The Sim bargaining mechanism is mathematically proven to possess three crucial properties for optimal and robust Internet-based trading:
1) It is strongly resistant to collusion (i.e., strongly group strategyproof).
2) It is resistant to identity faking (i.e., shill resistant).
3) It gives incentives to agents for behaving in a manner consistent with the desired outcome where every agent's benefit is maximized (i.e., incentive compatible).
As such the Sim bargaining mechanism enables Internet-based bargaining activities to be carried out optimally while individual price shading (respectively, markup), collusion, and identity faking for illicit trading become unprofitable or unfeasible. Given the ease to collude for manipulating resource prices and to fake identities in Internet environments, such an optimal and robust bargaining mechanism is indispensable for Internet-based trading platforms such as resource pricing in fog computing.