-1- Cultural goods and transmission of culture, in collaboration with P. Michel, Actualité économique, January 2000.
In a Diamond growth model, households produce culture by combining cultural goods and transmitted culture. The involuntary transmission of culture to children produces a positive externality not taken into account by the parents and is therefore a source of inefficiency. The government can achieve the best of the best by discriminating by age by subsidizing only the young. In the Cobb-Douglas case, a subsidy rate equal to the elasticity of the externality on the production of youth culture allows decentralization of the optimum.
-2- Can public arts education replace arts subsidization? , in collaboration with V. Ginsburgh, P. Michel, Journal of Cultural Economics, July 2008.
This paper examines two instruments (public education or proportional subsidy) to correct the imperfect culture transmission between parents and children in a Diamond growth model. Lump sum transfers have several roles that can not be disentangled. At the optimum, education can not replace the grant for art. In a second best, however, we show that it is better to subsidize education, while the consumption of art, especially that of older generations, should be taxed rather than subsidized.
-3- A dynamic game for fiscal federalism with non-local externalities, in collaboration with Pierre Cartigny, Research in economics, 2013.
We study the effectiveness of public agencies charged with correcting a non-local dynamic externality in a dynamic game model. We treat two cases: the spread of pollution between water basins (negative externality) and the contribution to global culture by an elite (positive externality). We consider each time (i) the exposure and (ii) the contribution of the jurisdictions to the common benefits. When the two effects offset each other: we must "let-do" the agencies. On the other hand, when the non-local character is more pronounced, ie when the jurisdiction of one of the agencies contributes more while being less exposed, we show that a static rule of redistribution between the agencies improves the responsiveness of the agencies. public intervention.
-4- Prices for superstars can flatten out, Journal of Cultural Economics, January 2014, winner Pommerehne Prize 2014-2015.
In the reference article on the subject, Sherwin Rosen 1981 argues that a possible explanation for the supertars phenomenon is the market-driven matching between a small number of very high quality artists and a large mass of low-volume consumers. qualified ('connoisseurship' weak). The paper proposes an enrichment of the possible cases by showing that the inverse pairing is possible. This may lead to the price of talented artists being capped, limited by the low overall demand of relatively fewer qualified consumers.
-5- NEXT event: a cooperative game theoretical view to festivals, in revision at Theory and decision, 2018,
During a cultural festival, artists and theaters act as a cartel by agreeing on pricing decisions that maximize the groups' profit as a whole. We model the problem of sharing the profit created by a cooperative organizing festival. In such a game, the value of a coalition is defined as the profitability of the optimal fixation of prices. We show that this class of games is convex and we axiomatically characterize the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) for this class of games. We also provide an axiomatic basis for the incremental downstream solution. Finally, we apply this model to the NEXT festival, for which we have collected data. We propose an approach to derive the games' vector from the data and we compute the different solutions.