Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 1986, 1993, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 1986, 1993, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
Topics
Immanuel Kant
John Dewey
C. A. Campbell
Some Objections and Possible Replies
Thought Exercises
Sources
(Author's Note: The account below is taken from Ron Yezzi, Philosophical Problems: God, Free Will, and Determinism (Mankato: G. Bruno & Co., 1993), pp. 88 - 96.)
Sartre's advocacy of complete free will and total moral responsibility does not enjoy widespread philosophical support. Most philosophers advocating free will take a less extreme position: Human beings possess partial free will with coordinate degrees of moral responsibility. That is, while many, if not most, human actions are determined, human beings still possess free will in special situations and the degree of moral responsibility is proportional to the degree of free will present in an action. Here we consider the positions of three advocates of partial free will―namely Immanuel Kant, John Dewey, and C. A. Campbell.
Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804 C.E.) was born in Koenigsberg, East Prussia, of working class parents. (His father was a skilled saddle-maker.) After study at the University of Koenigsberg, he served as a private tutor for about eight years, until 1755 when he became a lecturer at the University. He was a lecturer and professor there until 1796. Kant was the first major philosopher in modern times to make a living as a university professor. As an instructor, he had a reputation for presenting lively, humorous lectures (qualities not always immediately evident in his writings). He led a regular, uneventful, scholarly life. (Supposedly, the people of Koenigsberg could set their clocks by the time Kant set out for his daily walk.) Although he was a professor at a relatively undistinguished university in a provincial town and never traveled beyond the boundaries of East Prussia, Kant became one of the most important philosophers in the history of Western civilization.
In 1781, at the age of fifty-seven, he published the Critique of Pure Reason, a work of great originality and technical precision that tried to lay out the nature and limits of theoretical reason. Kant proclaimed his position a "Copernican revolution in philosophy"―and its philosophical influence has indeed been that significant. His originality and technical precision are also evident in his ethical writings which came later, the best known works being the Critique of Practical Reason and the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. His work in ethics has been enormously influential.
Perhaps we can best understand Immanuel Kant's position by beginning with his assertion that the activities of animals, being governed entirely by sensory stimuli, are wholly determined and exhibit no free will. To the extent that human activities similarly arise from a sensory nature―that is, from feelings, desires, and inclinations―they too are determined. The matter does not end there however. Human beings also possess the faculty of reason by which they can transcend their sensory nature―thereby escaping the determinism of the sensory world and exhibiting free will. Accordingly, for Kant, the degree of free will present is proportional to the degree of rationality.
Human beings are most free when they are most rational in making judgments about actions. It happens though that this highest stage of rationality occurs precisely when, in judging, they will actions according to the moral law, or categorical imperative: Act so that the rule governing your action can be willed as a universal law for all rational beings.1 Hence human freedom is synonymous with willing the categorical imperative. In willing it however, human beings are not simply obeying an external principle; rather they are laying down for themselves the moral law―that is, they are exhibiting what Kant calls autonomy of the will. Reason, freedom, autonomy of the will, and the moral law are inseparable.2
What is probably most bothersome about Kant's position here is the limiting of freedom simply to willing the categorical imperative. We ask, How can we truly act freely if we are compelled to act in only one way? From Kant's standpoint though, we must eliminate the word "compelled" here. In exhibiting autonomy of the will, that is, in exhibiting our freedom, we will the moral law for and to ourselves without being compelled to recognize an obligation to accept it. And in so far as no compulsion is present, the freedom is real. Moreover, while many of us might prefer a more wide-ranging, less confining freedom in our everyday activities, Kant is insistent that no freedom exists when we act according to our sensory nature, which is subject to deterministic forces of the natural world. To be free, we must act through our intelligible nature; that is, we must use our reason; and to be rational in making judgments about practical actions is identical with willing the categorical imperative.
When we take up the issue of moral responsibility associated with this conception of free will, Kant's position becomes somewhat complicated because the intelligible world where reason reigns is not necessarily sufficient to direct what we do in practice. In effect, the moral force associated with autonomy of the will may be, and often is, overcome by the feelings, desires, and inclinations of our sensory nature. Now, in so far as our sensory nature is determined, we may well conclude that we are not morally responsible when feelings, desires, and inclinations become the driving force for actions. Nevertheless, Kant does not draw this conclusion. In so far as some moral force is associated with autonomy of the will and we recognize some of our actions as definitely falling short of what the moral law requires, we should not make excuses or deny moral responsibility because of our sensory nature. According to Kant,
In judging actions I must pay no heed to the infirmity of human nature. The law in us must be holy, and the sentence of this law must be applied to the actions of men with all exactness. Fragilitas humana cannot be a ground for lessening our responsibility coram foro humano interno. [Human weakness cannot be a ground for lessening our responsibility in the presence of the inner human judge (conscience).] The judge within us is just. He takes the action for what it is and makes no allowance for human defectiveness, if only we have the will to listen for his voice and do not stifle it. Assume, for instance, that on the spur of the moment I give offence to some one by a hasty word: I cannot dismiss it from my mind and I long for an opportunity to make amends; try as I may I cannot rid myself of reproaches; I may find all manner of excuses which would satisfy an earthly judge, I may urge that I am only human and that it is the easiest thing in the world to let a word slip, but the judge within us will not be satisfied; it is nothing to him that human nature is frail, his concern is only with the action as it is. This makes it clear that there are in human nature purely moral grounds of impulse, and that it is not necessary to decry human nature so sorely for its weakness.3
If there were no moral force within us (the "purely moral grounds of impulse") and no judgment according to the moral law ("the judge within us"), then we should not be held morally responsible because of our sensory nature. Since such is not the case however, we are morally responsible even when feelings, desires, and inclinations are the springs of action. Although we must be hard upon ourselves and not make excuses because we are capable of making judgments according to the moral law, Kant thinks that we should be more lenient in judging others―possibly because of the absence of any assurance that they, too, make judgments according to the moral law. Similarly, we do not attribute moral responsibility to children, lunatics, and drunken persons because of their inability to make judgments according to the moral law.
Like Kant, John Dewey associates freedom with reason, or intelligence. However he does not associate it with an internal power such as autonomy of the will residing in a separate intelligible world of reason. Instead, he regards freedom as an intensely practical, everyday activity.
John Dewey (1859 - 1952 C.E.), the best known and most influential American philosopher, was born in Vermont. He performed good, but not outstanding undergraduate work at the University of Vermont―followed by much more impressive graduate work at Johns Hopkins University where he received a doctorate in philosophy, in 1884. He then embarked upon his academic career―teaching nine years at the University of Michigan, one year at the University of Minnesota, ten years at the University of Chicago, and a quarter of a century at Columbia University. After his retirement in 1930, he remained philosophically active until near the time of death.
Dewey's philosophy was extremely influential in promoting development of the social sciences and in promoting democracy as a moral ideal. His educational theories have also had great influence. Dewey took an intense interest in current events, writing on many social issues and espousing numerous social causes. In the words of one admirer, ". . . more than any other American of his time, Dewey expressed the deepest hopes and aspirations of his fellow man. Whether dealing with a technical philosophical issue or with some concrete injustice, he displayed a rare combination of acuteness, good sense, imagination and wit" (Richard J. Bernstein).
Although not likely to win awards for his literary style, Dewey indeed was a prolific writer. A bibliography of his writings in itself could take up a small book.
Human Nature and Conduct and Reconstruction in Philosophy are two of his better known works.
According to Dewey,
What men have esteemed and fought for in the name of liberty is varied and complex―but certainly it has never been a metaphysical freedom of will. It seems to contain three elements of importance, though on their face not all of them are directly compatible with one another. (i) It includes efficiency in action, ability to carry out plans, the absence of cramping and thwarting obstacles. (ii) It also includes capacity to vary plans, to change the course of action, to experience novelties. And again (iii) it signifies the power of desire and choice to be factors in events.4
These elements are achievable through the human capacity to acquire an intelligent knowledge of facts and "to employ them in connection with desires and aims." As we know more about the conditions we are dealing with, we are able to deliberate more intelligently about possible courses of action and are therefore able to gain greater control over our future. And with this greater control comes greater freedom.
For Dewey, ignorance is a true enemy of freedom. As we overcome it, we expand the range of opportunities open to us and are no longer bound to the consequences of unknown forces. Hence we are free to the extent that we use reason or intelligence to make ourselves aware of our situation and its future possibilities so as to make our choices effective in controlling our future. Of intelligence, Dewey says,
Intelligence is the key to freedom in act. We are likely to be able to go ahead prosperously in the degree in which we have consulted conditions and formed a plan which enlists their consenting cooperation. The gratuitous help of unforeseen circumstance we cannot afford to despise. Luck, bad if not good, will always be with us. But it has a way of favoring the intelligent and showing its back to the stupid. And the gifts of fortune when they come are fleeting except when they are made taut by intelligent adaptation of conditions. In neutral and adverse circumstances, study and foresight are the only roads to unimpeded action.5
As we overcome our ignorance, we also take on greater moral responsibility. That is, as we use intelligence to become more aware of conditions present and opportunities available, we become more responsible for the consequences of our actions. Thus, for Dewey, freedom and moral responsibility are not static, "given" states of a human being; rather they vary with the person's situation and, in particular, with the function of intelligence in the situation.
Suppose that an importer buys baskets in Peru for one dollar apiece and then sells them in the United States for twenty-five dollars. To the extent that the basket weavers are ignorant of economic conditions in the United States and of marketing practices, they possess less freedom from Dewey's standpoint. By overcoming this ignorance, they increase their freedom because they are then likely to have a wider possible range of actions available and their own choices and desires have greater significance in their lives. For example, instead of merely accepting the one dollar per basket as the way things are, they can insist on a better return from the importer or band together to gain more bargaining power or seek out other marketing possibilities that insure a higher return. As knowledge of conditions affecting them increases, the basket weavers are increasingly able to use their intelligence in ways that enhance freedom. Similarly, they take greater moral responsibility, because they have greater control over their own lives. For example, in the initial situation of ignorance, they are less morally responsible for, say, dire poverty, than is the case once they increase their knowledge.
C. A. Campbell (1897 - 1971 C.E.), a British philosopher, taught for many years at the University of Glasgow in Scotland. His major papers have been collected together in a volume entitled In Defence of Free Will.
According to C. A. Campbell, moral responsibility, that is, the assignment of moral praise and blame, is only possible if we presume that a person could have chosen otherwise than he or she did. In other words, no one can be morally praised or blamed if there was only one way to act. Accordingly, moral responsibility requires free will.
Campbell grants that the majority of our actions do not exhibit free will; rather they result from the desires of our character as formed through our past biological and environmental history. Yet there still remain some situations, namely, those where a conflict arises between duty and strongest desire, where actions are attributable to free will. Let A be the dutiful action and B be the action according to strongest desire; moreover, let us suppose that the desire to do A is relatively weak relative to the desire to do B. Then,
In such situations we all believe, rightly or wrongly, that even although B continues to be in the line of least resistance, even although, in other words, the situation remains one with the characteristic marks of moral temptation, we can nevertheless align ourselves with A. We can do so, we believe, because we have the power to introduce a new energy, to make what we call an "effort of will", whereby we are able to act contrary to the felt balance of mere desire, and to achieve the higher end despite the fact that it continues to be in the line of greater resistance relatively to our desiring nature. . . .6
Moreover, Campbell thinks that the decision is not attributable simply to some effect of our previously formed character:
. . . the agent himself in the situation of moral temptation does not, and indeed could not, regard his formed character as having any influence whatever upon his act of decision as such. For the very nature of that decision, as it presents itself to him, is as to whether he will or will not permit his formed character to dictate his action. In other words, the agent distinguishes sharply between the self which makes the decision, and the self which, as formed character, determines not the decision but the situation within which the decision takes place. Rightly or wrongly, the agent believes that through his act of decision he can oppose and transcend his own formed character in the interest of duty. We are therefore obliged to say, I think, that the agent cannot regard his formed character as in any sense a determinant of the act of decision as such. The act is felt to be a genuinely creative act, originated by the self ad hoc, and by the self alone.7
In these situations where duty conflicts with strongest desire, Campbell believes that we can be immediately aware, introspectively, that a creative act of self-choice resolves the conflict. In that creative act resides our free will and, consequently, the rightful attribution of moral responsibility.
(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)
If human freedom consists in willing the categorical imperative, then this is not what most people mean by free will since it only allows for a single course of action. If we accept Kant's limited conception of free will along with the determinism of our sensory nature, then, for all practical purposes, we might as well embrace determinism completely.
Furthermore, Kant's separation of a human being into a determined sensory nature and a free intelligible nature creates a false dichotomy. In actuality, we cannot separate reason and the senses so sharply, because human beings function as a reasoning-sensing whole in the overwhelming majority of their practical activities. That this is so becomes very obvious when Kant tries to deal with moral responsibility. He has to admit that our actions result from both reason and sensory nature; and then he concludes, inconsistently, that we are morally responsible for actions attributable, for the most part, to our determined sensory nature.
A Possible Reply: What most people mean by free will is not the point-at-issue. Rather we need a rationally clear and defensible conception of freedom. Thus, if most people find freedom confined to a single course of action too limited, this "fact" does not detract in any way from a rational understanding of the way in which autonomy of the will lays down the categorical imperative without any compulsion.
Regarding sensible and intelligible nature, here we must accept human beings for what they are. Reason is capable of functioning independently of sensory experience; indeed, such functioning is the only sure basis for truth. The role of sensory nature in our actions should not blind us to the way reason is capable of functioning independently. In the case of moral responsibility specifically, we should not let our sensory nature provide an excuse for not recognizing the way in which our actions fall short of what we rationally realize to be the morally correct course of action.
It is highly questionable whether Dewey even deals with the problem of free will. He never really deals with the causes of human actions. More particularly, he never considers the ways in which biological circumstances, environmental conditions, and past personal history determine actions. That this is so becomes evident when we consider the "three elements" he associates with free will: none of these elements is incompatible with determinism, unless Dewey can establish the independence of each element from biological circumstances, environmental conditions, and past personal history. He does not do this. As a result, his "freedom is a special kind of personal feeling rather than a special state of free will existing within human beings.
A Possible Reply: We must avoid the tendency of philosophers to deal with free will in highly abstract terms. Freedom is a practical, everyday activity. The three elements mentioned capture the essence of what is meant by freedom in practical everyday activity. Furthermore, upon examination, we find that intelligence is the key to functioning freely, that is, to exhibiting the three elements.
Campbell grants that our character is deterministically formed but maintains that free will occurs when a creative act of self-choice resolves conflicts between duty and strongest desire. He makes the mistake however of failing to recognize duty as another aspect of character development. What we take to be our duty, correctly or incorrectly, is as much an expression of character as any desire we may have. Consequently, since character is deterministically formed, any conflicts between the demands of duty and desire are deterministically resolved. In other words, we act on the basis of the strongest motive after it has evolved deterministically according to the relative strengths of duty and desire within our character.
A Possible Reply: When we go through a moral struggle between duty and desire, we are aware that desire expresses what we want to do and duty is an external obligation to which we may or may not conform. Hence duty is not simply another aspect of our character as deterministically formed; and the resolution of conflict between duty and desire requires free will.
2.201 What is Kant's categorical imperative? From his perspective, you are free to the extent that you use, or will, the categorical imperative and you are determined to the extent that you do not use, or will, it. Consider some proposed action where you decide what to do on the basis of something other than the categorical imperative. Why would Kant regard your subsequent action to be determined? Would you yourself regard it to be determined? Explain your answer.
2.202 Do you think that Kant's free will is worth having? Why or why not?
2.21 According to Dewey's position, freedom and moral responsibility are not static, 'given' states of a human being; rather, they vary with the person's situation and, in particular, with the function of intelligence in the situation. Thus freedom and responsibility vary according to circumstances. Given this view, how can you increase your degree of freedom and responsibility? Which groups of people in our society are least free and least morally responsible? To what extent do persons themselves control the circumstances that affect their degree of freedom and moral responsibility? How would you justify your answers? Do you agree with his "variable" interpretation of freedom and responsibility? Why or why not?
2.211 Do you think that Dewey's "practical" interpretation of free will makes more sense than some of the more abstract interpretations in other positions?
2.22 Is the judgment that "a person could have chosen otherwise absolutely essential to a conception of moral responsibility, as C. A. Campbell insists? Why or why not?
2.221 Do you agree with Campbell that most of our actions are due to our deterministically formed character and therefore do not exhibit free will? Justify your answer.
2.222 Try to think of a situation in your own life where a conflict occurred between duty and your strongest desire. Then discuss the way you resolved the conflict. Did you resolve it through a creative act of self-choice that vindicates Campbell's position on free will? Explain your answer.
3.23 For Kant, Dewey, and Campbell give one example of what each would mean by "acting freely." Then consider what the two others would say in commenting upon each example. Would there be agreement or disagreement? Are there instances where one of the commentators would analyze the example quite differently so that it is not a case of "acting freely? (Suppose we give as an example of "acting freely, from Campbell's standpoint, choosing between the duty of marital fidelity and the urge to have an extra-marital sexual affair. Would Kant go along with this as an example of "acting freely"?)
2.231 Considering the positions thus far―Sartre, Kant, Dewey, and Campbell―regarding free will, which would you be most comfortable with? Least comfortable? Justify your answers.
2.232 Evaluate the various Objections to partial free will mentioned in the text. Be sure to consider the Possible Replies, in making your evaluation. Which is the strongest objection? The weakest? Would you offer other objections besides those mentioned in the text? If so, what are they? Do you have any preference among the three philosophical positions discussed? If so, explain why. What is your general evaluation of partial free will?
1. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 18.
2. See ibid., p. 71.
3. Kant, Lectures on Ethics (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 67
4. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1930), pp. 303-304.
5. Ibid., pp. 304-305.
6. C. A. Campbell, "In Defence of Free Will," in Campbell, In Defence of Free Will and Other Philosophical Essays (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1967), p. 42.
7. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
(Note: The 1986 copyright was initially held by University Press of America, Ron Yezzi, Directing Human Actions: Perspectives on Basic Ethical Issues--but was then transferred to me.)