upadhikhandana

UPADHI KHANDANA

By Bindu Madhavan on www.dvaita.org

This is a short metrical work in 20 granthas. In this, Sri Madhvacharya critizises the concept of "Upadhi", pluralising factor or agency, which is a central theme in the Advaita philosophy of Sri Sankara. The world of plurality is believed by the Advaitin to be the outcome of fontal ignorance or nescience or Ajnana playing upon the One Real. According to the Advaitin, the oneness of existence is the truth of things and all plurality is ascribable to this fontal ignorance. In Mayavada Kandana, it was pointed out that that the concept of Ajnana envisaged in Advaita is not tenable.

Sri Madvacharya naturally opens his attack by pointing out that the very idea of such nescience descending upon Brahman is unthinkable, unaccountable and impossible.

In Upadhi Khandana, he points out that Ajnana cannot play the role of Upadhi, ie as an adjunct to project Brahman as Jiva as well as projection of Jiva and Jagat. According to Advaita, it is the cause of the bondage and its removal is Liberation. Sri Madhvacharya refutes this Advaitic theme by examining the nature and role of the concept of Upadhi.

a) Since Brahman is omnisiant, He cannot be veiled by Ajnana. Brahman cannot be the locus of Ajnana nor the object of Ajnana.

b) Advaita considers Jiva as not being different from Brahman in the ultimate analysis and that Jiva is projected as distinct by means of Upadhi,ie adjunct and hence Jiva can be locus of Ajnana. To respond to this, Sri Madvacharya asks whether this so called adjunct is a real adjunct or this is also projected by Ajnana.

c) If the adjunct is real, there will be two reals: Brahman and Upadhi. This will defeat the very concept of Advaita and spell danger to Monism.

d) If the Upadhi is projected by Ajnana, and hence not real, then there will be infinite regress, ie Anavastha. This is as follows: To project Jiva as distinct, Upadhi ie Ajnana is required, to project that Ajnana, one more Ajnana is required and so on. Further, there will be reciprocal dependance, ie Anyonyasraya also. The projection of Upadhi depends upon the projection of Ajnana and the projection of Ajnana depends upon projection of Upadhi. It will also lead to circular dependance, Chakraka, as follows:

The location of Ajnana on Jiva depends upon the distinction of Jiva from Brahman, the distinction of Jiva depends upon the projection of Upadhi and the projection of Upadhi depends upon Ajnana. Thus, to rely on a previous Ignorance (Ajnana) to create a subsequent Upadhi, is to court the double fallacy of regressus ad infinitum resulting in an impossible and hopeless situation to make out any rational and intelligible relation between the Upadhi and Brahman.

e) The above points are made against those Advaitins who consider the Ajnana as Mithya ie Projected. The concept of the Upadhi of such Advaitins who consider both the Upadhi, ie the adjunct and the bheda, ie the distinction as real is criticised by Sri Madvacharya as follows:

The contention that a real distinction between Brahman and the Jivas is caused by a set of real Upadhi such as Anthakaarana etc is not tenable. Upadhis do not cause any distinction but only indicate the distinctions that are already there. In the instance of Akasa also, the Upadhis such as Ghata, Matha etc., only indicate the particular places.

If it is insisted that the Upadhi does not merely indicate the distinction but actually causes it, then, does it cause the distinction by contacting the whole of the object to be differentiated or only a part of it? If the whole, then it is unable to differentiate, if by contacting a part, then to carve out that part, another Upadhi will be required. Thus this leads to infinite regress, ie Anavastha.

In the case of the difference between the Brahman and the Jiva, and among the Jivas, if it is not real, then, all will have to share the pains and the pleasures of all. It is the experience of all that they do not share the pleasures and the pains of all. From this it can be easily inferred that all are really different from each other. The function of Upadhi must be to help understand the existing distinctions in reality and not to create a non-existing difference.

Thus, the concept of Ignorance being thus arrested at the very outset, the Advaitic principles then cannot go forward to explain neither the status of individual souls or adhikarins nor subjects fit for metaphysical investigations. On the other hand, Dvaita has no such difficulties. In it, a spiritual aspirant (not identical with Brahman) knowing something of Brahman and wanting to know more becomes the proper person (adhikarin) to undertake metaphysical quest, undergo the necessary discipline laid down in the Sastras and reap the benefit of his labors. After pointing out the untenability of the concept of Upadhi and the differentiation by it, a clear difference between the Brahman and the Jivas is brought out by mentioning the contrasting charecteristics of the two. The Jivas have limited capacity, sufferings and the limited agency. These definitely indicate that he is different from God who has unlimited knowledge, power etc. Everything is thus inteligible in Dvaita.

Advaitins's plea that "the very inability to explain the nature and the role of Ajnana is a merit" is ridiculed.