Working Papers

2022-




2017-2021





We study macroeconomic consequences of a major trade disruption using the example of the Finnish-Soviet trade collapse in 1991. This is a rare case of a well-identified large trade shock in a developed economy. We find that the shock had a significant effect on Finnish output. While the direct trade channel effect was rather moderate, the shock led to significant tightening of financial conditions. It was therefore endogenously amplified due to the propagation through the domestic financial sector. Even so, the trade collapse was insufficient to generate an all-out economic crisis. It can account for only a part of the Finnish Great Depression (1990 − 1993). The crisis was triggered and prolonged by the meltdown of the overheated financial and banking sectors since 1989. We show that the financial system remained a major independent source of shocks throughout the depression.


Using unique real time quarterly macroeconomic projections of the Eurosystem/ECB staff, we estimate competing specifications of the ECB’s monetary policy reaction function. We consider specifications which include inflation and output growth projections, a past inflation gap, a time varying natural real interest rate and different inflation targets. Our first key finding is that the de facto inflation target of the ECB lies between 1.6% and 1.8%. Our second key finding is that the ECB reacts both to short term macroeconomic projections and to past deviations of inflation from its de facto target.


2012-2016









2007-2010












1999-2006