Working Papers

Abstract: In new democracies, democratic consolidation necessitates political reforms that even the playing field for democracy. What shapes public opinion towards such democratizing reforms? We conducted a survey experiment in Malaysia, a new democracy since 2018, to test the effect of framing on public opinion towards democratizing reforms, and provide further observational evidence on public opinion towards proposed compromise solutions. We document two findings: First, public opinion towards democratizing reforms is sensitive to perceptions of threat to the political dominance and privileges of ethnic groups under the previous authoritarian regime. Such perceptions can originate from frames of direct threat or indirect loss. Second, proposed compromise solutions can increase support for democratizing reforms, but only for those reforms which have divided public opinion. Where reforms enjoy broad support, proposed compromise solutions depress support for reforms. Our results contribute to the renewed scholarship on the challenges of democratization, democratic consolidation, and precarity of backsliding in new democracies.

Abstract: When opposition parties and alliances win against autocratic incumbents, what do they do to reverse autocracy and to what extent are they successful in preventing autocratic comebacks? We argue that long-neglected endogenous weaknesses in opposition coalitions strongly undermine their own efforts to reverse autocracy, and open the door for autocratic comebacks. First, partisanship in opposition coalitions result in fractured and ineffective governance. Second, effusive enthusiasm in reversing autocracy deepens mass polarization and encourages counter-mobilization against the new government. We demonstrate this argument through most different case comparison between the recent autocratic reversal experiences of Poland and Malaysia. We show in both cases that while ideologically diverse opposition coalitions opportunistically cooperate to achieve short-term electoral victory, their ideological and distributional differences undermine governance after victory. In addition, because dismantling and reversing autocracy can be framed as partisan revenge, counter-mobilization by the ex-autocratic incumbents are highly successful in further undermining public support for the new government. These findings contribute to the growing literature on resisting democratic backsliding and authoritarian-lead democratization.

Abstract: When Lee Hsien Loong became Prime Minister in August 2004, Singapore’s opposition parties were in the doldrums. They had only 2 elected Members of Parliament amongst a total of 84, on the back of almost two-thirds of the seats uncontested in the prior general elections. Their fortunes would be completely reversed in the next two decades with 10 elected Members of Parliament amongst a total of 93, and all seats contested in the prior general elections. Why was there such a remarkable turnaround? This chapter argues that the Singapore government’s neoliberal economic policies, particularly its loose immigration policies, fermented mass grievances, and drove growing mass support for the opposition. As new opposition parties formed to tap onto this growing support, existing opposition actors capitalized on their small gains in between electoral cycles to grow their organizations via reruiting prominent new members and candidates, institutionalizing internal party discipline, and shifting their electoral communication strategies. The result was two decades of unprecedented opposition growth.

Abstract: Recent analyses of authoritarian-lead democratization have overwhelmingly focused on how autocratic incumbents shape democratization’s trajectory. The role that opposition parties play, particularly after securing electoral victories against dominant incumbents, is frequently neglected. This article argues that compromises reached in opposition pre-electoral alliances also affect democratization after incumbent defeat in unexpected ways. Specifically, opposition alliance pre-electoral bargains in terms of the distribution of political offices and policy compromises constrain the governance flexibility of a newly victorious government post-elections. They restrict political elites from negotiating alternative solutions when new information or new political realities arise. Both types of public pre-electoral bargains result in a disenchanted public when new governments attempt to deviate from these pre-electoral commitments. The collapse in public support opens multiple doors for the ex-dominant autocratic incumbent to return to executive power. In contrast, when opposition alliances forge bargains behind closed doors and win based on vague notions of democratic change, they are free to write an open narrative of victory and to impose their own agenda after autocratic defeat. Public support remains high despite governance controversies and inadequacies. The ex-dominant autocratic incumbent is marginalized, and authoritarian comeback is delayed at least until the next election cycle or when a desperate autocrat mounts a coup. This paper illustrates the arguments empirically by comparing how opposition victories in similarly unprecedented electoral turnovers in 2018 Malaysia and 1986 Philippines lead to divergent outcomes in political stability and authoritarian comebacks.