Culture represents a non-market form of "private education" within the household. In [12], particular dynamics, with "jumps", are generated if we assume convex-concave functions in crop production. This leads to threshold effects in crop accumulation. The first paper in which culture is introduced into a growth model [11] is written in collaboration with P. Michel and lays the foundation for the study of culture transmission in macroeconomic models of "diamond" generations. The decentralization of the optimum is described in detail along the trajectory. The other two models of growth with culture [7] and [9] in collaboration with P. Michel and V. Ginsburgh, study questions relating to the appropriateness of public instruments such as education or subsidy, under different hypotheses. on family relationships: altruism or egoism between generations. A microeconomic level, we proposed with P. Cartigny, to consider the dynamic inter-agency game [5] appropriate to understand the public intervention adapted to fiscal federalism. Culture is then a particular case of positive externality. This axis continues today with the search for an empirical counterpart to the notion of generation in [3]. Using INSEE Family Budgets surveys from 1980 to 2006, we provide a breakdown of generations into "effective" generations, ie from breaks in individual behaviors and not a priori, as is usually done. .
Contribution of the axis: In this axis, we provided the first representation of culture in a macroeconomic model. This places culture as a key variable to consider with respect to other large traditional rules that can improve well-being (such as the interest rate of the golden rule). obtain the value of the instruments according to characteristics of the transmission at the origin of the externality. We present public policy criteria by differentiating the instruments of the old and young (less subsidize the young), the mass and the elite (redistribute mass towards the elite by a redistribution between the public agencies).