor sensual pleasures.

Intellectual Hedonism

Ordinarily, we associate intellectual pleasures with a deep engagement of the mind such as acquiring knowledge or appreciating great works of art—whether it be in the form of music, painting, literature, dance, or drama. We mean, of course, a certain kind of knowledge—for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics rather than Reuben's Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex But Were Afraid to Ask. And a certain kind of music—for example, Beethoven's violin concerto rather than Bill Haley and the Comets singing “We're Gonna Rock Aroun' the Clock Tonight.” In some cases, there may be sensual pleasure involved, too, but to a lesser degree.

John Stuart Mill, also an English Utilitarian philosopher, argued that quality is important and that intellectual pleasures are intrinsically superior to sensual ones. According to Mill,

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.... It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.³

According to Mill, we prefer intellectual pleasures even when they are accompanied by some frustration rather than settle for a full satisfaction of our merely sensual desires. Moreover, those who prefer differently only show that they lack experience with intellectual pleasures.

Whereas Mill asserts that intellectual pleasures are superior in themselves, Epicurus stresses the favorable consequences of intellectual hedonism: Cultivation of the mind aids us in avoiding pain (a) by making us aware of the proper limits of desires, (b) by dispelling fears based upon ignorance and superstitious views of the world, and (c) by freeing us from the desire for those external luxuries needed to enjoy sensual pleasures.

Pleasure for Whom: Egoistic vs. Universalistic Hedonism

Egoistic Hedonism

Although Epicurus advocates just actions and strongly encourages friendship with a few persons as means to avoid pain for ourselves, he recognizes no continuing obligation to avoid pain for the society as a whole. Instead of involvement in public affairs, he recommends “a quiet life and retirement from the world.” Accordingly, he is an egoistic hedonist, that is, he advocates the pursuit of pleasure for oneself.

Universalistic Hedonism

By contrast, a universalistic hedonist tries to maximize pleasure and minimize pain for all those involved in an action. Universalistic hedonism is usually associated with Utilitarianism,⁴ the position of Bentham and Mill, which rests upon the Principle of Utility:

By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.

By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that part be the community in general, then the happiness of the community; if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.⁵

(From Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation)

Given any proposed action, the Principle of Utility, often called “The Greatest Happiness Principle,” asserts that we ought to take into account the interests of all those involved in the action—whether it be one person, a small group, or even the society as a whole—and then that we ought to maximize the happiness or pleasure. Note well that the interests of all those involved should be considered. Accordingly, we are obligated not to give preference to our family, our friends, a special interest group to which we belong, our community, or our nation. For example, in dealing with a pollution problem caused by a local industry, we cannot base our judgment of what to do solely upon possible consequences for workers at the plant or even for the local community as a whole (if the pollution causes problems for people outside the local area). Likewise, government or society generally cannot simply ignore the consequences for workers at the plant. The objective is always to take everyone's interest into consideration and then to maximize the pleasure or happiness as best we can. Although the Principle of Utility takes everyone's interests into account, remember that the maximization of happiness for the greatest number does not guarantee a total absence of pain—since the pain of some may be overridden by the greater pleasure of many others.

Biographical Sketch

John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873 C.E.), an English philosopher, received a rigorous education supervised by his father James Mill, a close friend and philosophical colleague of Jeremy Bentham. John Stuart Mill came to embrace the Utilitarianism of his father and Bentham, although he made some unique additions of his own to their basic position. For example, he insisted on greater appreciation of the role of feelings in making Utilitarian judgments and he stressed the qualitative superiority of intellectual pleasures to sensual ones. During the nineteenth century, through his writings, John Stuart Mill became the most influential philosopher in the English-speaking world. He also worked with the East India Company and served a term in Parliament.

The Principle of Utility, according to John Stuart Mill, finds its ultimate justification in the social feeling of mankind—although he grants that “this feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether.”⁶ Mill however is quite optimistic regarding a growing recognition of this social feeling by human beings. In his work, Utilitarianism, he says,

But there is this basis of powerful natural sentiment; and this it is which, when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilization. The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this association is riveted more and more as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence. Any condition, therefore, which is essential to a state of society becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person's conception of the state of things which he is born into, and which is the destiny of a human being. Now, society between human beings, except in the relation of master and slave, is manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted. Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally. And since in all states of civilization, every person, except an absolute monarch, has equals, everyone is obliged to live on these terms with somebody; and in every age some advance is made towards a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody. In this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests. They are under a necessity of conceiving themselves as at least abstaining from all the grosser injuries, and (if only for their own protection) living in a state of constant protest against them. They are also familiar with the fact of co-operating with others, and proposing to themselves a collective, not an individual interest as the aim (at least for the time being) of their actions. So long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with those of others; there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests. Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least, with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it. He comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others. The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence. Now whatever amount of this feeling a person has, he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and of sympathy to demonstrate it, and to the utmost of his power encourage it in others; and even if he has none of it himself, he is greatly interested as anyone else that others should have it. Consequently the smallest germs of the feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education; and a complete web of corroborative association is woven around it, by the powerful agency of the external sanctions. This mode of conceiving ourselves and human life as civilization goes on, is felt to be more and more natural. Every step in political improvement renders it more so, by removing the sources of opposition of interest, and leveling those inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes, owing to which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness it is still practicable to disregard. In an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits of which they are not included. If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it, I think that no one who can realize this conception will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the happiness morality.⁷

Thus, the desire to live in unity and harmony with others, the growing recognition that consideration of everyone's interests equally is necessary for the very existence of society, the cooperative activities in society that stimulate growing identification of one's own interests with those of the society, as well as the influence of education, of institutions, and of public opinion and even of self-interest provide pathways leading to that social feeling that provides the ultimate sanction for The Greatest Happiness Principle.

Applying the Principle of Utility, in practice, may seem to be an exceptionally difficult task—since apparently we cannot easily determine the interests of all concerned with respect to pleasure and pain and since we may lack the time to make the determination for each situation of life. Utilitarians are aware of these difficulties. John Stuart Mill, for example, would argue that, despite any such difficulties, the Principle of Utility still is a better guide to moral action than any other principle. He also points out that, for most people most of the time, taking account of everyone's interests in making a decision seldom involves large numbers of people. As for the time problem in arriving at decisions, he argues that human beings have sufficient past experience to establish rules,⁸ based upon the Principle of Utility, which serve as guides for actions without our having to make decisions anew all the time. Thus, for example, we can establish on Utilitarian grounds the rule that stealing is wrong and can then follow this rule rather than having to determine the precise pleasure and pain for all persons involved whenever an occasion for stealing arises. Mill's position on lying is instructive here:

. . . it would often be expedient, for the purpose of getting over momentary embarrassment, or attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, to tell a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity, is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional, deviation from truth, does that much towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only the principal support of all present social well-being, but the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back civilization, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends; we feel that the violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of such transcendent expediency, is not expedient, and that he who, for the sake of a convenience to himself or to some other individual, does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place in each other's word, acts the part of one of their worst enemies. Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all moralists; the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would save an individual (especially an individual other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that the exception may not extend beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in weakening the reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognized, and, if possible, its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighting these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within which one or the other preponderates.⁹

Note that the rule against lying allows for some exceptions. Mill also grants that rules may require improvement with further experience. The absence of absolute rules reveals the complexity of ethical actions rather than any defect in the Utilitarian position. Where conflicts arise as to the proper course of action, we should try to resolve them as best we can through knowledge, character, and appeal to the Principle of Utility, according to Mill.

Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies

(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)

Hedonism, like every other view of the good life, has come under various sorts of criticism. The list of objections that follows is not complete; but it covers some of the more common criticisms.

(1) Malicious Pleasures

According to hedonism, pleasure is good; but there are malicious pleasures such as sadism that are intrinsically bad.

A Possible Reply: Although pleasure is the goal of the good life, it does not follow that every single act producing some amount of pleasure is good. Acts can involve both pleasure and pain. Thus we use the term “malicious pleasures” in cases where any pleasure involved is heavily outweighed by associated pain that is also present. For example, while sadistic actions may well produce temporary pleasure for one person (or perhaps for a few) they produce far greater or more intense pain for others and even for the sadist (as time passes). Malicious pleasures are “intrinsically bad” only in the sense that, as a matter of fact, they involve much more pain than pleasure.

(2) Pleasure as an Accompaniment Rather than a Goal: A Criticism of Psychological Hedonism

Although pleasure may well accompany a good action, it is not necessarily a goal of the action. For example, out of a sense of duty, I may risk my life to save a small child from an oncoming car and then experience pleasure when I am successful; but I acted out of a sense of duty, not because I wanted the pleasure that accompanies being successful in saving the child.

A Possible Reply: Different persons achieve pleasure in different actions. So it is hardly surprising that some people find pleasure in acting according to duty. Indeed, our social upbringing usually involves a constant stress upon pleasures that accompany “doing our duty”—such rewards as self-satisfaction and the joy of gaining others' respect.

(3) The Hedonistic Paradox: A Criticism of Sensual Hedonism

Persons who pursue sensual pleasures most avidly often end up with pain, whereas those who do not direct their lives for the sake of intense pleasures often experience them.

A Possible Reply: Persons who pursue sensual pleasures imprudently often end up with pain. There is no reason however why a hedonist cannot act prudently in pursuing pleasure. Besides, society today offers all sorts of aids to eliminate the unfortunate effects of overindulgence in sensual pleasures. Aspirin, anti-biotics, birth control pills, diet plans, abortion, surgery, psychiatric counseling, behavior control programs, welfare programs, and medical insurance are all available.

(4) Absence of a Knowledgeable Observer

There is no knowledgeable observer capable of determining when one pleasure is better than another or capable of determining what maximizes pleasure for the greatest number of people.

A Possible Reply: The complexities involved in comparing pleasures and pains do not set up insurmountable barriers to sound judgment. Although we are surely not infallible, we often make successful comparisons based upon our experience. The process of living provides continual education in discriminating the relative merits of various pleasures and pains; this holds true whether we consider judgments in the best interests of the individual or of the society as a whole. Moreover, to deny the possibility of a knowledgeable observer who can determine the best interests of society as a whole is equivalent to denying the possibility of determining the public interest and that, in turn, invites anarchy.

(5) Universalistic Hedonism as a Source of Wrong Actions

From the standpoint of a universalistic hedonist, murder of one person is morally acceptable if this act provides greater pleasure for a number of others. Yet, since we know that murder is never morally acceptable, universalistic hedonism is defective.

A Possible Reply: Note the important “if” in this objection. What real evidence is there that murder, that is, the intentional killing of an innocent person, can produce greater pleasure than pain for all the people involved? Any pleasure experienced would be temporary and/or the product of a sick mind—far outweighed by the detrimental effects of such an action. We cannot simply consider pain caused to the murdered person. There is also the pain caused to family and friends. In addition, any social group allowing such an act will engage in other acts that have painful consequences. Can anyone in such a group really feel secure about the future? After all, anyone (even you) could be the next victim.

(6) Sacrificial Asceticism and the Rejection of Hedonism

Even if we grant that pleasure has value, we are not thereby obligated to pursue it. As a matter of sacrificial asceticism, we may simply reject the pursuit of pleasure.

A Possible Reply: From the standpoint of psychological hedonism, of course, sacrificial asceticism is simply impossible. As for the claim that we can separate pleasure as a value from the obligation to pursue it, confusion about the nature of value is the root of the problem. Nothing can possess value in an ethical sense without there being some obligation (even a self-imposed one) to pursue it. Asserting that something has value is simply another way of recognizing some kind of obligation. Accordingly, we cannot assert that pleasure has value unless we also recognize an obligation to pursue it.

Thought Excursions

*3.10 Examples of sensual pleasures mentioned: food, drink, sex, comfortable living, participating in and watching sporting events, watching TV comedies, riding snowmobiles, petting animals, lounging in a boat with a six-pack of beer and fishing for awhile on a lake in northern Minnesota, “a jug of wine, a loaf of bread, and thou,” Playboy magazine. If possible, explain how each of these may be a source of intellectual pleasure as well. Would each be regarded as primarily a source of sensual or intellectual pleasure for most people? What about you?

**3.101 Evaluate the reasons given by John Stuart Mill and Epicurus to show that intellectual pleasures are superior to sensual pleasures. Can one argue against Mill that human beings, because of their intelligence, are incapable of experiencing sensual pleasure in the same way as a pig and therefore that his example referring to a pig is just irrelevant? In other words, can one argue that a human being's experience of sensual pleasures is never the same as a pig's because of the role of intelligence? As examples, consider a holiday dinner at a family gathering or sexual intercourse within the context of love as sensual pleasures that a pig may not be able to experience in the same way as human beings, because of the absence of the “higher faculties.” How might Mill reply?

*3.102 Suppose that someone argues for a balance of sensual and intellectual pleasures in life without regarding one kind as superior. Is such an approach unalterably opposed to the positions of Mill and Epicurus? Explain your answer. If achieving a balance is a worthwhile goal, how should the balance be struck?

*3.103 Thesis: As a pleasure, training for and winning an Olympic medal is qualitatively superior to going out partying and getting drunk every weekend for a few years. Discuss. How would you compare the pleasure of moderate jogging four times a week with that of getting drunk every weekend? Can a pleasure be qualitatively superior, but inappropriate, for a particular person? Explain. If it can, what should be the role of qualitatively superior pleasures in our lives?

**3.104 Is there too much pursuit of sensual pleasures in the United States these days? How would one go about answering such a question? For example, should one ask if too much sensual pleasure is intrinsically bad, that is, bad in itself? Or should one ask if too much sensual pleasure distracts persons from more important matters? Or should one simply ask if sensual pleasure is qualitatively inferior? Or does the pursuit of sensual pleasures have harmful social and personal consequences? Or is it impossible to make any judgment? Justify your answers.

*3.11 John Doe never tries to hurt anyone else intentionally. Moreover, he treats other people justly and values friendships with others. Can we rest assured that John Doe is a universalistic hedonist? Why or why not?

**3.111 Is Mill's reasoning that attributes the ultimate justification of the Principle of Utility to “the social feeling of mankind” unrealistic? For example, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, he is optimistic about the prospects for the spread of this social feeling. Has his optimism been born out, if we look around us in the current time? (Be sure to consider the quoted passage, where Mill makes clear a number of reasons for his optimism.)

*3.112 What reasons are offered by Mill to establish, on Utilitarian grounds, the rule against lying? When are exceptions to the rule allowable? How does Mill propose to prevent possible abuses by persons too eagerly making exceptions to the rule against lying? Is his advocacy of rules (and possible exceptions) adequate or inadequate? Explain your answer.

**3.12 Suppose that a local college is offering the following programs one weekend:

Racquetball for Everyone

The First Annual X-rated Movie Film Festival

A Fishing Institute: Improving Your Fishing Techniques

The Energy Crisis: What Citizens Can Do

Can There Be a Just War?

An Evening with Woody Allen

Women and Power in Contemporary Society.

As hedonists, how would Epicurus, Omar Khayyam, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill set priorities among these programs? Try to pick one program each would most approve and one each would least approve. Be sure to explain the reasoning involved. (For Utilitarians, you should consider the significance of self-regarding actions in your reply, too.) Do not be surprised though if the priorities are not clear-cut. How might typical persons in the United States set priorities here? How would you set them, from the perspective of pleasure and pain? How would you justify your priorities to the hedonistic philosopher you most disagree with?

**3.13 Evaluate the various objections to hedonism mentioned. Be sure to consider the possible reply a hedonist may make to each objection, in making your evaluation. Which is the strongest objection? The weakest? Would you offer other objections besides those mentioned in the text? If so, what are they? What is your general evaluation of hedonism as a view of the good life?

Hedonism and Strong Drink

How long, how long in Infinite Pursuit

Of This and That endeavor and Dispute;

Better be merry with the fruitful Grape

Than sadden after none, or bitter, Fruit.

Omar Khayyam, Rubaiyat

Of all the views of the good life, we expect hedonism to be foremost in celebrating the joys of consuming alcohol; and Omar Khayyam's words above do not disappoint our expectations. For Khayyam, wine offers a highly pleasant, and hence desirable, way of escaping in the present the worries and cares of yesterday and tomorrow. Time is fleeting; and we should enjoy life while we may. He seems to associate intoxication with a quiet joviality and sensuousness followed by a delightful sleep—rather than with loud, boisterous, angry, or violent behavior.

Epicurus however, being an intellectual hedonist, does not take the same position. As a pleasure, drinking is not intrinsically bad or inferior—that is, it is not bad or inferior in itself; rather, according to Epicurus, it is wrong because drinking, instrumentally, produces pain for a person. It produces pain directly when the result is bodily suffering or ill health or a squandering of money or distress to neighbors. Indirectly, drinking has no lasting effect in dispelling often troubling, and hence painful, fears. Furthermore, as a continual desire, drinking hinders the development of the mind by which we learn the proper limits and prudent control of desires in life. For Epicurus, only development of the intellect truly dispels fears and sets proper limits to desires; accordingly, alcohol is a hindrance to real happiness.

As a qualitatively neutral hedonist, Jeremy Bentham finds nothing intrinsically bad or inferior with drinking as a pleasure. It is the quantity of pleasure that counts. Moreover, given the numerous kinds of pleasures and pains as well as the wide variety of circumstances affecting sensitivity to pleasure and pain, the specific activities producing pleasure will vary widely with different persons; so it is not surprising that many persons experience a great amount of pleasure by drinking alcoholic beverages. This however is not the end of the matter. As a Utilitarian, Bentham would be much concerned with the effects of drinking on others—for example, the often extremely harmful consequences of drunken driving, the detrimental effects of excessive drinking on family relationships, and the links between alcohol consumption and acts of violence. In determining the goodness or badness of actions, we need to take account of the pleasure and pain for all those involved in the action. Even for self-regarding actions, that is, ones having consequences only for ourselves, Bentham offers this warning: As a matter of common experience, we know that becoming intoxicated once increases the likelihood of doing so again and a pattern of becoming intoxicated is eventually harmful to persons themselves. Finally, Bentham would point out that drinking is but one kind of pleasure, to be weighed against others in maximizing pleasure for ourselves.

John Stuart Mill shares Bentham's Utilitarian concerns and would probably agree with his warning. Mill though would go further. Drinking is intrinsically inferior to intellectual pleasures because it does not engage the higher faculties of the mind. It is a pleasure more appropriate to fools and lower animals rather than to well-functioning human beings. Although Mill would not condemn all consumption of alcohol, he would strongly attack attempts to extol the great “virtue” in intoxication and the joys of overindulgence. He would strongly disagree with Omar Khayyam.

Can One Pleasure Be Qualitatively Superior to Another?

To this question, many persons would answer, “No,” on the grounds that the individual is the ultimate judge of what kind of pleasure each enjoys and individuals have different preferences. Some persons enjoy playing tennis and others, studying physics; neither pleasure can be considered superior qualitatively in any objective sense. John Stuart Mill, as we saw, disagrees.

Suppose that we consider the question through the following example: Two roommates, Rhoda and Phyllis, both receive A's on the latest exam in Economics 110. Rhoda attended all the classes, took careful notes, studied long and hard, and answered to the best of her ability on the exam; the A gave her a great deal of pleasure. Phyllis, on the other hand, skipped a number of classes, took no notes, did not study, partied a lot but then took advantage of the latest scientific development, a memory pill for Economics 110, to do very well on the exam; the A gave her a great deal of pleasure. (For readers who find a memory pill far-fetched, presume that Phyllis obtained the exam with the instructor's answer key ahead of time.) Can Rhoda claim that her pleasure is, in an objective sense, qualitatively superior to Phyllis'? In other words, should every correct thinking person agree that Rhoda's pleasure is qualitatively superior?

In examining the issue, be careful not to confuse quantity with quality. So who experiences the most pleasure either immediately or in the long-run is irrelevant. (Accordingly, you cannot argue here that Rhoda's work will eventually be rewarded more sometime in the future.) Also, avoid the question whether or not Phyllis' actions are morally justifiable. Finally, remember that recognition of qualitative superiority need not entail a preference for the qualitatively superior pleasure in every instance. For example, recognizing the qualitative superiority of listening to Beethoven's violin concerto to eating hamburgers need not entail that everyone always forgo hamburgers for violin concertos.

What case can Rhoda make for qualitative superiority? First of all, she can argue that she fulfilled more adequately the essential function of an exam, namely, the demonstration of skill acquired through one's own effort. Secondly, she can argue that, in so far as the A grade results through her own effort, the grade is more representative of what she accomplished than is the case with Phyllis. Rhoda may even say that the memory pill, not Phyllis, deserves Phyllis' A. Consequently, her pleasure is more properly her own pleasure in comparison with Phyllis. Finally, Rhoda can argue that her pleasure is associated with an achievement resulting through self-discipline, an acquired skill, and engagement of her intellectual faculties whereas Phyllis' “achievement” is highly dubious—especially since anyone, even animals, can take a pill. It is hard to deny that Rhoda has a very strong case.

Moreover, if we accept her argument, we should conclude that any pleasure Rhoda experiences even with a C grade (or lower) is still qualitatively superior, although she may not then get as much pleasure as Phyllis does.

Are there reasons for denying qualitative superiority in the example above that were overlooked? If so, point them out.

Sacrificial Utilitarianism?

Objection (5) raises the possibility that universalistic, or Utilitarian, hedonism approves of murder in some situations. Suppose that we examine this possibility in more detail.

Problem: Lou is a reporter covering a civil war in a Latin American nation between an authoritarian government and leftist revolutionaries. He, along with fifteen other reporters, are kidnapped from their hotel and taken captive. Their captors then bring before them a healthy, four year-old child and make this proposal: If Lou will kill this innocent child, then they will set the reporters free; if Lou refuses, they will kill the innocent child themselves anyway and then kill the reporters, too. They say that they want to show foreign reporters what happens when they get mixed up with a war that is none of their business. Assume that there is no serious reason to doubt their word. Thus, whether Lou agrees or refuses to kill the child, the child will be killed; it is simply a question of what will happen to the reporters. Whether they live or die depends upon Lou's decision. What would a Utilitarian do?

Here are some possibilities:

(1) An Act-Utilitarian Solution: We should decide what produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people by examining the likely consequences of specific actions. In this case, the child will die regardless what Lou chooses to do. But he can gain the lives and freedom of sixteen human beings by doing the killing himself. The likelihood that he will experience exceptional anguish by doing the killing is unfortunate; yet it is also clearly outweighed by the benefits to be gained for sixteen people. According to the Principle of Utility, Lou has an obligation to kill the child

(2) A Rule-Utilitarian Solution: We should abide by those rules of action that produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Since the presence of rules is essential for a functioning society, we cannot examine the circumstances of each specific action to determine what is morally right. One such rule forbids us to commit murder. The intentional killing of an innocent person is an ultimate threat to the social good, because it is an ultimate denial of even the possibility of happiness. In a society that condones murder, no one is really safe and hence the greatest good for the greatest number is not served. The reporters face a tragic situation. The Principle of Utility however demands a rule forbidding acts of murder; so Lou has an obligation not to kill this innocent child, regardless what the captors do.

(3) A Mixed (Rule-Act) Solution: We should abide by those rules of action that produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people, although we occasionally should allow for exceptions. Although rules are essential for a functioning society, we can occasionally allow for exceptions in cases where no precedent causing social harm is set and the greatest good is served. In this particular case, any assertion that Lou's killing the child sets a harmful social precedent condoning murder is simply unreasonable, since this is such an extraordinary situation. Moreover, given that the child will die anyway, it is senseless, in terms of the Principle of Utility, to sacrifice the lives of the reporters when they can be saved. Lou has an obligation to ignore his qualms and kill the child.

(4) Another Mixed (Rule-Act) Solution: We should abide by those rules of action that produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people, although we occasionally should allow for exceptions. Although rules are essential for a functioning society, we can occasionally allow for exceptions where no precedent causing social harm is set and the greatest good is served. However, no exception can ever be made to the rule forbidding murder. This rule is absolutely fundamental to general social well being. In this particular case, Lou's killing the innocent child would save the reporters' lives; but it also would encourage their captors to engage in further, probably even worse, acts of injustice and violence. Not killing not only makes a forceful moral-political point to the captors but also sets up a noble model of action that serves the interests of the greatest number of people in the long run. The heavy price these reporters pay is outweighed by the benefits they confer on society generally through their sacrifice. Even when there is no assurance that outsiders will ever learn the reason for the reporters' deaths, Lou should still refuse to kill the child—presuming that the willingness to engage in such a refusal, when generally and properly acknowledged as a fundamental tenet of a good society, strengthens the social bond and furthers the general social well being. Once we examine this case carefully, we find that, according to the Principle of Utility, Lou has an obligation not to kill the child.

From a Utilitarian standpoint, is one of these solutions clearly superior to the others? Explain. In your judgment, which solution would be most acceptable to John Stuart Mill? Why?

If all four solutions are reasonable from a Utilitarian point of view, does this result establish an inadequacy? Or can one argue that “a hard case,” such as the problem considered here, is not a fair test of the Utilitarian position as a whole? Are all four solutions indeed equally reasonable from a Utilitarian point of view, in your judgment? Justify your answer.

If you were in Lou's position, what would you decide? Why? Is your decision based upon Utilitarian principles? Explain.

Sources

Footnotes

1. Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” in Whitney J. Oates, ed. The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers (New York: The Modern Library, 1940), p. 32.

2. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation, in Edwin A. Burtt, ed., The English Philosophers From Bacon to Mill (New York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 791.

3. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, & Representative Government (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1910), pp. 8-9.

4. The Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill is clearly a type of hedonism. In more recent philosophy however, utilitarianism has been interpreted more broadly to include any ethical position in which worth is determined according to the consequences of an action—often referred to as “a teleological theory of ethics.” On this website, an upper case “U” indicates reference to the Utilitarian position of Bentham and Mill, whereas a lower case “u” indicates reference to the more recent, broader interpretation.

5. Bentham, op. cit., p. 792.

6. Mill, op. cit, p. 31.

7. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

8. In recent philosophy, considerable controversy has been generated by the question whether U(u)tilitarian judgments should be guided by rules or particular circumstances. So many philosophers espouse either rule or act Utilitarianism. Neither label applies precisely to Mill's position, which is a wise one, in my judgment. My best advice to anyone interested in this controversy would be, Read and reread the final three paragraphs in chapter II of Mill's Utilitarianism.

9. Ibid., pp. 21.

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