Research

Publications


““Near" Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima," (with Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, and Christopher Ryan), Econometrica, 2024, 92, 141-165.

Strong Collusion-Proof Implementation," Korean Economic Review, 2023, 39, 241-256. 

Learning Rival's Information in Interdependent Value Auctions," (with Youngwoo Koh), Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 187, 105029.

      *Supplementary Material

Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Bidders: Theory and Experiment,” (with Syngjoo Choi and Jose-Alberto Guerra), Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 117, 218-237.  

Stable Matching in Large Economies,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Fuhito Kojima), Econometrica, 2019, 87, 65-110. 

      *supplementary material

Weak Cartels and Collusion-Proof Auctions,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Daniele Condorelli), Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 178, 398-435. 

      *supplementary material

Price Discrimination with Loss Averse and Horizontally Differentiated Consumers," (with Jinwoo Kim, Sang-Hyun Kim, Jihong Lee), Korean Economic Review, 2018, 117-129.

Price Discrimination with Loss Averse Consumers,” (with Jonghee Hahn, Sang Hyun Kim, and Jihong Lee), Economic Theory, 2018, 65, 681-728.

       *supplementary material

An Experimental Study of Sponsored Search Auctions,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Syngjoo Choi), Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 102, 20-43.

     *supplementary material

Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Fuhito Kojima), Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 158, 54-86. 

Efficient Assignment Mechanisms for Liquidity-Constrained Agents,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale), International Journal of Industrial Organizations, 2013, 31, 659-665.

Standard Auctions with Security Bids,” Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, 2013, 24, 54-71.

Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale), Review of Economic Studies, 2013, 80, 73-107.

     *supplementary material 

Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Konrad Mierendorff), Econometrica, 2013, 81, 2487-2520. 

     *Supplementary Material 

Bidding with Securities: Comments,” (with Yeon-Koo Che), American Economic Review, 2010, 100, 1929-35

“Do Breakup Fees Lead to Efficient Takeover?,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Tracy Lewis), Economics Letters, 2010, 108, 52-54. 

Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions,” (with Yeon-Koo Che), Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, 565-603. 

The Value of an Informed Bidder in Common Value Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 143, 585-595.

“Correlation on Belief and Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games,” Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, 2007, 18, 52-61.

Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment,” (with James Andreoni and Yeon-Koo Che), Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 59, 240-259. 

Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation,” (with Yeon-Koo Che), Econometrica, 2006, 74, 1063-1107.

Asymmetric Information about Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions,” (with Yeon-Koo Che), Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46, 383-397.


Working Papers and Works in Progress

Prestige Seeking in College Application and Major Choice,” (with Yeon-Koo Che, Dong Woo Hahm, Se-Jik Kim, and Olivier Tercieux)

Weak Monotone Comparative Statics,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Fuhito Kojima), revision requested by Econometrica 

“Repeat Applications in College Admission,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Youngwoo Koh)

“Robust Implementation with Collusion in Undominated Strategies,” (with Yeon-Koo Che and Daniele Condorelli)