Working Papers

Abstract: Recent analyses of authoritarian-lead democratization have overwhelmingly focused on how autocratic incumbents shape democratization’s trajectory. The role that opposition parties play, particularly after securing electoral victories against dominant incumbents, is frequently neglected. This article argues that compromises reached in opposition pre-electoral alliances also affect democratization after incumbent defeat in unexpected ways. Specifically, opposition alliance pre-electoral bargains in terms of the distribution of political offices and policy compromises constrain the governance flexibility of a newly victorious government post-elections. They restrict political elites from negotiating alternative solutions when new information or new political realities arise. Both types of public pre-electoral bargains result in a disenchanted public when new governments attempt to deviate from these pre-electoral commitments. The collapse in public support opens multiple doors for the ex-dominant autocratic incumbent to return to executive power. In contrast, when opposition alliances forge bargains behind closed doors and win based on vague notions of democratic change, they are free to write an open narrative of victory and to impose their own agenda after autocratic defeat. Public support remains high despite governance controversies and inadequacies. The ex-dominant autocratic incumbent is marginalized, and authoritarian comeback is delayed at least until the next election cycle or when a desperate autocrat mounts a coup. This paper illustrates the arguments empirically by comparing how opposition victories in similarly unprecedented electoral turnovers in 2018 Malaysia and 1986 Philippines lead to divergent outcomes in political stability and authoritarian comebacks.