John Hospers poses this question: "How can anyone be responsible for his actions, since they grow out of his character, which is shaped and molded and made what it is by influences―some hereditary, but most of them stemming from early parental environment―that were not of his own making or choosing?"1 He notes the existence of hundreds of psychiatric case histories documenting ways in which subconscious forces mold actions. In "What Means This Freedom?" he offers the following fairly typical example:
. . . The mother blames her daughter for choosing the wrong men as candidates for husbands; but though the daughter thinks she is choosing freely and spends a considerable amount of time "deciding" among them, the identification with her sick father, resulting from Oedipal fantasies in early childhood, prevents her from caring for any but sick men, twenty or thirty years older than herself. Blaming her is beside the point; she cannot help it, and she cannot change it.2
Hospers also says,
Countless criminal acts are thought out in great detail; yet the participants are (without their own knowledge) acting out fantasies, fears, and defenses from early childhood, over whose coming and going they have no conscious control.3
These kinds of explanation are not applicable only to the neurotic, psychotic, and abnormal. "Normal" persons as well are motivated by unconscious forces.
According to Hospers, we may suggest various justifications for assigning moral responsibility: (1) A person acted with premeditation; (2) A person stated reasons for the action; (3) A person can be convinced by reasons to act differently; or (4) A person exerted enormous personal effort in overcoming obstacles. Yet how do we know that the nature of the premeditation is not determined by unconscious motives? (For example, a person may carefully plan a Presidential assassination without being aware of underlying motives.) Or how do we draw a line between genuine reasons and rationalizations that mask unconscious motives? If reasons convince a person to act differently, what unconscious forces molded the person's character to be amenable to rational persuasion? Or what lucky circumstances determined a person's character so that obstacles are met with enormous personal effort? These justifications for assigning moral responsibility all have serious liabilities.
In asserting that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility, Hospers does not mean to imply that we cannot send anyone to prison for a crime or to an institution because of mental disturbance. Such actions are sometimes justifiable as ways of protecting society. Furthermore, Hospers grants the usefulness and acceptability of some words―such as "credit" and "blame," "reward" and "punishment," and "responsibility"―at the level of ordinary, everyday language. Determinism however precludes the use of such words at a deeper, more basic level.
Some Objections and Possible Replies
(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)
(1) The Unreliability of Psychoanalysis
Accounts of unconscious motives make for exciting reading; but they do not report hard facts. To the extent that the hard determinists' denial of moral responsibility rests upon unreliable psychoanalytic studies, the denial lacks a firm foundation.
A Possible Reply: Given the extent of psychoanalytic reporting and research over nearly a century, psychoanalysis is not so easily dismissible as the objection asserts.
Even if we gave up psychoanalytic reports however, we would have ample hereditary and environmental conditions―unknown to persons and beyond their control―by which to explain the molding of character and temperament. So the grounds for denying moral responsibility would still remain.
(2) The Problem of Moral Responsibility
As a matter of common knowledge, we know that we can and do hold persons morally responsible for their actions. We morally praise and blame people constantly―whether we are talking about a murderer, a President, a family member, an acquaintance, or a friend. If our actions are determined however, assigning moral praise or blame makes no sense. Hence determinism is incompatible with a more basic truth about human existence, namely, moral responsibility. In resolving any conflict here, we are justified in going along with our common knowledge rather than accepting the questionable extrapolations of determinists. So we should accept free will.
A Possible Reply: From the standpoint of hard determinism, we can safely eliminate moral responsibility. We can reward or punish persons according to what is best for the interests of society without holding them personally responsible for their actions. For example, thievery and murder are contrary to the best interests of society. Consequently, we can restrain thieves and murderers so they cannot commit anti-social acts or encourage others to do so, without morally praising or blaming these unfortunates. Such elimination of moral responsibility also encourages the more civilized approach of rehabilitating criminals rather than simply condemning and punishing them.
2.5 Hospers gives reasons for asserting that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. How would you evaluate these reasons?
2.51 To what extent are your own actions motivated by unconscious forces? How would you go about deciding upon an answer to this question? How important is the question with respect to your life? Is the question really important in talking about your moral responsibility for actions?
2.52 What evaluation would you make of the Objections and Possible Replies?
1. John Hospers, "What Means This Freedom?", in Bernard Berofsky, ed., Free Will and Determinism (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 32.
2. Ibid., p. 27.
3. Ibid.
(Note: The 1986 copyright was initially held by University Press of America, Ron Yezzi, Directing Human Actions: Perspectives on Basic Ethical Issues--but was then transferred to me.)
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