The Principle of Utility, according to John Stuart Mill, finds its ultimate justification in the social feeling of mankind—although he grants that “this feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether.”6 Mill however is quite optimistic regarding a growing recognition of this social feeling by human beings. In his work, Utilitarianism, he says,
But there is this basis of powerful natural sentiment; and this it is which, when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilization. The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this association is riveted more and more as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence. Any condition, therefore, which is essential to a state of society becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person's conception of the state of things which he is born into, and which is the destiny of a human being. Now, society between human beings, except in the relation of master and slave, is manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted. Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally. And since in all states of civilization, every person, except an absolute monarch, has equals, everyone is obliged to live on these terms with somebody; and in every age some advance is made towards a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody. In this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests. They are under a necessity of conceiving themselves as at least abstaining from all the grosser injuries, and (if only for their own protection) living in a state of constant protest against them. They are also familiar with the fact of co-operating with others, and proposing to themselves a collective, not an individual interest as the aim (at least for the time being) of their actions. So long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with those of others; there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests. Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least, with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it. He comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others. The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence. Now whatever amount of this feeling a person has, he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and of sympathy to demonstrate it, and to the utmost of his power encourage it in others; and even if he has none of it himself, he is greatly interested as anyone else that others should have it. Consequently the smallest germs of the feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education; and a complete web of corroborative association is woven around it, by the powerful agency of the external sanctions. This mode of conceiving ourselves and human life as civilization goes on, is felt to be more and more natural. Every step in political improvement renders it more so, by removing the sources of opposition of interest, and leveling those inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes, owing to which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness it is still practicable to disregard. In an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits of which they are not included. If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it, I think that no one who can realize this conception will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the happiness morality.7
Thus, the desire to live in unity and harmony with others, the growing recognition that consideration of everyone's interests equally is necessary for the very existence of society, the cooperative activities in society that stimulate growing identification of one's own interests with those of the society, as well as the influence of education, of institutions, and of public opinion and even of self-interest provide pathways leading to that social feeling that provides the ultimate sanction for The Greatest Happiness Principle.
Applying the Principle of Utility, in practice, may seem to be an exceptionally difficult task—since apparently we cannot easily determine the interests of all concerned with respect to pleasure and pain and since we may lack the time to make the determination for each situation of life. Utilitarians are aware of these difficulties. John Stuart Mill, for example, would argue that, despite any such difficulties, the Principle of Utility still is a better guide to moral action than any other principle. He also points out that, for most people most of the time, taking account of everyone's interests in making a decision seldom involves large numbers of people. As for the time problem in arriving at decisions, he argues that human beings have sufficient past experience to establish rules,8 based upon the Principle of Utility, which serve as guides for actions without our having to make decisions anew all the time. Thus, for example, we can establish on Utilitarian grounds the rule that stealing is wrong and can then follow this rule rather than having to determine the precise pleasure and pain for all persons involved whenever an occasion for stealing arises. Mill's position on lying is instructive here:
. . . it would often be expedient, for the purpose of getting over momentary embarrassment, or attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, to tell a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity, is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional, deviation from truth, does that much towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only the principal support of all present social well-being, but the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back civilization, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends; we feel that the violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of such transcendent expediency, is not expedient, and that he who, for the sake of a convenience to himself or to some other individual, does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place in each other's word, acts the part of one of their worst enemies. Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all moralists; the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would save an individual (especially an individual other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that the exception may not extend beyond the need, and may have the least possible effect in weakening the reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognized, and, if possible, its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighting these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within which one or the other preponderates.9
Note that the rule against lying allows for some exceptions. Mill also grants that rules may require improvement with further experience. The absence of absolute rules reveals the complexity of ethical actions rather than any defect in the Utilitarian position. Where conflicts arise as to the proper course of action, we should try to resolve them as best we can through knowledge, character, and appeal to the Principle of Utility, according to Mill.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)
Hedonism, like every other view of the good life, has come under various sorts of criticism. The list of objections that follows is not complete; but it covers some of the more common criticisms.
According to hedonism, pleasure is good; but there are malicious pleasures such as sadism that are intrinsically bad.
A Possible Reply: Although pleasure is the goal of the good life, it does not follow that every single act producing some amount of pleasure is good. Acts can involve both pleasure and pain. Thus we use the term “malicious pleasures” in cases where any pleasure involved is heavily outweighed by associated pain that is also present. For example, while sadistic actions may well produce temporary pleasure for one person (or perhaps for a few) they produce far greater or more intense pain for others and even for the sadist (as time passes). Malicious pleasures are “intrinsically bad” only in the sense that, as a matter of fact, they involve much more pain than pleasure.
(2) Pleasure as an Accompaniment Rather than a Goal: A Criticism of Psychological Hedonism
Although pleasure may well accompany a good action, it is not necessarily a goal of the action. For example, out of a sense of duty, I may risk my life to save a small child from an oncoming car and then experience pleasure when I am successful; but I acted out of a sense of duty, not because I wanted the pleasure that accompanies being successful in saving the child.
A Possible Reply: Different persons achieve pleasure in different actions. So it is hardly surprising that some people find pleasure in acting according to duty. Indeed, our social upbringing usually involves a constant stress upon pleasures that accompany “doing our duty”—such rewards as self-satisfaction and the joy of gaining others' respect.
(3) The Hedonistic Paradox: A Criticism of Sensual Hedonism
Persons who pursue sensual pleasures most avidly often end up with pain, whereas those who do not direct their lives for the sake of intense pleasures often experience them.
A Possible Reply: Persons who pursue sensual pleasures imprudently often end up with pain. There is no reason however why a hedonist cannot act prudently in pursuing pleasure. Besides, society today offers all sorts of aids to eliminate the unfortunate effects of overindulgence in sensual pleasures. Aspirin, anti-biotics, birth control pills, diet plans, abortion, surgery, psychiatric counseling, behavior control programs, welfare programs, and medical insurance are all available.
(4) Absence of a Knowledgeable Observer
There is no knowledgeable observer capable of determining when one pleasure is better than another or capable of determining what maximizes pleasure for the greatest number of people.
A Possible Reply: The complexities involved in comparing pleasures and pains do not set up insurmountable barriers to sound judgment. Although we are surely not infallible, we often make successful comparisons based upon our experience. The process of living provides continual education in discriminating the relative merits of various pleasures and pains; this holds true whether we consider judgments in the best interests of the individual or of the society as a whole. Moreover, to deny the possibility of a knowledgeable observer who can determine the best interests of society as a whole is equivalent to denying the possibility of determining the public interest and that, in turn, invites anarchy.
(5) Universalistic Hedonism as a Source of Wrong Actions
From the standpoint of a universalistic hedonist, murder of one person is morally acceptable if this act provides greater pleasure for a number of others. Yet, since we know that murder is never morally acceptable, universalistic hedonism is defective.
A Possible Reply: Note the important “if” in this objection. What real evidence is there that murder, that is, the intentional killing of an innocent person, can produce greater pleasure than pain for all the people involved? Any pleasure experienced would be temporary and/or the product of a sick mind—far outweighed by the detrimental effects of such an action. We cannot simply consider pain caused to the murdered person. There is also the pain caused to family and friends. In addition, any social group allowing such an act will engage in other acts that have painful consequences. Can anyone in such a group really feel secure about the future? After all, anyone (even you) could be the next victim.
(6) Sacrificial Asceticism and the Rejection of Hedonism
Even if we grant that pleasure has value, we are not thereby obligated to pursue it. As a matter of sacrificial asceticism, we may simply reject the pursuit of pleasure.
A Possible Reply: From the standpoint of psychological hedonism, of course, sacrificial asceticism is simply impossible. As for the claim that we can separate pleasure as a value from the obligation to pursue it, confusion about the nature of value is the root of the problem. Nothing can possess value in an ethical sense without there being some obligation (even a self-imposed one) to pursue it. Asserting that something has value is simply another way of recognizing some kind of obligation. Accordingly, we cannot assert that pleasure has value unless we also recognize an obligation to pursue it.
*3.10 Examples of sensual pleasures mentioned: food, drink, sex, comfortable living, participating in and watching sporting events, watching TV comedies, riding snowmobiles, petting animals, lounging in a boat with a six-pack of beer and fishing for awhile on a lake in northern Minnesota, “a jug of wine, a loaf of bread, and thou,” Playboy magazine. If possible, explain how each of these may be a source of intellectual pleasure as well. Would each be regarded as primarily a source of sensual or intellectual pleasure for most people? What about you?