VigIA: Prioritizing Public Procurement Oversight with Machine Learning. With Juan F. Perez (Uniandes) and Andres Salazar (DANE). Data & Policy, 2024, vol. 6, e75.
"Reenviado Muchas Veces": How Platform Warnings Affect WhatsApp Users in Mexico and Colombia. With Kevin Munger (Penn State), Angel Villegas-Cruz (Penn State), and Mateo Vasquez (UC San Diego). Political Communication, 2024, vol 41(5), 719-742.
Do Gifts Buy Votes? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. With Jenny Guardado (Georgetown University) and Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton University). World Development, 2023, vol. 162, 106125.
Predicting Politicians' Misconduct: Evidence from Colombia. With Mounu Prem (EIEF) and Juan Vargas (URosario). Data & Policy, 2022, vol. 4, e41.
Runoff Elections in the Laboratory. With Laurent Bouton (Georgetown University), Rebecca Morton (NYU), and Aniol Llorente-Saguer (Queen Mary University of London). The Economic Journal, 2022, vol. 132, no. 641, 106-146.
Can Facebook Ads and Email Messages Increase Fiscal Capacity? Experimental Evidence from Venezuela. With Federico Ortega (UCAB). Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2022, vol. 70, no.4, 1531-1563.
Preventing rather than Punishing: An Early Warning Model of Malfeasance in Public Procurement. With Gonzalo Rivero (Pew Research) and Juan Martinez (Microsoft). International Journal of Forecasting, 2021, vol. 37, no. 1, 360-377.
From Curse to Blessing? Institutional Reform and Resource Booms in Colombia. With Stanislao Maldonado (URosario) and Lorena Trujillo (ICFES). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 178, 174-193.
Tweeting for Peace: Experimental Evidence from the 2016 Colombian Plebiscite. With Juan Martinez (Microsoft), Kevin Munger (Penn State University) and Mateo Vasquez (UC San Diego). Electoral Studies, 2019, vol. 62.
Civil Conflict and Voting Behavior: Evidence from Colombia. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2018, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 601-621.
Natural Disasters and Clientelism: The Case of Floods and Landslides in Colombia. Electoral Studies , 2018, vol. 55, pp. 73-88.
Self-enforcing clientelism. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2015, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 401-427.
Clientelism. With Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton University). In Routledge Handbook of Democratization in Africa, 2019. Eds. G, Lynche and P. VonDoepp.
Experiments on Clientelism and Vote Buying. In New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 15), 2012, Emerald Group, pp. 177-212. With Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton University). Eds. Danila Serra and L. Wantchekon.
What Predicts Corruption? With Emanuele Colonnelli (UChicago) and Mounu Prem (EIEF). In A Modern Guide to the Economics of Crime. Eds. P. Buonanno, P. Vanin, and J. Vargas, forthcoming.
Pandemic Corruption: Insights from Latin America. With Mounu Prem (EIEF) and Juan Vargas (URosario). In Procurement in Focus: Rules, Discretion, and Emergencies. Eds O. Bandiera, E. Bosio, and G. Spagnolo, CEPR Press.
Social Protection, Short-term Debt and Access to Credit. With Esteban Alvarez (DNP), Bridget Hoffman (IDB), Maria Paula Medina (UC Davis), Camilo Pecha (IDB), Marco Stampini (IDB), David Vargas (IDB), and Diego Vera-Cossio (IDB). R&R American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.
We exploit an expansion in social protection to middle-income households to study how they cope with economic shocks and how to build their resilience. We use a regression discontinuity design around the eligibility cutoff for a program that delivered monthly cash transfers mainly through bank accounts in Colombia. We find no impact on food security, education, and health outcomes—–the target outcomes of antipoverty programs. In contrast, program eligibility increases non-food consumption and reduces debt for routine expenses. Bank account ownership increases by 16%, and beneficiaries are more likely to borrow from formal lenders. Amid systemic and idiosyncratic shocks, the program prevents middle-income households from reducing non-food spending and acquiring expensive debt. When hit by severe shocks, beneficiary households substitute away from predatory loans. The results suggest that middle-income households are constrained by lack of insurance and that social protection can help them build resilience through formal credit markets.
A Theory of Armed Clientelism. Submitted.
Armed clientelism is a particular form of patronage in which politicians and non-state armed groups establish a symbiotic relationship where the former provides economic resources, judicial protection, or other benefits, while the latter provides political support and votes. In this paper, a theory of armed clientelism is presented, which shows that when politicians establish illegal alliances with armed groups and mafias, they face a political tradeoff: illegal alliances augment the probability of being elected, but generate the risk of being removed from office. The model predicts that in a context in which a mafia (partially) controls a district or a town, armed clientelism is more likely, among other things, when social diversity among the constituency is high and judicial state capacity is low. It also shows that armed clientelism is more prevalent in districts where the group and the machine are ideologically aligned, and when the armed group exerts greater territorial control in its area of influence.
Electoral Intermediaries. With Christopher Li (Florida State University) and Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton University). Submitted
Democratic elections increasingly involve political intermediaries (e.g. grassroots organizations or political brokers). We develop a model of electoral competition in which candidates must decide between brokers (patronage) and grassroots organizations. Our model shows that patronage is more likely when public offices are relatively more “valuable” for brokers. Moreover, setups that constrain candidates from funding grassroots campaigns and weaken ties between politicians and citizens make patronage more likely. We show that patronage negatively affects citizens’ welfare, as winning brokers turned civil servants undermine the quality of governments. Finally, our model explores the role of policy deliberation in curbing patronage politics.
Can Cash Transfers Increase Social Distancing During COVID-19? Evidence from Colombia. With Esteban Alvarez (DNP) and Camilo Pecha (IDB). Submitted
Governments around the world have used cash transfers to reduce human mobility during the current coronavirus pandemic, yet little is known about the effectiveness of this policy. We evaluate the impact of a large unconditional cash transfer program in Colombia using geolocated cellphone data and administrative records tracking the number of beneficiaries. We find that the program had an average null effect on mobility across the country but significantly reduced it in the largest cities. We test for different explanations and conclude that mobility responds relatively more to cash in places with high civic capital.
Pandemic Communication: Evidence from a Presidential TV Show in Colombia. With Johan Ortega (URosario) and Mateo Vásquez (ITAM). Submitted.
What kinds of messages and emotions do leaders communicate to their voters in times of crisis? On the one hand, they could divert attention from the problem and set the agenda on issues in which they demonstrate competence. On the other hand, they could focus on the problem, either to assign responsibilities to other actors or to signal their good handling of the crisis. We answer this question by analyzing the speech of the President of Colombia during the emergency caused by COVID-19 in that country. To do this, we extract hours of text from a daily television program hosted by the president and broadcast during the pandemic, and we use text-as-data tools to understand what issues he addressed and with what emotions he did so. Using topic models and sentiment analysis, we find that in the toughest moments of the pandemic, in terms of the number of deaths, the president focused more, and with a more negative sentiment, on public health issues than on economics. Furthermore, in the initial phases of the pandemic, the focus was on attributing the blame to external factors, while in later phases, emphasis was placed on the good management given to this catastrophic event.
Inefficient Procurement in the Times of Pandemia. With Mounu Prem (EIEF) and Juan Vargas (URosario). Economic Journal, R&R (dormant).
Conditional Cash Transfers and Prosociality: Evidence from a large Lab-in-the-Field Experiment. With Sandra Polania (University of Notre Dame).
Desigualdad y leyes de potencia. Cuadernos de Economía, 2010, Vol. 29, no. 53, pp. 57-95. With Yalila Aljure.
El sentido común en la teoría de la acción colectiva. Cuadernos de Economía, 2008, Vol. 27, no. 49, pp. 295-305.
Aplicaciones de le economía computacional y la teoría de la complejidad. Revista de Economía Institucional, 2007, Vol. 9, no. 17, 369-374.
Reciprocidad y la paradoja del votante. Revista de Economía Institucional, 2007, Vol. 9, no. 16, pp. 149-188.
In Memoriam Milton Friedman (1912-2006). Revista de Economía Institucional, 2006, Vol. 8, no. 15, pp. 337-341.
Cuarto Simposio Nacional de Microeconomía: Discurso Inaugural. Revista de Economía Institucional, 2006, Vol. 8, no. 15, pp. 333-336.
Alianza Summa: una aproximación desde la teoría de la organización industrial. Cuadernos de Economía, 2004, Vol. 24, no. 42, pp. 161-194.