Research

Working papers/work in progress

• Coordination via Redistribution with Andrea Martinangeli and Peter Martinsson

  • Idea: Voluntary redistribution options can improve coordination.

• Communication as Gift-Exchange with Mark Le Quement. Online Appendix. (R&R Games and Economic Behavior)

  • Idea: Reciprocity can lead to informative communication.

• Punishment Cannot Sustain Cooperation in a Public Good game with Free-rider Anonymity with Edward Cartwright

  • Idea: Punishment loses efficacy when there is imperfect information.

• Endogenous Leadership and Public Goods with Edward Cartwright

  • Idea: Identifying conditions under which a rational agent would choose to lead in public good provision.

Published Papers

• Introduction to Special Issue on Psychological Game Theory with Martin Dufwenberg (2019), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 167: 181-184.

• Guilt and Participation with Alec Smith (2019), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 167: 279-295.

  • Idea: Characterising the implications of guilt-aversion in discrete public good games.

• Agreements with Reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs (2018) with Dooseok Jang and Martin Dufwenberg, Games and Economic Behavior 111: 85-99. Online appendix.

  • Idea: Rejecting binding agreements can be beneficial for public good investment.

• Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem (2017) with Martin Dufwenberg, Games and Economic Behavior 101: 260-272.

  • Idea: Networks of reciprocity can solve the coordination problem in discrete public good games.

• How Category Reporting Can Improve Fundraising (2013) with Edward Cartwright, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 87:73-90.

  • Idea: Characterisation of how a fundraiser should optimally publicise donations.

• Naive beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms (2012) with Edward Cartwright, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 168: 280-289.

  • Idea: Non-Bayes' rational beliefs can reduce the indeterminism of social norms.

• Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game (2010) with Edward Cartwright, Journal of Public Economic Theory 12(4): 691-708.

  • Idea: An expectation of imitation motivates early contributions in a sequential public good game.

• Public Goods, Social Norms and Naive Beliefs (2010) with Edward Cartwright, Journal of Public Economic Theory 12(2): 199-223.

  • Idea: Non-Bayes' rational beliefs can increase or decrease public good contributions.