Dvaita Theory of Knowledge and the Spirit of Science

Dvaita Theory of Knowledge and the Spirit of Science

-Prof. Michael W. Myers

To what extent is Dvaita Vedanta consistent with science? Might it be integrated with science? Does Dvaita’s method of inquiry come into the accord with commonly accepted methods of science inquiry?

The American Pragmatist C.S. Peirce emphasizes the fact that in science the conclusion to be sought is not presupposed at the beginning of the investigation. Now in logic to presuppose the conclusion has long been recognized as a fallacy of circularity or question begging. But in day-to-day operation of scientific investigation, the question becomes one of strategies of work. A hypothesis is formed = which does form a direction and guide for work-but it is discarded if repeated results disconfirm it. Thus the scientist does not know at the outset where the investigation will go ¹. This strategy enables scientists to be open to and value discovery. It allows scientists to aim for an ideal science and to discard outdated theories while remaining true to the spirit of science.

Now theology is often criticized – or even defined – such that it proceeds in an entirely non-scientific way. Its conclusions are thought to be forgone. It is expelled from the academy precisely because of its unscientific character, because it presuppose an answer to the question an all-powerful sustainer god. In this view, theological belief as a starting point is illicit, Dvaita Vedanta, with its belief in Krishna as Lord and its view of Madhvacharya, Hanuman and Bhima as avatara of Vayu, God of the Wind is this exiled from scientific inquiry as a case in point. But there may be a possible defense of Dvaita Vedanta and a need for revision of the canon of admissible subjects to scientific and scholarly investigation.

Historically, method in Vedanta consisted in writing commentaries on sacred texts, thus grew the schools in parallel fashion to scholastic tradition in the West. Sanakara seems to have preserved uniquely human method of inquiry for all posterity in his use and defense of shabda pramanya, knowing through words of testimony. He gives religious authority an epistemological foundation in Vedic tradition. The question remains whether or not shabda pramana can stand the epistemological test in face of attack from science and competing modern traditions. One might argue that shabda pramana is not in competition with science because it has authority over us only in moral, not factual terms. This is an ancient attractive position found in traditions as divergent as purva meemamsa and Judaism. Scripture commands; it enjoins and prohibits but says nothing true or false about the world. Orthodoxy is not so much valued as orthopraxy. Even in regard to Dvaita Vedanta, Deepak Sarma writes. “[A]gama [sacred text] is supreme in matters of dharma and knowledge of Vishnu and pratyaksha [perception] is supreme in matters of mundane reality”²

But Vedanta as the Uttara Meemamsa supersedes strictly instrumental and independent views of religious language and defends realism in its philosophy of language. For Vedanta, scripture does say something true about the world: Brahman. Vedanta distances itself form Purva Meemamsa on the basis of its knowledge of Brahman gleaned from sacred texts. So it falls to Vedanta to provide a robust defense and a positive account of meaning and truth via shabda.

Madhva defines a pramana “a means of valid knowledge that reveals an object as it is. ” ³ Sarma calls this a rather bold statement revealing the foundation of his philosophy of realism. “⁴ In distinction to the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta, Madhva holds that it is possible to have knowledge of an object that is free from sublation. This Madhva frees the pramanas from their paradoxical ad problematical status in Advaita Vedanta. There is no “two-truth” theory in Dvaita Vedanta.

The pramanas accepted by Dvaita Vedanta differ a bit from Advaita Vedanta. There is a category for the direct knowledge possessed by Lord Vishnu, Lakshmi, yogins and future yogins (Kevala pramana). Pratyaksha, perceptions remains the most important source of human knowledge. It forms, along with inference and shabda the category of anu pramana.⁵ Pratyaksha gives Dvaita Vedanta its realist force through the action of the sakshi, the internal witness. The sakshi is at the core of mind’s cognitions, while raw sense experience is the outermost layers. Sarma draws on Descartes’ self-reflection in the Meditations to give evidence for the sakshi. Self-reflection and thought at the very least prove that there is knower. Like Descartes’ cogito, “the sakshi serves an identical purpose in Madhvacharya’s epistemology as the experience and source of absolute certainty and awareness that there is a knower. “ ⁶ Sarma argues that the role of the sakshi is indispensable to Madhva’s realism; yet he acknowledges that it may be liable to the same kind of criticism as Descartes’ cogito.⁷ We shall return to this below.

Madhva accepts the pramanas of anumana, inference and sabda, testimony, into his systems Shabda goes under the name Agama, defect less sentences and texts. For Madhva, “the content of the Agamas is information about Vishnu, his consort Lakshmi, dharma, law and doctrine, and other matters unseen or unavailable by any other means.⁸ Interestingly, Madhva’s collection of Agamas contains the smRiti as well as Shruti.

In terms of priority, anumana or logic is seen as a means to an end, not an end in itself. Hence the question is whether pratyaksha or Agama takes precedence in the order of pramanas. It is important to the argument that pratyaksha take precedence in keeping with the realism of the system. It is true that each has internal supremacy over a limited range. Agama is supreme in matters of dharma and knowledge of Vishnu. Pratyaksha is supreme in matters of mundane reality. But because sakshi is the final judge of the truth of the pramanas, Shruti or sacred texts that conflict with pratyaksha must be reinterpreted such that they do not. ⁹ This is consistent with Karl Potters observation in Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies that

When one examines the use made of appeals to the texts, one comes to the conclusion that the argument from authority is not as dogmatic as Westerners are frequently prone to believe

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Therefore it is permissible, within certain limits, to construe some passages according to secondary rather than primary senses of the terms involved. This is allowed when, for example, the primary interpretation contradicts other passages, or run counter to the testimony of all the other sources of good reasons. ¹⁰ Because pratyaksha is foundational in respect to anything experiential, “if an Agama concerns anything experiential then it must agree with pratyaksha.¹¹ Madhva’s epistemology is the foundation of his realism. Sarma concludes his discussion of Madhva’s epistemology:” Positing sakshi enables the existence of a subtle predominance of experiential knowledge over both Shruti and anumana ¹²

Sarma opened the discussion of sakshi with the observation that it may suffer the same kinds of criticism as Descartes’ cogito. But we can see now that rather than the sakshi serving as the weakest link in a theory of the self; the sakshi undergirds Dvaita epistemology’s empirical method and preference for perception. It would follow that Dvaita Vedanta can join the dialogue with science through the language of critical realism and the spirit of empiricism.

Dvaita Vedanta is thus consistent with the spirit of science. The positing of the sakshi allows perception to be first among pramanas for the Dvaita Vedantins. The sakshi forms the ground for the mind’s correlation of data received through the senses. Yet perhaps the Dvaita use of Shabda can also be open to investigation and inquiry along scientific lines.

Madhva’s ontology of Vishnu may be offered as an example. Vishnu as the instrumental rather than material cause of the world is consistent with modern theories of evolution. For Dvaita Vedanta, God does not create the world ex nihilo. We might say that from the Indian perspective, the creationist arguments from the West should be construed as arguments about the priority of Agama or pratyaksha. The terms of the argument from sacred text come from a particular tradition (that is, the Bible), while the terms of the scientific account of evolution may be shared across traditional boundaries east and West. In this case it would seem that the Bible must be reinterpreted in light of experience, while the Veda is found consistent without such reinterpretation. Of course other cases may differ.

In conclusion, we may return to our initial question, where does Dvaita Vedanta stand in relation to science? The Dvaita Vedanta community is self-consciously independent as a religious community. Yet, we have seen intriguing moves toward integration with science in our discussion of Dvaita Vedanta’s critical realism. As science and religion move forward in dialogue, it becomes a desideratum to form a more nuanced and sensitive account. Dvaita Vedanta’s language of critical realism provides a starting point.

Notes:

1. C.S. Peirce, “How to Make our Ideas Clear” in Essays in the philosophy of Science. Ed. Vincent Thomas. New York: Liberal arts Press 1957 pp 31-56

2. Deepak Sharma, An Introduction to Madhva Vedanta. Hampshire, Eng, ad Burlington Vt: Ashgate, 2003 p.43

3. Sarma p.19

4. Sarma p.19

5. B.N.K. Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacharya, Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 1986(1962) , p.128

6. Sarma p.28

7. Sarma p.30

8. Sarma p.33

9. Sarma p.44

10. Karl H. Potter, presuppositions of India’s Philosophies. , Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass 1991 pp. 85-86

11. Sarma p.44

12. Sarma p.49