Madhvas Works

Madhva's works by Sri C.R.Krishna Rao

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Madhva wrote thirty-seven works in all. They have been held in such great regard that the very titles of the works have been strung together into a poem called the Grantha Malika Stotram. There are several features peculiar to these works which may be briefly considered.

1) Brevity : The most striking feature of Madhva's works is their extreme brevity. They will not unfold their meaning to mere scholarship. Other Acharyas would have devoted a whole book to 'Tattva Samkhyana', but Madhva has expressed all his ideas in a few lines. Prapancha mithyatvanumana Khandana is another very short work, which could easily have expanded in to a good sized volume. Madhva seems to have deliberately chosen a crisp, pithy, sutra style by which he was enabled to pack a maximum amount of thought into a minimum of words. Take as an example his exposition of the first sutra, the Jijnasa Adhikarana. In the Kumbhakonam edition of the Anuvyakhyana, the introduction and exposition of this, sutra occupy a little over six pages of bold print. In the Sudha, more than one hundred and eighty pages of small print are required to express all the ideas contained in the siz pages of the original. In consequence, Madhva cannot be understood without a proper commentary. It our good fortune that a great genius was found to comment on Madhv's works. Akshobhya-tirtha was unique in one respect. He was the direct disciple of Madhva, and he was the direct guru of Jayatirtha. To none other did it befall to be a link between two such Master minds. Our gratitude is due to Akshobhya-tirtha for having discovered Jaya-tirtha.

(2)Quotations : The second feature that every reader of Madhva's works notices is the abundance of quotations. Even here we require the commentator's help to show the relevancy and the significance of the quotations. They range over a wide field, of sruti and smriti literature. In every case they are apt and to the point. Often times the entire meaning of the text is found in the quotation and in such cases, Madhva contends himself by making the quotation without adding any words of his own.

(3)Style : As already stated Madhva adopted a very condensed style. There is no ornamentation, no flowing prose, no digression, and no fanciful interludes. It is a plain matter of fact style. There is not one superfluous word. Sometimes a word or a phrase is employed to convey several different ideas. Though ideas are couched in a minimum of words, there is no ambiguity. We may not understand Madhva, but we cannot misunderstand him. It may be said that he had a mathematical mind which delights in analysis and expresses itself in a few symbols.

(4)Explanations : In his commentaries on the Upanishads and the Gita, Madhva explains only the really difficult or ambiguous words and phrases. And invariably there is a quotation to support the meaning adopted. For example, Sankhya Yoga, Aham Asmi, are given unusual meanings. But they fit the context better than the meanings of the every day usage and what appear to be unusual meanings are supported by the authorities.

(5) Originality: The Dvaita philosophy is a distinct system formulated by the genius of Madhva from many hints, scattered in Vedic and Smriti literature. The credit of having brought these elements into a comprehensive whole must be his. In his commentaries on the Prasthanas he did not feel bound to keep to the beaten track, but chose a new path of his own. He introduced several new concepts into his philosophy. To mention one, Vishesha is his distinct contribution. Wester philosophers and scientists are obsessed with the notion of thing-in-itself, of the reality behind appearance, of the unknowability of nature. What is a rose for instance ? It has a colour, a shape, a scent and a taste and a softness to the touch. The scientist and the philosopher agree that these are the sensation produced by electrical disturbances in our brain as a result of the impact of protons and electrons on our various organs. But what is the rose in itself in reality ? They agree that they cannot know. Madhva's simple answer is that the rose is really the sum of total of all these inseperable sensations. It is only for linguistic convenience that colour, shape, scent etc are spoken of as distinct and seperate from the object. That there is an object distinct from these sensations and that it produces theses sensations is an assumption with as little foundation as the assumption of a material ether to account for the wave theory of light. The 'real' rose is an assumption. The rose of experience is the compound of all qualities and it is vishesha or speciality that enables us to think and speak of the inseperable qualities as if they were seperate from the object.

Jean states that, "The redness of a rose depends on three factors - the redness in the rose itself, a redness in the light by which it is illuminated, and a capacity for seeing redness on the part of the percipient." (N.B. Sc. P. 22) The second and third factors are the conditions of correct perception. No one says that a rose will appear red to a blind man or in a dark room. The redness of the rose itself is one of its inseperable properties. Jean makes this clear. "Whatever capacity a red flower may have for producing a sensation of redness in a man's mind, it also has a capacity for reflecting red light whether there is any one to see it or not, as may be very simply proved by photography. This capacity is obviously a primary quality, being 'utterly inseperable from the body in what state so ever it be', and Berkley's argument cannot touch it. Berkley's argument fails through his not seeing that each quality such as redess must have primary ingredients as well as it is alleged secondary ingredients; there is an objective scientific redness as well as the subjective philosophic redness." (Ph & P.P. 197)

If the rose has an objective scientific redness must we not allow it an objective scientific softness and a scientific scentedness and so on ? If we add a scientific shape, mass and weight we get the complete rose, the rose in itself. Sir Edmund Whittaker observes, " We have no right to postulate the existence of entities which lie beyond the knowledge actually obtainable by observation, and which form no part in the prediction of future effects." (E. to E. p 146) If this is so we have no right to postulate a 'real rose' which can in no circumstances be observed.

Eddington wrote in the New Pathways of Science, " Similarly the sensory qualities of colour, sound, and scent cannot have been transmitted to us from the object in the external world to which we attribute the colour, sound and scent; for even if we suppose the object itself to be endowed with such qualities it would be impotent, as the colour-blind person to convey to us their character. The part played by the external objects is to condition directly or in directly the signals which pass along the nerves." Dr. Stebbing has criticised this statement as she has done so many others. She says, "the fact that we have knowledge of our nervous system, the processes in the nerve fibres, and of states of the brain is used to establish the conclusion that we do not possess knowledge of the external world in which are to be found nervous systems, neural processes and brain states..... It is very common error and consists in confusing the conditions of perception with objects of perception. Yet these conditions are discoverable only by the perception of other objects." (P.&Ph. pp. 128 and 129). She continues on page 130, "The existence of the optic nerve, of the nervous process and of the consequent brain state can only be established by inference; it is only by inference that it can known that the optic nerve is being stimulated. It is only because Russel and Joad first know that there are external objects that they are able to infer that there are private sensa. It is only because the scientists are able to perceive the familiar furniture of the earth that they are able to discover the presence of electromagnetic waves. It is only because they are able to perceive the solidity of a piece of iron that they are able to discover that the atoms are tenuous. Unless the iron were solid there would be no point in saying that the atoms are tenuous. "

While Jeans is prepared to admit that there is a redness in the rose itself, Eddington obviously is not. He has stated, "So too the chairs and tables around us which broadcast to us incessantly those signals which affect our sight and touch cannot in their nature be like unto the signals or to the sensation which the signals awake at the end of their journey." Referring to this, Dr. Stebbing remarks, "But what reason is there for supposing that a chair has a nature utterly unlike how it behaves and what it is perceived as. If, per impossible, there were any sense in making such a supposition, how could any one expect to be able to know how to set about finding an answer to it." (P. & Ph.p.135)

From the foregoing it is clear that when we look at an object say a rose, our perception gives us immediately a true knowle4dge of the object itself. It is only by virtue of vishesha we dissociate the inseperable qualities from the object itself. It may happen in wonderland that the cat can dissappear and leaves its grin behind. But in our every-day world, the rose cannot disappear and leave its redness or softness behind. The destruction of the rose destroys its qualities and vice versa. The search for the 'real' rose which transmits signals is doomed to fail, because there is no 'real' rose divested of its capacity to send the various signals which affect our senses. Our senses do sometimes deceive, but we can discover the deception only by our sense under better conditions of observation. Madhva's epistemology is a vast and interesting subject. The curious reader may consult Dr.R.Nagaraja Sarma's brilliant work, the Reign of Realism or Dr. Dasgupta's classical History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.4.

Madhva's works may be divided into three classes, the purely philosophic, the purely theological and those in which philosophy and theology are blended. Generally speaking the Prakaranas, Anuvyakhyana, Nyayavivarana, Sutrabhashya, Gitabhashya and Gita Tatparya are philosophical. Sadachara Smirit, Tantrasara, Krishnamruta maharanava and some others are mainly theological. The Bhashyas on the Upanishads are a blend. Where Upasanas and similar matters are dealt with, the commentary is theological, where however texts like Tat tvam asi, have to be interpreted the commentary takes on a philosophic hue. It requires a close acquaintance with the works to seperate the philosophy from the theology.

A philosopher who makes any reference to personal God or to a goddess seems to forfeit his title He becomes a theologian. If the talks only of the Absolute and forgets all abouts the gods and goddesses he retains his title of philosopher. But is there such a distinction among our Acharyas. Sankara is admitted on all hands to the one of our foremost philosophers. But he is also a theologian. The same may be said of the other Acharyas. Theology is a cementing force. We can all say in unison Hara hara Mahadeva or Hari Narayana Govinda. But whoever heard Tat Tvam Asi used for bhajan or sankeertan.

A reader who finds a plethora of quotations in Madhva's works in apt to get the idea that there is more theology than philosophy in them. The Prakaranas are hard nuts to crack. So are the other works mentioned above. But if the reader studies the teekas, the subcommentaries, he will find as much philosophy as he can digest. Let me quote from Dr. Das Gupta. He spent a whole lifetime in the study of Indian Philosophies. He was well acquainted with the works of Madhva, Jayatirtha, Vyasa tirtha and other writers of the Dvaita school. His opinion therefore will carry weight with the modern student who wishes to study Indian philosophy. "In my opinion Jaya-tirtha and Vyasa-tirtha present the highest dialectal skill in Indian thought. There is a general belief amongst many that monism of Sankara presents the final phase of Indian thought. The realistic and dualistic thought of Samkhya and Yoga had undergone a compromise with monism both in the puranas and in the hand of the later writers. But the readers of the present volume who will be introduced to the philosophy of Jaya-tirtha and Vyasa tirtha will realise the strength and uncompromising impressiveness of the dualistic position. The logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyasatirtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole field of Indian thought. Much more could have been written on the system of Madhva logic as explained in the Tarka-tandava of Vyasa-tirtha. In this great work Vyasa-tirtha has challenged almost every logical definition that appears in the Tattvachintamani of Gangesha which forms the bed-rock of the new school of Nyaya logic. But this could have been properly done only in a seperate work on the Madhva logic. Of the controversy between the monists of the Sankara school and the dualists of the Madhva school most people are ignorant of the Madhva side of the case, though there are many who may be familiar with the monistic point of view. It is hoped that the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers undertaken in the present volume will give new light to students of Indian thought and will present many new aspects of dialectical logic, hitherto undiscovered in Indian or European thought" (H.I.P. Vol. IV. Preface)

Both Jaya-tirtha and Vyasa-tirtha were powerful reasoners. They built on the foundations laid by Madhva, or rather we should say they made explicit what was implicit in Madhva's works. They expanded and explained what their great guru had taught. There is no strict unanimity among monist writers who followed Samkara regarding doctrinal points such as avidya. But one notices that there is not the slightest deviation in Jaya-tirtha's works or in Vyasa-tirtha's works from Madhva's teaching. They gave in their work greater prominence to the philosophic aspects of dvaita. To give one example, Samkara and his followers describe the experience of rajjusarpa, rope-snake illusion as sadasadvilakshana, that is as different from the real and the unreal. Madhva pointed out that the snake perceived is unreal and that the contradiction (badha) is the perception of the rope as such. In the words of anuvyakhyana badha is :

"vijnatasya anyatha samyag vijnanameva tanmatam."

Jayatirtha uses this as a touchstone to examine various theories of error and to show their inadequacy and untenability. To follow him (See Nyaya Sudha) in the many ramifications of thought which this discussion involves is a severe test of one's intelligence. I mention this to show how essential it is to study the commentaries of Jaya-tirtha if we are to get at the real meaning of Madhva. Guru Bhavam vyanjayanthi bhati Sri Jayatirtha vak.

Sri Krishnarpanamastu

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