Student Conference 2013

Date, Time, Location

April 13, 8am-6:30pm, St. Catherine University, St. Paul, MN

Keynote

Ramona Ilea (Pacific University)

Title: Philosophy and Activism: Compatible or In Tension?

Abstract: I analyze the way in which being a philosopher is compatible and in tension with being an activist. I focus on animal rights as a case study, but my analysis is applicable to other types of activism and philosophical writing, especially in the area of applied ethics.

Program

Here's a link to the current program.

Abstracts (by Room)

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Lance Pearson (MSU)

"A Moral Accounting of Unrequited Love: Perspectives from both Hume and Kant"

In all the many great works done in the name of morality and ethics, all of the in-depth analysis of human behavior and intention, and all of the voluminous works regarding from whence do our inclinations of what justice ought to be like unfurl there is little space for love. Hey, love needs love too. A thousand poets and artists have worked their medium without thanks, their reward to see their labor made explicit in reality, their love made real. Much has been said in philosophy on how things are loved, but less so on on love itself, especially considering the libraries of other topics treated. It is in part an effort to add to this lesser field that this paper is written. It is also an effort to explore the morality of love, particularly with regards to Kant and Hume. It is also an effort to explore along similar lines the morality of unrequited love, a topic almost unheard of in philosophy, for it would appear to be yet more emotional flim-flam unworthy of great thought, and worse it would appear to not even involve others in a significant enough way to be worthy of inquiring into its effects at large. It is a topic worthy of attention, however, and the thesis of this very paper regards it. Thesis: Unrequited love is moral and ethical. Both systems of moral thought are examined and love, as defined by the particular thinker, is moral, though several issues do arise, and for Kant, there may be an irreconcilable issue.. Unrequited love is also found to be moral.

Christine Sabatuk (UMTC)

"Is an intrinsically moral life appealing to the liar? A critique of Powell"

I will argue against the position that Powell argues for in his paper called “Kant and Kantians on “The Normative Question””. Powell argues for the interpretation of Kant on the Normative Question as leading a moral life is intrinsically valuable. I will first explain the part of Kantian morality that Powell is addressing. In particular, I will focus on Kant’s first formulation of his Categorical Imperative and its relation to the Normative Question of morality. In particular I will be referring to examples of lying when demonstrating these concepts. After I have established this base, I will summarize Powell’s article. First, I will go over what practical reason foundationalism is and his critique of it. Then, the second part of this will be his response to why the practical reason foundationalists are wrong on what Kant’s answer to the Normative Question is; which is Powell’s claim. Lastly, I will argue that Powell and the practical reason foundationalists’ answer to the Normative Question are not sufficient answers to this problem. Instead, I will argue the claim that morality as useful is the correct response to the normative question.

Alethea Tusher (UMD)

"Understanding the Role of Liking in the Experience of Love"

In this paper, I accept J. David Velleman’s theory that to love someone is to respond to his Kantian dignity by becoming emotionally vulnerable to him. However, I amend his theory by adding that what we mean when we say that we want to be loved is to be loved and liked simultaneously. In this context, to like is to like someone for his instrumental value, whereas to love is to love someone for his intrinsic value. I lay out Velleman’s account of love in which he proposes love to be another response, along with respect, to a person’s Kantian dignity. I then amend Velleman’s theory by elucidating how the conception of liking as distinct from but often coexisting with love explains how under Velleman’s account one comes to love another person as well as how it is possible to love someone whom you do not desire to spend time with or promote.

Cody Sweeney (UMTC)

"Against the Moral Cognitivist Interpretation of Hume In Response to the Common Sense Objection to Mereological Nihilism"

In her paper “Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume’s Metaethics” Elizabeth Radcliffe argues two contentious points about David Hume: (i) that he is best read as a moral cognitivist, and (ii) that his moral cognitivism and moral internalism are compatible, contrary to the dominate view that moral internalism is incompatible with moral cognitivism. According to Radcliffe, under Hume’s philosophy, a moral judgment can be cognitive even though it is the result of a non-cognitive judging process caused by sentiments. However, I argue that this fails to establish Hume as a moral cognitivist because it does not account for how a prescriptive idea, such as goodness or wrongness, can arise in the judgment through the process. At most what can be said as a cognitive judgment regarding the sentiments is something like “I have a sentiment of approval towards x.” A statement like “x is good” would be blocked by Hume’s empiricism because there is no impression of the “good,” only the impression of a sentiment of approval. It follows, then, that meta-ethicists do not have to attempt to reconcile in Hume’s philosophy his internalism with moral cognitivism because he has not yet been established as moral cognitivist.

Krystal Bundy (Gusdavus)

"Philosophy of Food: The Myth of the Self/Other Distinction and Alternatives Found in Food Philosophy"

The traditional western philosophical canon has yielded a self/other distinction that has been detrimental to our health as “selves” and as a society. By identifying ourselves as pure reasoners bound to base desires like hunger, we have produced an environment of hostility toward the body and food. This paper examines a few core reasons we maintain a self/other distinction. Namely, we maintain the distinction because a) we identify as reasoners, b) we think of ourselves as autonomous, and c) the idea of an infinite reasoning capacity as opposed to a finite body gives us hope for immortality. The paper then questions the reasons for holding the self/other distinction and identifies ways in which this distinction actually harms us, such as the example of anorexia nervosa set by Susan Bordo’s “Anorexia Nervosa: Psychopathology as the Crystallization of Culture.” This paper concludes that we can find a better alternative in food philosophy, which embraces instead of shames the body and food.

Emma Connell (Concordia)

"From Bachelard to Justice Brennan: The Supreme Court’s Reflections of Philosophical Understandings of Privacy"

The concept of privacy has always been essential to human beings. It has not been stagnant, however. Human understandings of what it means to be private have shifted dramatically as ways of human existence have moved toward being largely technologically-based. Legal understandings of privacy have shifted along with this development, since law is, by nature, reflective rather than generative. A thorough study of privacy law before the mid-1980s indicates that societal understandings of privacy have shifted significantly in the last few decades. Privacy law of the 1900s reflects that United States citizens considered privacy to be tied to place, specifically within the home. Examination of privacy law before the 1980’s juxtaposed against the philosophies of Bachelard, Mills, Hume, and Levinas show that the concept of home as a private place is deeply rooted in the understanding of human existence. From the 1980’s on, however, Supreme Court cases have revolved around privacy as relating to information. These laws show that human conceptions of privacy have shifted as society has morphed. I argue that the shift from place orientation to an information focus is indicative of a philosophical shift in the human understanding of privacy, and that this has dramatic implications for human experience.

Edward Eiffler IV (UMTC)

"Human Nature via Power"

Throughout my essay, I offer a critique of Hobbes’ Leviathan, which then provides an alternative using the state of nature as a means to understand human nature. This alternative allows us to conceive of human nature, while not being hypothetical. The alternative is considering someone with power, not only over themselves, but also over others. What the individual does with their power, demonstrates an example of human nature. I am not claiming to know what human nature is, but rather a realistic means to find it. In doing so, I use De Sade’s 120 Days of Sodom, as an example of what people can do with power. Initially, we arrive at a similar understanding of human nature. While De Sade focuses on sexual desire and Hobbes does not, they both focus on human nature being self-interested.

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Michael Hanson (UMD)

"In Response to the Common Sense Objection to Mereological Nihilism"

Mereological nihilism, a theory in compositional metaphysics, has long suffered the objection that in virtue of its sheer anti-intuitive nature, it ought not to be believed. This essay seeks to address this objection. To this end this essay will provide a brief account of the nihilist position, an example of the objection that is prototypical, and an original attempt to meet this objection by providing a reasonable example of “common sense” that contains intuitions directed at mereological nihilism.

Sam Eklund (Macalester)

"Gunk and Junk: Mereological Combinations"

In this paper, I introduce two principles of mereology, gunk and junk. Gunk is the position that there are no fundamental “simples” of the world; all matter is infinitely divisible into further and further parts. Junk is the view that objecthood should be assigned to all collections of objects, regardless of similarity or spatial proximity. I will show that even though one’s position about junk may complement one’s belief in the status of gunk, the two are logically independent of one another. In order to show this, I will outline four coherent positions which all represent different positions on a “gunk/junk axis.”

Svetlana Shetinina (UMTC)

"Vagueness and Logic"

Vague concepts are present all around us – tall, fast, sweet, red, clear – and how we use these words can be described as an attempt to create meaningful categories often through comparisons and judgment calls. Given the presence of vagueness in a large number of our concepts and the need to sort out these concepts to make reasoned decisions, logic should attempt to incorporate some aspects of vagueness into its basic framework. In this paper I examine how classical logic treats issues of vagueness, determine what aspects of vagueness should be preserved within the system, and argue that a logical system such as the logic-asmodeling view, proposed by Roy T. Cook in the paper “Vagueness and Mathematical Precision”, would be more effective in helping us make sense of the world because it corresponds more closely to how we reason, does not attempt to ignore vagueness and consequently could help us gain insight into more complex concepts.

Tyler Hanck (Macalester)

"Ideational Sameness in Locke’s Philosophy of Language: The Inverted Color Spectrum Revisited"

Lockean communication depends upon two particular ideas being the same, viz. the idea signified by the speaker’s word and the idea excited in the mind of the listener. It is not clear what exactly Locke means by this. One wonders what theory of identity Locke intends for the sameness of ideas. Significative sameness has been offered as the standard account of what makes two ideas the same. In this paper I argue that this is not Locke’s view. Instead, I propose an account of ideational sameness that reflects both Locke’s empiricism and his naturalism: qualitative similarity. Two ideas are the same if the introspective, qualitative content of those ideas are roughly the same. The conventional way of reading the inverted color spectrum passage is thus an obstacle for my view. So, I propose an alternative way of understanding that part of the Essay not merely to tip the scale in my favor but also to approach Locke on his own terms, not ours.

Jordan Beaman (Hamline)

"Internet: A New Paradigm for Epistemology"

In the modern world, technology advances at a rate that biological evolution cannot match. As a result, it is important to be cognizant of the forces that we utilize everyday in the pursuit of knowledge, namely, the internet. Today, the way in which one acquires information is almost exclusively through the internet. Such a vast change in the course of human evolution must have some effect on the way in which we develop knowledge and think about knowledge. The internet is an incredible tool that can be extremely beneficial to our species, but it is important to recognize the changes that result from such pervasive technology in order to avoid dissonance with our traditional modes of education, and to avoid making errors in the attribution of truth-values to information found online that might be deceiving.

James Kunz (MSU)

"Attacking Epistemic Relativism"

If Paul Boghossian’s argument is sound, then no one anywhere can have even one piece of objective knowledge about the world. By objective I mean a statement is true independently of what people think. For example, common claims we take as objective are that the earth is round, or that 2 + 2 = 4. Subjective claims on the other hand would include statements such as that vanilla is the best kind of ice cream, or that the weather is not very pleasant today. Objective knowledge, though, is something most of us take for granted all the time, and without it we can’t really say we are sure we are actually experiencing the world as it is in an objective sense, rather than as we subjectively “know” it is. Boghossian’s argument states that if there are epistemic facts about what justifies what, then one should be able to have justified beliefs about them. He goes on to say we cannot, and that in the end this leads to epistemic relativism. However the first premise of his argument leads to a major epistemological dilemma.

Casey Rufener (Macalester)

"Reconsidering Poincare’s Geometric Conventionalism"

In chapter four of Reconsidering Logical Positivism philosopher Michael Freidman concludes the following, “this conception [the positivist’s] of the relationship between Poincare rests on a remarkable- and, in the end, ironical-misunderstanding of history” (Friedman, pg. 73). Freidman devotes his chapter to showing Poincare’s geometric conventionalism is incommensurable with Einstein’s theory of relativity. In showing the two notions to be incommensurable, Friedman is able to conclude the positivists [more specifically Moritz Schlick and Rudolph Carnap] are gravely (almost comically) mistaken to conflate the two. I will not argue with Freidman about the positivists interpretation. Also, my intention isn’t to contend with Friedman on the incommensurability of Poincare’s conventionalism and relativity. My contention with Friedman-and the focus of this paper is on his interpretation of Poincare’s conventionalism.

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Dennis Calkins (Hamline)

"Functionalism and Aristotle: A Survey of the Evidence"

Aristotle’s philosophy of mind has been interpreted in a variety of ways in the years since his death. This work argues that a functionalist interpretation is, if not the right one, not far off. In the course of this (condensed) work, the reader is given an introduction to the basics of Aristotle’s view of the hylomorphic soul, Aristotle’s concept of mind, and an understanding of functionalism. This work attempts to highlight sections from De Anima and Metaphysics that accord with functionalism, while also looking to those sections that present trouble to this interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind. Pulling from contemporary sources, the work also gives the reader a good grounding in modern scholarship. In the end, this work reveals a thinker who’s philosophy of mind is very much functionalist in nature.

Qr’stof Rochel (Hamline)

"May Be, May Be Not: Re-interpreting Parmenides in Plato’s Sophist"

With this paper, I contend that the argument of Plato’s Sophist is not, as Plato believes, necessarily at odds with the maxim of Parmenides which is presented in the dialogue. I begin by breaking down the difficulty of accounting for sophistic false-saying which the dialogue seeks to solve and presenting a detailed picture of Plato’s solution to this problem. Next I show that the problematic conception of nonbeing as contrary to being, upon which the problem of false-saying turns, is not, as Plato leads us to believe, entailed by Parmenides’ maxim. After discussing reasons Plato may have had for associating Parmenides with this problematic conception of nonbeing, I finally argue that the maxim, far from opposing the argument of the Sophist, is best understood as doing exactly what the dialogue purportedly seeks to do – warn us of the dangers of false saying and thinking

Wesley Brand (UMMorris)

"The Cosmological Argument and Mathematical Reasoning"

This paper has two goals: to examine a version of the Cosmological Argument advanced in David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion that claims God is the necessary alternative to an impossible infinite causal chain and to object that since time similarly cannot extend infinitely into the past and since causation requires temporal succession no being could cause time itself; thus, no creator necessarily determines the nature of physics.

Max Henkel (Carleton)

"Human Nature and Its Limitations"

In his essay “The Humanism of Existentialism” Jean-Paul Sartre proposes that “man is nothing else but what he makes of himself.” I wish to challenge this notion with a series of objections. Humans are, of course, fundamentally limited in their ability to act in ways they are not capable of considering due to some kind of epistemic deficiency, and some courses of action are necessarily “non-starters” due to the constraints of the physical world. The more important challenge I raise in this paper regards the connection between action and plan-making. I assert that individuals only carry out actions because they have previously made plans to do so, and that these plans reflect some degree of becoming something by styling oneself in a particular way. Humans are inescapably compelled to make plans for their lives, and this limits human freedom in its own particular way. The paper defends this thesis while also exploring objections to the notion that an unavoidable process of plan-making limits human freedom.

Emily Hurd (St. Thomas)

"Crime and Punishment: Understanding the Value of the Human Person"

In the novel, Crime and Punishment, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s character Raskolnikov struggles to understand the value of the human person. Raskolnikov attempts to test his value through an experiment of the Nietzschean philosophy of “the great man.” Can one step over the law and kill without remorse, murder without casuistry? In testing whether or not he is a great man, Raskolnikov believes that his only value and worth as a human being comes from his ability to successfully execute his crime without remorse. Should he fail in his test, any value he had perceived in himself comes to nothing. To Raskolnikov, his value is something he deserves or does not deserve according to his status as a great man. However, Dostoevsky believes a person’s value is not determined by any sense of desert; rather, one’s value is something he intrinsically has as a human being. In this paper, I will attempt to show how Raskolnikov’s “great man” theory, which fundamentally does not allow for any intrinsic human value, is unfeasible because of its destructive effects on society, the innate understanding of human value all persons share, and ultimately its incompatibility with the existence of love. I will then show how Dostoevsky successfully proves the existence of the intrinsic value of the human person by the understanding that love is not a function of desert in accordance with action, but is given in light of the value of a person. I will conclude in demonstrating how Sonya’s love for and recognition of Raskolnikov’s personal value at last brings meaning to his life which no ability to “step over” could.

Charles Reinhardt (St. Thomas)

"Sonya and Blessed John Paul II’s Genus of Women"

Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment presents a set of diverse views of the human condition. Dostoevsky uses different characters to present the various social philosophies and social situations. Each of these philosophies seeks to understand and reduce human suffering. The view presented by Raskolnikov is based on a subset of society. He thinks about great individuals who are not bound by the law. These individuals are able to “step over” the law in order to fulfill their greatness and alleviate the suffering of mankind. Despite the fact that she does not fit into any of the theories, Sonya alone successfully overcomes suffering. I will argue that Dostoevsky, through the character of Sonya, advances an understanding of what it means to be a human, in particular a woman, similar to the understanding that proposed by Blessed John Paul II in Mulieris Dignitatem. I will do so by showing how Sonya does not fit into Raskonikov's understandings of humanity, then by analyzing Sonya based on three aspects of John Paul’s teaching.

No One (NON)

"What Does Not Exist: The Content of this Session"

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