Working Papers:

The Network Effects of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism with a Quantitative Trade Model (2026)  (with A. Rungi and N. Walczak)[under review]
Abstract:  We investigate the economic and environmental impacts of the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) using a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium model with input-output linkages. We quantify the general equilibrium responses of trade flows, expenditures, and emissions. To our knowledge, we are the first to endogenize both carbon prices and the CBAM price.  We find that, once fully implemented, CBAM  could reduce carbon emissions embodied in EU imports by 5.19%. In the absence of global production network adjustments, this reduction would be larger (8.84%), highlighting the substitution effects along global supply chains. At the same time, CBAM slightly increases EU Gross National Expenditure (GNE) through terms-of-trade effects and induces a reallocation of sourcing toward domestic and relatively cleaner inputs. For non-EU countries, the aggregate effects are modest: GNE declines by 0.02%, and emissions fall by 0.11%. Overall, our results underscore the importance of accounting for global supply chains when evaluating border carbon policies. We conclude that policies targeting supply-chain emissions are essential for capturing the full carbon footprint of production.

Peer pressure in linear-quadratic games (2025) (with Diego San Román)
Abstract: We study peer effects in networks when agents can exert costly peer pressure that directly influences others’ incentives. We develop a linear–quadratic network model in which agents choose both effort and peer pressure and characterize equilibrium behavior. Peer pressure generates feedback loops that reshape effort provision and network spillovers. When the peer-pressure and friendship networks coincide, we derive a local approximation of interdependence highlighting the roles of degree and clustering. We then consider environments in which agents interact in a group but can exert pressure on only a subset of peers, showing how network architecture shapes the distribution of pressure, effort, and payoffs and how symmetric effort can coexist with substantial heterogeneity in pressure exertion and payoffs. Finally, we allow for link-specific peer pressure and show how agents optimally target influence toward peers. 

Learning to Import through Production Networks (2025) (with F. Nutarelli,  F. Serti, and F. Vega-Redondo)
Abstract:  Using administrative data on the universe of inter-firm transactions in Spain, we show that firms learn to import from their domestic suppliers and customers. Our identification strategy exploits the panel structure of the data, the firm-time variation across import origins, and the network structure. We find evidence of both upstream and downstream network effects, even after accounting for sectoral and spatial spillovers. We estimate that an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of suppliers (customers) that are importing from a given region increases the probability of starting to import from that region by 10.7 % (19.2 %).  Connections with geographically distant domestic firms provide more useful information to start importing.  Larger firms are more responsive to this information but less likely to disseminate it.

Promotion through Connections: Favors or Information? (2024)(with Yann Bramoullé) [revise & resubmit]
Abstract: Connections appear to be helpful in many contexts, such as obtaining a job, a promotion, a grant, a loan, or publishing a paper. This may be due either to favoritism or to information conveyed by connections. Attempts at identifying both effects have relied on measures of true quality, generally built from data collected long after promotion. Building on earlier work on discrimination, we propose a new method to identify favors and information from data collected at the time of promotion. Under weak assumptions, we show that promotion decisions for connected candidates look more random to the econometrician due to the information channel. We derive new identification results and estimate the strength of the two effects. We adapt the control function approach to address the issue of the selection into connections. Applying our methodology to academic promotions in Spain and Italy and political advancements in China, we find evidence that connections may convey information and attract favors.

Published and accepted papers:

Production and Financial Networks in Interplay (2026) (with G. Jiménez, E. Moral-Benito, J-L. Peydró, F. Vega-Redondo). American Economic Review.

Measuring the Input Rank in Global Supply Networks (2023)  (with  L. Fattorini and A. Rungi). The World Economy.

Polarization in Networks: Identification-alienation Framework (2022), with  A. Ozkes,  Journal of Mathematical Economics.

A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation (2021),   Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Contagious Disruptions and Complexity Traps in Economic Development (2017),  with Charlie Brummitt, Paolo Pin, Matthew H. Bonds, and Fernando Vega-Redondo, Nature Human Behavior.  Press coverage:  New Scientist, MIT Technology Review.

Older working papers:

Production Networks (with Fernando Vega-Redondo) (2016) 

In progress:

Contest in Teams

R&D Collaboration in Production Networks  (with Ludovica Pagliarone)