Research
The main focus of my research is Aristotle's ethical theory. Here, I am principally interested in Aristotle's views on the place of contemplation in the happy life, and in understanding these views against the background of Aristotle's biological naturalism (especially his views on living organisms as self-maintaining systems). In my first book, Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation (Cambridge University Press), I argue that while Aristotle thinks that contemplation is the highest end of a happy life, and is in some sense a useless activity, Aristotle also identifies a useful role for contemplation in the self-maintaining activity of human beings. Hence, contemplation plays a role in the good for human beings continuous with the role that perception plays in the good for animals and nutrition plays in the good for plants.
My research on Aristotle's ethical theory has inspired a newer interest in Platonic views on friendship, self-knowledge, and the nature of the philosophical life. Here, I have taken a special interest in the dialogues on love and friendship, viz., the Alcibiades, Symposium, Phaedrus, and Lysis. I am currently at work on a long-term project on eros and immortality in Plato's Symposium and Phaedo.
Outside of ancient Greek philosophy, I have broader historical, topical, and cross-cultural interests in virtue ethics. In such work, I explore various aspects of the Confucian tradition (to which I was introduced by participating in the NEH Summer Seminar "Traditions into Dialogue: Confucianism and Contemporary Virtue Ethics"); Hume’s reception of Hellenistic and Roman philosophy; intellectual virtue; philosophy as a way of life; and related themes.
For copies of my work, please see my PhilPapers page: https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-d-walker.
My work includes:
Book
Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation (Cambridge University Press, 2018 [hardcover]; 2020 [paperback])
Papers
"Aristotle's Eudemus and the Propaedeutic Use of the Dialogue Form." Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (2021): 399-427. (JHP Prize for Best Article of 2021.)
By scholarly consensus, extant fragments from, and testimony about, Aristotle’s lost dialogue Eudemus provide strong evidence for thinking that Aristotle at some point defended the human soul’s unqualified immortality (either in whole or in part). I reject this consensus and develop an alternative, deflationary, speculative, but textually supported proposal to explain why Aristotle might have written a dialogue featuring arguments for the soul’s unqualified immortality. Instead of defending unqualified immortality as a doctrine, I argue, the Eudemus was most likely offering a dramatically engaging propaedeutic to the sort of philosophical inquiry about the soul and its prospects that Aristotle pursues more scientifically in the De anima and Parva naturalia.
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/798836
https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2021.0047
“Aristotle, Isocrates, and Philosophical Progress: Protrepticus 6, 40.15-20/B55.” History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020): 197-224. (Special issue: “Ancient Modes of Philosophical Inquiry,” edited by Jens Kristian Larsen and Philipp Steinkrüger.)
In fragments of the lost Protrepticus, preserved in Iamblichus, Aristotle responds to Isocrates’ worries about the excessive demandingness of theoretical philosophy. Contrary to Isocrates, Aristotle holds that such philosophy is generally feasible for human beings. In defense of this claim, Aristotle offers the progress argument, which appeals to early Greek philosophers’ rapid success in attaining exact understanding. In this paper, I explore and evaluate this argument. After making clarificatory exegetical points, I examine the argument’s premises in light of pressing worries that the argument reasonably faces in its immediate intellectual context, the dispute between Isocrates and Aristotle. I also relate the argument to modern concerns about philosophical progress. I contend that the argument withstands these worries, and thereby constitutes a reasonable Aristotelian response to the Isocratean challenge. https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/23/1/article-p197_10.xml?language=en
https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02301012
“Socrates’ Lesson to Hippothales in Plato’s Lysis.” Classical Philology 115 (2020): 551-566.
In the opening of Plato’s Lysis, Socrates criticizes the love-besotted Hippothales’ way of speaking to, and about, Hippothales’ yearned-for Lysis. Socrates subsequently proceeds to demonstrate (ἐπιδεῖξαι) how Hippothales should converse with Lysis (206c5-6). But how should we assess Socrates’ criticisms of, and demonstration to, Hippothales? Are they defensible by Socrates’ own standards, as well as independent criteria? In this paper, I first articulate and assess Socrates’ criticisms of Hippothales. Second, I identify, examine, and respond to puzzles to which Socrates’ demonstration to Hippothales gives rise.
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/708811?journalCode=cp
https://doi.org/10.1086/708811
“The Appeal to Easiness in Aristotle’s Protrepticus.” Ancient Philosophy 39 (2019): 319-333.
In fragments from the Protrepticus, Aristotle offers three linked arguments for the view that philosophy is easy. According to an obvious normative worry, however, Aristotle also seems to think that the easiness of many activities has little to do with their choiceworthiness. Hence, if the Protrepticus seeks to exhort its audience to philosophize on the basis of philosophy’s easiness, then perhaps the Protrepticus provides the wrong sort of hortatory appeal. In response, I briefly situate Aristotle’s arguments in their dialectical context. On this basis, I elucidate what sort of easiness Aristotle attributes to philosophy, and what difference Aristotle thinks philosophy’s easiness makes to its choiceworthiness.
https://www.pdcnet.org/ancientphil/content/ancientphil_2019_0039_0002_0319_0333
https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil201939221
“Knowledge, Action, and Virtue in Zhu Xi.” Philosophy East and West: A Quarterly of Comparative Philosophy 69 (2019): 515-534.
I examine Zhu Xi's investigation thesis, the claim that a necessary condition (in ordinary cases) for one’s acting fully virtuously is one’s investigating the all-pervasive pattern in things (gewu格物). I identify four key objections that the thesis faces, which I label the rationalism, elitism, demandingness, and irrelevance worries. Zhu Xi, I argue, has resources for responding to each of these worries, and for defending a broadly intellectualist conception of fully virtuous agency.
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/688516/pdf
https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2019.0038
“Punishment and Ethical Self-Cultivation in Confucius and Aristotle.” Special issue on “Law and Humanities in China,” ed. Marco Wan, Law and Literature 31 (2019): 259-275.
Confucius and Aristotle both put a primacy on the task of ethical self-cultivation. Unlike Aristotle, who emphasizes the instrumental value of legal punishment for cultivation’s sake, Confucius raises worries about the practice of punishment. Punishment, and the threat of punishment, Confucius suggests, actually threatens to warp human motivation and impede our ethical development. In this paper, I examine Confucius’ worries about legal punishment, and consider how a dialogue on punishment between Confucius and Aristotle might proceed. I explore how far apart these thinkers actually stand, and examine the possibilities for a rapprochement between them. Doing so brings to light the self-cultivation perspective’s range of resources for thinking about punishment’s justification.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1535685X.2018.1496636
"How Narrow is Aristotle's Contemplative Ideal?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2017): 558-583
In Nicomachean Ethics X.7–8, Aristotle defends a striking view about the good for human beings. According to Aristotle, the single happiest way of life is organized around philosophical contemplation. According to the narrowness worry, however, Aristotle's contemplative ideal is unduly Procrustean, restrictive, inflexible, and oblivious of human diversity. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle has resources for responding to the narrowness worry, and that his contemplative ideal can take due account of human diversity.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phpr.12194
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12194
"Aristotle on the Utility and Choiceworthiness of Friends." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96 (2014): 151-182
Aristotle’s views on the choiceworthiness of friends might seem both internally inconsistent and objectionably instrumentalizing. On the one hand, Aristotle maintains that perfect friends or virtue-friends are choiceworthy and lovable for their own sake, and not merely for the sake of further ends. On the other hand, in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9, Aristotle appears somehow to account for the choiceworthiness of such friends by reference to their utility as sources of a virtuous agent’s robust self-awareness.
I examine Aristotle’s views on the utility and choiceworthiness of friends, and offer a novel reading of Nicomachean Ethics IX.9. On this reading, Aristotle accepts a version of instrumental conditionalism about final value, i.e., the thesis that goods (including friends) can be choiceworthy for their own sake (i.e., possess final or end value) at least partly on account of their instrumental properties. In articulating what sort of instrumental conditionalism it is reasonable to attribute to Aristotle, I argue that Aristotle appeals to the utility of perfect friends as part of a broadly material-causal account of why such friends are choiceworthy for their own sake. On this reading, perfect friends are not choiceworthy for the sake of their utility in eliciting self-awareness; rather, their choiceworthiness for their own sake is (at least partly) realized in, or constituted by, their conduciveness to the virtuous agent’s self-awareness. This reading, I argue, frees Aristotle from the charge of inconsistency: Aristotle can appeal to the conduciveness of perfect friends to the virtuous agent’s self-awareness as a way of explaining why such friends are choiceworthy for their own sake.
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/agph-2014-0008/html
https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2014-0008
"Reconciling the Stoic and the Sceptic: Hume on Philosophy as a Way of Life and the Plurality of Happy Lives." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2013): 879-901
On the one hand, Hume accepts the view—which he attributes primarily to Stoicism—that there exists a determinate best and happiest life for human beings, a way of life led by a figure whom Hume calls “the true philosopher.” On the other hand, Hume accepts that view—which he attributes to Scepticism—that there exists a vast plurality of good and happy lives, each potentially equally choiceworthy. In this paper, I reconcile Hume’s apparently conflicting commitments: I argue that Hume’s “Sceptical” pluralism about the character of the happiest life need not conflict with his “Stoic” advocacy of the supreme happiness of the true philosopher, given Hume’s flexible understanding of how one might live as a true philosopher.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09608788.2013.801829
https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2013.801829
"Rehabilitating Theoretical Wisdom." Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2013): 763-787
Given the importance of theoretical wisdom (sophia) in Aristotle’s account of the human good, it is striking that contemporary virtue ethicists have been virtually silent about this intellectual virtue and what contribution (if any) it makes—or could make—toward human flourishing. In this paper, I examine, and respond to, two main worries that account for theoretical wisdom’s current marginality. Along the way, I sketch a neo-Aristotelian conception of theoretical wisdom, and argue that this intellectual virtue is more central to the concerns of contemporary virtue ethicists than it has perhaps so far seemed.
https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/10/6/article-p763_4.xml?language=en
https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681022
"Aristotle on Activity 'According to the Best and Most Final' Virtue." Apeiron 44 (2011): 91-110.
I examine Aristotle's claim (in Nicomachean Ethics I.7 1098a16-18) that eudaimonia consists in "activity of soul according to virtue, but if there are many virtues, then according to the best and most final" virtue. Ongoing debate between inclusivist and exclusivist readers of this passage has focused on the referent of "the best and most final" virtue. I argue that even if one accepts the exclusivist's answer to this reference question, one still needs an account of what it means for activity of soul to accord with the best and most final virtue. I examine the nature of this accordance relation and defend a novel inclusivist reading of the whole passage.
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/apeiron.2011.007/html
https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron.2011.007
"Contemplation and Self-Awareness in the Nicomachean Ethics." Rhizai 7 (2010): 221-238.
I explore Aristotle’s account in the Nicomachean Ethics of how agents attain self-awareness through contemplation. I argue that Aristotle sets up an account of self-awareness through contemplating friends in Books VIII-IX that completes itself in Book X’s remarks on theoretical contemplation. I go on to provide an account of how contemplating the divine, on Aristotle’s view, elicits self-awareness.
https://philpapers.org/rec/WALCAS-4
"The Utility of Contemplation in Aristotle's Protrepticus." Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010): 135-153.
Fragments of Aristotle’s lost Protrepticus seem to offer inconsistent arguments for the value of contemplation (one argument appealing to contemplation's uselessness, the other appealing to its utility). In this paper, I argue that these arguments are mutually consistent. Further, I argue that, contrary to first appearances, Aristotle has resources in the Protrepticus for explaining how contemplation, even if it has divine objects, can nevertheless be useful in the way in which he claims, viz., for providing cognitive access to boundary markers (horoi) of the human good. https://www.pdcnet.org/ancientphil/content/ancientphil_2010_0030_0001_0135_0153
Chapters
“Aristotle on Wittiness,” in Laughter and Comedy in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Pierre Destrée and Franco Trivigno (Oxford University Press, 2019), 103-121.
This chapter offers a complete account of Aristotle’s underexplored treatment of the virtue of wittiness (eutrapelia) in Nicomachean Ethics IV.8. It addresses the following questions: (1) What, according to Aristotle, is this virtue and what is its structure? (2) How do Aristotle’s moral psychological views inform Aristotle’s account, and how might Aristotle’s discussions of other, more familiar virtues, enable us to understand wittiness better? In particular, what passions does the virtue of wittiness concern, and how might the virtue (and its attendant vices) be related to the virtue of temperance (and its attendant vices)? (3) How does wittiness, as an ethical virtue, benefit its possessor? (4) How can Aristotle resolve some key tensions that his introducing a virtue of wittiness apparently generates for his ethics? In addition to exploring these questions, this chapter challenges some commonly accepted accounts of Aristotle’s views on the nature of the laughable. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/laughter-humor-and-comedy-in-ancient-philosophy-9780190460549?cc=sg&lang=en&
“Non-Impositional Rule in Confucius and Aristotle,” in The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Early Chinese Ethics and Political Philosophy, ed. Alexus McLeod (Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 187-204.
I examine and compare Confucian wu-wei rule and Aristotelian non-imperative rule as two models of non-impositional rule. How exactly do non-impositional rulers, according to these thinkers, generate order? And how might a Confucian/Aristotelian dialogue concerning non-impositional rule in distinctively political contexts proceed? Are Confucians and Aristotelians in deep disagreement, or do they actually have more in common than they initially seem?
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350007222.ch-008
"The Functions of Apollodorus," in Plato in Symposium: Selected Papers from the Tenth Symposium Platonicum, eds. Mauro Tulli and Michael Erler (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag), 110-116.
In Plato’s Symposium, the mysterious Apollodorus recounts to an unnamed comrade, and to us, Aristodemus’s story of just what happened at Agathon’s drinking party. Since Apollodorus did not attend the party, however, it is unclear what relevance he could have to our understanding of the drama and speeches about erôs that follow. Apollodorus’s strangeness is accentuated by his recession into the background after only two Stephanus pages. What difference—if any—does Apollodorus make to the Symposium? Does his inclusion call the dramatic and philosophical unity of the work into question?
I argue that, despite initial appearances, Plato has important philosophical reasons for including Apollodorus as a character. Far from being an odd appendage to an otherwise complete narrative, Apollodorus plays an integral role in the Symposium. (i) Through installing Apollodorus as the narrator of the work, Plato introduces us to the Symposium’s major philosophical themes. (ii) Through his unflattering portrayal of Apollodorus as a disturbed disciple of Socrates, Plato attempts to inoculate the aspiring philosophical reader against something like the kind of misguided erôs that Apollodorus manifests.
“Confucian Worries about the Aristotelian Sophos,” in Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue, ed. Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote, and Ernest Sosa (New York: Routledge, 2016), 196-213.
This chapter examines key Confucian worries about the Aristotelian sophos as a model of human flourishing. How strong are these worries? Do Aristotelians have good replies to them? Could the Aristotelian sophos, and this figure's distinguishing feature, sophia, be more appealing to the Confucian than they initially appear? https://www.routledge.com/Moral-and-Intellectual-Virtues-in-Western-and-Chinese-Philosophy-The-Turn/Mi-Slote-Sosa/p/book/9781138925168
"Structured Inclusivism about Human Flourishing: A Mengzian Formulation," in Virtue Ethics and Confucianism, eds. Stephen Angle and Michael Slote (New York: Routledge, 2013), 94-102.
I briefly defend the philosophical cogency of inclusivism about human flourishing, the view that intrinsic goods are valuable for the sake of flourishing by somehow composing flourishing. In particular, I consider the stuctured inclusivist view that intrinsic goods are components of flourishing as body parts are components of a body. As a test case, I examine the conception of human flourishing offered by the early Confucian philosopher Mengzi (Mencius). I argue that by appealing to Mengzi’s account, one can respond to worries (such as those of Richard Kraut) about how such a structured inclusivism could possibly make sense. https://www.routledge.com/Virtue-Ethics-and-Confucianism/Angle-Slote/p/book/9781138933606
Book Reviews
Review of Erick Raphael Jiménez, Aristotle’s Concept of Mind. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, January 10, 2018. ndpr.nd.edu/news/aristotles-concept-of-mind
Review of Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Great Civilized Conversation: Education for a World Community. The Journal of Asian Studies 74 (2015): 455-456. (Invited review)
Review of Jon Miller, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide. Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 30 (2013): 176-180. (Invited review)
Review of Joel J. Kupperman, Theories of Human Nature. Dao: A Journal for Comparative Philosophy 11 (2012): 253-257. (Invited review.)
Review of Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics. Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 397-398.