1. The Effects of Induced Emotions on Leading-by-Example (with Zeyu Qiu)
Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of induced emotions on leading-by example. Using an online sample of more than 1,000 participants, we observe behavior in a one-shot sequential voluntary contribution mechanism game where leaders and followers are induced to be either happy or angry. Our findings show that angry leaders contribute less than happy leaders. The same effect is observed when considering followers’ behavior. Crucially, controlling for leaders’ contributions, the mood effects on followers’ behavior disappear, implying that it is sufficient to induce emotions only on leaders in order to affect followers’ behaviour. Our findings further highlight the role of emotions as a causal force, suggesting that negative changes in well-being can bring about adverse effects on team cooperation.
2. Intelligence and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments (with Rati Mekvabishvili and Zeyu Qiu).
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between intelligence and cooperation in two 20-period repeated public goods games. Study 1, set in an equal endowment environment, finds that higher intelligence individuals contribute less to the public good and hold lower expectations about others’ contributions. Study 2 tests for the robustness of this relationship in a public good game with unequal endowments and finds that this pattern disappears. A closer analysis reveals that high intelligence rich individuals sustain more stable contributions over time than their lower intelligence counterparts. Consistently, high intelligence individuals —regardless of their own endowment— hold more stable beliefs about the rich individuals’ contributions over time. These findings underscore the complex interplay between cognitive ability, resource distribution, and belief formation in shaping cooperative behavior in the long run.
3. Cognitive ability, risk preferences and errors (with Graeme Pearce)
Abstract: In this paper we examine the link between cognitive ability, risk preferences and the errors that people make. We build a unique dataset that contains over 260,000 decisions made under uncertainty in a variety of tasks by almost 13,000 individuals, with each person having completed a test designed explicitly to measure their cognitive ability. We use both reduced form and structural analyses to distinguish between behavioural differences driven by risk aversion from those that are a consequence of errors. We find that intelligence (1) has a small and behaviourally irrelevant impact on risk preferences and (2) a robust link to errors, reducing the probability of errors through increased preference stability. There is also some evidence of a negative association between intelligence and mistakes. Our results have implications for the development of theories that seek to explain the impact of cognitive ability on decision making.