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2019 Minnesota Philosophical Society Conference

Saturday October 26, 8AM – 4 PM, Anoka Ramsey Community College, Cambridge, MN

The 2019 Minnesota Philosophical Society Conference and Undergraduate Conference will take place Sat. Oct 26 from 8 AM until 4 PM on the Cambridge campus of Anoka Ramsey Community College.

Please contact Peter.Wahlstrom@anokaramsey.edu if you have any questions.

There will be a $10 fee for all non-undergraduate attendees. Please make out checks to “Minnesota Philosophical Society.”

Checking in and Finding Your Way Around ARCC (entrance at circle drive)

When you arrive at the conference, you can check in at the G Building Lobby and join us for a light breakfast in G201. Parking available in lot 2.

A map of ARCC is included in the following pages, and can also be found online here: https://arccwebstorage.blob.core.windows.net/media/3104/cc-campus-maps.pdf

Lunch (11:30-12:20)

We will be having a light lunch catered from the City Center Market.

Nearby off-campus dining options (within a 5 to 10 minute drive) for a quick lunch include:

· Willards - 133-135 Main St. S

· People’s Cafe - 118 Main St S

· Chapala Mexican Grill - 200 2nd Ave SE

· Herman’s Bakery & Deli - 130 Main St S

· Pizza Pub - 124 Main St S

· Cambridge Bar & Grill - 216 Main St S

Keynote Address (12:30 to 2, G202)

Michael Fuerstein (St. Olaf College), "Diagnosing Moral Failure On Climate Change: Lessons From the History of Gay Rights and Women’s Rights" The keynote will take place from 12:30 to 2 PM in G202 Auditorium/Theater. It is open to the public.

Climate change is imminent, and it is severe and far-reaching in its implications. Given the inadequacy of humanity’s response up to this point, it threatens to become one of our greatest moral failures. What would real progress look like? What would make it possible? I approach these questions by drawing lessons from the gay rights and women’s rights movements, two of the most promising episodes from our recent moral past. The key factors in those cases were democratic experiments of living: systemic interventions in social practice which re-shaped the moral experience of privileged social groups. Such cases suggest that progress depends, not just on improvements in knowledge or deliberation, but also on improvements in moral community. I offer an interpretation of this idea and consider the implications for addressing our looming climate catastrophe.

Hotel Options in the area

· GrandStay Hotel & Suites - 300 Garfield St S, Cambridge, 763-689-0542

· Best Western Plus - 409 Main St E, Isanti, 763-452-0520

ARCC Campus Map

Conference Schedule

8 AM-11:30 PM

F105

F106

F107

F205

F206

F222

F223

G202

8:30-9:20

“The Biggest Mistake in Philosophy of Mind: Neglecting the Periphery”

Jason Ford (University of Minnesota-Duluth)

“Does Autonomous Reasoning Favor Consequentialism?”

Caner Turan (Tulane University)

“You are Too Stupid to Know Anything: Epistemic Injustice and Cognitive Disability”

Caroline Christoff

(University of Minnesota-Duluth)

“Role of Rule Based Ontological Studies in explaining Social world and its Criticism”

Neetika Singh (Indian Institute of Technology)

“Strategies for Defending and Promoting the Value of Philosophy”

Paul Nieman

(St. Cloud State University)

“On the Scientific Legitimacy of Animal Beliefs”

Paul Kelly (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

“The War for Personal Integration: An Antithesis and Synthesis of Virtue Ethics and Situationism”

Anthony Dittus

(Marquette University)

“The Problem With Probabilism”

Russell Ahmed-Buehler

(Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science)

9:30-10:20

“On Appeal To Prudential Intuition”

Joe Nelson (Duke University)

“J. S. Mill was not a Particularist”

Henry West (Macalester College)

“Futility, Complicity, and the Ethics of Collective Action”

Alex Bearden

(BGSU & ARCC)

“Biocentricism and Climate Science: Should We Interfere?”

Kristine Smith

(Winona State University)

UG

“Aristotle’s Akratic and the Drunk”

Cara Cummings (Johns Hopkins University)

“Introducing the Minnesota Regional Ethics Bowl”

Catharine St. Croix (University of Minnesota-Twin Cities)

“Testimony As A Descriptional Kind”

Zihe Luo (State University of New York-Buffalo)

10:30-11:20

“Morality and Emotion: Regulating Empathy”

Amna Whiston (University of Oxford)

“Kitcher’s Dilemma”

David Lambie (State University of New York at Oswego)

“The Constitutivist’s Dilemma: A Problem For The Self-Conception Strategy”

Brian M. Johnson (Purdue University)

“Exploring Artificial Moral Agents through a Feminist Care Ethics and Relational Agency Lens”

Angelica Fleury

(University of Minnesota-Duluth)

UG

“Buying Humane Meat Is Wrong Because It Wrongs the Farmer”

Josh Mund

“The Alleged Fallacy in Nicomachean Ethics I.2”

Takashi Oki (Nagoya University)

“The Role of “Interest” in the Cartesian Recipe for Happiness”

Jaleel Fotovat-Ahmadi (San Francisco State University)

11:30 PM – 4 PM

F105

F106

F107

F206

F222

F223

G202

11:30-12:20

Lunch (G201)

12:30-2:00

Keynote Speaker (G202)

2:10-3:00

“The “Four Principles” at 40: What is Their Role in Introductory Bioethics Classes?”

Brendan Shea

(Rochester Community and Technical College)

“Empathy and Yoga”

Jacqueline Kumar (Queens University)

“A Common Mistake Among Challenges to Causal Decision Theory”

Rhys Borchert (University of Arizona)

“An Empiricist Solution to Personhood”

Ya-Sokee Yang (University of Minnesota-Morris)

UG

“Neither Person nor Thing: The Promise of an Animal Model for AI”

Alexis Elder

(University of Minnesota-Duluth)

“Plato Fools Them All – The Mini-Masterpiece of Uses/Non-Uses of Parapan and the Ti/Poion Knowledge Distinction in Meno 71a-c3 and 80d5-e5)

John Humphrey (Minnesota State University-Mankato)

“Metaphysics by Negation: Comparing Edith Stein's Core and Aristotle's Substance”

Phil Kallberg

3:10-4:00

“Justice in Aristotle’s Theory of the Good”

Michael Otteson (University of Kansas)

“Why We Should Do Philosophy With Children”

Marilea Bramer (Minnesota State University-Moorhead)

“Rethinking Thomas Hobbes on the Passions”

Christopher Bobier

(St. Mary’s University)

“Haecceity: The Principle of Individuation in the Metaphysics of John Duns Scotus and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz”

Farrow Ulven (University of Minnesota-Twin Cities)

UG

“Knowledge, Mind and Hidden Natures”

Erik Kraemer

(University of Wisconsin-La Crosse)

“Two Forms of Moral Universalizability in Consequentialism: Or, Ideal Rule Consequentialism as a Degenerating Research Program”

Scott Forschler

(Independent Scholar)

“Is Your Version of Moral Subjectivism Objectively Correct? A comprehensive strategy for defending moral objectivity”

Patrick Clipsham (Winona State University)

Detailed Schedule

8-8:20: Registration and Welcome

Registration is in the G Building Lobby. Coffee and light breakfast are in G201.

8:30-9:20: Main Program

F105. Jason Ford (University of Minnesota-Duluth), “The Biggest Mistake in Philosophy of Mind: Neglecting the Periphery”

Well, if not the biggest mistake, certainly one of the bigger ones. Many theorists treat “consciousness” as identical with “the focus of attention”. Even some who directly note the existence of a periphery of attention, within the sphere of consciousness, then go on to treat consciousness as though it were identical with the focus of attention. But, if we focus on the periphery, we see that several theories of the mind become far more difficult to defend. In this paper, I will show the impact of taking the periphery seriously on Higher Order Representational theories, Functionalism, and Representationalism.

F106. Caner Turan (Tulane University), “Does Autonomous Reasoning Favor Consequentialism?”

Joshua Greene questions the normative power of deontological ethics. According to him, our deontological judgments are distorted by our emotional responses, which rest on evolutionary-based, morally irrelevant factors. Since Greene thinks consequentialist judgments are not affected by such factors, i.e., they are the product of autonomous moral reasoning, he concludes that consequentialism is normatively superior to deontology. I argue that Greene’s argument does not seem to apply to our theoretical moral intuitions, be they consequentialist or deontological. The problem our theoretical intuitions face is not that they are susceptible to morally irrelevant factors, but that they are vulnerable to exceptions. There is, however, a subset of theoretical intuitions called formal intuitions, which are not vulnerable to exceptions, and Kant’s universalization principle is a likely candidate for a deontological formal intuition. Even though Greene’s argument shows us something interesting about the way in which some of our deontological intuitions can be distorted by nonmoral biases, our problem is not deciding between consequentialism and deontology. Since there seem to be abstract, deontological intuitions that are immune from the sort of biases that Greene worries about, our real problem is working out how to move from secure moral intuitions to practical guide to action.

F107. Caroline Christoff (University of Minnesota-Duluth), “You are Too Stupid to Know Anything: Epistemic Injustice and Cognitive Disability”

In this paper, I attempt to provide a reason for why individuals with cognitive disabilities are often not allowed a voice in decisions made about their care and medical treatment. I argue that individuals with cognitive disabilities are subject to both testimonial and hermeneutical epistemic injustice. Individuals underestimate the testimony of people with cognitive disabilities due to underestimation of ability, rigid assumptions about diagnosis, incorrect evaluations of the awareness of the cognitively disabled, and misplacement of the burden of proof onto the cognitively disabled. These testimonial injustices create hermeneutical archetypes that create a powerful feedback loop that devalues the perspectives of the cognitively disabled.

F205. Neetika Singh (Indian Institute of Technology), “Role of Rule Based Ontological Studies in explaining Social world and its Criticism”

Rule based ontological studies emphasize upon the institutional setting within the social realm. Humans act together in favor of set targets that are in accordance with the constitutive rules. Social world constitutes of shared experiences of human beings located within the network of beliefs and intentions of individuals. John Searle’s social ontological theory argues in favor of the concept of two parallel functional structures in social world i.e. of ‘Background’. This concept of ‘Background’ can be called a narrow concept of context because it neglects the necessity of active participation in historical journey of actions for developing a teleological purpose. This paper critically analyses the rule based ontological theories and identifies the problem of narrow context of actions within it; and the relevance of broader concept of contextual understanding of actions. The concept of meaningful action in historical frame with the single functional structure (even though it would be a complex one) rather than two parallel ones is important to explain the social world. The purpose of life is realized through continuous process of constant engagement with the practices instead of inverted sense of teleology. Intentions are grounded in several interlinked episodes of actions performed by socially engaged human beings. A web of interconnected actions in social background not necessarily designed in linearity is necessary to understand the nature of social world. Such a theory of action is argued by Alasdair McIntyre’s in his After Virtue and therefore it can be approached as a solution to the problem in ‘action theory’ of rules for the better understanding of social world.

F206. Paul Nieman (St. Cloud State University), “Strategies for Defending and Promoting the Value of Philosophy”

This discussion session provides a brief overview of St. Cloud State University’s decision to retrench (terminate) 8 tenured and promoted faculty, 4 from the Library, 1 from Theatre, and 3 from Philosophy. The presenter will describe the Philosophy Department’s response, and some efforts it has made to increase enrollment in philosophy courses and in its major and minor programs. Following this, will be an open discussion to share strategies that those in attendance have used at their institutions to defend and promote philosophy, and the liberal arts more generally, to both administrators and students.

F222. Paul Kelly (University of Wisconsin-Madison), “On the Scientific Legitimacy of Animal Beliefs”

In everyday life, ascribing beliefs to animals is commonplace. However, can we ever really know what animals believe? Stephen Stich (1979, 1983) and Jacob Beck (2013) have argued that our inability to precisely describe the contents of animal beliefs renders the concept ANIMAL BELIEF scientifically illegitimate. In what follows I will (1) briefly describe the theory-theory of belief ascription, (2) present a novel formulation of Stich’s argument in support of the view that the concept ANIMAL BELIEF is scientifically illegitimate, (3) advance and defend several objections to Stich’s argument, and (4) respond to Beck’s recent defense of Stich’s claims. In so doing, I seek to demonstrate that both Stich and Beck’s reasoning is mistaken, and hence that they have failed to establish that the concept of ANIMAL BELIEF is scientifically illegitimate.

F223. Anthony Dittus (Marquette University), “The War for Personal Integration: An Antithesis and Synthesis of Virtue Ethics and Situationism”

The task of the following essay is threefold: To layout the systems of situationism’s two major proponents, Harman and Doris; to dispute situationism along the lines of the ability of its empirical experiments to only test for individual cases of behavior and not virtue; and to interpret, synthesize, and reconcile the invaluable insights of the situationist tradition with virtue ethics, while refining our understanding of virtue ethics in the process.

G202. Russell Ahmed-Buehler (Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science), “The Problem With Probabilism”

Discussion of rational degrees of belief or credences is dominated by probabilism, the view that rational credences are (finitely additive) probability functions. Contemporary justifications for this view, however, uniformly beg the question by assuming either that rational credences are real-valued or that rational credences satisfy properties characteristic of real numbers. I briefly present both the Dutch book argument and three accuracy arguments for probabilism before highlighting the problematic assumptions in each.

9:30-10:20: Main Program

F105. Joe Nelson (Duke University) “On Appeal To Prudential Intuition”

Philosophers of welfare often appeal to what we may call “prudential intuition”. They present propositions, questions, or scenarios with the aim of eliciting intuitions about what is basically (non-instrumentally) good or bad for us. They then treat these intuitions as evidence for the truth of their contents, and appeal to them in arguments for or against theories of welfare. This way of arguing is legitimate only if we are justified in believing that we have “strong prudential insight”, i.e. that our intuitions reliably track the truth about what has basic prudential value. In this paper I make a preliminary case for the following claim: we are not justified in believing that we have strong prudential insight. I consider two possible justifications for the strong insight hypothesis—that there is no other plausible, non-skeptical way of accounting for our prudential intuitions, and that the strong insight hypothesis is the default, such that the burden of proof is on those who would reject it—and argue that we should not accept either. My conclusion has serious implications for the philosophy of welfare: it is right, then many well-known arguments in this area fail, and all for the same reason.

F106. Henry West (Macalester College), “J. S. Mill was not a Particularist”

In this paper I contrast two conceptions of the fundamental question of ethics, which I call the “particularist“ conception and the “moral code” conception The particularist believes that the fundamental question of ethics is to ask, on each occasion that one can perform an action, “What is morally right or wrong or morally indifferent in this situation?” The “moral code” theorist believes that the fundamental question of ethics is: “What set of moral rights, rules, and precepts ought to govern agents in my society?” In other words, “What should be the code of ethics enforced in my society by law, public opinion, education, and feelings of personal conscience and self-respect?” John Stuart Mill is often interpreted as an “act-utilitarian,” which would be a form of particularism. Mill’s conception of ethics was primarily that of a moral code theorist. Although Mill did admit that in particular circumstances there could be acts that violated the accepted moral code and be justified by the principle of utility, that did not make him an “act-utilitarian.”

F107. Alex Bearden (BGSU & ARCC), “Futility, Complicity, and the Ethics of Collective Action”

Collective action problems are situations where a shared goal is only reached through coordination. In especially large collective situations, the effect of any individuals is negligible toward the attainment of a shared goal—it makes no difference. Some collective problems, such as climate change, pose unprecedented existential threats to human and other well-being. As such, these collective situations are increasingly identified as moral challenges. Insofar as the problem is fundamentally moral, what I am required to do? When I make no difference in attaining the shared goal, do I have no reason to choose the cooperative strategy or is my moral reason swamped by another type of nonmoral reason? In this talk, I argue that collective cases demonstrate a conflict between moral and nonmoral (or self-benefitting) reasons, which provides an insight into moral theorizing itself. I draw out this insight both in regard to the futility problem (i.e. that I don’t make a difference) and the complicity response (i.e. if I don’t make a difference, then I should at least avoid complicity). Both only show, however, that our self-benefitting reasons triumph over moral reasons, yet, I argue this is deeply mistaken.

F222. Cara Cummings (Johns Hopkins University), “Aristotle’s Akratic and the Drunk”

At 1147a14 Aristotle compares the akratic to the sleeping, mad, and drunk. Later, he compares the akratic to the student (1147a21) and the actor (1147a24). I will argue that Aristotle makes these comparisons because each of these classes of people fulfills at least two of the following conditions for being like the akratic, who herself fulfills all four: ACTUALITY: While in this state, she is halted at First Actuality qua knower. INSINCERITY: While in this state, she is insincere in her utterances. RESPONSIBILITY: She is responsible for getting herself into this state. VOLUNTARY: While in this state, she acts voluntarily and is blamed for her wrongdoing.

I will first explain how the akratic exhibits each of these behaviors. Next, I will explain how far each of the comparisons approximates the akratic’s behavior. I will argue that the akratic is most like the drunk, as they both fulfill all four conditions.

F223. Catharine St. Croix (University of Minnesota-Twin Cities), “Introducing the Minnesota Regional Ethics Bowl”

For the 2019-2020 academic year, the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities is launching the first-ever Minnesota Regional Ethics Bowl. We'd love for you to join us! Regional Ethics Bowls around the country are part the National High School Ethics Bowl competition. These annual competitions provide a supportive, respectful environment that prepares high school students for the intellectual rigors of a college education while giving them the opportunity to think carefully (and philosophically!) about meaningful questions. In brief, the Ethics Bowl season starts in late September or early October every year, when the year's Case Studies are released. Students then have time to read through the cases, learn about ethics, and develop their views. They have until the regional competition, which is held in February, to prepare. I'll talk about details of the Bowl itself, recruiting local schools, and how anyone interested can help out!

G202. Zihe Luo (State University of New York-Buffalo), “Testimony As A Descriptional Kind”

Kourken Michaelian argues that testimony is likely an HPC natural kind and develops a naturalist global reductionism that is immune to the objection from the too-narrow induction base. I argue, first, that testimony is not an HPC (homeostatic property cluster) natural kind because, unlike Michaelian thinks, there is no appropriate causal mechanism that grounds testimony as a kind. I argue, second, that testimony is not an SPC (stable property cluster) natural kind (arguably the most liberal theory of natural kinds) because testimony is simply not stable enough to ground any robust inductions in relevant sciences. I submit that naturalist global reductionism of testimonial justification fails.

9:30-10:20: MPS Undergrad

F206. Kristine Smith (Winona State University) “Biocentricism and Climate Science: Should We Interfere?”

In Paul W. Taylor’s essay “A Theory of Environmental Ethics”, he highlights what he deems to be the Biocentric Outlook. In this short essay, I expand upon this theory while arguing that this outlook can be modified not only for use in modern society, but also to solve our current climate crisis and to prevent another from taking place. By emphasizing Taylor’s rules of noninterference and of restitutive justice, we can start to develop an ethical framework through biocentrism that outlines how we as a society must act in order to address our teleological needs while living with nature in a manner that is not just exploitative.

10:30-11:20: Main Program

F105. Amna Whiston (University of Oxford), “Morality and Emotion: Regulating Empathy”

The aim of this paper is to critically discuss emotion regulation strategies, understood as efforts to influence which emotions people have, when they have them, and how these emotions are experienced and expressed (Gross 1999). More specifically, my target are moral sentimentalist views that place high importance on emotion regulation. Jesse Prinz, for example, argues that whilst emotions like fear, anger, guilt and shame are fundamental to moral competence, empathy regulation should involve negating the moral significance of empathy and that the ‘acquisition of moral competence may not depend on a robust capacity for empathy’ (Prinz 2011, 222). In contrast, Antti Kauppinen (2014), while recognising the requirement to overcome emphatic biases, contends that we ought to ‘regulate’ our empathic response by down-regulating our empathic reaction to the treatment of those who are personally important or similar to us, and up-regulating our empathic reaction to the treatment of those who are distant or different. In making this effort, we respond to what is done to someone from what Hume called ‘the common point of view’ (T, 581), a perspective anyone could come to share Kauppinen (105). I will argue that both sentimentalist views are constrained by an implausible account of emotion, which shapes their emphasis on emotion regulation.

F106. David Lambie (State University of New York at Oswego), “Kitcher’s Dilemma”

Allen Buchanan has charged that Philip Kitcher’s account of ethical pragmatic naturalism suffers from a dilemma. The consequence of this dilemma is that Kitcher must either rest his normative conclusions on normative premises or accept certain morally repugnant conclusions concerning the acceptability of some oppressive social practices. Neither horn of the dilemma is desirable. I do three things in this paper. First, I lay out the dilemma and explain why it arises. Second, I offer a solution in the spirit of pragmatic naturalism. The solution allows Kitcher to retain the view that the ethical project was originally concerned with remedying altruism failures that resulted in serious social costs. This allows him to start from non-normative premises while avoiding repugnant conclusions about what is right. Third, I apply the solution to one of Kitcher’s examples to show how it helps avoid the feared repugnant conclusions.

F107. Brian M. Johnson (Purdue University), “The Constitutivist’s Dilemma: A Problem For The Self-Conception Strategy”

This essay is part of a larger project defending a moral worldview grounded in perfectionist tendencies evident in the German Idealist tradition. In this essay, I argue against constitutivist approaches in contemporary metaethics. The constitutivist’s dilemma is a problem for constitutivist approaches to what David Copp has called “the self-conception strategy.” I distinguish between constitutivist and perfectionist approaches to the strategy and argue that the latter have the advantage of avoiding, what I call “the constitutivist’s dilemma.” While I think we should take the selfconception strategy seriously, I argue that constitutivist version faces an insurmountable difficulty with roots in traditional complaints concerning Kantian moral philosophy. While contemporary Kantians have responses to the standard complaints concerning ‘rigorism’ and ‘empty formalism,’ these complaints remain legitimate when levied specifically against constitutivist versions of the self-conception strategy. The way to avoid such difficulties is to take perfectionist versions of the strategy seriously. As part of my broader project, this argument sets the stage for a limited defense of perfectionism—one that depends on a thesis about the sociality of rational cognition that I do not have space to defend here.

F222 Josh Mund (University of Wisconsin-Madison), “Buying Humane Meat Is Wrong Because It Wrongs the Farmer”

Humanely raised farm animals have lives worth living, and they would not have these lives were it not for the purchasing behavior of consumers. Do these facts render such purchases permissible? In this paper I acknowledge reasons for thinking that purchasing humane meat does not wrong the animals who are thereby caused to come into existence, but I argue that purchasing humane meat is nevertheless wrong because it wrongs farmers. Although the worthwhile lives and contingent existence of humanely raised animals may exonerate the consumer from wronging any future animals, they do not exonerate a farmer from wronging her animals by slaughtering them. Further, committing moral wrongs, such as animal slaughter, makes one worse off, in a genuinely prudential way. Because the consumer’s purchase causes the farmer to be worse off in this way, purchasing humane meat is wrong because it wrongs the farmer.

F223. Takashi Oki (Nagoya University), “The Alleged Fallacy in Nicomachean Ethics I.2”

Scholars disagree over whether or not Aristotle fallaciously infers that there exists ‘some end desired for itself at which every purposive activity aims’ in Nicomachean Ethics I.2. In this paper, I argue that here Aristotle has in mind a branching tree composed of some (not necessarily all) purposive activities, and thinks that the highest end because of which the other things that belong to this branching tree are wished for is the best good, while leaving open the possibility that there are other such trees the highest end of each of which is the best good in each case.

G202. Jaleel Fotovat-Ahmadi (San Francisco State University), “The Role of “Interest” in the Cartesian Recipe for Happiness”

Descartes outlines a recipe for happiness in his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth which involves certain truths in pursuing a virtuous life. One of these truths has to do with understanding that we are distinct individuals who have individualized “interests” and that we need to forgo our own “interests” for the “interest” of the group of which we are a part. In this paper, I explore Descartes’ notion of “interest” and how it ultimately contributes to his recipe of happiness. I argue for the two ways of understanding the term “interest” (i.e. individual interest versus group interest). This entails a distinction between the interest of an individual person (the part) and the interest of a group of people (the whole). I will suggest an alternative interpretation of Descartes’ interest passage that accounts for the different uses of “interest.” This alternative to Descartes’ original interest passage breaks down the two understandings of “interest”: the subjective nature of our personal interest (first part of the interest passage) and the objective interest of a group (second part of the interest passage). Ultimately, this alternative interpretation of the interest passage lends itself to a better understanding of how we can attain happiness, according to Descartes.

10:30-11:20: MPS Undergrad

F206. Angelica Fleury (University of Minnesota-Duluth), “Exploring Artificial Moral Agents through a Feminist Care Ethics and Relational Agency Lens”

In the discussion of Artificial Intelligence Ethics, one topic of debate is which model of ethics to take into consideration in the implementation of artificially intelligent machines. Particularly, how humans ought to interact and view machines that replicate our own intellect imperfectly. We can focus on our similarities, thinking of AMAs as continuous with human agents, or our differences, thinking of them as discontinuous. Some philosophers contend that human-machine relationships should follow a discontinuity approach, which underscores an essential difference between human moral agents and autonomous moral agents (Fossa, 2018). Here, autonomous moral agents are not to be considered as anything other than tools that are to be used by human beings. Conversely, the continuity approach focuses on the similarities between humans and AMA’s and claims that AMA’s are moral agents, albeit currently lesser ones in comparison (Rini 2017). Despite both views considering the varying attitudes and relationships that humans have towards proposed AMA’s, they fail to consider a possible middle ground. The challenge here would be to decide upon what framework would make sense for constructing “lesser” moral agents that factor in both similarities and differences.

11:30-12:20: Lunch in G201

12:30-2:00: Keynote Address in G202

Michael Fuerstein (St. Olaf College), "Diagnosing Moral Failure On Climate Change: Lessons From the History of Gay Rights and Women’s Rights"

The keynote will take place from 12:30 to 2 PM in G202 Auditorium/Theater. It is open to the public.

2:10-3:00: Main Program

F105. Brendan Shea (Rochester Community and Technical College),“The “Four Principles” at 40: What is Their Role in Introductory Bioethics Classes?”

Beauchamp and Childress’s “Four Principles” approach to bioethics has become something of a standard not only in bioethics classrooms and journals, but also within medicine itself. In this teaching-focused workshop, I’ll be doing the following:

1. Introducing the basics of the “Four Principles” approach, with a special focus on its relation to the common morality and the importance to weighing and balancing of competing norms.

2. Comparing and contrasting this to other potential approaches, such as those provided by virtue ethics, act utilitarianism, casuistry, and competing versions of principles-based ethics.

3. Considering the ways in which the principles-based approach can best be implemented for lower-level, introductory bioethics classes, where the average student may have little background knowledge in either philosophy or medicine.

I’ll be presenting sample activities, case studies, and lesson plans. There will be considerable time reserved for discussion at the end, so that participants can exchange ideas relating to the teaching of both bioethics and other varieties of applied ethics.

F106. Jacqueline Kumar (Queens University), “Empathy and Yoga”

This paper contends that “empathy” is “other-regarding,” and that this notion, or a variant of the word, is a central tenet of both Western and Eastern philosophical traditions. We offer an account of bhakti yoga (love/devotion), and how empathy finds expression in the Indian tradition. Secondly, we discuss karma yoga (action) and its insistence on empathic conduct as expressed in the Bhagavadgîta. Thirdly, we compare bhakti, karma and jnãna yoga (inner knowledge) in order to show how the three incorporate the role of empathy and make it the foundation of morality. Throughout this paper we liken the Indian concepts of bhakti, karma and jnãna to the Western notion of empathy as expressed by some Greek, Roman and early Enlightenment thinkers.F1

07. Rhys Borchert (University of Arizona), “A Common Mistake Among Challenges to Causal Decision Theory”In

this paper, I address three independent challenges to Causal Decision Theory (CDT) and argue that all three fail. I maintain that these challenges all fail for the same reason: they rest on an equivocation between a decision under risk and a decision under ignorance. The recognition of this equivocation allows CDT to avoid these challenges. I trace the source of this mistake to a mistaken analysis of Newcomb's Problem.F2

22. Alexis Elder (University of Minnesota-Duluth), “Neither Person nor Thing: The Promise of an Animal Model for AI”De

signers of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotic technologies often aim for either an impersonal, mechanistic appearance, or else for a (roughly) humanoid appearance and interaction style, as in social robotics. Here, we explore the advantages of a third possibility, neither human nor impersonal thing. We argue that in many cases, designers may do best to aim at a zoomorphic appearance. Doing so can better accommodate human psychological tendencies and expectations that, all too often, contribute to unreasonable expectations and ethical problems, from automation bias to the limitations of opaque automated decision-making. By attuning appearances to facilitate a better match between user expectations and artificial entities’ capabilities, these ethical perils can be avoided while capitalizing on the real benefits these technologies have to offer.F2

23. John Humphrey (Minnesota State University-Mankato), “Plato Fools Them All – The Mini-Masterpiece of Uses/Non-Uses of Parapan and the Ti/Poion Knowledge Distinction in Meno 71a-c3 and 80d5-e5”Al

though Meno commentators routinely recognize Moravcsik as the first Meno commentator to note and offer an explanation of a “parapandifference” between Meno’s three questions challenge to inquiry to Socrates at 80d5-8 and the dilemma challenge Socrates offers in response to Meno at 80e1-5, Moravcsik is routinely agreed to be mistaken about the meaning and import of this difference by post-1971 Meno commentators. In particular, post-1971 Meno commentators could not agree more that Moravcsik is mistaken to claim that the epistemological difference between parapan ti ignorance and ti ignorance is the key to understanding the dilemma challenge and Socrates’ use of the doctrine of recollection to answer it. I show this summary dismissal of Moravcsik's reading of 80d5-e5 betrays the Meno literature’s still unseen parapan nakedness, that is, its failure to see or understand Plato’s mini-masterpiece of uses/non-uses of parapan in 71a-c3 and 80d5-e5.G2

02. Phil Kallberg, “Metaphysics by Negation: Comparing Edith Stein's Core and Aristotle's Substance”Th

is essay explains Aristotle's theory of substance and Edith Stein’s theory of the personal core. It then explores the connections and similarities between Stein’s core and Aristotle’s theory of substance. Both theories define themselves by negation or "that which they are not." Both theories have metaphysical implications. And both theories are about the nature of individuals. Further while Aristotle's theory has been criticized for problematic implications, Stein's has gone relatively uncriticized and the essay will offer some possible reasons why.2:

10-3:00: MPS UndergradF2

06. Ya-Sokee Yang (University of Minnesota-Morris), “An Empiricist Solution to Personhood”Th

e empiricist doctrine is that knowledge is derived from experience. This doctrine has not been applied to personhood (as far as I can tell) and if one did apply this notion to personhood, then one would find a possible solution to personhood, which is that there is an experience or substance in the real world that personhood is based on. This essay does just that and argues that the substance of personhood is human beings. The argument will follow David Hume’s belief that ideas come from impressions. Specifically, the concept of personhood is an idea and if this is true, then the idea of personhood must be based on something real (in this case human beings). This basis leads us to also find that our ability to imagine fictional non-human persons to be false. Since humans are the core of personhood there cannot be non-human persons. In the end, a case of personhood being an anthropomorphic (human-centered) concept is argued for in this paper. 3:

10-4:00: Main ProgramF1

05. Michael Otteson (University of Kansas), “Justice in Aristotle’s Theory of the Good”Th

is paper argues that Matthew Walker’s recent interpretation of the nature of justice in Aristotle does not accommodate all of the key aspects of Aristotle’s theory. Walker suggests that justice is an important virtue because it helps the agent acquire the appropriate amount of material goods necessary for the contemplative life. However, I argue that Aristotle would require someone to pay back a loan that they took out from another person even if doing so would undermine their ability to contemplate. Aristotle endorses absolute, not proportionate, repayments when the proper distribution of material goods in the case of rectificatory justice.F1

06. Marilea Bramer (Minnesota State University-Moorhead), “Why We Should Do Philosophy With Children”Re

search on doing Philosophy with children in schools has shown that there are numerous cognitive, social, and emotional benefits for students who have weekly philosophy lessons. This is particularly true for students who come from disadvantaged backgrounds. Additionally, in April 2018 the National Association of School Boards of Education recommended that Philosophy be included in teacher training for Kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12) teachers. Philosophy is uniquely poised to become more explicitly integrated into public life and into education. Expanding Philosophy in teacher training programs and in continuing education programs for teachers while also expanding the use of Philosophy with K-12 grade students would be one way to reintegrate philosophy back into public life at a time when most universities and colleges are yet again cutting department budgets and faculty positions. F1

07. Christopher Bobier (St. Mary’s University), “Rethinking Thomas Hobbes on the Passions”Th

ere is widespread scholarly disagreement whether Hobbesian passions are or involve a type of cognition (i.e., imagination, idea, or thought). This disagreement has implications for our understanding of Hobbesian deliberation. If passions are intrinsically cognitive, then, since Hobbesian deliberation is a series of alternating passions, deliberation would appear to be intrinsically cognitive as well. In this paper I argue for a non-cognitive reading of Hobbesian passions, according to which a passion is nothing more than an appetite or aversion caused by, but distinct from, an imagination of a future good or harm.F2

22. Erik Kraemer (University of Wisconsin-La Crosse), “Knowledge, Mind and Hidden Natures”Th

is discussion considers how the Knowledge Argument against Mind-Body Physicalism might be turned on its head to argue, instead, for a variety of physicalism, namely Hidden Nature(s) Physicalism. The name, Hidden Natures Physicalism (hereafter HNP), derives from a critical article by William Robinson (2016) and denotes the view that the intrinsic physical natures of (certain) mental states are not currently known. I begin by setting out the standard version of the Knowledge Argument from Frank Jackson (1986) and offer two objections it. I then demonstrate how a closely related argument can instead be employed to support HNP, and explore enlightening structural similarities between HNP and a view with which it is commonly opposed, namely traditional theism. After arguing that HNP is the most defensible version of physicalism, I conclude by examining problems arising from recent work of Richard Fumerton on property dualism (2013). Fumerton’s discussion of related epistemological issues suggests a revision of the Knowledge Argument that physicalists need to address. I argue that relying on HNP enables physicalists to reply more adequately to Fumerton’s worries than does relying on its currently more popular and better-known rivals. F

223. Scott Forschler (Independent Scholar), “Two Forms of Moral Universalizability in Consequentialism: Or, Ideal Rule Consequentialism as a Degenerating Research Program”Mo

ral universalizability tests come in two distinct forms which are rarely carefully distinguished. Their distinct universalization conditions can be called the Universal Practice (UP) and Universal Applicability (UA) conditions; tests based on these (which include some satisfaction criterion to be satisfied within that condition) can be called UP tests and UA tests, respectively. Ideal rule consequentialists use UP tests, while most consequentialists use UA tests when they appeal to moral universalizability. I will show (1) that the two conditions are logically distinct; (2) that nevertheless they have often been confused with one another; (3) that the UA condition is superior to the UP condition in several respects; and (4) that all of the most promising attempts to address the faults of the UP condition will, if applied consistently, surreptitiously turn it back into a UA condition.G2

02. Patrick Clipsham (Winona State University), “Is Your Version of Moral Subjectivism Objectively Correct? A comprehensive strategy for defending moral objectivity”Th

is paper describes a comprehensive argumentative strategy for defending the objectivity of morality. This strategy unifies insights from recent debates surround ‘Anti-Archimedean Arguments’ for moral objectivity, as well as ‘Companions in Guilt Arguments.’ While both of these styles of argument have been the subject of intense philosophical scrutiny, none have noticed that a simple question (the titular question of this essay) can allow us to identify which of these two arguments would work most effectively against specific versions of moral subjectivism. I conclude that all (or nearly all) versions of moral subjectivism are susceptible to this style of attack.3:

10-4:00: MPS UndergradF2

06. Farrow Ulven (University of Minnesota-Twin Cities), “Haecceity: The Principle of Individuation in the Metaphysics of John Duns Scotus and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz”Th

is paper investigates the concept of haecceity as the principle of individuation within the metaphysics of John Duns Scotus and the instantiation of the concept within Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s metaphysics, comparing the changes the concept undergoes between these two thinkers. Scotus conceives the concept in the context of medieval theology after the reintroduction of Aristotelian philosophy by way of translations and commentaries from Islamic scholars. With this backdrop, alongside theological disputes in the period around the individuation of angels, Scotus posits the haecceity as a positive, intrinsic, and non-qualitative attribute of an individual substance which contracts and adds to an individual’s common nature, thereby individuating the substance. After outlining Scotus’s formulation of the haecceity, this paper discusses Leibniz’s development of the concept within his later work. Leibniz’s transformation of haecceity conceives it as the complete notion of an individual substance which, relative to his own metaphysical commitments, comes to express the entire world.

2019 CALL FOR PAPERS

MINNESOTA PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY CONFERENCE

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 26th, 2019

Anoka Ramsey Community College, Cambridge Campus, Cambridge, MN

Keynote Speaker: TBA

Please submit your paper on any topic in philosophy by September 16^th, 2019 as an attached Word or PDF document to Peter.Wahlstrom@anokaramsey.edu, with the subject heading “MPS Submission 2019.”

· Papers should be no longer than 3,000 words and prepared for blind review, and should include an abstract.

· Author’s information, including title and abstract of the paper, should appear in the email used to submit the paper.

· Also accepting Abstracts for Presentations that are not based on a paper, e.g. teaching and learning strategies

· Minnesota Philosophical Society charges a $10.00 conference fee for non-undergraduate attendees.

· Whether you are submitting a paper or not, please let us know if you might be interested in being a session moderator and on what topic.

· Papers in any area of philosophy are welcome.

Notifications of acceptance will be sent by October 4th.

Please contact Peter Wahlstrom with any questions at Peter.Wahlstrom@anokaramsey.edu.

2019 CALL FOR PAPERS

MINNESOTA PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY UNDERGRADUATE CONFERENCE

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 26th, 2019

Anoka Ramsey Community College, Cambridge Campus, Cambridge, MN