Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 1986, 1993, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 1986, 1993, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
As a final position, we consider the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche who asserted that the "mechanical doltishness" of the determinists matches the "crass stupidity" of the free willists. Neither the conception of free will as a "cause of itself" (causa sui) nor the "reification" of causal relationships makes sense to Nietzsche. He says,
The causa sui [cause of itself] is the best self-contradiction that has yet been conceived, it is a sort of logical violation and unnaturalness; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with this very folly. The desire for"freedom of the will" in the superlative, metaphysical sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated; the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui and, with more than Münchhausen's audacity, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness. If any one should find out in this manner the crass stupidity of the celebrated conception of "free will" and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him to carry his "enlightenment" a step further, and also put out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of "free will": I mean "non-free will," which is tantamount to a misuse of cause and effect. One should not wrongly materialize "cause and "effect," as the natural philosophers do (and whoever like them naturalize in thinking at present), according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until it "effects" its end; one should use "cause" and "effect" only as pure conceptions, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and mutual understanding―not for explanation. In the "being-in-itself" there is nothing of "causal-connection," of "necessity," or of "psychological non-freedom"; there the effect does not follow the cause, there "law" does not obtain. It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we interpret and intermix this symbol-world, as "being-in-itself," with things, we act once more as we have always acted―mythologically. The "non-free will" is mythology; in real life it is only a question of strong and weak wills.1
The free willists who desire to bear entire and ultimate responsibility, he warns, are trying to pull themselves "up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness"; the determinists, on the other hand, have confused their scientific concepts, which are just "conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and mutual understanding," with the description and explanation of reality. Nietzsche finds it revealing that scientists who create the concepts of cause and effect themselves become the slaves of their own creation by accepting determinism. Here is the revelation of a weak will.
According to Nietzsche, "in real life it is only a question of strong and weak wills." In this sense, the usual arguments over free will and determinism are irrelevant. The person of strong will delights in getting something to obey―whether it be emotions, one's body, other people, or objects in the environment; and that is all this person needs to have "free will." The person of weak will, on the other hand, evades responsibility and does "not wish to be answerable for anything." We can forget about free will and determinism, if we know the difference between strong and weak wills.
Nietzsche's treatment of free will and determinism also points toward solution of a problem resulting from his insistence upon the will to power as the fundamental instinct of human beings and his advocacy of commitment or self-choice in the direction of life. Ordinarily, an instinct is conceived as being determined and therefore in conflict fundamentally with a commitment of free choice. Nietzsche however rejects this ordinary way of talking about free will and determinism. Commitment and the will to power are both indicators of a strong will; and that, for Nietzsche, is the fundamental issue. So we can, from his perspective, forget about any potential inconsistency between an instinct and a free choice.
Nietzsche's focus upon strong and weak wills simply begs the question-at-issue with respect to free will and determinism, since we still do not know whether those wills are free or determined. It follows that the issue of moral responsibility also remains unanswered.
The description of scientific concepts as "conventional fictions" and the charge that scientists proceed "mythologically"--which constitutes the basis for his rejection of determinism--ignore the careful methods and research in the sciences. Scientific method and accumulated scientific evidence have a way of dispelling fictions and mythology. So, in terms of knowledge, science is our best guide in describing and explaining reality.
A Possible Reply: The point is that the issue of free will and determinism is irrelevant in real life; so the objection that "focus upon strong and weak wills begs the question-at-issue" is really no objection at all.
Regarding the "careful methods and research in the sciences," we should not confuse the confined, stilted language of science with reality. Science is simply an expedient way of limiting our consideration of reality for some convenient purposes. While the limiting may be useful at times, the fullness of reality is lost. And when we fail to recognize what is lost, we create myths.
**2.70 Why does Nietzsche attribute "crass stupidity" to the free willists and "mechanical doltishness" to the determinists? Would you agree or disagree with him? Why?
**2.71 Nietzsche's account of scientific concepts has a somewhat contemporary "ring" in the light of some recent work in the philosophy of science. If this problem interests you, you may want to read Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
**2.72 Do you agree with Nietzsche that strong and weak wills are the real issue, not free will and determinism, and free will can be associated with delighting in getting something to obey? Explain your answer.
*2.721 Evaluate the objections and possible replies with respect to Nietzsche's position.
1.Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (New York: MacMillan Company, 1907), pp. 29-31.