Law is largely conceived today as a tool of social engineering. It is supposed to promote something outside of itself, in general social purposes. It is a means to an end and not an end in itself. As such, it must be efficient… or at least its efficiency cannot be disregarded. The rise of impact studies in legislative process is a manifestation of this tendency. However, what does it mean to be efficient? How to assess the efficiency of a law or of an institution? What are the problems regarding this assessment? Is efficiency the sole purpose of the law? These questions will be addressed through a broad approach of regulations.
textbook:
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation, oxford university press
if you are interested by epistemological question, you can read G.L.S. Shakle, Epistemics and economics, transaction publishers.
For an introduction to Austrian economics, you can read Kirzner, Market Theory and the Price System, Liberty fund
Tentative schedule.
Lecture 1. Why should we regulate? (I): efficiency
Robard Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation, 2012, Oxford University press, Oxford, Chapters 1 and 2
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 1968, Science, vol 162, pp 1243 and seq.
Lecture 2. Why should we regulate? (II): distributional and “justice” issues
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 2002, Harvard University press, Cambridge, Chapitre 1
Elisabeth M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Baby Shortage, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 323-348
in French, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Le Sacrifice et l'Envie, libéralisme et justice sociale, Hachette
Lecture 3. Regulatory strategies (I): CAC and economic incentives
Robard Baldwin, martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation, 2012, Oxford University press, Oxford, chapter 7
World Bank, Guidance Notes on Tools for Pollution management, Market-Based Instruments, available online: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETENVIRONMENT/Resources/GuidanceNoteonMarketBasedInstruments.pdf
Lecture 4. Regulatory strategies (II): Soft law, nudges, self-regulation and regulation by information
David Trubeck and Louise Trubeck, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination, 2005, European Law Journal, vol 11, pp 343-364
Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 1997, Law and Policy, vol 19, pp 400-402
Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, 1982, Harvard University press, Cambridge, Chapiter 8
Lecture 5. How regulation can fail? theory and practice (I)
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics, 1971, vol 2, pp 3-21... and more generally, George Stigler, The Citizen and the State, Chicago University Press.
Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, University of Chicago Law Review, 1990, vol 57, pp 407-441
Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 1945, American Economic Review, pp 519-530
Lecture 6. How regulation can fail? theory and practice (II)
Bruce Yandles, Bootleggers and Baptists – The Education of a Regulatory Economist, Regulations, may/june 1983, available online: http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1983/5/v7n3-3.pdf
Donald Wittman, The End of Special Interests Theory and the Beginning of a More Positive View of Democratic Politics, in Edward Balleisen and David Moss, Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation, 2009, Cambridge University press, New York
Lecture 7. Impact assessment and the case for CBA
Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, Pricing the priceless: Cost Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 2002, available online: http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/C-B%20pamphlet%20final.pdf
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Impact Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis: What do They Imply for Policymaking and Law Reform?, 2011, Revue d’Administration Publique, pp 787-806