vishnutatvanirnaya

VishnuTatvaNirnaya

Compiled by Mohan Bheemasenarao on Dvaita List

Reference: 'Srimad-Visnu-Tattva-Vinirnaya' by S.S. Raghavachar (Third edition of the English translation)

Chapter 1

sadAgamaikavij~neyaM samatItaxarAxaram.h |

nArAyaNaM sadA vande nirdoshhAsheshhasadguNam.h || 1 ||

1. I offer adoration always to Narayana who is cognizable in all his uniqueness only through the right scriptures, who wholly transcends the Ksara Individual selves) and the aksara ( Lakshmi, his divine consort. His transcendence of both Lakshmi and the invidual selves implies a fortiori his ranscendence of inanimate nature) and who is flawless and abounds in all excellent attributes.

visheshhaNAni yAnIha kathitAni saduktibhiH |

sAdhayishhyAmi tAnyeva kramAtsajjanasaMvide || 2 ||

2. With a view to facilitate the comprehension on the part of good men, ( Good men in the highest sense are those who renounce everything else and seek only Narayana, the ultimate Deity ) I will establish the truth of these adjectives ( Applied to Narayana here are the three adjectives enumerated: (a) 'Cognizable in all his uniqueness only through the right scriptures' (b) 'Who wholly transcends the ksara and aksara' (c) 'Who is flawless and abounds in all excellent attributes ' ) in the order in which they have been enunciated, through statements of scriptures and arguments corroborative of them.

"R^igAdyA bhArataM chaiva paJNcharAtramathAkhilam.h |

mUlarAmAyaNaM chaiva purANaM chaitadAtmakam.h ||

ye chAnuyAyinastveshhAM sarve te cha sadAgamAH |

durAgamAstadanye ye tairna j~neyo janArdanaH ||

j~neya etaissadAyuktairbhaktimad.hbhiH sunishhThitaiH |

na cha kevalatarkeNa nAxajena na kenachit.h |

kevalAgamavij~neyo bhaktaireva na chAnyathA" || 3 ||

- iti brahmANDe |

3. The Brahmandapurana states: 'The right scriptures consist of the four Vedas begining with the Rgveda, the Bharata, the whole of the Pancaratragama, the original Ramayana, the Puranas corroborating these and all other works that follow these. Texts other than these are bad testimonies and through the latter Janardana cannot be known. But through right scriptures he can be known, by those who are persistently devoted to their study, who are inspired by loving devotion to him and are well established in that devotion. He cannot be apprehended by mere reasoning or by sensuous perception and not by one devoid of the qualifications specified. He can be apprehended by only through the scriptures and only by devotees. There is no other way'.

"nAve'davinmanute` taM bR^ihanta'm.h sa`rvA`nu`bhUmA`tmAna'

sAmparA`ye" | iti taittirIyashrutiH | (tai.A. 3.12.9.17)

"naishhA tarkeNa matirApaneyA proktAnyenaiva suj~nAnAya

preshhTha" | iti kaThashrutiH | (kaTha u. 1.2.9)

"nendriyAni nAnumAnaM vedA hyevainaM vedayanti tasmAdAhuH

vedAH" || 4 ||

iti pippalAdashrutiH |

4. The Taittiriya-sruti says: "No one who does not know the Vedas understands this great all-experiencing atman, understanding of whom is the way to liberation"

The Katha-sruti says: "This knowledge is neither attainable nor refutable by reasoning. Only when it is imparted by a teacher it leads to direct realisation"

The Pippalada-sruti says: "Neither the senses nor inference lead to the knowing of this One. Only the Vedas do so and hence they are called "Veads".

na chaiteshhAM vachanAnAmevAprAmANyaM |

purushheyatvAd.h vedasya |

"itihAsapurANaH paJNchamo vedAnAM vedaH"

chhA. u. 7.1.4)

iti tadgR^ihItatvAchcha || 5 ||

5. The texts quoted cannot themselves be considered untrue, for the Veda is not a personal composition and the other texts are admitted as authoritative by the Veda itself in the statement, 'Itihasa-purana is the fifth Veda as it forms the fifth in the series of Rk, Yajus, Saman and Atharvan'.

na cha 'apaurushheyaM vAkyameva nAsti', iti vAchyam.h |

tadabhAve, sarvasamayAbhimata dharmAdyasiddheH || 6 ||

6. It cannot be argued that there can be no text which is not a composition by some author,for,in the absence of such an impersonal authority,dharma etc., which are admitted by all schools of philosophy,go unproved.

yasya tau nAbhimatau, nAsau samayI - samayaprayojanAbhAvAt.h || 7 ||

7. A thinker who does not admit dharma and adharma is not a philosopher, for, his position is devoid of the purpose, which all philosophy should subserve.

na cha tena lokopakAraH - dharmAdyabhAvaj~nAne

parasparahiMsAdinA apakArasyaiva prApteH || 8 ||

8. He does not help the world;since he promotes the understanding that there is no dharma or adharma.Mutual violence will come to prevail in the world and thus he only injures the world.

na chopakAreNa tasya prayojanam.h - adR^ishhTAbhAvAt.h || 9 ||

9. There is nothing for him to gain by helping the world, for he admits no unseen reality (fostering those who do good to the world).

ato dharmAdyabhAvaM vadatA svasamaya-

syAnarthakyaM aN^gIkR^itameveti nAsau samayI || 10 ||

10. Thus one who maintains the unreality of dharma etc..himself admits by implication, the futility of his philosophy and therefore he is not a philosopher.

na cha paurushheyeNa vAkyena tatsiddhiH |

aj~nAnavipralambhayoH prApteH || 11 ||

11. Dharma and adharma cannot be determined by the personal injunctions of someone, for persons (human beings) are liable to ignorance and deceptiveness.

na cha tadarthatvena sarvaj~naH kalpyeta |

anyatrAdR^ishhTasya sarvaj~natvasya kalpanaM

tasyAVipralambhakatvakalpanaM

tasya tatkR^itatvakalpanaM cheti kalpanAgauravaprApteH || 12 ||

12. It would not be sound to postulate an omniscient person to obviate this liability to ignorance and deceptiveness and to make for the possibility of determining dharma and adharma, for, in that case results the flaw of excessive postulation.Omniscience,not a matter of experience, has to be postulated, that the omniscient person is not deceptive is to be postulated and that he is the author of statements about dharma and adharma has to be postulated.

apaurushheyavAkyAN^gIkAre na kiJNchitkalpyam.h || 13 ||

13. But if the statements are admitted as not the composition of any person,there is nothing to be postulated.

apaurushheyatvaM cha svata eva siddham.h |

vedakarturaprasiddheH || 14 ||

14. That the Vedas are not compositions of any one is evident by itself, for the author of the Vedas is unascertained.

aprasiddhau cha kartustatkalpane kalpanAgauravam.h || 15 ||

15. While the author of the Vedas is unascertained,to postulate such an author is a case of unnecessary postulation.

akalpane chAkartR^ikatvaM siddhameva || 16 ||

16. And if he is not postulated,that Vedas are author-less follows inevitably.

na cha laukikavAkyavatsakartR^ikatvam.h |

tasyAkartR^ikatvaprasiddhyabhAvAt.h || 17 ||

17. On the analogy of worldly testimony, we cannot argue that the vedic testimony also must have some personal source, for in the case of the former there is no prevalent conception that it is author less ( i,e., there is not a single instance to prove its authorlessness )

na cha kenachit.h kR^itvA 'veda' ityuktaM vedasamam.h, paramparAbhAvAt.h || 18 ||

18. If a statement were to be made by someone and were to be named 'Veda', it does not become equal to the Veda as there is no (continuous) tradition to that effect.

na cha svayampratibhAtavedaiHdR^ishhTamavedavAkyaM bhavati, paramparAsiddha vedavAkyAnusAritvAt.h |

vedadrashhTR^INAM uktaguNavatvAchcha teshhAm.h || 19 ||

19. The testimony that is intuited by those to whom the Vedas manifest themselves, cannot be other than 'Veda' for, what they intuit is one in import with the Veda (that portion of the Veda which is undisputed) and they do have the merits that are said to characterize the seers of the Veda

uktaM cha brahmANDe \dash "viMshallaxaNato.anUnastapasvI bahuvedavit.h |

veda ityeva yaM pashyet.h sa vedo j~nAnadarshanAt.h" || 20 ||

20. The following is said in the Brahmandapurana: 'If he, who does not have less than twenty out of the thirty two merits, who is given to penance, and who knows many Vedas, sees, by the power of his intuitive vision, any text as forming part of the Veda, it has to be admitted as such'.

prAmANyaM cha svata eva |

anyathA.anavasthAnAt.h || 21 ||

21. The validity of the Veda(as of all other sources of knowledge) is intrinsic Otherwise the fallacy of infinite regress would result.

na choktayuktyadhInatvaM prAmANyasya |

buddhidoshhanirAsamAtrakAraNatvAdyuktInAm.h || 22 ||

22.The validity cannot be said to depend upon the argument adduced (above), for arguments merely serve to remove the flaws of thought.

adushhTabuddhInAM svata eva siddhatvAchcha prAmANyasya || 23 ||

23. To those whose thought is flawless the validity is self-established.

na cha 'AkAN^xAyAmeva pramANAntarApexatvAdanavasthAbhAvaH'

iti vAchyam.h AkAN^xAyAM eva buddhidoshhAtmakatvAt.h || 24 ||

24. It may be argued thus: 'Grounding the validity of cognition on another cognition does not itself involve infinite regress.Only when there is a need for the ascertainment of the basis of the validity of a cognition we seek the validating cognition. In the absence of such a need, there is no infinite regress to the supporting cognition'. But this search for the validating cognition is itself a flaw. (Thus defective cognition is made known and corrected by other cognitions, while valid cognition is self-validated).

dushhTabuddhInAmevAprAmANyashaN^kA, iti parato.aprAmANyam.h || 25 ||

25.Only those with defects of thought suspect the validity of a given cognition and therefore we urge that invalidity is determinable extrinsically.

prAmANyaM cha svata eva siddham.h || 26 ||

26. But validity is self-established

na cha 'uchchAraNakAla eva varNAnAmutpattiH' iti vAchyam.h || 27 ||

27. It cannot be maintained that letters originate just when they are pronounced.

'tadevedaM vachanam.h'iti pratyabhij~nAvirodhAt.h || 28 ||

28. That would contradict the recognition of the form, 'This is the same that was uttered before'

na cha 'sAdR^ishyAt.h, pratyabhij~nA bhrAntiH', iti vAchyam.h || 29 ||

29. Nor can it be said that the recognition is an illusion engendered by the similarity of letters

'so.ayaM devadattaH' ityAderapi tathAtvaprApteH || 30 ||

30. For even recognitions of the form, "This is that Devadatta" would have to be stigmatized illusory

sarvaxaNikatvaM vadatA bauddhena seyaM digityAdipratyabhij~nAyA bhrAntitvaM na vAchyaM - paJNchaskandhebhyo.anyatvAt.h |

na cha disha eva bhrAntikalpitAH | vij~nAnashUnyayorapi sAmyAt.h |

na chAdityodayAdinaiva dikkalpanA - andhakAre.api diN^mAtrapratIteH |

kAdAchitkabhrAntirevAdityodayAdidarshanAnnivAryate |

sA cha 'vij~nAnashUnyayorapi bhavati' iti teshhAM matam.h, vAdivipratipatteH |

ato 'dishassthirA eva' iti siddhyati, shUnyavadeva |

atastadvadvedasyApi sthairyaM siddham.h - 'tadevedaM vAkyam.h' iti pratyabhij~nAnAt.h |

na chAnumAnAdInAmAgamaM vinA prAmANyaM dharmAdishhu | tadagocharatvAt.h || 31 ||

31. The Buddhist who maintains the momentariness of everything cannot urge that the recognition of the form 'This is the same space' is illusory; for, space, according to him, is different from the five skandas (The five skandas viz., rupa, samjna, vedana, samskara and vijnana constitute personality in aggregation. They are positive and momentary. Space is regarded as other than these skandas along with two forms of destruction viz., pratisankhya and apratisankhya. All these three are non-positive and eternal. The point is that even this extreme temporalism must concede the validity of recognition in certain cases).It cannot be held that directions in space are all illusory, for even vijnana and sunya will have to be similarly treated. It cannot be said that space is imagined owing to factors like the rising of the sun for even in darkness the awareness of space is there.Only accidental illusions concerning directions in space is removed by the observation of rising of the sun etc. Such illusions arise, according to the opinion of the Buddhists, with regard to Vijnana and sunya also, for, they are disputed by other schools of thought. Thus directions in space are abiding even as sunya is said to be. Therefore, in the same way, the abiding character of the Veda also is established. We have the recognition of the form, " This is the same (Vedic) sentence". And other sources of knowledge like inference have no validity independent of scripture in matters like dharma, for, the latter are not accessible to them.

ato - 'apaurushheyavAkyenaiva dharmAdisiddheH' - sarvavAdinAmapi tadaN^gIkAryam.h || 32 ||

32. Therefore, as dharma etc are ascertainable only through statements not due to any personalities, such statements are to be admitted by all Philosophers

tatprAmANyaM cha svata eva siddham.h || 33 ||

33. And the validity of Vedic testimony is self-established

aprAmANyasya cha paratastvAnaN^gIkAre dushhTendriyAderapyaprAmANyahetutvaM na syAt.h? tadanaN^gIkAre chAnubhavavirodhaH || 34 ||

34. If invalidity is not ascribed to extrinsic causes, factors like defective sense organs ought not to cause incorrect cognition. If the phenomenon of defective organs causing error is not admitted, experience itself stands contradicted.

ataH, 'prAmANyaM svataH, parato.aprAmANyam.h' - iti siddham.h || 35 ||

35. Therefore it is established that the truth of cognitions is intrinsic to them and their falsity is extrinsic.

" vA`cA vi'rUpa` nitya'yA" (R^igveda 8.75.6) || 36 ||

36. The Sruti says: ‘O sage, Virupa, praise him in eternal words.

"nityayA.anityayA staumi brahma tatparamaM padam.h" iti || 37 ||

37. And in words both eternal and non-eternal I praise that Brahman, who is the final goal’

"shrutirvAva nityA anityA vAva smR^itayo yAshchAnyA vAchaH" iti paiN^gishrutiH || 38 ||

38. The Paingi-sruti says: ‘The Srutis are eternal words and the smrtis and other speech constitute non-eternal words’

"vij~neyaM paramaM brahma j~nApikA paramA shrutiH |

anAdinityA sA tachcha vinA tAM na sa gamyate" || 39 ||

- iti kAtyAyanashrutiH |

39. The Katyayana-sruti says: ‘The highest object of knowledge is Brahman and the highest source of knowledge is the Sruti. Sruti is unoriginated and eternal and even so is Brahman. Independent of Sruti he cannot be known.

"sahasradhA mahimAnaH sahasraM yAvad.hbrahma vishhThitaM tAvatI vAk.h" |

"kash.h Chanda 'sAM` yoga`m.h A ve'da` dhIraH` ko dhiShNyA`m.h

prati` vAca'm.h papAda" (R^igveda 10.114.9) ityAdi cha || 40 ||

40. It further says: ‘Thousands are the glories of Brahman and they are individually thousandfold. The speech of the Veda is co-extensive with Brahman. What man of intelligence is there who can comprehend the significance of the Vedas and who is there, who comprehending it, can expound it ?’

"nityA vedAH samastAshcha shAshvatAH vishhNubuddhigAH |

sarge sarge.amunaivaita udgIryante tathaiva cha |

tatkrameNaiva tairvarNaistaiH svaraireva nachAnyathA |

ataH shrutitvametAsAM shrutA eva yato.akhilaiH |

janmAntare shrutAstAstu vAsudevaprasAdataH |

munInAM pratibhAsyanti bhAgenaiva na sarvashaH |

yatastA hariNA dR^ishhTAH shrutA evAparairjanaiH |

shrutayo dR^ishhTayashcheti tenochyante purAtanaiH |

tadutpattivachashchaiva bhavedvathaktimapexya tu |

chetanasya janiryadvaduchyate sarvalaukikaiH |

purANAni tadarthAni sarge sarge.anyathaiva tu |

kriyante.atastvanityAni tadarthAH pUrvasargavat.h |

vedAnAM sR^ishhTivAkyAni bhaveyurvyaktyapexayA |

avAntarAbhimAnAnAM devAnAM vA vyapexayA |

nAnityatvAtkutasteshhAmanityatvaM sthirAtmanAm.h" || 41 ||

- iti brahmANDe |

41. The Brahmandapurana says: 'All the Vedas are eternal and in their eternal form they subsist in Visnu's mind. In each creation they are spoken out by him alone in the self-same form, in the same order, with the same letters and modes of utterance and not otherwise. Hence they are 'Srutis' because they are only heard by all. They were heard by by the sages in previous lives and through the grace of Vasudeva they manifest themselves to those sages in the present life in parts and not in their entirety. Since the Vedas were perceived by Hari and were heard by others, they are called revelation and perception by the ancients. The allusions to their origin are to be interpreted in terms of their manifestation. Just as the creation of the individual soul is figuratively taken, the origination of the 'Sruti' also should be so understood.But the Puranas which agree with the Vedas in significance, are brought forth in each creation in new forms. Therefore they are not eternal. Their import, of course, is what it was in the previous epochs. All the passages that speak of the creation of the Vedas merely signify their manifestation or they may be referring to the coming into being of new presiding deities set in secondary authority by Visnu. They do not signify the non-eternality of the Vedas. How can the Vedas of an abiding character, be other than eternal ? '

na chAnityatve, 'shrutir.h', 'veda', ityAdi visheshhashabda upapadyate || 42 ||

42. If they were not eternal, their special designation as 'Sruti' and Veda would lose all meaning

"vedAste nityavinnatvAchchhrutayashchAkhilaiH shruteH |

AmnAyo.ananyathA pAThAdIshabuddhisthitAssadA" || 43 ||

-iti mahAvArAhe |

43. The Mahavarahapurana says: 'They are Vedas because they eternally are, they are Srutis because they are heard by all, they are Amnaya because they are recited in the self-same order and they subsist always in Hari's mind.'

na cha nityatvaM vinA vedAnAM darshanavyavahAro yujyate || 44 ||

44. If the Vedas were not eternal, speaking of 'seeing' the Vedas as it is done, would be wrong.

na cha varNapadAdInAmanityatvaM vaktuM yuktam.h, sarvaj~natvAdIshvarasya tadbuddhau sarvadA pratIyamAnatvAt.h || 45 ||

45. It is not reasonable to think of the letters and words of the Vedas as non-eternal, for, as God is omniscient, they are always being intuited by him.

na cha ghaTAdivatsaMskAramAtratvaM vaktuM yuktam.h || 46 ||

46. It is not tenable to say that they subsist only as impressions of former experience as in the case of transient objects like jars and so on.

pratyabhij~nAvirodhasyoktatvAt.h || 47 ||

47. As it is already pointed out, such a supposition would go against the fact of recognition.

purANAnAmapyanyathAshabdarachanamevAnityatvam.h || 48 ||

48. Even the Puranas are non-eternal only because of the variations in verbal composition

ata AkAshaguNe shabde vyajyamAnA varNAdayastatkramAtmako vedashcha nitya eveti siddham.h || 49 ||

49. Therefore, letters etc. that are manifest in sound which is an attribute of eternal space, and their specific order that constitutes the Vedas are established to be eternal.

na cha kevalasiddhe.arthe vyutpattyabhAvAdaprAmANyam.h |

siddhAnvita eva vyutpattigR^ihIteH || 50 ||

50. It ought not to be held that the Vedas cannot have any truth on the ground that words never signify any accomplished entity. The significance of words is grasped only in relation to accomplished entities.

'iyaM mAtA' 'ayaM pitA' ityAdAvaN^guliprasAraNAdipUrva- kanirdeshenaiva hi tajjAnAti || 51 ||

51. By sentences like 'This is (your) mother', 'This is (your) father', and by a corresponding indication of the respective persons or objects by fingers (by others) a child grasps the significance of words.

'kAryAnvita eva vyutpattiH' iti vadataH, kAryasya kAryAnvayAbhAvAt.h kalpanAgauravam.h || 52 ||

52. A thinker who maintains that all words signify their respective referents only as related to something to be accomplished is driven to excessive postulation, for the word karya (something to be accomplished)will have to refer to its referent as related to something else to be accomplished and there is nothing else to be accomplished.

iyaM mAtA' 'ayaM pitA' 'surUpo.asi', ityAdau

siddhamAtraj~nApanena paryavasitatvAdvAkyasya || 53 ||

53. In sentences like 'This is (your) mother', 'This is (your) father', 'You are handsome', the signification of the sentence is completed in conveying information about accomplished facts.

tasya tatra prAmANyAnubhavAchcha || 54 ||

54. And the truth of the statements about those facts is directly experienced.

na cha kutrachitsiddhaj~nApanAdanyadvAkyasya prayojanaM dR^ishhTam.h || 55 ||

55. Nowhere do we see the purpose of a statement in anything other than the information it conveys about accomplished facts.

j~nAtvaiva hIshhTasAdhanatAM pravartate nivartate cha viparyayeNa |

ataH siddha eva sarvavAkyAnAM prAmANyaM siddham.h || 56 ||

56. When an accomplished fact is ascertained to be a means to a desired end, one begins to work for the end. If it is found not to be such a means one desists from all effort in that direction. Therefore, the truth of all statements lies in their signification of accomplished facts.

prasiddhaM cha vyAkaraNaniruktAdInAM siddhamAtre prAmANyaM sarvavAdinAm.h ||57||

57. It is well known in all schools of thought that grammar and etymology have valid significance only in relation to existent entities.

tadanaN^gIkAre cha sarvashAbdavyavahArAsiddhiH || 58 ||

58. If grammar and etymology are themselves rejected, there can be no employment of language whatever.

uktaM cha nAradIye -

"sarvaj~naM sarvakartAraM nArAyaNamanAmayam.h |

sarvottamaM j~nApayanti mahAtAtparyamatra hi |

sarveshhAmapi vedAnAM itihAsapurANayoH |

pramANAnAM cha sarveshhAM tadarthaM chAnyaduchyate"

-iti || 59 ||

59. It has been said in the Naradapurana: 'All the Vedas, itihasa, purana and all other sources of knowledge, impart knowledge about Narayana as omniscient, as the creator of all, as flawless and as surpassing all. They have as their great purport this teaching; whatever else is mentioned in them is subsidiary to this purport'.

na cha jIveshvarAbheda eva tAtparyamAgamasya -

tatra pramANAbhAvAt.h || 60 ||

60. The purport of the scriptures is not the identity of the individual soul and God, for there is no significant passage to that effect.

na cha jIveshvarabhedaH siddhaH ityanuvAdakatvaM bhedavAkyAnAm.h |

AgamaM vinA IshvarasyaivAsiddheH || 61 ||

61. The passages stating the differences between individual self and God cannot be construed as simply reiterating what is known otherwise, on the ground that the said difference is established in common experience, for independent of the scripture,the existence of God is not known.

na chAnumAnAttatsiddiH, viparyayeNApyanumAtuM shakyatvAt.h || 62 ||

62. His existence cannot be proved by inference,because the opposite also can be proved by inference.

'vimataM sakartR^ikaM, kAryatvAd.h, ghaTavad.h' ityukte,

'vimataM vikartR^ikaM, asmatsammatakartR^irahitatvAt.h, Atmavad.h'

ityanumAnavirodhAt.h || 63 ||

63. If it is argued, 'The world must have had a creator, because it is an effect, even as a jar being an effect was produced by a potter', it is countered by a contradictory inference to this effect,'The world could not have been produced by a creator,for, it is not a created system according to our conception, even as the self was never produced by a creator like a potter'.

'akAryatvamupAdhiH' ityukte,'sharIrijanyatvamitaratrApyupAdhiH' ityuttaram.h || 64 ||

64. If it is argued that the counter-inference is vitiated by the fact that it applies only to entities that are not effects like the self and not to the world as a whole, it can be answered with equal force that the first inference is vitiated by the fact that it applies only to products like a jar manufactured by embodied creatures and not to the world as a whole.

pratyaxAnumAnasiddhatve cha bhedasya tadvirodhAdevAprAmANyamabhedAgamasya || 65||

65. Further, if difference is established by perception and inference, scripture asserting non-difference must be construed as false just on the ground of its contradiction to what is established by these other means of knowledge.

tenAbhedAgamasya prAmANyAbhAve nAnuvAdakatvaM bhedavAkyAnAm.h || 66 |

66. If the scriptural statements of identity are false on this account, statements of difference would not be mere reiterations.

na hi balavato.anuvAdakatvaM, dArDh.hyahetutvAt.h || 67 ||

67. Surely when a stronger source of knowledge reiterates what is established by other sources, it is not mere reiteration. It is a confirmation.

pratyaxAderAgamasya prAbalye.api nopajIvyapramANavirodhe prAmANyam.h || 68 ||

68. Even if a scripture is stronger than the other means of knowledge like perception, it cannot have validity if it conflicts with the pramana on which it depends and on whose foundation it is ifself built up.

vishhayAbhAve svasyaivAprAmANyaprApteH || 69 ||

69. If it is devoid of subject-matter it becomes false.

tenaiva hyanumAnAdinAgamasya vishhayaH siddhyati tatpaxe.api || 70 ||

70. Even according to the school of identity, the subject-matter of scripture is supplied by other pramanas like inference.

anumAnena hyanuvAditvapaxa Ishvaro boddhavyaH pratyaxeNa chAgamaH |

atastayorvirodhe prAmANyaM na syAt.h || 71 ||

71. On the view that holds that passages positing difference between God and individual self are mere restatements, God is established by inference and the individual self ( The word agama must be taken as meaning of the individual self - Vide Jayatirtha's Tika. If the scripture contradicts those pramanas which supply it the very entities it deals with, it loses validity') is established in perceptual experience.

anumAnasiddheshvarAchcha bhedo.anubhavataH siddhaH jIvasya asArvatrikatvenAnubhavAt.h|

na chAnubhavavirodhe Agamasya prAmANyam.h || 72 ||

72. Experience itself establishes the difference between the individual self and God whose existence is supposed to be proved by inference. For it is a matter of everyone's experience that he is not the author of all. The scripture can have no validity if it contradicts experience.

AgamaprAmANyAnubhavasyApyaprAmANyaprApteH || 73 ||

73. Otherwise even the experience of the truth of the scripture becomes false.

bahupramANasaMvAdashcha dArDh.hyahetureva || 74 ||

74. The concordance of many pramanas leads to the strengthening of conviction.

bahUnAM vachane tasyaiva darshane dArDh.hyasyaiva dR^ishhTeH || 75 ||

75. It is a matter of experience that what is testified to by many and is also fact of observation,becomes a strongly established principle.

sarvAvivAdasthaLe eva kathaJNchidanuvAdakatvam.h || 76 ||

76. Only in universally undisputed cases, concordance is mere reiteration ( not confirmation )

na chAtra sarvAvivAdaH ekatvavAdinAmeva vivAdadarshanAt.h || 77 ||

77. In this matter, there is no universal absence of disagreement. The theorists of identity themselves dispute the difference between God and the individual self.

bahupramANavirodhe chaikasyAprAmANyaM dR^ishhTaM shuktirajatAdau || 78 ||

78. If one proof (pramana) contradicts many proofs, the solitary proof will have to be discarded as false.This is so in cases like the illusory perception of a conch-shell as a piece of silver.

na cha doshhajanyatvAdeva durbalatvamiti virodhaH |

bahupramANaviruddhAnAM doshhajanyatvaniyamAt.h || 79 ||

79. It is no contradiction to this conclusion to say that a cognition is weak only if it is produced by defects in the cognitive apparatus. It is the law that whatever cognition comes into conflict with many(proofs)must be constructed as originating from defects.

doshhajanyatvaM cha balavatpramANavirodhAdeva j~nAyate || 80 ||

80. That a cognition has been produced by defects is understood only when it is contradicted by strong proofs.

"adushhTamindriyantvaxaM tarko.adushhTastathAnumA |

Agamo.adushhTavAkyaM cha svadR^ikchAnubhavaH smR^itaH |

balavatpramANatashchaiva j~neyA doshhA nachAnyathA |

dvividhaM balavattvaM cha bahutvAchcha svabhAvataH |

tayossvabhAvo balavAnupajIvyAdikashcha saH |

yAthArthyameva prAmANyaM tanmukhyaM j~nAnashabdayoH |

j~nAnaM cha dvividhaM bAhyaM tathAnubhavarUpakam.h |

balyevAnubhavastatra nirdoshhaM tvaxajAdikam.h |

anupramANatAM yAti tathAxAditrayaM tataH |

prAbalyamAgamasyaiva jAtyA teshhu trishhu smR^itam.h |

upajIvyavirodhe tu na prAmANyaM amushhya cha |

yAmAhuranumAM kechittriyAdyavayavAtmikAm.h |

sA vyarthA nopapattyA hi vinA sApi pramANatAm.h |

yAtyato yuktirevaikA pramANamanumAtmakam.h |

yuktiH pratij~nArUpA cha hetudR^ishhTAntarUpikA |

tathopanayarUpA cha parA nigamanAtmikA |

pR^ithak.h pR^ithakpramANatvaM yAti yuktitayaiva tu |

pratij~nA hetugarbhaiva pR^ithakprAmANyameshhyati |

siddhatvena pratij~nAyA heturmAnaM pR^ithagbhavet.h |

pratij~nAvayavatvAttu svAtantryeNaiva mAnatAm.h |

dR^ishhTAnto yAtyupanayo vyAptimAshritya kevalam.h |

vyAptistu kevalA.api syAtpramANaM niyamAshrayAt.h |

tathA nigamanaM chopasaMhAraikasvarUpataH |

prAmANyaM yAtyanubhavo j~nApayatyupapattitAm.h |

virodhashcha tathAdhikyaM nyUnatA.asaN^gatistathA |

upapattidoshhA vij~neyA virodhashcha svato.anyataH |

janakasyAtyayo jAtiH svasya vA.anyasya vA bhavet.h |

janakaM pramANamuddishhTaM svasyArthasya prakAshanAt.h |

nigrahA eta eva syussaMvAdAnuktisaMyutAH |

arthataH prAptirevArthApattirityabhidhIyate |

dR^ishhTvA sadR^ishamevAnyaM pUrvadR^ishhTe tu vastuni |

etatsadR^ishatAj~nAnamupamAnaM prakIrtitam.h |

abhAvasya parij~nAnaM dvividhaM samudAhR^itam.h |

ekaM tatrAnubhavato yogyasyAnupalabdhitaH |

dvitIyamapi vij~neyaM sukhAdye cha ghaTAdike |

ekampratyaxarUpaM syAt.h dvitIyamanumAtmakam.h |

kvachidghaTAdyabhAvo.api pratyaxeNAvagamyate |

jhaTityeva parij~nAnAt.h na liN^god.hbhavatA matA |

arthApattishchopamA cha hyanumAbheda eva tu |

Agamo dvividho j~neyo nityo.anityastathaiva cha |

pratyaxaM trividhaM j~neyaM aishvaraM yaugikaM tathA |

ayaugikaM cheti tathA sarvamaxAtmakaM matam.h |

axANi cha svarUpANi nityaj~nAnAtmakAni cha |

vishhNoH shriyastathaivoktAnyanyeshhAM dvividhAni tu |

svarUpANi cha bhinnAni bhinnAni trividhAni cha |

daivAsurANi madhyAnItyetatpratyaxamIritam.h |

vishhayAnpratisthitaM hyaxaM pratyaxamiti kIrtitam.h |

axayaM purushhasyAxaM svarUpe mukhyameva tu |

upachArastadanyatra sR^ishhTAvupachayo yataH |

upapattisvarUpatvAdanumA sambhavAdikam.h |

pratyaxAgamamAhAtmyAdanumAnaM pramANatAm.h |

yAti naivAnyathA tasya niyatatvaM kvachid.h bhavet.h" || 81 ||

- iti brahmatarke |

81. The Brahmatarka formulates the following principles ' The senses free from defects are known as perception. Reasoning free from fallacies is called inference. Testimony free from faults is Scripture.Self-knowledge i.e., immediate knowledge by the self through itself is experience. The flaws in cognition are knowable through its contradiction with stronger means of knowledge and not otherwise.

The strength of a way of knowledge is due to its quantitative superiority and intrinsic nature. Between these two forms of strength, the strength owing to intrinsic nature is higher. Strength by intrinsic nature means the superiority of a way of knowing in relation to another way which depends upon it.

Truth consists of accordance with facts and it primarily pertains to knowledge and testimony. Knowledge is of two kinds and they are external knowledge and experience. Between the two, experience is stronger. Next to it is knowledge obtained by flawless senses, reasoning and testimony. The means of knowing like the perceiving through the sense, inferring and verbal understanding, are proofs in a subsidiary significance. Of these three, generally scriptural testimony is superior to the others.

But it is not valid when it stultifies that way of knowing on which it depends. What some regard as inference(for another) consisting of three or more propositions is a superfluity. That kind of inference has no status of a means of knowledge independent of reasoning (for oneself). Therefore reasoning (for oneself) is the only inference. Inference(for another), by virtue of being an embodiment of inference for oneself, becomes a means of knowledge through thesis, the ground, the instance, the subsumption and the conclusion severally. The thesis by incorporating the ground in itself can itself become a means of knowledge. Within the background of the thesis, the ground itself can become a means of knowledge.

By implicitly containing the thesis, the instance itself can become a means of knowledge. The subsumption by simply drawing support from the general concomittance can become itself a means of knowledge. The general concomittance(vyapti) in conjunction with the thesis can itself be a means of knowledge by virtue of the necessary character of the concommittance. In the same way the conclusion, since it sums up all the preceding propositions, can itself be a means of knowledge. Simple experience does prove that all these propositions are forms of reasoning. It is to be known that fallacies in reasoning are contradiction, over-conclusion, under-conclusion and irrelevance. Contradiction may be with itself or another piece of knowledge. The fallacy called jati arises when the conclusion supersedes the 'source'. The source may be that of the same conclusion or some other conclusion. By a source is to be understood the source of knowledge, because it illuminates the object of the conclusion.

All these ( contradiction etc. including jati) combined with assent and 'non-commitment', constitute 'vulnerable points'. By arthapatti ( presumption) is understood the ascertainment of the ground of a present fact which is otherwise inexplicable. By analogy is meant the understanding of the resemblance of an object previously seen to a present object on the ground of the observation of the resemblance of the present object to it.

The knowledge of non-existence is of two kinds. It may be obtained by direct observation or through the failure to observe to observe an object when all the conditions necessary for its observation are fulfilled. The former kind is illustrated in the case of the non-existence of pleasure etc., and the latter is illustrated in cases like the non-existence of a jar. The first is a species of perception and second is species of inference. Sometimes even the non-existence of objects like jars is apprehended through perception. Since the apprehension is instantaneous, it is opined that the apprehension is not inferentially generated.

Knowledge by presumption(arthapatti) and analogy are merely forms of inference. Scripture is to be understood as of two kinds i.e., eternal and non-eternal. Perception is known to be falling into three kinds i.e., divine perception, mystic( or yogic) perception and ordinary (non-yogic) perception. All these arise through the senses. The senses of Visnu and Sri constitute their essential nature and are of the character of eternal knowing. The senses of others are of two kinds i.e., those which are constitutive of the nature of selves and those which are external to the selves. Those which are external, are of three kinds, i.e., divine, demoniac and intermediate. By perception is meant the state in which the sense(aksa) is in communion with its object(visaya). The sense of a self is imperishable and it primarily pertains to the essential nature of the self. The senses that are different from the essential nature of the self are so called in a secondary sense, as they receive augmentation during creation. The sources of knowledge like sambhava(conjecture) are forms of inference.

Inference becomes a source of knowing when under the control of perception and scripture, otherwise it nowhere attains conclusiveness.

82. atra chopajIvyatvena pramANaprAbalyAt.h bheda eva tAtparyaM yuktam.h |

82. In the present instance, since the supporting source of knowledge,namely perception is stronger, it is reasonable to construe that the purport of the scripture lies in the teaching of difference.

kathaM chAnuvAdakatvaM bhedasya pramANenAsiddhau || 83 ||

83. And, how can the texts teaching difference be construed as mere reiteration, if difference is not established by other sources of knowledge ?

siddhau cha kathamabhedavAkyasyAbAdhaH || 84 ||

84. And again, if is has been established how can the text teaching non-difference go unnullified ?

na chApramANasiddhena anuvAdakatvaM pramANasya bhavati || 85 ||

85. A valid mode of knowledge cannot be looked upon as a mere reiteration, when what it presents has not been established by any other valid mode of knowledge

durbalatve cha bhedapramANasyAbhAsatvAt.h na bhedavAkyAnAmanuvAditvam.h || 86 ||

86. If other modes of knowledge presenting difference are weak just because of their fallacious character, the scriptural passages teaching difference cannot be mere restatements of them.

atashcha bhedavAkyAnAmeva prAbalyam.h || 87 ||

87. Hence only the texts teaching difference are strong.

sarvapramANaviruddhavachanAnAmeva prAbalyAN^gIkAre " idaM vA agre

naiva kiJNchanAsId.h" "asataH sadajAyata" (chhA\.u\.6\.2\.1)

ityAdInAmevAvichAreNa pratIyamAnasyArthasya

sarvapramANaviruddhatvAttatra sarvAgamAnAM mahAtAtparyaM prasajyeta || 88 ||

88. If it is admitted that only these scriptural passages are to be considered more valid, which contradict all modes of knowledge, then the unscrutinized and superficial import of passages like, 'Nothing of all this existed in the beginning' and, 'From non-being being originated', will have to be considered as constituting the supreme purport of all scriptures just because that import contradicts all modes of knowledge.

na cha 'tatra yuktivirodhaH' iti vAchyam.h || 89 ||

89. It cannot be said that such an interpretation is contrary to reason

tasminpaxe 'yuktiviruddhatvena ananuvAditvam.h' iti guNa eva syAt.h || 90 ||

90. On the theory under discussion, as the scripture contrary to reason would not be restating the deliverance of reason, its being contrary to reason would constitute, in fact, an excellence.

yuktisiddhatve hyanuvAditvaM syAt.h || 91 ||

91. If the import of the scripture stands established by reason, the scripture, on that theory, would be merely a restatement of the deliverance of reason.

ataH pramANasiddhatve tadapalApAyukteH |

apramANasiddhatve cha bhedapramANasya anuvAditvAbhAvAchcha na bhedavAkyAnAM daurbalyam.h || 92 ||

92. Therefore, if difference is established by other means of knowledge, it cannot be validly repudiated,and if it is not so established, the texts teaching difference cannot be construed as mere reiterations. Hence the texts that assert the difference between God and individual self are not less valid ( than the identity-texts )

na cha pramANabahutve daurbalyam.h |

dR^iDhArthamevAdi bahuvAkyasaMvAde dR^ishhTam.h || 93 ||

93. A conclusion which is supported unanimously by many sources of knowledge cannot be weak on that account; if many testimonies concur in its favour we see, that it becomes immensely strengthened.

tathA sati, abhyAsAderapyaprAmANyahetutvaM syAt.h || 94 ||

94. Otherwise, repetition in scripture, would be a ground of the falsity of what is thus repeated.

abhyAsasya cha tAtparyaliN^gatvaM sarveshhAM siddham.h || 95 ||

95. All commentators agree that repetition is a clue to the purport of a passage.

tadanaN^gIkAre, tatpaxe.api navakR^itvaH "tattvamasi"

(chhA\.u\. 6\.8\.7, 6\.9\.4, 6\.10\.3, 6\.11\.3,6\.12\.3, 6\.13\.3,6\.14\.3, 6\.15\.3, 6\.16\.3)

ityabhyAsasyAnuvAdakatvena aprAmANyaM syAt.h || 96 ||

96. If this principle is not admitted for the very theory under discussion, the repetition of the dictum, 'That thou art' nine times, would be merely a case of restatement and the dictum would have to be considered in consequence as false.

'prathamavAkyenaiva yasyAsiddhaM tadarthamaparam.h' ityukte,

'pratyaxAdinA bhedo yenAnishchitaH, tadarthamaparaM vAkyam.h' ityuttaram.h |

tasmAd.h, bahupramANasaMvAditve prAbalyameva || 97 ||

97. If it is to be said that the subsequent reiterations are for convincing one to whom the first enunciation of the truth does not carry conviction, we reply that the scriptural affirmation of difference is for convincing one by whom the reality of difference is not conclusively ascertained by other modes of knowledge like perception. Therefore, concordance of several modes of knowledge is an enhancement of their evidential strength.

ataH sarvapramANaviruddhatvAnnAbhede tAtparyaM vAkyasya, kintu

vishhNoH sarvottamatva eva mahAtAtparyaM sarvAgamAnAm.h || 98 ||

98. Therefore, as non-difference ( between God and the individual self ) is contradicted by all the sources of knowledge, it is not the purport of the scriptures. On the contrary, the supreme purport of all the scriptures is the pre-eminence of Visnu over every other entity.

tathA choktaM bhagavatA -

" dvAvimau purushhau loke xarashchAxara eva cha |

xaraH sarvANi bhUtAni kUTastho.axara uchyate ||

uttamaH purushhastvanyaH paramAtmetyudAhR^itaH |

yo lokatrayamAvishya bibhartyavyaya IshvaraH ||

yasmAtxaramatIto.ahaM axarAdapi chottamaH |

ato.asmi loke vede cha prathitaH purushhottamaH ||

yo mAmevamasammUDho jAnAti purushhottamam.h |

sa sarvavid.h bhajati mAM sarvabhAvena bhArata ||

iti guhyatamaM shAstramidamuktaM mayA.anagha |

etad.h buddhvA buddhimAnsyAtkR^itakR^ityashcha bhArata" || (bha\.gI\.

15\.16\-20) - iti || 99 ||

99. This truth has been enunciated by the Lord in these words;

' These two alone are the purusas in the world, the perishable and imperishable. All the individual creatures are the perishable purusas. Mahalakshmi is the imperishable purusa. But the highest purusa is other than these two. He is called the Supreme atman. He, it is, who prevading the three worlds sustains them and is eternal and is the overlord. Because I transcend the perishable spirits, and am superior to the imperishable spirit also, I am glorified in the Vedas and secondary scriptures as the highest purusa. He who understands me undeluded as the highest purusa in this manner, is one who knows all and serves me in all ways. O sinless Arjuna, this most secret shastra has been imparted by me. O Bharata, let one apprehend this by intuitive perception and attain liberation.

"sarvotkarshhe devadevasya vishhNormahAtAtparyaM naiva chAnyatra satyam.h |

avAntaraM tatparatvaM tadanyatsarvAgamAnAM purushhArthastato.ataH || 100 ||

-iti paiN^gishrutiH |

100. The paingi-sruti says: 'All the scriptures have as their supreme purport the greatness

of Visnu, the god of gods, over all else. They have no other theme. All else they may speak about is their secondary import contributory to the main theme. This is so because the ideal of life is realizable only through this knowledge of the greatness of Visnu over all else. Such is the truth.'

mukhyaM cha sarvavedAnAM tAtparyaM shrIpateH param.h |

utkarshhe tu tadanyatra tAtparyaM syAdavAntaram.h" || 101 ||

- iti mahAvArAhe |

101. The Mahavarahapurana says: 'The great and primary purport of all the Vedas is the greatness of Sripati. Their reference to other matters is secondary'

yuktaM cha vishhNoH sarvottamatva eva

mahAtAtparyaM sarvAgamAnAm.h |

moxo hi sarvapurushhArthottamaH || 102 ||

102. It is reasonable that all scriptures should have as their supreme purport the absolute greatness of Visnu. Liberation is the highest of the ideals of life.

"dharmArthakAmAssarve.api na nityA moxa eva hi |

nityastasmAttadarthAya yateta matimAn.h naraH" || 103 ||

- iti bhAllaveyashrutiH |

103. The Bhallveya-sruti says: 'Dharma, artha and kama are not abiding, only moksa is abiding. Therefore an intelligent man must seek to attain that'

"anityatvAt.h saduHkhatvAt.h na dharmAdyAH paraM sukham.h |

moxa eva parAnandaH saMsAre parivartatAm.h" || 104 ||

-iti bhArate |

104. It is said in the Bharata that 'The ends like dharma are transient and freely mixed with sorrow.Therefore, they do not bring about supreme happiness.Only moksa is the highest bliss to be aimed at by those who are wandering in samsara (mundane world).

moxashcha vishhNuprasAdena vinA na labhyate ||105 ||

105. This liberation is not to be attained except by the grace of Visnu

"yasya rasAdAtparamArtirUpAdasmAtsaMsArAnmuchyate nApareNa |

nArAyaNo.asau paramo vichintyo mumuxubhiH karmapAshAdamushhmAt.h"||

-iti nArAyaNashrutiH || 106 ||

106. The Narayana-sruti says: 'He, by whose grace alone a person is released from this samsara,which is of the nature of the deepest affliction is this Narayana, who is to be contemplated as the supreme by all those who seek release from this shackle of karma'

"nAyamAtmA pravachanena labhyo na medhayA na bahunA shrutena |

yamevaishha vR^iNute tena labhyaH tasyaishha AtmA vivR^iNute tanuM svAm.h" ||

- iti kaThashrutiH (kaTha u\. 1\.2\.23) ||107||

107. The Katha-sruti says: 'This atman is not attainable by teaching, by intelligence and by excessive learning; only by him whom he chooses is he attained.To him this atman reveals His form'.

"teshhAmahaM samuddhartA mR^ityusaMsArasAgarAt.h|

bhavAmi na chirAt.h pArtha mayyAveshitachetasAm.h" ||

- iti bhagavadvachanam.h (bha\.gI\. 12\.7) || 108 ||

108. The declaration of the Lord in the Gita is ' I rescue them speedily from the ocean of death and transmigration whose hearts have taken possession of Me.'

109. "utpattisthitisaMhArA niyatirj~nAnamAvR^itiH |

bandhamoxau cha purushhAdyasmAt.h sa harirekarAT.h" || 109 ||

-iti skAnde |

109. 'That spirit, from whom proceed the creation, maintenance, destruction, regulation, knowledge, concealment, bondage and liberation is the sole sovereign.' Thus says skandapurana.

"aj~nAnAM j~nAnado vishhNuH j~nAninAM moxadashcha saH |

Anandadashcha muktAnAM sa evaiko janArdanaH" ||

-iti cha || 110 ||

110. It also says, 'Visnu grants knowledge to the ignorant and he grants liberation to men of knowledge. The same Janardhana grants happiness to the liberated selves'.

"bandhako bhavapAshena bhavapAshAchcha mochakaH |

kaivalyadaH paraM brahma vishhNureva na saMshayaH" ||

-iti cha || 111 ||

111. It also says, 'Vishnu alone binds through the fetters of transmigration and He alone is the liberator. He alone is the giver of freedom. Visnu alone is the supreme Brahman. There is no doubt about that'

prItishcha guNotkarshhaj~nAnAdeva visheshhato dR^ishhTA, na abhedaj~nAnAt.h || 112 ||

112. Love is particularly seen to arise towards an individual who acknowledges the superiority in qualities in one and it is not seen to arise in response to the affirmation of identity.

abhedaj~nAnAdaprItirevottamAnAM bhavati || 113 ||

113. In fact those who excel, develop the opposite of love towards their inferiors, if the latter assert identity with them

ghAtayanti hi rAjAno, ' rAjA.aham.h' iti vadantAm.h |

dadati cha sarvamabhipretaM guNotkarshhaM vadataH ||114||

114. Kings put down a subject if he claims, 'I am the King'. If, on the other hand he praises the superior qualities of the kings, the kings grant him all his objects of desire.

"na tAdR^ishI prItirID.hyasya vishhNorguNotkarshhaj~nAtari yAdR^ishI syAt.h |

tatprINanAnmoxamApnoti sarvastato vedAstatparAH Sarva eva" ||

-iti sauparNashrutiH || 115 ||

115. The Sauparna-sruti says: 'There is no love equal to that of Visnu, the adorable one, towards a devotee who recognizes His surpassing excellences. By thus pleasing Him all the devotees attain liberation. Therefore all the Vedas aim at glorifying the surpassing excellences of Visnu'

"yo mAmevamasammUDho jAnAti purushhottamam.h |

sa sarvavid.h bhajati mAM sarvabhAvena bhArata" ||

(bha\.gI\. 15\.19)

-iti guNotkarshhaj~nAnAdeva paramA prItirbhagavatA svayamevAbhihitA || 116||

116. The Lord Himself has indicated that He develops overflowing love towards one who acknowledges His surpassing excellences, in the passage, 'He who understands Me undeluded as the highest purusa in this manner, is one who knows all and he serves Me in all ways'

ato vishhNorguNotkarshhe eva sarvashrutismR^itInAM mahAtAtparyam.h || 117||

117. Therefore all Smrutis and Srutis have their supreme purport in the surpassing excellence of the attributes of Visnu.

na cha ' abhede tAtparyam.h' ityatra kiJNchinmAnam.h |

| 118||

na cha visheshhaNavisheshhyatayA bhedasiddhiH |

visheshhaNavisheshhyabhAvashcha bhedApexaH |

dharmipratiyogyapexayA bhedasiddhiH |

bhedApexaM cha dharmipratiyogitvamityanyonyAshrayatayA bhedasyAyuktiH padArthasvarUpatvAd.h bhedasya || 119||

119. The argument, 'Difference is apprehended as either the substantive or the adjectival factor and the apprehension of the substantive and adjectival factors ( as manually different) presupposes the grasp of difference. Similarly, the apprehension of difference presupposes the apprehension of the entity that differs and the entity from which it differs and apprehension of these entities in such mutual exclusiveness presupposes the apprehension of their difference. Thus in both ways the fallacy of mutual dependence is inevitable is unsound, because difference is the very substantive essence or svarupa of entities

na cha dharmipratiyogyapexayA bhedasyAsvarUpatvaM aikyavat.h svarUpasyaiva tathAtvAt.h || 120||

120. Just because difference implies the entity and counter-entity, it does not cease to be the svarupa of the entity, even as unity, which also implies the entity 'which is one with' and the entity 'with which it is one' does not cease to be the very svarupa of the entity in question. In both cases the svarupa is itself of such a character.

svarUpasiddhAvapi tadasiddhishcha jIveshvaraikyaM vadataH siddhaiva || 121||

121. Those who posit the identity of Isvara and Jiva, themselves hold that the svarupa is evident; but still the identity is not evident.

bhedastu svarUpadarshana eva siddhaH |

prAyaH sarvato vilaxaNaM hi padArthasvarUpaM dR^ishyate || 122||

122. Difference is apprehended when the svarupa is apprehended. The essential nature of an entity as generally unique and different from all else is apprehended.

' asya bheda' iti tu ' padArthasya svarUpam.h' itivat.h || 123||

123. The expression, 'The difference of this' (Suggesting that difference is other than 'this') is similar to the expression, 'The svarupa of this entity' ( Where also we speak as if there is difference between the svarupa and the entity while there is none)

yadi na svarUpaM bhedastadA, padArthe dR^ishhTe prAyaH sarvato vailaxaNyaM tasya na j~nAyate || 124||

124. If the svarupa is not itself the difference, the general difference of an entity from all others would not be grasped when it is grasped

aj~nAte cha vailaxaNye ' Atmani ghaTa' ityapi saMshayaH syAt.h\? | 125 ||

125. If such general difference is not apprehended, it must be possible to doubt whether one's self is not jar.

na hi kashchittathA saMshayaM karoti || 126||

126. No one entertains such an absurd doubt

j~nAtvaiva prAyaH sarvato vailaxaNyaM kasminshchideva sadR^ishe saMshayaM karoti | | 127||

127. Having apprehended such general difference from all else, one comes to doubt whether it is not the same as some particular entity which is like it. ( The position is this: In the initial apprehension of an entity its uniqueness is grasped in a general way. When some other entities similar to it are noticed doubts arise which serve to suspend provisionally the uniqueness in relation to those similars. After a clear investigation the doubt may disappear, thus re-affirming the uniqueness. Thus individual discriminations merely serve to remove confusions that check the awareness of uniqueness initially apprehended. The account is justified by the phenomenon of the restriction of the range of possible confusions and mis-identifications.)

na hi Atmani ' ahaM devadatto, na vA\?' iti kasyachit.h saMshayo bhavati\? || 128||

128. No one entertains doubts about himself in such ways as, 'Am I Devadatta or not?'

sAmAnyataH sarvavailaxaNye j~nAta eva ghaTatvAdij~nAnam || 129||

129. The apprehension of the special characteristics like jarness arises only after a grasp of the uniqueness of an object in general.

ato nAnyonyAshrayatA || 130||

130. Therefore there is no mutual dependence

na cha yugapajj~nAnAnupattirdoshhaH -yathA yugapadeva dIpasahasradarshane sAmAnyataH sarve j~nAyanta eva, tathA syAt.h\?|| 131||

131. It cannot be urged that a simultaneous apprehension of the difference of an entity from all else is not possible. Just as a thousand lamps burning together in a place can be perceived instantaneously in a general way, (though the detailed perception of them one after another is a prolonged process) even so the uniqueness of an entity in general can be grasped in flash as it were.

ekasminneva vastuni visheshhastairapyaN^gIkR^ita eva -

(bR^i\.u\.4\.3\.6) || 132||

132. The thinkers under discussion have surely admitted the category of 'Visesa' within the one and solidarity being accepted by them

“neti neti" ityatra sarvavailaxaNyAN^gIkArAt.h |

visheshhAnaN^gIkAre cha punarukteH || 133||

133. In the text, 'Not so, not so' the difference of Brahman from all else is asserted and if the category of 'Visesa' is not admitted the subsequent negation simply repeats the first negation.

na cha ghaTAdvailaxaNyameva paTAdvailaxaNyam.h, anubhavavirodhAt.h || 134||

134. Surely the difference from jars is not the same as the difference from cloth. Such a position would violate the verdict of experience.

tasmAd.h, bhedadarshanaM yuktameva || 135||

135. Therefore the apprehension of difference is logically explicable

yachcha pramANadR^ishhTAnAmapi padArthAnAM mithyAtvakalpanaM tachcha pramANaviruddhatvAdeva prakAshataskaratvam.h || 136||

136. The Supposition of the falsity of entities cognized through valid modes of knowledge is merely a case of robbing the world of philosophic light, for, it contradicts all valid modes of knowledge

na hi pramANadR^ishhTasya tarkabAdhyatvaM –pratyaxAdiviruddhAnAM tarkAbhAsatvaniyamAt.h || 137||

137. In reality what has been cognised through valid modes of knowledge cannot be refuted by mere logic, for it is the universal principle that logic which runs against valid modes of knowledge is fallacious.

shuktyAdeH rajatatvAdipratIterapi balavatpratyaxaviruddhatvAdeva bhramatvaM, na tarkamAtrAt.h || 138||

138. The perception of things like a piece of shell as silver is determined to be an illusion only because it contradicts very strong perceptual evidence and not by mere logic

tarkamAtreNa pratyaxabAdhane bhUtachatushhTayasyAb AdeH pR^ithivItvAdR^ishhTeH pR^ithivyA api pR^ithivItvaM na syAt.h\? || 139||

139. If mere logic could refute perception, as the other four elements like water do not have the characteristics of earth, it would be arguable that even earth does not have them, which is abused.

ato na tarkamAtrata eva dR^ishhTasya bhrAntitvaM kalpyam.h || 140||

140. Therefore on the strength of mere logical quibbles, facts of observation cannot be explained away as illusions.

ataH sarvabhedanirAsakatarkasya sarvashrutismR^itipratyaxAnumAnaviruddhatvAt.h nitarAM AbhAsatvam.h || 141||

141.Therefore, the logic that seeks to dismiss all difference is absolutely fallacious as it is diametrically opposed to all strutis, smrtis, perception and inference.

na cha ' paramArthato bhedAbhAvo, vyAvahArikaH so.asti' iti vAchyam.h || 142 ||

142.It ought not to be said that in reality there is no difference but in the practical and empirical world there is difference

sadasadvailaxaNye pramANAbhAvAt.h || 143||

143.There is no proof for positing anything which is neither existent nor non-existent

' asataH khyAti ayogAd.h' iti vadataH khyAtirabhUt.h, na vA yadi na abhUt.h, na tatkhyAtinirAkaraNam.h |

yadyabhUt.h, na tathApi || 144||

144.One who says that 'What is non-existent does not present itself to consciousness' must be questioned whether while framing his principle he was conscious of the non-existent or not. If he was not conscious of it, he could not even deny its presentation to consciousness ( for denial presupposes the awareness of what is denied ). If he was conscious of it, then also its presentation to consciousness could not be denied.

na chAsato vailaxaNyaM tatpratItiM vinA j~nAyate || 145||

145.And the difference of anything from the non-existent cannot be apprehended if there is no awareness of the non-existent.

na cha shukte rajatatvaM sadasadvilaxaNam.h || 146 ||

146.The silverness apprehended(in an illusion) in a piece of shell is not something neither existent nor non-existent.

asadeva rajataM pratyabhAd.h' ityanubhavAt.h || 147||

147.The (correcting) experience is of the form, 'Silver which was non-existent appeared to be there'

na cha pratItatvAdasattvAbhAvaH || 148||

148.Because it is experienced, it cannot be urged that it is not non-existent

asataH sattvapratItiH sato.asattvapratItirityanyathApratItereva bhrAntitvAt.h || 149||

149.In fact by illusion we mean precisely this mis-perception of the non-existent as existent and of the existent as non-existent

na cha ' asato bhrAntAvapi pratItirnAsti', iti vAchyam.h || 150||

150. It cannot be maintained that the experience of the non-existent does not take place even in illusions.

anirvachanIyaparamArthatvasyAsata eva dR^ishhTyaN^gIkArAt.h || 151||

151.Theory under discussion does admit that the identity of the illusory silver ( pratibhasika ) with real silver (vyavaharika), which identity is clearly non-existent, is apprehended in illusion.

na cha tadapyanirvAchyaM -anavasthiteH || 152||

152. Even that identity cannot be pronounced to be different from the existent as well as the non-existent, for in that case, we are in for infinite regress ( The content of the erroneous cognition may be admitted for the sake of the argument to be other than non-existent. This identity of the apparent with the real posited in illusion is clearly non-existent. Hence in illusion the non-existent is cognised )

' prathamAnirvachanIyAsiddhyA, sarvAnirvachanIyAsiddhiH' iti mUlaxatiH || | 153||

153. As the first case of inexplicability ( as other than both non-existent and existent ) is not established, all other cases of inexplicabilities remain unestablished and the very bottom of the hypothesis is annihilated.

anirvachanIyatve rajatasya, ' anirvachanIyamidaM rajatam.h', iti bAdhakaj~nAnamutpadyeta || | 154 ||

154. If the silver apprehended in illusion is inexplicable ( either as existent or as non-existent ) the sublating judgement ought to arise in the form, 'This silver is inexplicable'. (But it arises in the form, 'There is no silver)'.

mithyAshabdastvabhAvavAchI || | 155||

155. The term 'unreal' signifies non-existence

na cha ' sadasadvailaxaNyaM nAmAsti', ityatra kiJNchinmAnam.h || 156||

156. There is no proof to show that there is anything like inexplicability

anubhavavirodhashcha tatpaxe || 157||

157. And the view under consideration contradicts experience.

158. sadasatordvayoreva sarvairanubhUyamAnatvAt.h || 158||

158. For, only 'What is' and 'What is not' are being experienced by all. (All judgement is either affirmation or negation)

ato.anirvachanIyAbhAvAdasataH pratItyanaN^gIkArAt.h pratIyamAnatvAchcha bhedasya sattvaprApternAdvitIyatvaM yujyate || 159||

159. Therefore (1) as there is nothing inexplicable ( as either being or non-being ), (2) as the non-existent is considered to be uncongnisable, and (3) as difference is a matter of experience, difference becomes real and thus the non-duality of the ultimate reality is impossible. ( Difference is a matter of experience for both our theory and Advaita. We have shown that it is not explicable as maintained by the Advaitin. It is not non-existent, for that which is not existent is not an object of experience for Advaita. The only remaining alternative is that difference must be conceded as ultimately real )

kathaM cha shrutisiddho jIvaparamAtmabhedo nirAkriyate || 160 ||

160. How can the difference between the individual self and the supreme Being established by Sruti be neglected ?

mithyAvAditve cha shruteH kathamaikyasya satyatvam.h || 161 ||

161. If the Sruti propounds what is false, how can unity propounded by the Sruti be real ?

kathaM chaivaMvAdinAM vedavAditvam.h || 162 ||

162. How, again, can the thinkers of this line of thought be the followers of the Veda ?

vedoktasya mithyAtvAN^gIkArAdeva hi avedavAditvaM bauddhAdInAmapi || 163||

163. In fact the thinkers like the Buddhists are not the followers of Veda, only for the reason that they admit the falsity of what the Veda affirms.

ato vishhNoH sarvottamatva eva mahAtAtparyaM sarvAgamAnAm.h || 164||

164. Hence the supreme purport of all the scriptures is the transcendent greatness of Visnu over every other entity.

kathaM cha jIvaparamAtmaikye sarvashrutInAM tAtparyaM yujyate sarvapramANaviruddhatvAt.h || 165||

165. How can the theme of all Srutis be the unity of the individual self and supreme spirit when such a theme flagrantly contradicts all modes of valid knowledge ?

tathA hyanubhavavirodhaH -na hi ' ahaM sarvaj~naH, sarveshvaro, nirduHkho, nirdoshhaH' iti vA kasyachidanubhavaH\? asti cha tadviparyayeNAnubhavaH || 166||

166. To explain: It would contradict, experience. No one experiences, 'I am omnicient', 'I am the Lord of all', 'I am without any sorrow or pain', 'I am faultless'; indeed there is the experience of the contrary.

na cha mithyAnubhavo.ayam.h -tadviparItapramANAbhAvAt.h || 167||

167. This experience is not illusory for there is no proof to the contrary.

na chAbhede kashchidAgamaH | santi cha bhede sarvAgamAH || 168||

168. There is no scriptural passage in support of the said unity. All the scriptures vindicate difference.

tathA hi -" atattvamasi" (chhA\.u\. 6\.8\.7, 6\.9\.4,6\.10\.3,6\.11\.3, 6\.12\.3, 6\.13\.3, 6\.14\.3, 6\.15\.3,6\.16\.3) iti

navakR^itvopadeshaH sadR^ishhTAntakaH || 169 ||

169.To explain: There is the teaching, 'That thou art not' enunciated nine times with illustrations.

na chAyaM abhedopadeshaH || 170 ||

170. And this is not a teaching of non-difference

" sa yathA shakuniH sUtreNa prabaddho dishaM dishaM patitvA anyatrAyatanaM alabdhvA bandhanamevopAshrayate" (chhA\.u\. 6\.8\.2) |

"sanmUlAH somyemAH sarvAH prajAH sadAyatanAH satpratishhThAH" (chhA\.u\. 6\.8\.4) || 1|| |171 ||

171. 'Just as a bird bound by a rope, flies in every direction, and then not finding it possible to rest anywhere else finally comes back to the spot to which it is bound, even so all these creatures, my dear, originate in Being, abide in Being and are established in Being'.

" yathA somya madhu madhukR^ito nistishhThanti nAnAtyayAnAM vR^ixANA\mrasAnsamavahAramekatA\m+rasaM gamayanti |

te yathA tatra na vivekaM labhante.amushhyAhaM vR^ixasya raso.asmyamushhyAhaM vR^ixasya raso.asmItyevameva khalu somyemAH sarvAH prajAH sati

sampadya na viduH sati sampatsyAmaha iti |

ta iha vyaghro vA simho vA vR^iko vA varAho vA kITo vA pataN^go vA damsho vA mashako vA yadyad.hbhavanti tat.h tadAbhavanti" (chhA\.u\.6\.9\.1\-3) || 2||

|172 ||

172. 'My dear', just as the bees make honey, by bringing together the juices of many trees, and the juices of the several trees do not distinguish among themselves each saying, " I am the juice of this tree", "I am the juice of the other tree," even so all these creatures commingling with Being". Whatever each creature is, be it a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gnat or a mosquito, it continues to be that'

" imAH somya nadyaH purastAtprAchyaH syandante pashchAtpratIchyastAH samudrAtsamudramevApiyanti sa samudra eva bhavati tA yathA tatra na viduriyamahamasmIyamahamasmIti |

evameva khalu somyemAH sarvAH prajAH sata Agamya na

viduH sata AgachchhAmaha iti ta iha vyAghro vA simho

vA vR^iko vA varAho vA kITo vA pataN^go vA damsho vA

mashako vA yadyad.hbhavanti tat.h tadAbhavanti"

(chhA\.u\. 6\.10\.1\-2) | 3||

|173||

173. 'These rivers, my dear, the eastern flow towards east, the western towards west and they all emanate from the sea and reach the sea. The sea remains the sea. Just as these rivers do not understand, " I am this river," "I am the other river," even so, all these creatures coming from Being do not realize, 'We come from Being'; Whatever each creature is, be it a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gnat or a mosquito, it continues to be that'

" sa eshha jIvenAtmanAnuprabhUtaH pepIyamAno modamAnastishhThati |

asya yadekAM shAkhAM jIvo jahAtyatha sA shushhyati" (chhA\.u\. 6\.11\.1\-2) | 4|| |174 ||

174. 'This living tree filled with the atman called the jiva drinks plentifully, enjoys itself and flourishes. When this jiva abandon a branch of this tree, that branch withers away forthwith'.

" nyagrodhaphalamata Ahareti idaM bhagava iti bhinddhIti bhinnaM bhagava iti kimatra pashyasIti aNva iva imA dhAnA bhagava iti AsAm aN^gaikAM bhinddhIti bhinnA bhagava iti kimatra pashyasIti na kiJNchana bhagava iti |

taM hovAcha yaM vai somyaitamaNimAnaM na nibhAlayasa etasya vai somyaishho.aNimna evaM mahAnyagrodhastishhThati"(chhA\.u\. 6\.12\.1\-2)|| 5|| |175 ||

Uddalaka: 'Bring a fig hither.'

Svetaketu: 'Here it is, Sir'

Uddalaka: 'Break it'

Svetaketu: 'It is broken, Sir'

Uddalaka: 'What do you see there?'

Svetaketu: 'These seeds, Sir, which are like fine atoms.'

Uddalaka: 'Of these, please break one'

Svetaketu: 'It is broken sir'

Uddalaka: 'What do you see there?'

Svetaketu: 'Nothing at all, Sir.'

Then he said to him, 'Verily, my dear, that finest (atomic) essence which you do not perceive verily, my dear, through the power of that finest essence, this huge fig tree stands'.

" lavaNametadudake.avadhAyAtha mA prAtarupasIdathA iti sa ha tathA chakAra taM hovAcha yaddoshhA lavaNamudake.avAdhA aN^ga tadAhareti taddhAvamR^ishya na viveda |

yathA vilInamevAN^gAsyAntAdAchAmeti kathamiti lavaNamiti madhyAdAchAmeti kathamiti lavaNamityantAdAchAmeti kathamiti lavaNamityabhiprAsyaitadatha mopasIdathA iti taddha tathA chakAra tachchhashvatsaMvartate taM hovAchAtra vAva kila tatsomya na nibhAlayase.atraiva kileti"

(chhA\.u\. 6\.13\.1\-2) || 6|| |176 ||

176. 'Place this salt in the water. In the morning come unto me'. Then he did so. Then he said to him, 'That salt you placed in the water last evening - please bring it hither'. Then he grasped for it; but he did not find it, it was completely dissovled.

Uddalaka: ' Please take a sip of it from this end',

said he, 'How is it?'

Svetaketu: 'It is salt'

Uddalaka: 'Take a sip from the middle', said he, 'How is it?'

Svetaketu: 'Salt'

Uddalaka: 'Take a sip from that end,' said he, 'How is it ?'

Svetaketu: 'Salt'

Uddalaka: 'Set it aside. Then come unto me'. He did so. 'That always remains', he said, 'Being which you do not perceive here, is verily here alone'.

" yathA somya purushhaM andhArebhyo.abhinaddhAxamAnIya taM tato.atijane visR^ijet.h"

(chhA\.u\. 6\.14\.1) || 7|| |177||

177. 'Even as, my dear, they bring man from the Gandhara country blindfolded and leave him in an uninhabited place..........?

" atha yadAsya vAN^manasi sampadyate manaH prANe

prANastejasi tejaH parasyAM devatAyAM tAvanna jAnAti" || 178||

(chhA\.u\. 6\.15\.2) || 8||

178. 'Then as long as his speech does not merge in mind, mind in the life-breath, the life-breath in the fire and the fire-breath in the fire and fire in the supreme deity, so long he recognises'.

" purushhaM somyota hastagR^ihItamAnayanti apahArshhIt.h steyamakArshhIt.h parashumasmai tapateti |

sa yadi tasya kartA bhavati tata evAnR^itamAtmAnaM kurute so.anR^itAbhisandho anR^itenAtmAnamabhisandhAya parashuM taptaM pratigR^ihNAti sa dahyate.atha hanyate |

atha yadi tasyAkartA bhavati tateva satyamAtmAnaM kurute sa satyAbhisandhaH satyenAtmAnamantardhAya parashuM taptaM pratigR^ihNAti sana dahyate.atha

muchyate" (chhA\.u\. 6\.16\.1\-2) || 9|| ||179||

179. 'My dear, they apprehend a man, lead him and accuse " He stole and robbed" and say, "Let the axe be heated for him". If he is the doer thereof, and then makes himself false, intends falsehood and covers himself with falsehood, and takes hold of the heated axe, he gets burnt. Then he is slain. If he is not the doer thereof and then makes himself true, intends truth, and covers himself with truth, and takes hold of the heated axe, he does not get burnt. Then he is released'.

-" evameva khalu somya" (chhA\.u\. 6\.6\.2), "

AchAryavAnpurushho veda" (chhA\. 6\.14\.2)

iti sthAnanavake.api bheda eva dR^ishhTAntAbhidhAnAt.h || 180||

180. 'Thus my dear, only he who has a preceptor understands'. Thus in all the nine sections, illustrations are offered in support of difference.

na hi shakunisUtrayornAnAvR^ixarasAnAM nadIsamudrayorjIvavR^ixayoH

aNimadhAnayorlavaNodakayorgandhArapurushhayoraj~naprANAdiniyAmakayoH stenApahAryayoshchaikyam.h || 181||

181. Surely there is no identity between the bird and the rope, no identity among the juices of many trees, between the rivers and the sea, the jiva and the tree, the finest essence and the seed, the salt and the water, the Gandhara country and the man, the ignorant man and the controller of the life breath etc.,and the thief and the stolen property ( and its lawful owner )

" sati sampadya na viduH sati sampatsyAmaha iti, ta iha vyAghro vA siMho vA"

(chhA\.u\. 6\.9\.1\-3) iti, " sata Agamya na viduH sata AgachchhAmaha iti, ta iha

vyAghro vA siMho vA" (chhA\.u\. 6\.10\.1\-2) iti

bhedAparij~nAnena anarthavachanAchcha || 182||

182. And in fact evil is said to result from the ignorance of difference in the passage, 'These creatures commingling with Being, do not realise, " We are commingling with Being"; whatever each creature is, be it a tiger, a lion it continues to be that'.'These creatures coming from Being, do not realise,"We come from Being"; Whatever each creature is, be it a tiger, a lion, it coninues to be that'.

na hi gR^ihAdAgatasya gR^ihe pravishhTasya tadaikyam.h || 183||

Indeed there is no identity between a house and a man who comes from it, and between a house and a man who enters it.

" tAH samudramevApiyanti sa samudra eva bhavati" ityatrApi bheda evochyate |

anyathA ' tAssamudra eva bhavanti' iti vyapadeshaH syAt.h || 184 ||

184. The words, 'They emanate from the sea and reach only the sea. The sea remains the sea', also affirm only difference. Otherwise the statement would have been, 'The rivers become the sea itself'.

ato, nadyaH samudrAdAgachchhanti, taM pravishanti cha, samudrastu sa eva naitAsAM samudratvaM bhavatItyarthaH || 185||

185. Therefore the meaning is that the rivers come from the sea and enter the sea; but the sea remains itself; and these rivers do not become the sea.

na hi bhinnAnAM nadIjalaparamANUnAM samudrANubhiH aikyaM yujyate || 186||

186. It is impossible that the different atoms composing the waters of the rivers become one with the atoms of the water of the sea

tathA sati mahAjanasamitau pravishhTAnAM dvitrANAM tadaikyaM syAt.h || 187||

187. Otherwise, if two or three individuals enter a great assembly of people, they must wholly lose themselves in the members alreay there. (The absurdity of this supposition lies evidently in the fact that entry of new members should cause no increase, if the supposition were true)

na cha tadyujyate -bhedena anubhavAt.h || 188||

188. That is impossible, for the new members are observed to be different from the members who were previously there in the assembly.

" svaM hyapIto bhavati" (chhA\.u\. 6\.8\.1) ityatrApi " sva" iti

paramAtmano.abhidhAnam.h, " svAtmanA chottarayoH" (bra\.sU\. 2\.3\.20) iti sUtrAt.h || 189||

189. In the text, svam hyapito bhavati, the term sva signifies the supreme Self. This is established in the Sutra 'Through the atman, on account of the (two) points mentioned later'.

"svAtantryAt.h sva iti prokta AtmA.ayaM chAtatatvataH |

brahmAyaM guNapUrNatvAd.h bhagavAn.h vishhNuravyayaH" || -iti paramopanishhadi || 190||

190. The Paramopanisad says: 'The eternal Bhagavan Visnu is called 'Sva' because he is self-dependent'. 'atman' because he is all-prevading, and 'Brahman' because he abounds in auspicious qualities.

" apIta" ityapi praveshamAtram.h -" svam.h" iti dvitIyAnirdeshAt.h || 191||

191. 'Apita' means mere entering, because the word 'svam' has the objective case-termination

ekIbhAvavivaxAyAM, ' svena' iti nirdeshaH syAt.h\ || 192||

192. If its meaning were 'becoming one' the word 'sva' would have to be in the instrumental case i.e., svena (one with). { Svam hyapito bhavati is the text. Its prima facie rendering would be 'He becomes one with his own self'. Two difficulties are pointed out in this rendering. (a) 'Svam' does not mean one's own self but the Lord. (b) It is in the objective case not agreeing with the verb 'to become one with'. 'He enters into the Lord'. }

"svaM kulAyaM yathA.apItaH paxI syAdevamIshvaram.h |

apyeti jIvaH prasvApe muktau chAnyo.api san.h sadA" |

-iti cha || 193||

193. 'Just as a bird enters its nest (at night), even so does the individual self enter the Lord during deep sleep and release, even though it is different from him always'.

" evameva khalu somyetanmano dishaM dishaM patitvAnyatra AyatanamalabdhvA prANamevopAshrayate" (chhA\.u\. 6\.8\.2), ityatrApi "

mana" iti jIvaH, " prANa" iti paramAtmA -yatrAyaM " purushhaH svapiti nAma" (chhA\.u\. 6\.8\.1)iti tayoreva prastutatvAt.h || 194||

194. 'Even so, my dear, this manas(mind) flying hither and thither and not finding a resting-place anywhere else resorts to prana'. In this passage also 'manas' means the individual self and 'Prana' means 'the 'the supreme spirit for, the section deals with them as evidenced by the opening 'Where this purusa sleeps ?....

"mananAnmanaH uddishhTaH pudgalo nirayaM giran.h |

karmAnushayanAchchaiva saMsAryanushayI smR^itaH" ||

-iti cha |

" prANaH praNayanAdeshha sAdhutvAt.h san.h hariH smR^itaH" iti cha || 195||

195. It is said further, 'The transmigrating individual is knows as 'manas' because he thinks; as 'pudgala' because he undergoes retribution; and is 'anusayi because he falls into transmigration following his own deeds'. Further it is also said, 'Hari is knows as Prana because he activates the universe and as sat because he is faultlessly perfect',

" sanmUlAH somyemAH sarvAH prajAH sadAyatanAH satpratishhThAH" (chhA\.u\. 6\.8\.4) ityatrApi bheda eva pratIyate || 196||

196. In the passage, 'My dear, all these creatures originate in Being, abide in Being, and are established in Being', difference alone is brought out.

"srashhTR^itvAdAshrayatvAchcha muktAnAM cha prati prati |

sthApanAchcha vibhurvishhNuranyaH saMsAriNo mataH" ||

-iti cha || 197||

197. It is also said, 'The all-pervading Visnu is intimated to be different from the transmigrating individual self, because he is the creator, he is the supporter and it is he who establishes each liberated self'.

" anena jIvenAtmanAnupravishya nAmarUpe vyAkaravANi" (chhA\.u\. 6\.3\.2) iti, " sa eshha jIvenAtmanAnuprabhUtaH pepIyamAno modamAnastishhThati" (chhA\.u\. 6\.11\.1) ityatrApi "

jIva"{}shabdena paramAtmA.abhihitaH || 198 ||

198. In the texts, 'I will enter these ( three deities) as the atman, in the form of the jiva and differentiate names and forms' and 'This (living tree) filled with jiva, drinks plentifully enjoys itself and flourishes', by the term jiva, only the supreme atman is denoted

" jIva iti bhagavato.aniruddhasyAkhyA" iti shruteH || 199||

199. The sruti lays down that the term jiva stands for Bhagavan Aniruddha. ( Aniruddha is one of the four principal cosmic manifestations of Sri Visnu, described in Vaisnava scriptures )

"vishhNurjIva iti proktaH satataM prANadhAraNAt.h |

sa pravishya sharIraM cha sthAvaraM jaN^gamaM tathA |

mahAbhUtAni cha vibhustrivR^itkaraNapUrvakam.h |

saMsAriNaM bhrAmayati sadaivAnyatvalaxaNam.h |

tenAyaM modate nityaM vR^ixAvasthAM gato.api san.h ||

-iti cha || 200||

200.Visnu is said to be jiva because he sustains always the sense (in the body). He, the all-pervading one, enters the great elements, after mixing the three elements, enters the bodies, both unmoving and moving and sets in motion from state to state the transmigrating individual self, who is defined by his everlasting difference from him. It is by the presence of Visnu that the individual becomes glad even if he were to get into the conditions of a tree.

"tatteja aixata", "tA Apa aixanta", "imAstisro devatA" iti pUrvameva chetanatvasiddheH, anena "jIvenAtmanA" iti saMsAriNaH punaH pravesho na yuktaH || 201||

201. In the sentence, 'I will enter as this atman in the form of Jiva', it is wrong to read a further entry of the individual self into the elements, because the presence of individual consciousness in the elements prior to the entry in question is already made evident in the senetences, 'That fire resolved', 'Those waters resolved' and by the words 'These three deities'.

ataH, tatra "jIva"shabdena paramAtmaivAbhihitaH || 202||

202. Therefore in that passage only the supreme Spirit is signified by the term jiva.

"jIvenAtmanAnuprabhUtaH pepIyAmAno modamAnastishhThati" ityatrApi "jIva"shabdoditaH para eva |

"pepIyamAno modamAnaH"tu saMsArI || 203 ||

203. Even in the text, 'Filled by the jiva, the tree drinks plentifully and enjoys itself and flourishes', only the highest Self is named by the term jiva. He who drinks plentifully and enjoys himself is the individual self.

na hi chetanAdanyasya modabhogAdikaM yujyate || 204||

204. Surely no unconscious entity can rejoice and enjoy

"sukhasya chApyAyatanaM sharIraM duHkhasya chApyAyatanaM sharIram.h |

achetanaM prAkR^itametadAhuH bhoktA tayoshchetanakaH sharIrI" ||

- iti bhArate || 205||

205. It is said in the Bharata: 'The body is the seat of pleasure. The body is the seat of pain. It is insentinent and physical. The one who enjoys and suffers is the embodied individual self.'

"jIvApetaM vAva kiledaM mriyate na jIvo mriyate" ityatrApi "jIva"shabdaH pare || 206 ||

206. The term jiva is used in the sense of the highest Self in the other passage also which says, 'This verily dies if deserted by the jiva, the jiva does not die'

na hi saMsAriNo mukhyataH prANadhArakatvaM yujyate || 207||

207. The individual self cannot be the ultimate sustainer of life.

"brahmaNA tyaktadehastu mR^ita ityuchyate naraH"iti cha || 208||

208. It is also said, 'The man is said to be dead whose body is deserted by Brahman'.

"yaM vai somyaitamaNimAnaM na nibhAlayase etasya vai somyaishho.aNimna evaM mahAnnyagrodhastishhThati"

ityatrApi "aNima"shabdena para evAbhihitaH || 209||

209. 'My dear, this finest essence which you do not perceive, through the power of that finest essence this huge-fig tree stand'. In this statement also only the supreme Being is signified by the term 'The finest essence'.

"sa ya eshho.aNimA etadAtmyamida sarvaM tatsatya sa AtmA.atattvamasi shvetaketo" ityuktatvAchcha || 210||

210. It is so because of the text stating, 'All this is ensouled by him, this finest essence, that is real; he is the atman that thou, Svetaketu, art not'.

"dhAnAsu tvaNvya ivemA dhAnA"iti strIliN^gaprayogAdivashabdaprayogAchcha nANimatvam.h || 211 ||

211. In reference to the seeds, the feminine gender is used and they are compared to the finest essence. So they are not the same as the finest essence. ( The word anima meaning the finest essence is not in the feminine gender and cannot be compared to itself)

na cha tA na nibhAlayase || 212||

212. With reference to them it cannot be said. ' You do not perceive them'. (Because they are actually perceived)

"aitadAtmyam.h"ityetadIyam.h || 213 ||

213. The meaning of 'ensouled by him' is 'belongs to him'

"sa AtmA"ityAtmashabdastu para eva || 214 ||

214. 'He is the atman'. In this sentence also the word atman denotes the supreme Being.

"dyubhvAdyAyatanaM svashabdAt.h",

"nAnumAnamatachchhabdAt.h"

"prANabhR^ichcha" ityatra "tamevaikaM jAnatha

AtmAnam.h", iti "sva"shabdaparyAyA.atmashabdAnna

prakR^itijIvAvabhidhIyate, kintu 'para eva'iti

bhagavatA vyAsena

abhihitam.h || 215 ||

215. Bhagavan Vyasa lays down in the aphorisms, 'The abode of the sky etc., (is Brahman only) because of the word sva used, 'Not the entity that is merely a matter of inference', 'Not also the bearer of the prana', that in the sruti text, 'know only him, the atman'. As the term 'atman' synonymous with 'sva' is used, prakrti and jiva are not signified by it, but only the highest Self.

ataH "Atma"shabdastasminneva mukhyaH || 216||

216. Therefore the term atman primarily denotes the highest Self.

"AtatatvAchcha mAtR^itvAdAtmeti paramo hariH |

AtmAbhAsAstadanye ye na hyeteshhAM tatA guNAH" ||

- iti paramopanishhadi || 217||

217. The Paramopanisad says: 'Hari is primarily the atman because he is infinite (in time, space and perfections) and because he is the knower (omniscient) and creator. All other selves are merely the apparent atmans. Their attributes are limited.

"tejaH parasyAM devatAyAM tAvanna jAnAti"

ityatra cha yadA.asya prANAdIn.h paro grasati tadA na

jAnAti yadA dadAti

tadA jAnAtIti tadvashatvamevoktam.h || 218||

218. In the passage. 'As long as the fire does not merge in the highest Deity, so long he recognises' it is pointed out that the individual self does not understand anything when the highest Self draws into itself his senses and life-breath and when he grants them, he uderstands. Thus the subordination of the individual self to the highest Deity is brought out.

"yadA prANAn.h dadAtIshastadA chetanako.akhilam.h |

jAnAti grastakaraNastena vetti na kiJNchana" ||

- iti cha || 219||

219. It is also said, when the Lord grants the sense and life-breath all the sentient beings know and when their senses and life-breath are withdrawn by him can know nothing

"apahArshhIt.h steyamakArshhId.h" ityatra cha,

anyAbhimatasyaiva vastuno.apahAryatvAt.h bheda evAyaM

dR^ishhTAntaH || 220||

220. The text, 'He robbed, he stole', offers only illustration of difference, for that can be stolen which belongs to another.

anyaM santaM paramAtmAnaM svayamiti manyamAnaH stena eveti || 221 ||

221. He is indeed a thief who imagines himself to be the supreme atman, who is really different from him

na hi svakIyaM parityajan.h steno bhavati || 222||

222. He is no thief who simply renounces what legitimately belongs to himself.

"aikAtmyaM nAma yadidaM kechid.hbrUyuranaipuNAH |

shAstratattvamavij~nAya tathA vAdabalAjjanAH |

kAmakrodhAbhibhUtatvAdahaN^kAravashaM gatAH |

yAthAtathyamavij~nAya shAstrANAM shAstradasyavaH |

brahmastenA nirAnandA apakvamanaso.ashivAH |

vaiguNyameva pashyanti na guNAni niyuJNjate |

teshhAM tamashsharIrANAM tama eva parAyaNam.h |

yatassvarUpatashchAnyo jAtitaH shrutito.arthataH |

kathamasmi sa ityeva sambandhaH syAdasaMhitaH"||

- iti moxadharme || 223||

223. The Mokshadharma says: 'Those dull persons who propound this unity of atman, do so because they do not comprehend the truth of the sastras and are fooled by skill in argumentation and are dominated by egotism because they are overpowered by lust and anger. As they do not comprehend the import of the sastras, they become robbers of the sastras. They steal Brahman, are bereft of all ananda and their minds are unripe. They perceive only attributelessness and do not ascribe excellence to Brahman. The destiny of these persons who are formed of darkness is darkness itself. How can the relation of identity with the Supreme in the form, 'I am he' be tenable, when the Supreme is different in essential nature and in genus, according to all Srutis and from the standpoint of value'.

"yathA paxI cha sUtraM cha nAnAvR^ixarasA yathA |

yathA nadyaH samudrashcha shuddhodalavaNe yathA |

yathA chorApahAyau cha yathA puMvishhayAvapi |

tathA jIveshvarau bhinnau sarvadaiva vilaxaNau |

tathApi sUxmarUpatvAnna jIvAtparamo hariH |

bhedena mandadR^ishhTInAM dR^ishyate prerako.api

san.h |

vailaxaNyaM tayorj~nAtvA muchyate baddhyate.anyathA ||

- iti cha paramopanishhadi || 224||

224. The Paramopanisad says: 'Just as the bird and the rope are different, the juices of the many trees are different, the rivers and the sea are different, the thief and the property stolen are different, the man and the(Gandhara) country are different, the jiva and Isvara are different and are distinguished always by differences of essential nature. Even then, as they are subtle in their nature, Hari, the supreme Being does not appear as different from the jiva to the dull witted, even though he is the power actuating all. He who understands their natural distinctness gets liberated while he, who does not, gets chained to samsara'.

"prerakaH sarvajIvAnAM prANadhIchoditA cha saH |

vishhNuH saMsAriNo.anyo yastamavij~nAya mUDhadhIH |

dehendriyaprANabuddhinetR^itvaM manyate AtmanaH |

atassaMsArapadavIM yAti jIveshayossadA |

vailaxaNyaM paraM j~nAtvA muchyate baddhyate.anyathA" ||

- iti cha || 225||

225. It is also further said, 'He is the actuator of all jivas and he goads to activity prana and manas. Visnu is different from the transmitting individual self. That fool who does not know him and thinks of himself as the master of his body, senses, life and intellect inherits the cursed state, samsara. By comprehending the absolute difference in nature between Isvara and jivas, he gets emancipated. Otherwise he gets fettered'.

sarvAn.h vedAnadhItya mahAmanA anUchAnamAnI stabdha eyAyetyAtmano

anyamanUchAnatvAdiguNapradaM paramavij~nAya stabdhasya parAdhInatva

j~nApanena stabdhatAM nirasya tannishhThA hi atropadishyate || 226||

226. The discourse opening with, 'Having learnt all the Vedas, thinking himself great, Svetaketu, came puffed up with pride', first of all destroys the pride of the disciple by convincing him of his utter dependence on God-the pride which was due to his not understanding God, different from himself, who is the giver of all merits like learning-and then inculcates devotion to God.

taddhaika AhuH "asadevedamagra AsId.h" ityAdi

vAdiprasiddhamapi nirAkriyate || 227||

227. Even a point of view quite familiar in some schools of thought is repudiated as in the passage, 'Some say that in the begining only Non-Being existed'. ( The idea is that 'That thou art not is a negative teaching and requires a prior presentation of what is negated. Is there such a prior presentation of identity between jiva and Isvara ? In answer three points are set forth: (1) The pride of Svetaketu implies the assumption of such identity. (2) In the Sruti views familiar in current schools of thought are also repudiated and this belongs to that species of negation. (3) The Sruti also negates misconceptions that might result from a misunderstanding of its import and this statement. 'That thou are not' is just a negation of possible misunderstanding of other Sruti texts like 'I am Brahman'.)

"ishhTApUrtaM manyamAnA varishhThaM nAnyachchhre

yante pramUDhAH"

ityAdivat.h shrutitAtparyAparij~nAnaprAptaM cha || 228||

228. In the passages like, 'Great fools imagine that ista(rituals) and putra (charitable deeds) are the highest and recognise no higher ideal', there is negation of the errors that result from the misunderstanding of the purport of Sruti. The present negation is similar to it.

darshitaM cha "aikAtmyaM nAma yadidaM

kechid.hbrUyuranaipuNAH" iti || 229||

229. The position negated is actually presented and denied in the moksa-dharma passage to the effect, 'Those dull persons who propound this unity of atman....'

tadvashatvaj~nApanArthaM cha sadeva somyedamagra

AsIdityAdi sR^ishhTikathanam.h || 230||

230. The account of creation is given in the text commencing with the sentence, 'My dear, all this was only Being in the begining' with a view to intimate the dependence of every entity on Visnu.

ekavij~nAnena sarvavij~nAnaM cha prAdhAnyAt.h

kiJNchitsAdR^ishyAtkAraNatvAchcha || 231||

231. By the knowledge of the 'one' the knowledge of 'all' is attained because the 'one' is dominant, because there is some similarity between it and all and also because it is the cause of all.

na tu tadanyasya mithyAtvAt.h || 232 ||

232. By knowing the 'one', all can be known not because everything other than the one is false.

na hi satyaj~nAnena mithyAj~nAnaM bhavati || 233 ||

233. By the knowledge of the real, the knowledge of the unreal is not gained

na hi 'shuktij~no rajataj~naH'ityuchyate || 234 ||

234. One who knows the mother-of-pearl (which is) does not by virtue of that knowledge) know silver ( which is not)

virodhAt.h tayorj~nAnayoH || 235||

235. For the two units of knowledge are contradictory of each other

'nedaM rajatam.h'iti arajataj~no hi shuktij~no bhavati || 236||

236. As a matter of fact, one who knows, 'This is not silver', and thus is a knower of non-silver is precisely the person who knows the mother-of-pearl.

rajataj~nashchenna shuktij~naH ||237 ||

237. Thus if he knows silver (i.e., knows that there is silver before him) he does not know the mother-of-pearl (which is the object before him)

na hi tajj~nastadabhAvaj~no bhavati || 238 ||

238. The person who knows something is not one who knows its non-existence.

tadabhAvasya tajj~nAnapUrvakatvaM chAnyatra tasya sattvAdeva dR^ishhTam.h || 239||

239. The negation of something presupposes the knowledge of it: and that knowledge is rendered possible by its existence elsewhere or at a different point of time.

tadanaN^gIkAre tadeva na yujyate || 240||

240. If the presupposed knowledge of its existence in a different context is not admitted (i.e., its existence in the immediate context is the object of knowledge)the negation in question is impossible.

pradhAnaj~nAnAdapradhAnasya j~nAtavadvyapadesho.astyeva || 241||

241. When the dominant principle is known, the subordinate principles are treated as practically known.

yathA pradhAnapurushhANAM j~nAnAhvAnanAshanairgrAmo j~nAta AhUto nAshita iti vyapadeshaH || 242||

242. We speak of the village as known, invited or destroyed when the principal personages of the villages, are known, invited or destroyed

kAraNe ch pitari j~nAte putro j~nAta iti jAnAmyenamasya putro.ayamiti vyapadesha iti || 243||

243. And when the cause, namely the father is known, we take it that the son is known and we say, "I know him; he is the son of so and so'.

evamatrApyetatsR^ishhTaM sarvamityAdi || 244||

244. The same applies to the present instance. We know the world when we know it is the creation of Brahman

sAdR^ishyAchchaikastrIj~nAnAdanyastrIj~nAnamiti || 245||

245. By similarity also the position is explicable.Knowledge of one woman is treated as giving us knowledge of other women

tadeva sAdR^ishyamatrApi vivaxitam.h - "yathA somyaikena mR^itpiNDena sarvaM mR^inmayaM vij~nAta syAd.h" ityAdinA || 246 ||

246. It is such similarity that is meant in the present text also which starts with the sentence, 'Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, all that is made up of clay is known'.

anyathaikashabdaH piNDashabdashcha vyarthassyAt.h || 247||

247. Otherwise the words 'one' (in one lump of clay) and 'lump' (in lump of clay) would be useless

mR^idA vij~nAtayetyetAvatA pUrNatvAt.h || 248||

248. (When similarity is not the basic principle) the import would stand completely expressed if it were said merely, 'If clay is known all products of clay are known'

na hyekamR^itpiNDAtmakAnyanyamR^inmayAni || 249||

249. Not all products of clay are produced out of a single lump of clay.

sAdR^ishyameva hi teshhAm.h || 250||

250. There is only similarity between the one lump and all clay-products.

"yathA somyaikena lohamaNinA sarvaM lohamayaM vij~nAtaM syAt.h" (chhA.u. 6.1.5), "yathA somyaikena nakhanikR^intanena sarvaM kArshhNAyasaM vij~nAtaM syAd.h"(chhA.u. 6.1.6) ityAdikamapi vyarthaM syAt.h || 251||

251.Otherwise, the two other illustrations enumerated viz., 'just as, my dear, by one nugget of gold everything made of gold may be known' and 'just as, my dear, by one nail-cutter everything made of iron may be known', would be useless.

na hi ekamaNyAtmakamanyallohamayam.h |

na chaikanakhakR^intanAtmakaM sarvaM kArshhNAyasam.h || 252||

252. The other gold articles are not the products of a single nugget of gold and not all iron-products are made of a single nail-cutter.

"vAchArambhaNaM vikAro nAmadheyaM mR^ittiketyeva

satyam.h"(chhA.u. 6.1.4)ityatra cha "vAchA"nAmnAM

"ArambhaNam.h""vikAraH"avikR^itaM nityaM

"nAmadheyam.h""mR^ittiketyeva" ityetadvachanaM satyaM,

iti shrutyarthaH || 253||

253. The text 'Vacarambhanam vikaro namadheyam, mrttiketyeva satyam' means as follows: The names that are produced (not manifested) by our speech (i.e., non-Sanskrit names) are modifications (i.e., are changeable and non eternal). But the unchanging and eternal name is only mrttika (which is Sanskritic and is not produced but only manifested by our utterance).This statement is true ( Brahman is the pre-eminent reality and by knowing it, we also know the universe which is a subordinate reality. This is analogically justified by the consideration that Sanskrit is an eternal and unchanging language, when all others are human inventions and liable to mutations and extinction. knowledge of Sanskrit serves every utility that all other languages can serve and thus to know it is to know all )

na cha "vAchArambhaNa" shabdo.api mithyAtve prasiddhaH || 254||

254. To term 'prodution by speech' is not familiar as standing for falsity

'vAchArambhaNamAtram.h' iti cha ashrutakalpanam.h || 255 ||

255. To take it as meaning 'production by speech merely is to import into the text what is not there.

tasminpaxe, "nAmadheya" shabdaH,"iti" shabdashcha vyarthassyAt.h || 256||

256. On the interpretation being discussed both the words 'namadheya' and 'iti' would be useless. (Because these two indicate that the statement means to extoll the Sanskrit name of clay)

ato, na kutrApi jagato mithyAtvamuchyate -|| 257||

257. Therefore, nowhere in the sacred texts the unreality of the world is proclaimed.

"kavirmanIshhI paribhUH svayambhUryAthAtathyato.arthAn.h

vyadadhAchchhAshvatIbhyaH samAbhyaH" (I.u. 8) || 258||

258. ( On the other hand all of them are to the following effect:) 'The supreme God, Omniscient, ruling over all minds, superior to all else, and independent, created real entities running through all times.

"yac.h ci\`keta\' sa\`tyam.h it.h tan.h na moghaM\`

vasu\' spA\`rham.h u\`ta jeto\`ta dAtA\'"

(R^igveda 10.55.6),

vishvaM\' sa\`tyam.h ma\'ghavAnA yu\`vor.h id.h

Apa\'sh.h ca\`na pra mi\'nanti vra\`taM vA\'m.h

(R^igveda 2.24.12),"pra ghA\` nv.h asya maha\`to

ma\`hAni\' sa\`tyA sa\`tyasya\`

kara\'NAni vocam.h" (R^igveda 2.15.1)

|| 259 ||

259. 'The supreme God, who also receives desirable offerings from devotees and also grants to them desirable boons, created the universe and that universe created by him is real. It is not futile. O wealthy Indra and Brhaspati, the universe that is under your control is real. Oh, wealthy Indra and Brahspati your protection etc. of the real universe even all the gods (waters) do not comprehend not to speak of my not comprehending. The great and real deeds of this great and real god are expounded now alone.

"anAdyanantaM jagadetadIdR^ikpravartate nAtra vichAryamasti |

na chAnyathA kvApi cha kasya chedamabhUtpurA nApi tathA bhavishhyat.h" ||

"asatyamAhurjagadetadaj~nAH shaktiM harerye na viduH parAM hi |

yassatyarUpaM jagadetadIdR^iksR^ishhTvA tvabhUtsatyakarmA mahAtmA" || 260||

260. The world runs in this fashion without begining and end. There is no question about that. It was never otherwise to anyone anywhere in the past and it will be never otherwise to anyone anywhere in the future. Those who are ignorant of the great power of Hari say that this world is unreal; that infinite spirit created this real world in this form and hence is known as Satyakarma ( doer of real deeds and creator of real entities )

"asatyamapratishhThaM te jagadAhuranIshvaram.h |

aparasparasambhUtaM kimanyatkAmahaitukam.h ||

etAM dR^ishhTimavashhTabhyaH nashhTAtmAno.alpabuddhayaH |

prabhavantyugrakarmANaH xayAya jagato.ahitAH" ||

(bha.gI. 16.8\-9)- ityAdeshcha || 261||

261. 'They, the demoniac ones, maintain that the world is unreal and unstable ( because it is subject to sublation ). They do not admit that the world proceeds from God in a regular way, one from arising out of another in orderly progression. On the contrary, they say that it is neither existent nor non-existent. They attribute its being to necience from which arises desire. They, with their intellects destroyed and with little knowledge, adopt this point of view and flourish in the begining of the kali age, and those enemies of the world indulge in cruel deeds and promote its decline and fall. Such are the sacred texts.

"anityatvatvavikAritvapAratantryAdirUpataH |

svapnAdisAmyaM jagato na tu bodhanivartyatA |

sarvaj~nasya yato vishhNoH sarvadaitatpratIyate |

bodhAsahaM tato naitat.h kintvAj~nAvashamasya hi" ||

- iti paramopanishhadi || 262||

262. The Paramopanisad says: 'The world resembles dreams etc., in respect of its transitoriness, mutuability and dependence and not because it is dispelled by enlightenment. That such only are the points of resemblance follows from the fact that the world is always present to the consciousness of the omniscient Visnu. Therefore it is not something that disappreas when understanding dawns. It is under the Sovereignty of Visnu.'

"praj~nAvinirmitaM yasmAdato mAyAmayaM jagat.h |

anenAnugataM yasmAdanR^itaM tena kathyate |

bodhAnivartyamapi tu nityameva pravAhataH |

a ityuktaH paro devaH tena satyamidaM jagat.h |

tadadhInasvarUpatvAdasatyaM tena kathyate |

satyasya satyaH sa vibhurindrachApastha sUryavad.h" ||

- iti cha |

"tasyopanishhatsatyasya satyamiti prANA vai satyaM

teshhAmeshha satyam.h" (bR^i.u. 4.1.20)

- iti cha | | 263||

263. The world is said to be 'mayamaya', because it is a product of intelligence. It is called 'antra', because it is pervaded by him, who is the activating force. It is called mayamaya and antra even though it is not removable by knowledge and is eternal as a process. 'A' is the name of the supreme Deity. By him is the world made real (satya) and its nature is maintained by him. Therefore, it is described as 'asatya'. That all pervading Lord is the Reality of realities. He is to the world what the sun is to the rainbow. ( Creation lies before us like a glorious rainbow; but the sun that made it lies behid us hidden from us ) The Updanisad passage concerning him is, " He is the Real of reals; life-principles are real and of them he is Real. ( Real of reals signifies that he is the source and controller of the reality of all reals )

"mahAmAyetyavidyeti niyatirmohinIti cha |

prakR^itirvAsanetyevaM tavechchhAnanta kathyate |

prakR^itiH prakR^ishhTakaraNAdvAsanA vAsayedyataH |

a ityukto haristasya vidyA.avidyeti saMj~nitA |

mAyetyuktvA prakR^ishhTatvAt.h prakR^ishhTaM hi mayAbhidham.h |

vishhNoH praj~naptirevaikA shabdairetairudIryate |

praj~naptirUpo hi hariH sA cha svAnandalaxaNA" ||

- iti cha | | 264||

264. 'O infinite One, your desire is called mahamaya avidya, niyati, mohini, prakrti and vasana. It is prakrti because what it does is great. It is vasana, because it produces impressions in sentient beings. 'A' signifies Hari. Knowledge belonging to him is avidya. Maya means great and it is called maya because of its greatness. The consciousness of Visnu itself is named by these terms. Hari is of the nature of consciousness and that consciousness consists in self-delight'. Thus also the truth about the world is laid down.

"sarve vedA harerbhedaM sarvasmAt.h j~nApayanti hi |

bhedaH svAtantryasArvaj~nyasarvaishvaryAdikashcha saH |

svarUpameva bhedo.ayaM vyAvR^ittishcha svarUpatA |

sarvavyAvR^ittaye yasmAt.h svashabdo.ayaM prayujyate |

sarvavyAvR^ittatAmeva neti netyAdikA shrutiH |

vishhNorato vadedanyA api sarvA na saMshayaH" ||

- iti nArAyaNashrutiH | | 265||

265. The Narayana-sruti says: 'All the Vedas teach the difference of Hari from all else. That difference lies in his independence, omnisceince and overlordship over all etc. His essential nature (svarupa- own form) itself constitutes his differnce from all. Essential nature is what distinguishes an entity from others. The word sva in svarupa meaning essential nature is used in order to distinguish an entity from all others. The Sruti starting from not so, not so, points to the difference of Visnu from all else. All other Sruti texts also present the same truth. There is no doubt on this point.

"ahaM brahmAsmi"(bR^i.u. 3.4.10),

"tadyo.ahaM so.asau yo.asau so.aham.h",

"yo.asAvAditye purushhaH so.ahamasmi sa evAhamasmi"

- ityAdi tu antaryAmyapexayA || 266||

266. The texts like 'I am Brahman', 'What I am, that he is'; 'What he is, that I am'; 'That purusa who is in the sun, is myself' and 'I am only he', have significance from the standpoint of the Inner Ruler of all (antaryamin).

"sa yashchA\'yaM pu\`rushhe yashchAsA\'vAdi\`tye sa

eka\'H"(tai.u. 2.8.5, 3.10.4) |

"aH iti brahma, tatrAgatamahamiti"(ai.A. 2.3.6),

tasyopanishhad.h "aham.h"iti |

"ahaMnAmA harirnityaM aheyatvAtprakIrtitaH |

tvaM chAsau pratiyogitvAtparoxatvAtsa ityapi || 267 ||

267. 'He who is in the man and he who is in the sun are one and same'. " A " means Brahman'. 'The word that comes to Brahman (i.e., that signifies Brahman) is aham. Aham is an occult name of Brahman'. 'Hari is eternally named aham because he is free from evil. He is also called tvam because he is the principle encountered. He is also known as saha because he is not immediately perceived.

sarvAntaryAmiNi harAvasmachchhabdavibhaktayaH |

yushhmachchhabdagatAshchaiva sarvAstachchhabdagA api |

sarvashabdagatAshchaiva vachanAnyakhilAnyapi |

svatantratvAtpravartante vyAvR^itte.apyakhilAtsadA |

tatsambandhAttu jIveshhu tatsambandhAdachitsvapi |

vartanta upachAreNa tiN^padAnyakhilAnyapi |

tasmAtsarvagato vishhNureko bhichcha tato bahuH" ||

- iti nArAyaNashrutiH || 268||

268. The Narayana-sruti says: 'The pronoun "I" in all its cases refers to Hari, who is the inner ruler of all. Similarly all the case-terminations of Thou and He also refer to Him. All the case-terminations of all words point to him. Similarly all grammatical numbers point to him. Though he is distinguished always from all else, he is the import of all this, because he is Independent. ( It is owing to relation to him that all personal terminations also refer to jivas and inanimate objects ). It is owing to the relation of the jivas and inanimate objects to him that all personal terminations refer to them in secondary signification. Therefore Visnu is omnipresent, he is one, he is different, and he is abundant'.

"sarvabhUteshhu yenaikaM bhAvamavyayamIxate |

avibhaktaM vibhakteshhu tajj~nAnaM viddhi sAtvikam.h" || (bha.gI. 18.20)

- iti bhagavadvachanam.h | | 269||

269. The Lord's words are: 'Know that knowledge to be sattvika, by which one cognizes the one imperishable and undivided reality in all perishable and divided beings'.

na chAsatyo bhedaH - | 270 ||

270. And difference is not unreal

"sa\`tyam.h e\'na\`m.h anu\` vishve\' madanti rA\`tiM

de\`vasya\' gR^iNa\`to ma\`ghonaH\'" (R^igveda

4.17.5) | 271 ||

271. 'That all creatures become happy through the grace of this Visnu who is the friend of god Indra given to praise (Visnu) is a fact'.

"sa\`tyaH so a\'sya mahi\`mA gR^i\'Ne\` shavo\' ya\`j~neShu\' vipra\`rAjye\'" (R^igveda 8.3.4) | 272 ||

272. 'That glory of this Visnu (i.e., his transcendent majesty) is a fact. I glorify him in sacrifices, which are the kingdoms of vipras, with a view to become happy'.

"satya AtmA satyo jIvaH satyaM bhidA satyaM bhidA satyaM bhidA || 273 ||

273. 'The supreme Self is real. The individual self is real. Difference is real, difference is real, difference is real'.

maivAruvaNyo maivAruvaNyo maivAruvaNyaH", (bhAllaveyashrutiH?) || 274 ||

274. ' The supreme Being is not such that he can be worshipped by sinners. The supreme Being is not such that he can be worshipped by sinners. The supreme Being is not such that he can be worshipped by sinners'.

"AtmA hi paramasvatantraH sarvavit.h sarvashaktiH

paramasukhaH paramo

jIvastu tadvashaH alpaj~naH alpashaktiH ArtaH

alpakaH",

- ityAdishrutibhyaH || 275||

-

275. The supreme Self is absolutely independent, all knowing, all powerful, supremely, blissful and ultimate. But the individual self is dependent on him, knows a little, has limited power, is miserable and is finite'. Such texts prove that difference is real

na chAvAntarasatyatvamidam.h || 276 ||

276. This reality ( ascribed to difference ) is no lower degree of reality.

"yo ve\'da\` nihi\'ta\`M guhA\`yAM para\`me vyo\'man.h |

so\'.ashnu\`te sarvA\`n.h kAmA\'ntsa\`ha brahma\'NA vipa\`shchitA" || (tai.u. 2.1)

"etamAnandamayamAtmAnamupa\'saN^kra\`mya imA.NllokAnkAmAnnI kAmarUpya\'nusa\`JNcharan.h |

etat.h sAma gA\'yannA\`ste" | (tai.u. 3.10.5) || 277 ||

277. 'He who knows what is residing in the heart, and in the highest of heavens attains all objects of all desires along with the all-knowing Brahman. Having approached near the blissful One, he, shaped according to his desire, wanders (in delight) through these worlds, eating the food of his desires; he abides singing these saman chants'

"R^i\`cAM tvaH\` poSha\'m.h Aste pupu\`ShvAn.h

gA\'ya\`traM tvo\' gAyati\` shakva\'rIShu |

bra\`hmA tvo\` vada\'ti jAtavi\`dyAM ya\`j~nasya\`

mAtrAM\` vi mi\'mIta u tvaH" ||(R^igveda 10.71.11) || 278 ||

278. 'One Brahma being full in himself engages in abundant recitation of Rks. Another Brahma sings the Saman hymns among the Rks. Another Brahma expounds the Science of men. Another Brahma contemplates some aspect of Visnu.'

"paraM jyotirupasampadya svena

rUpeNAbhinishhpadyate"(chhA.u. 8.3.4),

"sa tatra paryeti jaxan.h krIDan.h ramamANaH

strIbhirvA yAnairvA

j~nAtibhirvA.aj~nAtibhirvA"(chhA.u. 8.12.3) || 279 ||

279. 'Having come to the supreme Light he stands revealed in his own natural form. There he moves about eating, playing and rejoicing with either women or chariots or with selves liberated along with him or those liberated in earlier epochs'

"yatra tvasya sarvamAtmaivAbhUt.h""tatkena kaM pashyet.h"

"tatkena kaM jighret.h""tatkena kaM vijAnIyAd.h yenedaM sarvaM

vijAnAti taM cha kena vijAnIyAt.h vij~nAtAramare kena vijAnIyAt.h" (bR^i.u. 4.4.14) || 280||

280. 'In that state in which all entities ( are supposed to) become his own self, what can he see and through what ? what can he smell and through what ? what can he comprehend and through what ? That through which he comprehends all this, through what can he comprehend it ? Through what can he know the knower ?'

"yathodakaM shuddhe shuddhamAsiktaM tAdR^igeva

bhavati"(ka.u. 2.1.15),

"tadA vidvAn.h puNyapApe vidhUya niraJNjanaH paramaM

sAmyamupaiti"(mu.u. 3.1.3)

"amR^itasyaishha setuH"(mu.u. 2.2.5) || 281||

281. 'Just as pure water poured into pure water acquires community of nature with it, even so the man of wisdom shakes off merits and demerits and as a pure soul attains to the highest similarity. The Lord is the support for the immortals ( i.e., liberated souls )'.

"a\`kSha\`NvantaH\` karNa\'vantaH\` sakhA\'yo

manoja\`veShv.h asa\'mA babhUvuH |

A\`da\`ghnAsa\' upaka\`kShAsa\' u tve hra\`dA i\'va\`

snAtvA\' u tve dadR^ishre || (R^igveda 10.71.7) || 282 ||

282. 'The liberated souls having found their eyes and ears, loving one another, become hierarchically different in qualities like intelligence. Some among them play in the huge ocean of milk. Some play near and in the gardens. They take bath and themselves look deep like fine lakes fit to bathe in. They behold the supreme Lord himself'.

"IshamAshritya tishhThanti muktAH saMsArasAgarAt.h |

yatheshhThabhogabhoktAro brahmAntA uttarottaram.h" ||

- iti moxAnantaraM bhedashrutibhyaH || 283||

283. 'Those who have been rescued from the ocean of transmigration and are emancipated remain resting on the Lord. All of them upto Brahma enjoy the objects of their desires in appropriate gradation'. In all these Sruti texts persistence of difference after emancipation is affirmed and so difference does not have, as alleged, a lower degree of reality.

"idaM j~nAnamapAshritya mam sAdharmyamAgatAH |

sarge.api nopajAyante praLaye na vyathanti cha" ||

(bha.gI. 14.2)

- iti bhagavadvachanam.h || 284||

284. The words of the Lord are: 'Those who resting in this knowledge attain similarity unto me, do not get created at creation and do not suffer at dissolution'.

"OM jagad.hvyApAravarjam.h OM"(bra.sU. 4.4.17),

"OM prakaraNAdasannihitatvAchcha OM"(bra.sU. 4.4.18)

- ityAdi cha || 285||

285. The aphorisms like the following also testify to this truth: 'The liberated jiva has no cosmic funtions' and 'For, the section deals with the lord and the thoughts of the jiva are far from it'

"avinAshI vA are.ayamAtmAnuchchhittidharmA"(bR^i.u.4.5.14) iti

taddharmANAmapyanuchchhitteH prastutatvAt.h || 286||

286. 'This atman, my dear, is imperishable and his attributes are inextinguishable'. In this passage, the indestructibility of his attributes also is introduced.

atraiva "mA bhagavAn.h mohAntamApipan.h", "na pretya

saJNj~nA.asti"

(bR^i.u. 4.4.12) iti saJNj~nAnAshasya

doshhatvenoktatvAt.h || 287||

287. 'In this important matter' O Lord, by saying "The liberated one has no consciousness", you are leading me to destruction of the form of confusion'. It is here said that destruction of consciousness is an evil.

"yatra tvasya sarvamAtmaivAbhUt.h tatkena kaM

pashyed.h"(bR^i.u. 4.4.14) iti hyAxepa eva || 288 ||

288. Therefore the passage, 'In that state in which all entities become his own self', is definitely and objection (by way of reductio absurdum and not the affirmation of truth is alleged).

na hi bhogAbhAvo "vij~nAtAramare kena vijAnIyAd.h"iti

vij~nAturavij~nAnaM chApexitam.h || 289||

289. Surely the extinction of enjoyment and the extinction of the consciousness of the conscious spirit as implied in the text, 'By what can one know the knower', are not conditions to be desired'.

"ahamityeva yo vedyaH sa jIva iti kIrtitaH |

sa duHkhI sa sukhI chaiva sa pAtraM bandhamoxayoH" ||

- iti paramashrutiH || 290||

290. The Parama-Sruti says, " He who suffers and enjoys, who is subject to bondage and is to be liberated is known as jiva. He congnises himself in all his states as 'I'.

"magnasya hi pare.aj~nAne kiM na duHkhataraM

bhavet.h"(mahA. 12.290.79)

- iti moxadharme || 291||

291. The Moksadharma says: 'Do not greater evils befall one who is sunk in the deepest ignorance ?'

"na tu taddvitIyamasti"iti cha |

"yattadbrahma dvaitatvena na pashyati tadeva dvitIyaM netyAha |

yattato.anyadvibhaktatvenaiva pashyed.h"iti vAkyasheshhAt.h |

na hi drashhTurdR^ishhTerviparilopo vidyata iti hetoshcha | | 292||

292. The text, 'But there is no second entity', just states that what Brahman does not see as different from itself, does not exist as different from it. The rest of the text says that what Brahman sees as different from itself, exists as different. This meaning follows from the reason also adduced in the text, 'The vision of this absolute seer never fails'

"karmANi vij~nAnamayashcha AtmA pare.avyaye sarva

ekIbhavanti"(mu.u. 3.2.7)

ityatrApi ekIbhAvo matyaikyaM

xIrAbdhyAdisthitatadrUpApexayA sthAnaikyaM vA || 293||

293. The text, 'All the karma and atman constituted of consciouness become one in the supreme imperishable atman', also propounds unity of thought or unity of location in relation to some special form of the Deity existing in places like the milky ocean.

"kAmena me kAma AgAt.h hR^idayAddhR^idayaM mR^ityoH |

yadamIshhAmadaH priyaM tadaitUpamAmabhi |

brahmamatyanukUlA me matirmuktau bhavishhyati |

ataH prAyonukUlatvamidAnImapi me sthitam.h" || 294||

294. 'In release, may such desire arise in me which would be in conformity with the desire of the Lord, who causes destruction, may such will arise in me, which would be in conformity with his will and may what is dear to him become dear to me. In release my mind will be in tune with the mind of Brahman. Therefore, even now, my mind is mostly in tune with it'.

"yenAkramantyR^ishhayo hyAptakAmA yatra tatsatyasyaparamaM nidhAnam.h",

"etamAnandamayamAtmAnamupasaN^krAmati"(tai.u. 2.7)

- ityAdishrutibhyaH || 295||

295. 'To that world in which the presence of the ultimate Reality is fully revealed, the blessed sages who have attained what has to be attained travel through this path'. 'He approaches this atman who abounds in bliss'. These Sruti texts determine the nature of the unity said to be attained in liberation.

svarUpaikyAbhiprAye "karmANi vij~nAnamayashcha"(mu.u.

3.2.7) iti na yujyate |

na hi tatpaxe.api karmaNAM brahmaikyaM muktAvasti || 296||

296. If the unity meant was unity in essential nature it would be wrong to speak of both karma and the self constituted of consciousness as attaining unity. Even on the opposed view karma does not become one with Brahman in liberation.

nivR^ittyabhiprAye cha paJNchadashakalAnAmapi samatvAt.h |

"gatAH kalAH paJNchadasha pratishhThA devAshcha sarve pratidevatAsu"

(mu.u. 3.2.7) ityanyAsAM kalAnAM gamanamuktvA karmaNAM

vij~nAnAtmanashchaikIbhAvakathanaM syAt.h

visheshhAbhAvAt.h || 297||

297. If by unity mere cessation of karma is meant, as that would hold good of the fifteen vital factors (Kala) also, it would be superfluous to speak of the exit of the other vital factors and the integration of Karma and the individual self with Brahman as the passage does: 'The fifteen vital factors have gone back to their causes, all the deities(presiding over the senses) have gone back to their respective original forms. And Karma and atman constituted of consciousness become one in the supreme imperishable atman'. There is no reason for such difference in treatment in that case.

na cha j~nAnanivR^ittasya rajatasya

shuktyaikIbhAvavyavahAro.asti || 298||

298. The silver that is sublated by correct knowledge is not said to become one with the shell (on which it was illusorily superimposed)

"pare.avyaye"(mu.u. 3.2.7) ityadhikaraNatvakathanaM

cha bhedaj~nApakam.h || 299||

299. The words of the text, 'become one in the supreme imperishable atman', enunciating that Brahman is the seat of the process of becoming one, intimate difference.

anyathA, 'para eva bhavanti' iti nirdeshaH syAt.h? | 300||

300. Otherwise, the statement ought to have been that they become the supreme atman itself.

"jIvasya paramaikyaM tu buddhisArUpyameva tu |

ekasthAnanivAso vA vyaktisthAnamapexya saH |

na svarUpaikatA tasya muktasyApi virUpataH |

svAtantryapUrNate.alpatvapAratantrye virUpate" ||

- iti paramashrutiH || 301 ||

301. 'The unity of jiva with the Lord consists of sameness of thought or it may mean dwelling in the same place. Such sameness of habitation is relative to some particular manifestation of the Lord. It is not unity of essential being. For even the released individual is different from him. The difference between the two lies in the Lord being independent and infinite and the individual being finite and dependent'. Such are the words of Parama-Sruti.

"brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati" (mu.u. 3.2.9) ityAdi

cha "sampUjya brAhmaNaM bhaktyA shUdro.api brAhmaNo

bhaved.h" itivad.h 'bR^iMhito bhavati' ityarthaH || 302 ||

302. The proposition of the Sruti, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman', is similar to the saying, 'Even a sudra, by worshipping a Brahmana with devotion, becomes a Brahmana': it means that a knower of Brhaman becomes developed.

na hi brAhmaNapUjakaH sa eva brAhmaNo bhavati || 303||

303. Certainly the worshipper of brahmana does not become that brahmana himself.

brahmANi jIvAH sarve.api parabrahmANi muktigAH |

prakR^itiH paramaM brahma paramaM mahadachyutaH |

tasmAnna muktA na cha sA na kvachidvishhNuvaibhavam.h |

prApnuvanti sa evaikaH svatantraH pUrNashhaDguNaH" ||

iti paramashrutiH || 304||

304. The Parama-Sruti says: 'All the jivas are Brahmans; the jivas that attain release are superior Brahmans; prakrti(Lakshmi) is a still higher Brahman. Lord Acyuta is the greatest and highest Brahman. Therefore, neither the liberated souls nor she ever attain the splendour of Visnu anywhere, He alone is independent and has the six attributes to perfection'.

"pa\`ro mAtra\'yA ta\`nvA vR^idhAna\` na te\'

mahi\`tvam.h anv.h a\'shnuvanti", (R^igveda 7.99.1) || 305 ||

305. O Visnu, you transcend all measure and limitation. You are boundless and full in your actual being and not merely by repute. 'No one can attain such greatness as yours'.

brahmeshAnAdibhirdevaiH yatprAptuM naiva shakyate |

tadyatsvabhAvaH kaivalyaM sa bhavAnkevalo hare" ||

iti cha || 306||

306. 'That nature, which is unattainable even by the gods like Brahma and Isa, is what is called, perfection(kaivalya); only you, O Hari, are all-surpassingly perfect(kevala). These texts also confirm the principle stated.

yathApiyanti tejAMsi mahAtejasi bhAskare |

pR^ithakpR^ithak.h sthitAnyahni svarUpairapi sarvashaH |

pare brahmaNi jIvAkhyabrahmANyapyapiyanti hi |

muktau pR^ithak.h sthitAnyeva tadanyeshhAmadarshanam.h |

apyayo.ayaM samuddishhTo na svarUpaikatA kvachid.h" ||

iti nArAyaNashrutiH || 307||

307. ' Just as all minor lights existing separately in their own forms, enter everywhere into the over-poweringly effulgent sun at day, even so all the Brahmans called the jivas enter into the supreme Brahman in the state of liberation even though they have their own distintive essences. This entry is merely the non-perception of these jivas by the unenlightened perceivers and never identity of essential being.' This is the explanation offered by the Narayana-sruti.

ataH sarvAgamaviruddhameva jIveshvaraikyam.h || 308||

308. Therefore it stands that the doctrine of the identity of individual self and the supreme Being is contradicted by all the scriptures.

tathaiva sarvayuktiviruddhaM cha || 309||

309. Similarly it is contradicted by all reasoning

na tAvadekajIvavAdo yujyate || 310||

310. In the first place, the view that there is only one jiva(individual self) is untenable

ekAj~nAnaparikalpitatve cha 'sarvasya sarvamidaM parikalpitam.h' iti

jAnataH punaH shishhyAdibodhanaM na yujyate || 311||

311. If everything is the figment of one jiva's imagination he who understands that all this is his own imagination, cannot engage himself in the task of enlightening any disciple.

na hi 'svapno.ayam.h' iti nishchitya svApnaputradAyArthaM yatate || 312||

312. A person who recognises his dream as dream does not proceed to apportion inheritance to his dream-son.

svapne tu svApnatvAj~nAnAdeva yatate || 313||

313. But in the dream itself, since he is not aware that he is dreaming, he may do so

na cha bahUnAM dR^ishyamAnatvAdasya 'aj~nAnaparikalpitamidam.h' iti nishchayo yujyate || 314||

314. Further, since many individuals are seen in the world, it is impossible to determine whose imagination the entire empirical world is.

svapne tu prabodhAnantaramekasyAvashishhTatvAnnishchayaH |

na chAtra tathAsti || 315||

315. But in the case of the dream, such identification of the dreamer is possible, for only one person of the dream world ( i,e., dreamer ) survives in the waking state. But here with regard to all experience such identification of world imagining jiva is impossible.

'tasya tasya tathA tathA pratipattavyam.h' ityaN^gIkAre, vastuni

vikalpAsambhavAt.h, 'akalpitam.h' ityeva syAt.h || 316||

316. It is suggested that each one should consider himself the only jiva in question; but such alternative points of view cannot all be true of reality; the only conclusion would be that the world is not a product of any false imagination whatever.

na cha 'tathA pratipattavyam.h' ityatra pramANamasti || 317||

317. Further, there is no valid proof for the necessity that each jiva should look upon the universe as his own imagination.

'shishhyAj~nAnaparikalpitam.h' ityaN^gIkAre

tasyaivAchAryabhAve 'svayameva kalpito bhavati' iti

samyag.h granthAdhigamasyaiva anarthahetutvaM

syAt.h || 318||

318. If the teacher is merely a product of the disciple's imagination, when the disciple becomes teacher in his turn, he himself becomes a product of his own disciple's imagination. Thus sound comprehension of (sacred) texts itself becomes a source of evil,(because his liberation would not follow from his own enlightenment).

na cha kasyachinmuktiH - granthAdhigame, tasyaiva

shishhyAj~nAnaparikalpitatvaprApteH || 319||

319. No one would be emancipated in that case, for no sooner a man comprehends the liberating texts and becomes a preceptor than he becomes a figment of his pupil's illusionary imagination.

sa chaikajIvo yadi bhedavAdi bhavati, tasya tatraiva

dArDh.hyAt.h, 'na kadAchid.h

bhedanivR^ittiH', iti na kasyApi muktiH syAt.h || 320||

320. If the one jiva postulated were to be a dualist, he becomes established in dualism. So never would there be an elimination of difference and hence no one would attain liberation. ( This means that the solitary jiva, if ignorant and strongly entrenched in ignorance, has no chance of being redeemed, as there is no one else to rescue him in the whole universe ).

'tena yathA kalpitaM tathaiva bhavati' iti

tenaikajIvavAdinAM nityanirayakalpane, sa eva syAt.h || 321||

321. As it is supposed that things are what that one individual self imagines them to be, if he were to imagine that the advocates of the doctrine of a single jiva go to eternal damnation, it would happen literally so.

na cha 'ekajIvAj~nAnaparikalpitaM samastam.h' ityatra kiJNchinmAnam.h || 322||

322. There is no shred of evidence in support of the thesis that the entire world is the figment of the imagination of a single jiva.

prapaJNcho yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saMshayaH |

mAyAmAtramidaM dvaitaM advaitaM paramArthataH" ||

(mA.u. 1.2.9)ityasya chAyamarthaH || 323 ||

323. The meaning of text 'If the prapancha were to exist it would undoubtedly cease'. This duality is mAyAmAtrA ( only illusory) and from the standpoint of ParamAthma (the Absolute) there is 'non-duality', is as follows:

prapaJNcho yadi "vidyeta" bhaveta utpadyeta tarhi "nivarteta" |

na cha nivartate - tasmAd.h anAdirevAyam.h || 324||

324. If the Prapancha were to be something that originates, then it is something that would terminate. But it does not terminate. Therefore it must be be unoriginated.

'prakR^ishhTaH paJNchavidho bhedaH' - "prapaJNchaH" || 325||

325. That which consists of the great (pra) five kinds of differences (pancha) is prapancha

na cha avidyamAno.ayaM - mAyAmAtratvAt.h || 326||

326. It is not non-existent on the ground that it is mAyAmAtra.

"mAyA" iti bhagavatpraj~nA, saiva mAnatrANakartrI yasya, tan.h"mAyAmAtram.h" || 327||

327. MAyA means the Lord's consciousness. That which the Lord's consciousness comprehends and protects is MAyAmAtra.

'parameshvareNa j~nAtatvAdraxitatvAchcha na dvaitaM bhrAntikalpitam.h' ityarthaH || 328 ||

328. The world of duality is comprehended by the supreme Lord and protected by him and hence it is not a product of illusory imagination

na hi Ishvarasya bhrAntiH || 329||

329. Surely the Lord cannot be liable to illusions.

tarhi, "advaitaH sarvabhAvanAm.h" (mA.u. 1.2.2) iti vyapadeshaH katham.h |

ityata Aha - "advaitaM paramArthataH" (mA.u. 1.2.9) iti || 330||

330. Then what is the significance of the statement, 'Of all forms of being he is non-dual?' To that question the answer is given by the sentence, 'Advaita is from the standpoint of paramArtha'.

paramArthatApexayA hi 'advaitaM sarvasmAduttamo.arthaH sa eka eva' ityarthaH || 331||

331. There is Advaita in respect of highest Reality, He alone is the Supreme Reality over all.

anyathA hi "advaitaH sarvabhAvAnAm.h" (mA.u. 1.2.2) iti vyarthaM syAt.h || 332||

332. Otherwise the statement, 'He is non-dual of all forms of being', would be useless. (It would have been, enough if it was said, 'He is non-dual'.)

"sarvabhAvAnAM" madhye, tasyaikasyeva 'advaitatvam.h ityukte samAdhikarAhityamevoktaM syAt.h |

anyeshhAM sarvabhAvAnAM cha samAdhikabhAvaH || 333||

333. When it is said that of all forms of being, he alone has non-duality, it only signifies that he has no equal and superior. All the other forms of being have both equals and superiors.

"vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenachid.h" (mA.u.1.2.10)

iti vAkyasheshhAchcha 'na kalpitatvamasya' iti j~nAyate || 334||

334. By the rest of text which says, 'The differences would dissappear if they were merely imagined to exist by some one', it is made evident that the world of difference is not a fancied world.

'nivartate' ityaN^gIkAre "nivarteta" "vidyeta" iti cha prasaN^garUpeNa kathanaM "yadi" |

shabdau cha na yujyante || 335||

335. If the statement is interpreted as asserting that the world 'does cease to be'('nivartate'), then the shape of the proposition as working out the inevitable consequences of a certain assumption as indicated by the words "nivarteta" (would terminate), "vidyeta"(were to exist) and the word "yadi" (if) would be meaningless.

"vidyeta" ityasya chotpattyarthAnaN^gIkAre 'yadyadasti tattannivartate'

iti vyAptyabhAvAt.h "nivarteta" iti na yujyate || 336||

336. If the words 'If it were to exist', are not interpreted as meaning, 'If it were to originate', then as there is no universal and necessary law that all that exists must cease to exist, the consequences drawn 'would terminate' would be absurd.

ataH prapaJNchasyAnAdisatyatvaparamidaM vAkyam.h || 337||

337. Therefore, this text aims at asserting the unoriginated reality of the world of fivefold differences.

ataH "upadeshAdayaM vAdo.aj~nAte dvaitaM na vidyate"

(mA.u. 1.2.10)ityAha | aj~nAta eva "dvaitaM na vidyate" || 338 ||

338. For this reason, the text further says, 'This theory proceeds from (sacred) instruction. If not enlightened there is no duality'. There is no duality only under the condition of ignorance.

'aj~nAninAM paxa eva dvaitaM na vidyata', ityarthaH || 339 ||

339. The import is that only according to the theory of the unenlightened there is no duality.

jIveshvarabhidA chaiva jaDeshvarabhidA tathA |

jIvabhedo mithashchaiva jaDajIvabhidA tathA |

mithashcha jaDabhedo yaH prapaJNcho bhedapaJNchakaH |

so.ayaM satyo hyanAdishcha sAdishchennAshamApnuyAt.h |

na cha nAshaM prayAtyeshha na chAsau bhrAntikakalpitaH |

kalpitashchennivarteta na chAsau vinivartate |

dvaitaM na vidyata iti tasmAdaj~nAninAM matam.h |

mataM hi j~nAninAmetanmitaM trAtaM cha vishhNunA |

tasmAtsatyamiti proktaM paramo harireva tu" ||

- iti paramashrutiH || 340||

340. The Parama-sruti says: 'The universe consists of five differences. They are the difference between God and the individual self, that between God and insentient matter, that among individual selves, that between insentient matter and individual self and that among the material entities themselves. This is real and unoriginated. If it were originated, it would perish.But it does not perish. Nor is it a fabrication of illusion. If it were so, it would have disappeared.But it does not dissapear. Therefore, the view that there is no duality is the view of the ignorant. The view of the enlightened is that this world is comprehended and protected by Visnu. Therefore it is proclaimed to be real. But Hari alone is supreme'.

maitreyIshAkhAyAM (maitrAyaNI u. 7.8 *) cha "atha

j~nAnopasargAH" ityuktvA, "atha ye chAnye

mithyAtarkaiH dR^ishhTAntaiH kuhakendrajAlaiH

vaidikeshhu paristhAtumichchhanti taiH saha na

saMvaset.h prAkAshyA hyete taskarA asvargyA" ityAha |

nairAtmyavAdakuhakairmithyAdR^ishhTantahetubhiH |

bhrAmya.Nlloko na jAnAti vedavidyAntaraM tu yat.h" ||

- iti | | 341||

341. In the Maitreyi-sakha we have the following after the announcement, 'Then to consider the obstacles to knowledge': 'Then one should not live with those who, by false arguments and deceptive and magical illustrations, wish to establish themselves in the fold of the followers of the Vedas. They should be exposed as thieves and as unfit for any heavenly destiny. The people who wander deluded by the deceptive arguments of nairatmya-vada and false reasons and illustrations do not understand that which is the inner meaning of the Vedas'.

'Atmasambandhi kimapi nAsti' iti vAdo "nairAtmyavAdaH" || 342||

342. Nairatmya-vada is the view according to which there is nothing belonging to the atman. ( To deny the reality of the world is to deny in entirety what belongs to God )

bhrAntikalpitatve cha jagataH, satyaM jagaddvayamapexitam.h || 343||

343. If the world is a product of illusion, then it would presuppose two real worlds.

na hi satyashukteH, satyarajatasya, ayossAdR^ishyasya chAbhAve bhrAntirbhavati || 344||

344. There can be no mistaking of a piece of shell for silver, unless there is a real piece of shell, real silver and similarity between the two.

svapne.api vAsanArUpaM satyameva jaganmanasi sthitaM bahishhThatvena dR^ishyate || 345||

345. Even in dreams a real world subsisting in the mind in the form of impressions (vasana) is seen as externally existing.

dehAtmanorapi ekadeshasthatvAdisAdR^ishyamastyeva || 346||

346. In the case of the body and self there is similarity in points like co-existence in the same area of space.

'shaN^khaH pIto, nabho nIlam.h' ityAdishhvapi pItAdayo.anyatra vidyanta eva || 347||

347. In illusions like the perception of conch as yellow and sky as blue, features like yellowness are surely existing elsewhere.

tatsAdR^ishyaM cha dravyatvAdikaM kiJNchit.h

shaN^khAdInAM chAstyeva | ato na kutrApi

sadR^ishasatyavastudvayaM vinA bhramaH || 348||

348 bjects like the conch have some similarity with real yellow objects etc. in being substances etc. Therefore, nowhere do we have an illusion without two similar real entities.

na cha Atmani anAtmabhramaH kvApi dR^ishhTaH ||349 ||

349. Nowhere do we have the illusory superimposition of the non-self on the self ( No one mistakes in this way: 'I am he', 'I am it'.)

na hi kashchid.h 'ahaM, ahaM na bhavAmi' iti bhrAnto dR^ishyate || 350||

350. We see no one who gets into the illusion 'I am not I'

AtmanyanAtmabhrama evAyaM prapaJNcha iti tairuchyate | | 351||

351. But the theorists under discussion hold that the world is the superimpostion of the non-self on the self

taM vinaivAnAtmanyAtmabhramakalpane.anAtmanassatyatvaM syAt.h || 352 ||

352. If it is supposed that there is an illusory superimposition of the self on the non-self independent of the superimpostion of the non-self on the self, then the non-self must have reality.'

tadA chAdvitIyatvakalpane.anAtmaivAsti nAtmeti bhavati || 353 ||

352. Then it is supposed that Reality is one without a second, it follows that the non-self alone exists and the self does not.

AtmAj~nAnAtmakatve cha jagataH Atmano bhinnatvena na dR^ishyeta || 354 ||

353. If the world is of the nature of the non-apprehension of the self, it ought not to have been perceived as different from the self ( as it is done )

na hi shukterbhedena rajataM dR^ishyate bhrAntau || 355||

354. Silver is not perceived as different from the piece of shell ( on which it is illusorily superimposed ) in the illusion.

na chaikameva yugapadbahudhA dR^ishyate bhrAntau || 356||

356. One and the same entity is not seen as consisting of manifold simultaneously in any illusion. ( Never do we mistake the same shell at once as silver, gold, copper and tin )

na chAtmani bhedabhramaH kvApi dR^ishhTaH || 357||

357. Nowhere, do we come across the illusory perception of oneself as forming a manifold.

na cha kutrApi mithyopAdhikR^ito bhedo dR^ishhTaH || 358||

358. Nowhere, again, do we know of an illusory manifold engendered by a limiting adjunct which is itself unreal.

na cha j~nAnAj~nAnayorapi mithyAkalpitatvaM dR^ishhTam.h || 359||

359. And we do not also know of knowledge as well as error being products of illusory imagination. ( Objects of cognition may be unreal but the cognition itself is real )

tadvishhayasyaivAnyathAtvaM bhrAntau || 360||

360. Only the objects of knowlege are other than what they are taken to be in illusion

evamAdyanantayuktiviruddho.ayaM paxaH || 361||

361. The theory under examination stands condemned by countless argumennts like the ones urged thus far.

granthabahutvaM syAdityevoparamyate || 362||

362. Only because the treatise would swell to excess if we purse the discussion, it is being concluded.

na cha satyatvAN^gIkAre kashchiddoshhaH || 363||

363. And there is absoultely no philosophical difficulty in the way of affirming the reality of the world of difference.

bahujIvavAdipaxe.api bhedasya mithyAtvAN^gIkAre ete doshhAbhavantyeva || 364||

364. The school of Advaita which postulates a plurality of individual souls also asserts the unreality of differences. Hence the criticisms urged apply to it also.

mithyopAdhikR^itaM hi teshhAmapi bahutvam.h || 365||

365. Even according to it plurality is produced by unreal adjunts

na cha mithyopAdhikR^ito bhedaH kvApi dR^ishhTaH || 366||

366. Nowhere do we see differences being generated by unreal adjunts.

AtmanyanAtmakalpanArUpatvAnmithyopAdhireva na yujyate || 367||

367. The very concept of an unreal adjunct is untenable, because it is of the nature of imagining the self as non-self.

mAyAmayI sR^ishhTirapi tatsadR^ishasyAnyasya vidyamAnatva eva dR^ishhTA|

dravyatvAdisAdR^ishyayutaM kiJNchidadhishhThAnamAshrityaiva cha || 368||

368. Illsory creations occur only when there is another similar entity in reality and only on some substratum which resembles the other entity in being a substance etc

"adhishhThAnaM cha sadR^ishaM satyavastudvayaM vinA |

na bhrAntirbhavati kvApi svapnamAyAdikeshhvapi |

mAnasyAM vAsanAyAM tu bahirvastutvakalpanam.h |

svApno bhramashcha mAyAyAM kartR^idehAdivastushhu |

chaturaN^gabalatvAdikalpanaM bhrama ishhyate |

na bhrAntikalpitaM vishvamato vishhNubalAshritam.h" ||

-iti brahmavaivarte || 369||

369. The Brahmavaivarta-purana says: 'There is no illusion anywhere without a substratum and two mutually resembling real entities. This is so even in the case of dreams. The dream-illusion is merely the supposition of the external existence of objects which subsist in the mind internally as impressions. In magically produced illusions the error lies in taking the body etc. of the magician as the four limbs of army etc. Therefore the universe is no product of an illusion. It rests on the power of Visnu.'

"na cha mAyAvinA mAyA dR^ishyate vishvamIshvaraH |

sadA pashyati tenedaM na mAyetyavadhAryatAm.h" ||

-iti cha || 370||

370. It further says: 'The magician does not see the magic. But the Lord always sees the universe. Therefore it is to be resolved that it is not a magically produced illusion'.

"aparoxadR^isho mithyAdarshanaM na kvachid.hbhavet.h |

sarvAparoxavidvishhNurvishvadR^iktanna tanmR^ishha" ||

-iti cha || 371||

371. It also says further: 'There is no perception of the unreal on the part of one who perceives directly. Visnu is a direct and immediate knower of all. He sees the universe and so it is not unreal ( It means that all perceptual illusion is due to the cognition not being completely perceptual. For an omniscient and direct perceiver of all there can be no illusion. The argument rules out errors of perception entirely perceptual in character.)

yadi chaikameva brahmopAdhibhedAtsaMsarati muchyate cha tadA saMsAriNAM

sarvadA vidyamAnatvAt.h sarvadA saMsAryeva brahma || 372||

372. If it is maintained (as is done) that the single Brahman is caught up in samsara (as one jiva) and gets mukti (as another jiva) owing to differences in adjuncts, then as the bound selves will always be there, Brahman will always be caught up in samsara.

atastad.hbhAvo.api na muktiH sarvadopAdhisambandhatvAt.h tasya || 373||

373. Hence even the attainment of identity with Brahman cannot be release, for the Brahman is ever associated with adjuncts.

na cha shuddhasya nopAdhisambandha, iti vAchyam.h |

upAdhisambandhasyopAdhisambandhakalpane.anavasthAprasaN^gAt.h || 374||

374. It cannot be argued that the pure Brahman is not associated as such with any adjunct; for, to postulate association with another adjunct as a pre-conditon of association with the adjunct in question is to perpetrate infinite regress.

na cha tenaiva sambandhena sambaddhasya AtmAshrayaprasaN^gAt.h || 375||

375. Nor can it be maintained that association with the same adjunct provides the requisite contamination for entering into association with it. For that lands the argument in the fallacy of 'atmasraya' (It is to account for a factor on the basis of itself, when it needs to be accounted for and is not self-explaining.)

itashcha mithyopAdhiH na yujyate ||376||

376. There is a further consideration also damaging the idea of an unreal adjunct.

aj~nAnasiddhau mithyopAdhisiddhiH,

aj~nAnaM vinA mithyAtvAsiddheH || 377||

377. The unreal adjunct is possible only if there is ignorance. What presents itself to consciousness in the absence of ignorance can never be proved unreal.

na cha mithyopAdhiM vinA.aj~nAnasiddhiH,

mithyopAdhibhinnasyaiva aj~natvAt.h || 378||

378. And there can be no ignorance without an unreal adjunct, for only Brahman as conditioned and differentiated by the unreal adjunct, can be ignorant.

shuddhasyaivAj~natve muktasyApyaj~natvaprasakteH || 379 ||

379. If the pure Brahman (unconditioned by any adjunct) can be the seat of ignorance, then even the released soul must be liable to ignorance.

svAbhAvikatvAt.h satyatvAt.h sadvitIyatvaprasakteshcha || 380||

380. In that case, ignorance being natural would be real, and being real would constitute a principle besides Brahman itself, the latter cannot be regarded as the sole reality without a second.

svAbhAvikasya chAnivR^ittyaN^gIkArAdanivR^ittaprasakteshcha -satyasya anivR^ittiriti hi tatpaxaH || 381||

381. As it is admitted (by the opponent) that what is natural can never cease to be, ignorance would remain an irremovable entity. 'The real can never be terminated'. Such is the view in the theory.

atashchAnyonyAshrayatA | 382 ||

382. Thus the fallacy of reciprocal dependence results.

aj~nAnasiddhau mithyopAdhisiddhiH, mithyopAdhisiddhau jIvasiddhiH, jIvasiddhau tadAshrayAj~nAnasiddhiH\rsq iti chakrakaM vA || 383||

383. Or the fallacy of cakraka (circular explanation) arises, because the positon is that if there is ignorance there will be the unreal adjunct, if there is the unreal adjunct there will be the real individual self, and if there is the individual self, there can be ignorance in it.

na cha shuddhameva bhrAntyA aj~nam.h\rsq iti yuktam.h | 384 ||

384. It is not logical to hold that the pure Brahman itself is ignorant by virtue of illusion.

aj~nAnasiddhau bhramasiddhiH, tatsiddhau aj~nAnasiddhiH\rsq iti anyonyAshrayatvAt.h || 385||

385. For, even in that case, the fallacy of reciprocal dependence is inevitable. If there is ignorance, illusion is possible, and if there is illusion, ignorance is possible. ( Suppression of truth precedes every illusion. The suppression of truth is itself due to a factor other than the self-luminous Brahman, and all factors other than Brahman are illusory.)

"anAgatA atItAshcha yAvantaH sahitAH xaNAH |

atItAnAgatAshchaiva yAvantaH paramANavaH |

tato.apyanantaguNitA jIvAnAM rAshayaH pR^ithag.h" ||

-iti vatsashruterna saMsAriNAM parisamAptirasmatpaxe || 386||

386. According to our view, there is no exhaustion of the unreleased selves, for the Vasta-sruti says, 'If we compute all the moments of time, past and future, all the atoms past and future, still the separate groups of jivas do infinitely exceed'.

"paramANupradeshe.api hyanantAH prANirAshayaH |

sUxmatvAdIshashaktyaiva sthUlA api hi saMsthitAH |

sahasrayojanasabhAM prabhAvAdvishvakarmaNaH |

anantA rAshayo.anantAH prajAnAmadhisaMsthitA" ||

-iti skAnde || 387||

387. 'In fact, in the space that single atom occupies, an infinite number of groups of jivas exists, because of their subtlity. They do so even when gross through the power of the Lord'. 'An infinite number of groups of creatures occupy the assembly-hall which stretches to thousand yojanas through the power of Visvakarma'. So says the Skanda-purana.

na cha mithyAvastuno durghaTatvameva bhUshhaNam.h || 388||

388. And it cannot be said that impossiblity is itself an excellence in the unreal

dR^ishhTasya vastuno mithyAtvakalpanasya dR^ishhTisakAshAt.h balavatpramANayuktyapexatvAt.h | | 389||

389. The supposition of the unreality of anything, which is a fact of observation, requires the support of stronger evidence and reasoning.

tadabhAve satyatvaM dR^ishhT.hyaiva siddhyati || 390||

390. If such evidence and reasoning are not there, its reality gets established by the very force of that observation.

na hi annAdikaM bhogyaM dR^ishhT.hvA bhoktuM satyatve pramANAntaramapexate |

kintu nedaM annam.h iti kenachidukte kathaM idaM annatvena dR^ishyamAnaM, annaM na bhavati iti pramANAntaramapexate || 391||

391. If the objects of enjoyment like food are observed, one does not seek for futher proof of the reality of the objects in order to enjoy them. But if some one were to say that it is not food, then indeed he needs some futher evidence to be convinced that what appears as food is not really so. ( Naive realism when unopposed can afford to be complacent. But a denial of the obvious facts of experience must be founded on invulnerable evidence)

na cha pratyaxadR^ishhTasya tato balavatpratyaxamAgamaM vinA anumAnAdinaiva bAdho dR^ishhTaH || 392||

392. What is ascertained through perception cannot be dismissed by mere argumentation without the aid of stronger perceptions and scriptures.

dUrasthavR^ixahnasvatvAdau pratyaxApaTutvasya

nishchitatvAt.h yuktyA tatra dIrghatvanishchayaH || 393||

393. In the matter of the apparent smallness of the length of a tree, distant from the observer, through reason we determine its greater length, because it is a settled principle that the power of the eye is enfeebled in realtion to distant objects.

pratyaxasya hi dUre mandagrAhitvaM parimANAdau

anyathAtvaM cha tato balavatpratyaxeNaiva nishchitam.h || 394||

394. That perception is dull with regard to remote objects and that it can be mistaken in the grasp of magnitudes etc., is determined by more powerful perception itself.

na cha jagatpratyaxasya mithyAtvaM kenApi pramANena nishchitam.h || 395||

395. But in the present instance of the world, the falsity of the perception of the world is not established by any mode of (direct) knowledge.

Visheshhatashcha j~nAnAj~nAnasukhaduHkhAtmabhedAdivishhayasyAnubhavasya na mithyAtvaM dR^ishhTam.h || 396||

396. In particular the direct experience of knowledge and ignorance, pleasure and pain, and the uniqueness of the self, are not falsified by any direct experience.

atashcha saMsArasya satyatvAtsatyasya chAnivR^ittyaN^gIkArAnna moxaH syAt.h || 397||

397. Therefore, as the life of transmigratory existence is real and as what is real cannot be terminated, there can be no emancipation

anubhavasiddhasya balavadanubhavaM vinA yuktita eva

mithyAtvAN^gIkAre Atmano.api mithyAtvaM syAt.h || 398||

398. If what is established by direct experience is taken to be false independent of any stronger direct experience and on the strength of mere reasoning, then even the atman will have to be considered unreal.

yuktishcha sarvasyAnyasya mithyAtvAN^gIkArAt.h || 399||

399. The reasoning would be that as all else is taken to be unreal, the atman also should be so taken

dvidhAkalpane kalpanAgauravamiti || 400||

400. To make two suppositions when one is enough is to err by way of excessive supposition.

AtmAdhishhThAnabhramasyaiva asiddheH, tasyAdhishhThAnatvamapi na yujyate || 401||

401. Since there is no illusion of which the self is the substratum, it is impossible that it ever can be the substratum of illusion.

durghaTasya cha bhUshhaNatve durghaTamapi AtmAmithyAtvaM syAdeva || 402||

402. If impossibility is itself an excellence then the unreality of the self, however impossible it may be, would follow.

pratIterapi avidyAkAryatvAN^gIkArAt.h, tasyAshcha

durghaTatvasya bhUshhaNatvAt.h

satyasya cha yuktyapexatvAt.h ghaTAdInAM

drashhTR^itvamAtmanashcha jaDatvaM drashhTurabhAve

cha pratItiradhishhThAnaM vinaiva bhramaH ityAdi

viruddhaM sarvamapi syAt.h || 403||

403. As Ordinary experience is itself a product of ignorance, as the impossibility of it is an excellence, and as the real alone needs reason, everything self-contradictory would have to be entertained. We ought to entertain that 'insentinet' objects like a jar are conscious', 'the self is insentient', 'even in the absence of an experiencer, experience takes place, and illusion arises without a substratum'.

upAdhibhedAN^gIkAre hastapAdAdyupAdhibhede.api tadgatasukhaduHkhAdibhokturyathA

bhedo na pratIyate evameva sharIrAdibhede.api bhokturbhedo na dR^ishyeta |

sarvadehagatasukhaduHkhAdikamekenaiva bhujyeta || 404||

404. If the distinction of adjunts is brought forward, we urge that the self in a single body does not experience any division within itself inspite of the fact that the body consists fo several distinct parts. Similarly inspite of plurality of bodies, there ought to have been no experience of the differentiation of selves (as is the case in life). The same self ought to have been experiencing all the pleasures, pains etc., arising in all the bodies.

yathA cha ekAN^gulyAdi apagame.api na

muktirevamekopAdhyapagame.api

tasyaivAnantopAdhisambaddhatvAnn muktissyAt.h || 405||

405. When one finger etc., is lost, the loser does not get emancipated, even so, even if the self sheds one of its adjuncts, since it is associated with a countless number of other adjuncts, it cannot attain release.

"udyatAyudhadordaNDAH patitasvashiro.axibhiH |

pashyantaH pAtayanti sma kabandhA apyarIn.h yudhi" ||

-iti bhAratavachanAt.h na vishleshhAdvisheshhaH || 406||

406. It cannot be said that the mutual separation of bodies accounts for the experience of differentiation among selves. The Mahabharata says that in spite of the separation of the various members of the body, the self functions as a unity. 'Even the trunks of soliders, with arms carrying, weapons, seeing with the eyes in their heads, which had beeen cut off, brought down the enemies in the battle'.

kiJNcha upAdhiH Atmana ekadeshaM grasati, uta sarvamAtmAnam.h || 407||

407. Further, does the adjunct seize a part of the self ? or does it seize the whole ?

ekadeshAN^gIkAre sAvayavatvam.h |

sAvayavasya chAnityatvaM tairaN^gIkR^itam.h |

sarvagrAse cha nopAdhirbhedakaH syAt.h |

upAdhikR^itAMshakalpane tadupAdhikR^itatve AtmAshrayatvam.h |

upAdhyantarakalpane.anavasthA || 408||

408. If it is admitted that it seizes a part only, that would imply that the self is composed of parts and according to the theory everything composed of parts is not-eternal. If the adjuct seizes the whole self, then it cannot be the principle of differentiation. If it is supposed that the self has parts owing to an adjunct and that the adjunct is the same as the limiting adjunct whose seizing of the self is being examined, we have the fallacy of self-dependence. If on the contrary, some other adjunct is said to introduce distinctions within the self, and the adjunct under consideration seizes one of the parts differentiated by the other adjunct, we have landed ourselves in infinite regress.

na cheshvarasya sarvagatatvAdaupAdhikabhedo brahmaNA bhavati || 409||

409. As Isvara is omnipresent, he cannot be said to be differentiated from Brahman as a result of the action of some adjunct.

na hi deshataH kAlatashchAparichhinnayoraupAdhikabhedo dR^ishhTaH || 410||

410. There is no instance of two entities infinite in space and time being differentiated through the action of an adjunct.

sarvopAdhigatatvAchchaikasyaiva Ishvarasya bhedasya mithyAtvAddhastapAdAdibhede.api bhokturekatvavat.h sarvasukhaduHkhAdibhoktR^itvamIshvarasyaiva syAt.h || 411||

411. As the self-same Isvara dwells in all the bodily adjuncts and as differences are unreal, on the analogy of the unity of the experiencer in a body inspite of the multipliciy of its members, Isvara himself must be the experiencer of all the pleasures and pains of all.

deshataH kAlatashchAparichchhinnayoraupAdhikabhedAbhAvAdeva duHkhino.anyat.h shuddhaM brahma na siddhyati || 412||

412. Further, as two principles, infinite in space and time, cannot be differentiated by any adjunct, there can be no pure Brahman other than the all-suffering Isvara.

ataH svAbhAvikasaMsAra ityanivR^ittireva syAt.h || 413||

413. Thus, as the transmigratory life of evil would be natural, no cessation of it would be possible.

kiJNcha vishishhTasya, shuddhasya vA saMsAraH || 414 ||

414. Further, who is it that is involved in samsara ? Is it the qualified (conditioned) atman or the pure atman ?

shuddhasya saMsAra ityukte svavyAhatiH || 415 ||

415. To say that the pure atman suffers samsara would be a self-contradictory proposition.

vishishhTasyetyukte vishishhTo.anyaH sa eva vA || 416||

416. If it be said that it is the qualified atman that suffers samsara we ask whether that atman is the same as the pure arman or different.

sa eva chedukto doshhaH || 417||

417. If it be answered that he is the same as pure one, the criticism urged before applies to the position also ( i,e., self-contradiction)

anyashchennityo.anityo vA || 418||

418. If he is different, we ask, whether he is eternal or non-eternal.

anityashchennAsha eva tasya na moxaH || 419||

419. If he is non-eternal, he can have only annihilation and no emancipation

nityatve cha bhedasya satyatvaM moxe.api tasya bhAvAt.h || 420||

420. If he is eternal, difference would be real, for it persists in emancipation also.

svarUpamAtrasyAbhedaH upAdhibhinna evetyaN^gIkAre svarUpamevopAdhisambaddhamiti na tasya shuddhatvam.h | | 421||

421. If it is held that the pure nature of the atman is differenceless but conditioned by adjuncts it gets differentiated, as that nature of the atman itself must be associated with the adunct, it cannot be pure.

ashuddhasvabhAvasya na kadAchichchhuddhatvamiti cha tatpaxaH || 422||

422. The theory under discussion lays down that what is impure by nature can never become pure.

upAdhimithyAtvAN^gIkAre chAnyonyAshrayatvAdidoshhAH uktAH || 423||

423. The proposition that the limiting adjunct is unreal, involves fallacies like reciprocal dependence as already demonstrated.

na cha anAdikarmabhedAd.h bhedaH || 424 ||

424. It cannot also be maintained that differences are due to beginningless differences of karma (merit and demrit).

aupAdhikabhedasiddhau karmabhedasiddhiH, tatsiddhau cha tatsiddhiH ityanyonyAshrayatvAt.h | 425||

425. If differences owing to the action of adjuncts are there, there will be difference of karma. Again, if differences of karma are there, there will be differences due to adjuncts. Thus reciprocal dependence arises again.

ato.anantadoshhadushhTatvAd.h granthabahutvaM syAdityevoparamyate | | 426||

426. Thus, as the school is infected with countless fallacies, only with a view to avoid excess of volume, the discussion is being closed.

ataH sarvapramANaviruddhatvAt.h na abhede shrutitAtparyam.h || 427||

427. Thus the purport of the Sruti is not non-difference, for that would stand contradicted by all pramanas.

sarvashabdAvAchyasya laxaNApi na dR^ishhTeti na tasya shAstragamyatvam.h || 428||

428. As what is not expressible by words cannot be even figuratively indicated, it cannot be the theme of the scriptures

ato.avAchyatvAdaj~neyatvAchchhUnyameva taditi prAptam.h || 429||

429. Hence, as it is non-describable in words and unknowable, it follows that it is only 'Shunya'

na cha svenApi j~neyatvaM tairuchyate || 430 ||

430. The theorists under discussion do not even admit that it is knowable to itself

kartR^ikarmavirodha iti hi te vadanti || 431||

431. They, in fact, contend that the self's knowledge of itself by itself involves the contradiction of the same principle being agent and object

na cha svarUpaM anyadvA j~neyaM j~nAtAraM cha vinA j~nAnaM dR^ishhTam.h || 432||

432. We know of no knowledge independent of an object to be known, be it itself or some other principle, and the knower.

ato j~nAtR^ij~neyAbhAvAt.h j~nAnasyApi shUnyataiva || 433||

433. As there is no knower and no object of knowledge, even knowledge would be merely 'Shunya'

ataH shUnyavAdAt.h na kashchidvisheshhaH || 434||

434. Therefore there is nothing to differentiate the theory from 'Shunya-vada'.

na cha j~nAtR^ij~neyarahitaM j~nAnaM kvApi dR^ishhTam.h || 435||

435. There is no instance of knowledge without a knower and an object to be known.

aprAptatvAchcheshvarabhedasya nAbhede shrutitAtparyaM yujyate || 436||

436. And (as argued out before), the difference between the jiva and Ishvara is not a matter established otherwise than through scriptures. Therefore the scripture cannot aim at the teaching of jiva and Ishvara.

"sarvottamaM sarvadoshhavyapetaM guNairasheshhaiH pUrNamanyaM samastAt.h |

vailaxaNyAjj~nApayituM pravR^ittAH sarve vedA mukhyato naiva chAnyat.h" -iti mahopanishhadi || 437||

437. The Mahopanisad says: 'All the Vedas aim at revealing Narayana who is all-surpassing, free from all evil, abounding in all excellences and different from all else by reason of his uniqueness. This they do in their direct signification and they teach nothing else.'

ataH sadAgamaireva sarvasmAd.hbhinnatvena sarvasmAdvishishhTatvena cha vij~neyo bhagavAnnArAyaNa iti siddham.h || 438 ||

438. Thus it is established that Bhagavan Narayana is known only through the right scriptures as different from all, and as surpassing all.

This completes Chapter1.

|| OM ||

"brahmA shivaH surAdyAshcha sharIraxaraNAtxarAH |

laxmIraxaradehatvAd.h axarA tatparo hariH |

svAtantryashaktivij~nAnasukhAdyairakhilairguNaiH |

nissImatvena te sarve tadvashAH sarvadaiva cha |

sargasthitixayayatiprakAshAvR^itibandhanam.h |

sarvaxarANAmekaH sa kuryAt.h sAtvikamoxaNam.h |

sargasthitiyatijyotirnityAnandaprado.axare |

cheshhTApradashcha sarveshhAmeka eva paro hariH |

tasya nAnyo.asti sargAdikartA nirdoshhakashcha saH" ||

-iti paramashrutiH || 439||

439. The Parama-sruti has the following: 'Brahma, Siva and all others beginning with the gods are Ksaras, because their bodies are perishable, Lakshmi is aksara because her body is imperishable. Hari is above both these, because he is infinite in all his glorious attributes like independence, power, knowledge and bliss. They are all under his control. He, all by himself, brings about the creation, subsistence, destruction, regulation, illumination, ignorance and bondage of all ksaras and the liberation of sattivika jivas. To the aksara he grants manifestation, subsistence, regulation, illumination and eternal bliss. The supreme Hari alone is the source of the activities of all these. There is no one else who brings about his creation etc. He is free from all imperfection.

"brahmasheshhasuparNeshashakrasUryaguhAdayaH |

sarve xarA axarA tu shrIrekA tatparo hariH" |

-iti skAnde || 440||

440. The Skanda-purana says: 'Brahma, Sesa, Suparna, Isha, Sakra, Surya, Guha and others are all ksaras. Only Sri is aksara. Hari is beyond both.

"yaM kA\`maye\` taM\-ta\'m.h u\`graM kR^i\'Nomi\`tam.h bra\`hmANaM\` tam.h R^iShiM\` taM su\'me\`dhAm.h |

a\`haM ru\`drAya\` dhanu\`r.h A ta\'nomi brahma\`dviShe\` shara\'ve\` hanta\`vA u\' |

a\`haM janA\'ya sa\`madaM\' kR^iNomy.h a\`haM dyAvA\'pR^ithi\`vI A vi\'vesha |

a\`haM su\'ve pi\`tara\'m.h asya mU\`rdhan.h mama\` yoni\'r.h a\`psv.h a{}\kp{}ntaH sa\'mu\`dre" ||

(R^igveda 10.125.5\-7)

(These are the words of Lakshmi)

441. 'I make him Rudra, whom I want to make Rudra. Similarly, I make whomsoever I please Brahma and rsi with fine intelligence. Against the violent Brahma-hater Rudra, I spread my bow with a view to kill him.I bring about the happiness of people. I enter into the upper and lower worlds. I give birth to brahma in a way that makes him the best of all. But my source, the Lord, abides within the waters of the ocean'.

"yamantaH samudre kavayo vayanti yadaxare parame prajAH |

\ yataH prasUtA jagataH prasUtI toyena jIvAn.h vyachasarja bhUmyAm.h |

\ yadoshhadhIbhiH purushhAn.h pashU{\m+}shcha vivesha bhUtAni charAcharANi |

\ ataH paraM nAnyadaNIyasa{\m+} hi parAtparaM yanmahato mahAntam.h |

\ yadekamavyaktamanantarUpaM vishvaM purANaM tamasaH parastAt.h |

\ tadevartaM tadu satyamAhustadeva brahma paramaM kavInAm.h" ||

(ma.nA.u. 1.3\-6) || 442 ||

442. 'What is intuited in parts within the ocean by wise men, on what imperishable one all the creatures subsist, in what the mother of the universe takes birth, what through waters created living beings on earth, what entered into man and animals, into all beings moving and non-moving as into all vegetation, than which there is no other subtler entity, what is greater than the great, bigger than all that is big, what is one, unmanifest, infinite in form, perfect, ancient and what transcends all ignorance and matter, that alone is true knowledge and has action following from true knowledge and has action following from true knowledge and that is the supreme Brahman of the wisest'.

"a\`sya de\`vasya\' mI\`LhuSho\' va\`yA viShNo\'r.h e\`Shasya\' prabhR^i\`the ha\`virbhiH\' |

vi\`de hi ru\`dro ru\`driya\'m.h mahi\`tvaMyA\'si\`ShTaM va\`rtir.h a\'shvinA\`v.h irA\'vat.h"|| 1.61||

(R^igveda 7.40.5) ||443||

443. 'Rudra who is the binder of all creatures, attained as is well known the status of a Rudra by worshipping with offerings this Visnu, a god who rains the desired objects on his devotees and whose purpose is always fulfilled. Even you, O Ashvins, owe your wealthy status to the grace of Visnu'.

"ca\`ndramA\` mana\'so jA\`tash.h cakShoH\` sUryo\' ajAyata |

mukhA\`d.h indra\'sh.h cA\`gnish.h ca\' prA\`NAd.h vA\`yur.h a\'jAyata" || ||444||

(R^igveda 10.90.13)

444. Moon took birth in his mind. Sun took his birth in his eye, Indra took birth in his face and also Agni. In his breath the wind-god took his birth'.

"eko nArAyaNa AsInna brahmA neshAno nAgnIshhomau neme dyAvapR^ithivI" |

(mahopanishhad.h 1.1.1)

"eko nArAyaNa AsInna brahmA na cha shaN^karaH |

sa munirbhUtvA samachinta yattata ete vyajAyanta |

vishvo hiraNyagarbho.agniryamo varuNarudrendrA" || 445||

-iti |

445. 'Narayana alone was there then, neither Brahma, nor Isvara, nor Agni and Soma, nor heaven and earth. Only Narayana was and there was neither Brahma nor Sankara. He became thoughtful and through his thought were born Vayu, Hiranyagarbha, Agni, Yama, Varuna, Rudra and Indra.

"vAsudevo vA idamagra AsInna brahmA na cha shaN^karaH |

nendrasUryau na cha guho na somo na vinAyakaH " ||

-ityAdishrutibhyashcha || 446||

446. 'Before the universe was created Vasudeva alone was, neither Brahma nor Sankara. There was no Indra or Surya or Guha or Soma or Vinayaka'. By Sruti texts like these the position is substantiated.

"yasmAtparaM nAparamasti kiJNchid.h"(ma.nA.u. 12.13) ityatrApi \lsq aparamasti\rsq ityevArthaH || 447||

447. In the statement, "To whom there is nothing superior and something inferior is there" is definitely indicated that something inferior to the Lord is there.

anyathA "tenedaM pUrNam.h"(ma.nA.u. 12.13) tato yaduttarattaraM tadarUpamanAmayaM itivAkyasheshhavirodhAt.h || 448||

448. Otherwise the rest of the text which says, 'By him is this filled and that which surpasses that is formless and faultless' would be contradictory.

"tenedam.h"ityuktameva "tata"iti parAmR^ishyate || 449||

449. The word tatah (that whose superior is spoken of) just refers to what was referred to as 'this' in 'By him this is filled' ( It is not that the Lord fills the world and is surpassed by some other principle, as some purvapaksin seems to have supposed. It simply meant that the Lord permeates the world and surpasses it. He is both immanent and transcedent)

anyathA "yasmAtparaM na"ityuktivirodhAt.h || 450||

450. Otherwise, the words, 'To whom there is nothing superior' would be nullified.

"nAmAni sarvANi yamAvishanti taM vai vishhNuM

paramamudAharanti" |

(bhAllaveyashruti, brahmasUtrabhAshhyodAhR^ita)

"asyaiva sarvanAmAni vyatiriktasya sarvataH |

yaH svatantraH sadaivaikaH sa vishhNuH paramomataH" ||

-ityAdishrutibhyo.anyanAmAnyasyaiveti nAnyeshhAM

sarveshvaratvAdikamuchyate || 451||

451. Visnu whom all names enter, is said to be supreme. All names refer to him who is different from all. He who is independent and eternally same, is the highest Visnu. In such texts, as all other names signify only him, it is pointed out that no other being can be the Lord of all.

sarvavedeshhvapi asya adoshhavachanAd.h Adau abhAvAvachanAchcha tadvachanAchcha anyeshhAM sarveshhAM vedeshhu sarveshhu |

teshhAM sarvanAmatvAnukteshcha || 452||

452. All this follows from the fact that in all the Vedas there is the assertion that Visnu is free from imperfections, that in all of them there is the non-existence of the statement that he was non-existent before creation, that in all the Vedas the defects and non-existence before creation of all other entities are asserted and that they are not said to be significance of all names.

"utpattirvAsudevasya prAdurbhAvo na chAparaH |

dehotpattistadanyeshhAM brahmAdInAM tadIraNAt.h |

deho.anAdirharernityo brahmAdInAmanityakAH |

mukhyotpattistadanyeshhAM prAdurbhAvo harerjaniH" |

-iti paramashruteshcha || 453||

453. The Parama-shruti says: 'In the case of Vasudeva origination means just manifestation and nothing else. All others like Brahma have bodies that comes into being through his actuating force. The body of Hari is unoriginated and eternal. The bodies of beings like Brahma are not eternal. The other beings have birth in a primary sense. But the birth of Hari is just his manifestation.

( This completes chapter 2)

|| tR^itIyaH parichchhedaH||

OM||"varjitaH sarvadoshhairyo guNasarvasvamUrtimAn.h |

svatantro yadvashAH sarve sa vishhNuH paramo mataH" |

-iti paramopanishhadi || 454||

454. The Paramopanishad says: 'That Visnu who is free from all imperfection, who is an embodiment of all auspicious attributes, who is independent and under whose control every thing else is, is the supreme Godhead'

"nityapUrNAkhilaguNo nirdoshhaH sarvadaiva yaH |

yaH svatantraH paro vishhNuH janmamR^ityAdivarjitaH"

|| 455||

455. 'He has all excellent attributes in all their fullness eternally. He is always free from imperfections. That supreme Visnu is independent and transcends birth and death'

"nArada uvAcha |

nirdoshhashchet.h kathaM vishhNurmAnushheshhUdapadyata |

chintAshramavraNAj~nAnaduHkhayugdR^ishyate katham.h |

eshha me saMshayo brahman.h hR^idi shalya ivArpitaH |

anuddhAryo.aparairmartyaiH sUktishaktyA tamuddhara ||

brahmovAcha |

strIpuN^malAbhiyogAtmA deho vishhNorna jAyate |

kintu nirdoshhachaitanyasukhAM nityAM svakAM tanum.h |

prakAshayati saiveyaM janirvishhNorna chAparA |

tathApyasuramohAya pareshhAM cha kvachit.h kvachit.h |

duHkhAj~nAnabhramAdIn.h saH darshayet.h

shuddhasadguNaH |

kva vraNAdi kva chAj~nAnaM svatantrAchintyasadguNe |

daurlabhyAyaiva moxasya darshayettAnyajo hariH |

mithyAdarshanadoshheNa tena muktiM na yAnti cha |

tamo yAnti cha tenaiva tasmAd.h doshhavivarjitam.h |

prAdurbhAvagataM chaiva jAnIyAd.h vishhNumaJNjasA" ||

-iti brahmANDe |

The Brahmanda-purana records the following conversation: Narada asked, 'If Visnu is free from all imperfections, how is it that he was born among men ? How again is it that in his incarnations he seems to suffer anxiety, weariness, wounds, ignorance and sorrow ? This doubt O Brahman has lodged itself in my heart like a dart. That cannot be pulled out by other mortals. By the power of your holy speech please pull it out'. Brahma replied, 'Visnu's body is not born of the union of man and woman. On the contrary, he manifests his own etenal form which is faultless consciousness and bliss. This manifestation alone is his birth and nothing else. Still, for deluding the asuras and others also sometimes, he exhibits sorrow, ignorance and weariness, though he is absolutely perfect. How can there be wounds etc ? How can there be ignorance in that independent and incomprehensibly perfect God ? The unborn Hari does exhibit them to render liberation not easity attainable. They (asuras) owing to the defect of their wrong vision, do not attain liberation and go to darkness. Therefore Visnu must be definitely understood as free from imperfections even in incarnations'.

"guNakriyAdayo vishhNoH svarUpaM nAnyadishhyate |

ato mitho.api bhedo na teshhAM kashchit.h kadAchana |

svarUpe.api visheshho.asti svarUpatvavadeva tu |

bhedAbhAve.api tenaiva vyavahArashcha sarvataH" ||

-iti paramopanishhadi ||457||

457. The paramopanishad says: 'The attributes and actions etc. of Visnu are his own essential substantive nature'. The are not different. There is no mutual difference whatever among them or between them and the substantive, essence. In the substantive nature itself there is visesa ( Visesa may be roughly defined as that ontological principle which accounts for the possibility of conceptual and verbal distinction even when there is no difference.) as there is substantiality in the substance. Though there is no difference, by virtue of visesa the language of difference is rendered possible.

"abhinnatvamabhedashcha yathA bhedavivarjitam.h |

vyavahAryaM pR^ithak.h cha syAdevaM sarve guNA hareH |

abhedAbhinnayorbhedo yadi vA bhedabhinnayoH |

anavasthitireva syAnna visheshhaNatAmatiH |

mUlasambandhamaj~nAtvA tasmAdekamanantadhA |

vyavahAryaM visheshheNa dustarkabalato hareH |

visheshho.api svarUpaM sa svanirvAhakatAsya cha" ||

-iti brahmatarke | | 458||

458. The Brahmatarka says: 'Just as being non-different and non-difference are not different, but still can be treated as different in language, even so are all the qualities of Hari. If difference were to be postulated between the non-different and non-difference and between the different and difference, there results infinite regress. The quality cannot be apprehended as adjectival to an entity, if the fundamental relation between the entity and its quality is not apprehended before. Therefore the single substantive essence lends itself to be spoken of as if it were a manifold consisting of substance, quality, etc,. through the principle of Visesa. All this is made possible by the power of Visnu which transcends human reason. Visesa itself is the substantive essence and also lends itself to be spoken of as if it were different therefrom. It functions with reference to itself as it does with reference to rest of the features of the substance.'

"ekamevAdvitIyam.h tat.h"(chhA.u. 6.2.1), "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana |

mR^ityoH sa mR^ityumApnoti ya iha nAneva pashyati" (ka.u. 4.11) |

"yathodakaM durge vR^ishhTaM parvateshhu vidhAvati |

evaM dharmAn.h pR^ithak.h pashyan.h tAnevAnu vidhAvati" ||

-ityAdishruteH cha || 459||

This is declared in the following texts: 'One only without a second', 'There is no pluralitiy here', 'He goes from death to death who sees plurality here', 'Just as water rained on a hill flows downwards, even so, he who sees the attributes as different, following that view, does downwards'.

"deshaH sarvatra purushhaH svatantraH kAlanityatA |

ityAdishhu svasambandhAdyathaiva guNarUpiNaH |

guNitvaM guNabhoktR^itvaM syAd.h vishhNoH tachcha sa svayam.h" |

-iti brahmatarke || 460||

460. The Brahmatarka says: 'Substances through relations to themselves are spoken as if they are qualities, when we say, "Space is everywhere", "A person is free","Time is everlasting". Similarly Visnu is the substratum of his qualities and enjoys them also. His very svarupa constitutes those qualities".

"vishhNuM sarvaguNaiH pUrNaM j~nAtvA saMsAravarjitaH |

nirduHkhAnandabhuN^.hnityaM tatsamIpe sa modate |

muktAnAM chAshrayo vishhNuradhiko.adhipatistathA |

tadvashA eva te sarve sarvadaiva sa IshvaraH" ||

-iti paramashrutiH || 461||

461. The Parama-sruti says: 'He who knows Visnu as full of excellences, gets rid of samsara and becomes a enjoyer of painless bliss for all eternity. He rejoices in proximity to Visnu. Visnu is the support for the liberated selves. He surpasses them and he is their Lord. All of them are under his control. He is always the supreme ruler'.

"amR^itasyaishha setuH"(mu.u. 3.2.7), "so\'.ashnu\`te sarvA\`n.h kAmA\'ntsa\`ha brahma\'NA vipa\`shchitA"(tai.u. 2.1), ityAdi cha || 462||

462. The texts, 'He is the support of the immortals' and 'He attains all objects of desire along with the all-knowing Brahman' also speak of the same theme.

"nR^ipAdyAH shatadhR^ityantA muktigA uttarottaram.h |

guNaiH sarvaiH shataguNA modanta iti hi shrutiH" |

-iti pAdme || 463||

463. The padma-purana says: 'Beginning with kings and culminating in satadhrti the souls attain freedom. They have gradation of the qualities, each higher rank possessing qualities a hundredfold in excess over the lower. According to this gradation they rejoice in their freedom, so says the Sruti'

ato \lsq nishsheshhadoshhavarjitaH pUrNo.anantaguNo nArAyaNa\rsq -iti siddham.h || 464||

464. Thus, it is established that Narayana is free from every imperfection and that he is perfect and abounds in infinite excellences.

yasya trINyuditAni vedavachane rUpANi divyAnyalaM baT.h taddarshatamitthameva nihitaM devasya bhargo mahat.h |

vAyo ramavachonayaM prathamakaM pR^ixo dvitIyaM vapuH madhvo yattu tR^itIyametadamunA granthaH kR^itaH keshave ||

Of the deity Vayu whose three blessed forms are distinctly spoken of in the words of the Vedas, whose essential form is prowess and wisdom, is the support and activity of the world, is highly worshipful and is ordained to manifest itself as it is (without any diminution of power, wisdom, etc.) of such Vayu the first avatar is that which carried the message of Rama(to Sita), the second which brought about the destruction of the (kuru) forces, and this third is Madhva by whom this work is composed for proclaiming the supremacy of Lord Kesava.

svatantrAyAkhileshAya nirdoshhaguNarUpiNe |

preyase me supUrNAya namo nArAyaNAya te ||

Obeisance to Narayana, the object of my love, who is self dependent, sovereign over all, flawless and of the essence of sublime qualities and infinite in every way

(This completes the VTVN series postings)

bhAratIramaNamukhyaprANAMtargata shrIkR^ishhNArpaNamastu