Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 1986, 1994, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
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(Author's Note: The account below, with slight modifications, is taken from Ron Yezzi, Philosophical Problems: The Good Life (Mankato: G. Bruno & Co., 1994), pp. 82-84.)
The Good Life:
Further Reflections
Faced with the varied array of conflicting positions and objections regarding the good life, readers may well wonder whether a correct decision about the good life is possible. We should put this issue in proper perspective however. First, we should not expect any interpretation of the good life to be beyond all possible objection, since so very few claims to knowledge, even scientific ones, achieve this status. Rather, given the alternatives, we should seek the best possible interpretation. Secondly, we should recognize that the quest for the good life results not simply from the desire for a correct interpretation but also from an unavoidable need to find some goals with which to direct our lives. So the multitude of conflicting positions should not deter us from facing the issue. Also, we should remember that we are dealing with a cultural heritage spanning several thousand years. So the presence of disagreements and differences over that long a span is hardly surprising.
A different sort of problem, however, may trouble some readers. Do philosophers allow us to retain our self-esteem? Aside from Omar Khayyam, they are all so demanding in their expectations. Most of us fall far enough short of these expectations that the philosophers' main messages do not sit well with either the democratization of life in the present day or the the current “I'm OK, you're OK” pop psychology. Can we improve ourselves when presented with constant reminders of our own shortcomings? Once we dwell upon these shortcomings, do we not lose that sense of self-esteem so necessary to sustain personal growth? Instead of “tearing us down,” shouldn't philosophers be more positive and optimistic about our talents and accomplishments? Why do they set themselves up as being superior to us?
In defense of our self-esteem, we may be tempted simply to reject serious consideration of what philosophers say. Taking all this seriously may be a challenging and unsettling step. I may have enough problems and pursuits already without taking on philosophical questions that have no simple answers. Do I really want to rethink my Christianity in the light of the positions of Augustine, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard? Do I really want to think seriously about Kant's call to duty and rejection of personal inclinations? Do I really want to mull over Sartre's contentions about self-deception? Why can't I be a hedonist without worrying seriously about the differences between Omar Khayyam and Mill?
We can treat this self-esteem problem as a theoretical or a practical issue. Theoretically, the problem dissolves very quickly. In laying out standards of quality and excellence, philosophers simply try to make clear the values and obligations that make up a good life. They set forth positive goals. Standards of quality and excellence become guidelines for development of human potentialities. Without such standards, philosophers fear a resultant worsening of the human condition, both for individuals and for society. Consequently they base an authentic sense of self-esteem on effort and struggle; it does not arise simply as a gift. Practically however, the self-esteem problem does not give way so easily. Self-esteem can be a fragile state of mind in contemporary society. Lacking fairly stable institutions and fundamental values to provide a “sense of place” in which there is a gradual, relatively secure sense of personal growth, individuals in contemporary society often find themselves in constant turmoil among competing interests and values. The situation may open up a wide array of opportunities for us; but it may also pose constant threats to our sense of self-esteem. In such a context, philosophical thinking may appear as just one more threat. If philosophy poses such a threat however, it is not the task of philosophers to dispel it by failing to discuss important issues. Risking self-esteem may be the price we need to pay in order to face the realities of contemporary life.
Beginning students in ethics are often bothered by their perception that philosophers tend to take extreme positions. What's wrong with a sensible, popular view of the good life? Working hard until you accomplish something? Having the courage to overcome obstacles? Having the feeling that you helped someone? Being able to live comfortably—whether you're eating or buying a house or traveling? Getting away from the pressures of life so you can relax? Getting a good education so you get the job you want? Having a good family and enjoying your children? Knowing that you can trust your neighbor not to hurt you? Being able to associate with interesting people? Keeping faith with God? Don't these activities constitute the good life—quite apart from the abstract questions posed, and extreme positions taken, by philosophers?
This sensible, popular view includes worthwhile activities; but it is philosophically unsatisfactory. Instead of stating what the good life is in terms of fundamental principles, this view simply lists miscellaneous activities likely to be included in the good life. Consequently, a number of problems arise. Why shouldn't the list be expanded to include more activities—for example, staying healthy, enjoying sexual pleasure, having fun, engaging in creative activities, becoming wealthy, taking risks, achieving security, and participating in community service projects? How long should the list of activities constituting the good life be? There is the further problem that a list of miscellaneous activities sets no priorities whatsoever. We cannot devote ourselves to all of these activities all of the time. So which take precedence before others? For example, if a conflict arises between effort devoted to a good family life and effort devoted to community service projects, does the sensible, popular view of the good life offer any standards for making a sound judgment? A person may be tempted to say, “Family comes first.” But what is there about a list of miscellaneous activities that establishes such a priority? Another problem arises due to vagueness. There are numerous ways to enjoy sexual pleasure—which may include masturbation, marital intercourse, extramarital intercourse, oral intercourse, anal intercourse, incest, viewing child pornography, sexual fantasy, etc. How does the sensible, popular view of the good life establish acceptable and unacceptable ways of enjoying sexual pleasure? Finally, the sensible, popular view seems oblivious to important social issues such as war, poverty, discrimination, economic injustice, world hunger, environmental problems, and the responsibilities of citizenship. For example, should limits be set on living comfortably and becoming wealthy in the light of these social issues?
Thus, upon examination, the absence of extremes in the sensible, popular view of the good life probably indicates a failure to ask and pursue hard questions. In so far as philosophers face the hard questions in order to arrive at fundamental principles for directing human action and to set priorities among various possible actions, they often take what may well appear to be extreme positions.