The effects of induced emotions on leading-by-example (with Zeyu Qiu) [Link to working paper]
Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of induced emotions on leading-by example. Using an online non-student sample of more than 1,000 participants, we observe behavior in a one-shot sequential voluntary contribution mechanism game where leaders and followers are induced to be either happy or angry. Our findings show that angry leaders contribute less than happy leaders. The same effect is observed when considering followers’ behavior. Crucially, controlling for leaders’ contributions, the mood effects on followers’ behavior disappear, indicating that these effects stem from leaders’ behavior. Our findings further highlight the role of emotional well-being as a causal force, suggesting that negative changes in well-being can bring about adverse effects on team cooperation.
Giving and Costless Retaliation in the Power-to-Take Game (with Nobuyuki Hanaki, Natsumi Shimada, Yuta Shimodaira) [Link to working paper]
Abstract: Extending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i) in addition to taking, the proposers can give part of their endowment to the responders, and ii) in addition to destroying their own endowment in retaliation, the responders can destroy the proposer’s endowment. Although these added options lead the responders to retaliate more severely, they do not significantly influence the proposers’ behavior. It is only when the proposers can give, and the responders can concurrently destroy the endowment of the proposers that the proposers take significantly less from the responders.
Communicating in a coordination game with private information (with Antonio Cabrales, Zeynep Gürgüç and Indrajit Ray)
Abstract: We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with twosided private information, preceded by a round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that individuals are overall truthful (about 80% overall) about revealing their types in both one-way and two-way cheap talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when the players fully reveal their information. However, they achieve even higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way, by selecting the desired coordinated outcome, following the truthful announcements (which differs from the theoretical equilibrium).
Gender Differences in Competitiveness: The Role of Social Incentives (with Mary L. Rigdon)
Abstract: The provision of social incentives in the workplace, where performance benefits a charitable cause, has been frequently used in modern organizations. In this paper, we quantify the impact of social incentives on performance under two incentive schemes: piece rate and a winner-take-all tournament. We introduce social incentives by informing individuals that 50% of their performance earnings will be donated to a charity of their own choice. Our findings indicate that, in the presence of social incentives, women increase their performance by approximately 23% and 27% in the piece rate and tournament payment schemes, respectively. These effects are sizable and significant. Despite the fact that women also become more confident when social incentives are used, their willingness to compete is not affected due to their general lack of willingness to take financial risks.
The Windfall-Income Donation Norm (with Adam Isen and Benjamin M. Marx)
Abstract: Increases in income sometimes have large effects on generosity and sometimes have no effect. We propose social norms as an explanation for these disparate findings, and we conduct two experiments to measure income effects on donations and norms. The main experiment uses an incentivized coordination game to elicit social norms for the potential choices in a donations experiment. Perceptions of what most people would consider a morally appropriate donation depend on whether income is a windfall and on the amount of windfall income. These norms respond to randomly assigned information about past giving that has been found to increase donations. They also match patterns of choices in the donations experiment, both overall and across subject demographics, and they reveal substantial willingness to pay to behave in ways that others will deem appropriate.
Corporate philanthropy, social incentives and leadership by example (with Edward Cartwright and Paola Paiardini)
Abstract: Corporate philanthropy has been frequently used as a tool to motivate behaviour in modern organisations. Using a large sample of subjects from an online experiment (N = 2,376), we study the impact of social incentives on leading-by-example in two separate studies. Study 1 considers treatments where leaders and followers are exogenously assigned to donate 0%, 20% or 40% of their income from a group project to charity. We find that the introduction of social incentives leads to a non-monotonic increase in contributions to the project for both leaders and followers. Study 2 examines behaviour in endogenous treatments where the assigned leaders choose the proportion of project income donated to charity. We show that social incentives increase contribution behaviour in a monotonic way. Consonant with previous literature, we find that part of our observed social incentive effects can be explained by shifts in beliefs.
Fairness perceptions and prosocial behaviour in luck and merit-based societies (with Zeyu Qiu).
Abstract: We experimentally study the impact of merit- and luck-based inequalities on cooperative behavior and fairness perceptions in explaining differences across treatments. Using a large sample from non-student populations (N=542), we examine behavior in one-shot public good games in treatments where individuals’ income is randomly allocated (“Luck”) or performance dependent (“Merit”). First, we find that individuals in groups with merit-based inequality perceive it fairer to cooperate less. Second, contributions reflect these fairness perceptions: merit-based groups cooperate less than luck-based groups. Third, this effect on cooperation is driven primarily by rich individuals in merit-based societies. Our findings have important implications for policy making targeted at promoting public good contributions.