Whitwick Colliery Disaster

Leicestershire's only major mining disaster.




Feb 2019 A Groby resident has a family connection with Leicestershire's only major mining disaster and the heroism of the rescue teams. His grandfather, Ernest Hutchinson, was one of many who received bravery awards. Ernest was also an accomplished pianist who used to play at the Hermitage Hotel. Mining has always been a dangerous occupation, and not just because of the incidence of lung diseases. Accidents were not uncommon and a serious head injury left Ernest with a plate in his head and a lifetime of pain.

His wife Priscilla was no stay at home spouse – she was a 'coal higgler', someone who sold coal to householders. She was the only woman that was ever known to take a horse and cart into Whitwick colliery yard to collect coal and sell it. She later sold the horse and cart and invested in a motor lorry, and then 2 more, to make her deliveries. It became the basis of P Hutchinson & Co, a very successful haulage business that has been passed through the generations.

The single worst incident

On 3rd July, 1986 the last shift came back to the surface at Whitwick pit and the colliery closed. Nearly one hundred years earlier, on April 19th, 1898, thirty five men and boys didn't return to the surface, victims of the single worst incident in the history of the Leicestershire coalfield. The youngest victim was aged just thirteen years. It cost the lives of the men, and left 28 widows and 94 fatherless children, all under the age of thirteen. On April 24th a funeral was held of those whose bodies had been recovered and the streets were lined with almost 20,000 mourners who had come from neighbouring counties to pay their respects.

A pit shaft had been sunk on land adjacent to what is now known now known as Hermitage Road by William Stenson, of Coleorton, in 1824. 'Leicester Bright' was mined from Whitwick, called this by Londoners who noticed that when burning it sparkled and shone when compared to coal from the Welsh coalfields. Stenson needed a way of transporting coal to Leicester so he contacted George and Robert Stephenson, and the Leicester Swannington Railway was constructed. The colliery employed a total of 820 men by 1969/1970 when coal production levels at Whitwick pit were at their peak.

Between 1860 and 1909 245 miners were fatally injured, but the Whitwick Fire was the only major disaster in the Leicestershire coalfield, which in 1898, employed 6,271 persons in ten collieries. The archive documents relating to the disaster paint a familiar picture of lives lost as a result of the shortcomings of those who should have protected them.

The thirty five victims were suffocated by fumes arising from burning timbers, which had been ignited by heat in the roof caused by the spontaneous combustion of the waste. These 'gob fires' had been a problem in the seam for many years but had always been successfully contained by removing the burning material and bricking up the affected area to keep it out of contact with the ventilation current passing down the roadway. The deputy on the night shift had inspected and bricked up 'fires' prior to the men starting work and the heat from them 'was not so great as, in his opinion, to require special attention'.

The outbreak occurred, however, in an area in which the 'fires' had posed a real threat to its safe working three months earlier and it appears, too, that there had been considerable discussion among the men as to the likelihood of the timbers being ignited. Despite the men's concern, however, the mine manager had not inspected the area for over 2 months. Although the consultant mining engineer visited the colliery about once a week on average to consult with the manager on the general problems of running the colliery 'efficiently and safely' he had not actually been underground for two years.

Lack of foresight

The Report into the disaster concluded that there was lack of 'foresight on the part of those charged with the care and direction of the mine'. The Report emphasized that 'There was a potentially dangerous situation and we do not think that either (men) appreciated its gravity and merely considered that the gob fires could be easily dealt with in the ordinary way. It appears to us probable that if the circumstances had been duly weighed then precautions may have been taken, perhaps, a diversion of the main road away from the gob fires, or the substitution of brick arching or iron supports and cross-bars for timber in the main road'. Five of the forty workers escaped. If the fire had occurred during the day shift over a hundred more would have been at work.

At the close of the Enquiry the the Jury said “We agree that we have not had sufficient evidence before us to prove culpable negligence on the part of any person. We agree to recommend greater precaution to be exercised by the more regular attendance of the Head Officials upon any site wherever gob fires exist. And that steel girders be used instead of timber wherever practicable. Also, that all dangerous places in any Main Road be encased by brick inverted arches. Also, that all return airways be traversed more frequently both by men and boys.”

Looking beyond the headlines

Dr Colin Griffin, a leading expert on the history of the Leicestershire coalfield, read the official report and the press cuttings and decided to look beyond the headlines. His focus was the Diary of the Coalville and District Miners' Association, the forerunner of the Leicestershire Miners' Association. “The Diary reveals that antagonism, hard bargaining, self-interest and perhaps chicanery were as much a part of the Whitwick Disaster as the heroism and generosity enshrined in the public and popular accounts of the event,” explained Dr Griffin.

He found that the initial unity between both sides of the industry in the face of the calamity, highlighted in the newspaper accounts and symbolized by the rescue operations, soon evaporated over the question of liability and compensation payments to dependants. The Chairman of the Disaster Fund, T H Heward, the manager of Coleorton colliery, urged the Union to accept an out of court settlement that gave the dependants a far lower level of compensation than legal counsel initially applied for in the courts.

When faced with the prospect of being sued for negligence under the Employers Liability Act the response of the Company was short, but decidedly not sweet : “We are instructed to inform you that the Company repudiate all liability in reference to such claims.” The Union eventually settled for £35 each for 26 deceased members, when it had earlier intended to claim £205 each. Adjusted for inflation each widow received around £4300 at today's prices for the loss of the family breadwinner or a son.

The Diary also illustrates that the Union was strongly asserting during its membership drive of the later 1890's that it was able to obtain higher levels of compensation for its members than an individual employee could obtain acting on his own initiative and illustrates the way in which the public distribution of the compensation payments was stage-managed by the Union to further this impression and notes the Union's refusal to assist solicitors acting for the families of non-members killed in the Disaster.

The hardship extended to those who survived or were not involved, as the Union's only full-time salaried official, Thomas Chambers, was unable to prevent the Union's governing body from taking an unsympathetic attitude towards those members made temporarily unemployed because of the disaster. At the Council Meeting of the Coalville & District Miners Association on April 30th the workmen of the Whitwick Colliery made an application to the Union Council for a weeks pay from the Association on consideration that they had been away from work "Six" clear days from "Tuesday to Tuesday" on account of the fire. But the Council decided that pay could not be granted and to dismiss the application “according to Rule 44 which reads no person shall receive support until he has been away from work six clear days from his last payment.”