Introduction to law and economics
Présentation du cours :
« Il n'est pas de miroitements, même lointains, même déformants, du droit qui ne puissent contribuer à sa connaissance » (Jean Carbonnier). Les rapports entre le droit et l’économie sont évidents et pourtant les disciplines ont encore trop tendance à s’ignorer alors que leur mise en relation s’avère extrêmement fertile. Cette approche permet en effet d’interroger les approches juridiques traditionnelles et favorise, par la même, une connaissance plus intime du droit.
Ce cours vise principalement à offrir aux étudiants une introduction critique aux relations possibles entre le droit et l’économie. Pour ce faire, il partira d’une analyse de quelques grands articles du mouvement, qui ont d’ailleurs souvent valu à leur(s) auteur(s) le prix Nobel d’économie. De l’école de Chicago au new institutional economics en passant par le public choice, l’économie des coûts de transaction et le behavioral law and economics, c’est l’ensemble des écoles et des approches qui seront étudiées.
quelques vidéos intéressantes:
1. Sur Ronald Coase, voici un cours donné par Saul Levmore
2. Les vidéos "Free to choose" de Friedman sont également disponibles sur youtube.
ouvrage: Mackaay & Rousseau, Analyse économique du droit, Dalloz/Themis
Tentative schedule
1. thinking like an economist
2. the economic impact of law
readings:
Ronald Coase, the problem of social cost, JLE, 1960
Guido Calabresi (1980), ‘About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin’
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (1994), ‘Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income’
Elisabeth Krecké (2004), ‘Economic Analysis and Legal Pragmatism’
3. understanding property
readings:
Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1973), ‘The Property Right Paradigm’
Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill (1990), ‘The Race for Property Rights’
Richard A. Epstein (1994), ‘On the Optimal Mix of Private and Common Property’
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed (1972), ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’
4. understanding contract
readings:
Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott (1980), ‘Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract’
Eric A. Posner (2003), ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?’
Oliver Hart and John Moore (1999), ‘Foundations of Incomplete Contracts’
Alan Schwartz (1979), ‘The Case for Specific Performance’
5. understanding tort
readings:
Robert Cooter, Price and Sanction, 1984, Columbia law review
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed (1972), ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1983), ‘Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach’
W. Kip Viscusi (2000), ’The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique’
6. understanding litigation
readings
Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘Legal Origins’
Steven Shavell (1982), ‘The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System’
Avery Katz (1988), ‘Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure’
Steven Shavell (1989), ‘Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive to Provide Evidence to Legal Tribunals’
7. externalities and environmental regulation
readings:
Ronald Coase, the problem of social cost, JLE, 1960
Garrett Hardin (1968), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’
William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates (1971), ‘The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment’
Kenneth J. Arrow and Anthony C. Fisher (1974), ‘Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility’
Richard L. Revesz (1999), ‘Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives’
8. asymmetric informations and statistical discrimination
readings:
George A. Akerlof (1970), ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’
F. A. Hayek (1945), ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’
Michael Spence (1973), ‘Job Market Signaling’
George J. Stigler (1961), ‘The Economics of Information’
9. Behavioral economics and the question of paternalism
readings:
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler (1998), ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’
Melvin Aron Eisenberg (1995), ‘The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract’
Oren Bar-Gill (2008), ‘ The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts’
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski (2000), ‘The New Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters’
10. Introduction to social choice and the question of the general interest
readings:
Buchanan & Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor
Arrow, Social preferences and social values, Yale University Press
James Madison ([1787] 1961), ‘The Federalist. No X. (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Continued)’
Robert Cooter (2002), ‘Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy versus Median Democracy’
11. understanding the legislature
readings:
Gillian K. Hadfield (2008), ‘The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of the Quality of Law’
Saul Levmore (1992), ‘Bicameralism: When are Two Decisions Better than One?’
Richard A. Epstein (1988), ‘Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent’
Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’
Cass R. Sunstein (1985), ‘Interest Groups in American Public Law’
12. social norms and the law
readings:
Robert C. Ellickson (1986), ‘Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County’
Paul G. Mahoney and Chris W. Sanchirico (2001), ‘Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?’
Lisa Bernstein (1992), ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’
Eric A. Posner (1996), ‘Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms’